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ABSTRACT 
 
International environmental disputes frequently have characteristics that distinguish 
them from other kinds of international disputes. Such characteristics of international 
environmental disputes include the following. Firstly, a dispute may be bilateral, 
multilateral or hybrid in character. Secondly, international environmental disputes 
frequently have a multi-dimensional character which includes the complexity of the 
scientific or technical information associated with a dispute and the complexity of 
questions relating to social, economic and political choice. Thirdly, international 
environmental disputes may entail difficulties in identifying the source of the alleged 
breach of an international environmental obligation. Fourthly, international 
environmental disputes may involve complex questions of quantifying damages. 
Lastly, international environmental disputes may involve the interpretation and 
application of procedural obligations. International environmental obligations of a 
procedural character. 
 Given the characteristics of international environmental disputes, this thesis 
aims to study the suitability and effectiveness of the existing third-party mechanisms 
in settling such disputes. This thesis attempts to find suitable means by examining the 
nature of each dispute settlement mechanism and making an evaluation in order to 
find out how each mechanism can provide processes or procedures that correspond to 
the special characteristics of environmental disputes. With regard to the question of 
effectiveness, criteria of effectiveness will be established and then each of the 
mechanisms will be assessed in the light of those criteria. This thesis also proposes 
some recommendations that would have a chance of being carried out in practice in 
order to address problems or drawbacks that appear to be an obstacle to the better 
resolution of international environmental disputes. 
 This thesis shows that judicial means are suitable for deciding bilateral 
environmental disputes and interpreting and applying procedural obligations. They 
are not suitable for deciding cases involving multiple parties, multidimensional 
disputes, quantifying environmental damages or identifying the sources of breach of 
environmental obligations, except ad hoc arbitration where parties can set up arbitral 
procedures which suit a specific characteristic of the environmental disputes at issue. 
Diplomatic means are suitable for deciding bilateral and multilateral disputes, 
multidimensional disputes but they are not suitable for awarding environmental 
 xi 
damages and interpreting and applying procedural obligations. As far as the 
effectiveness is concerned, this thesis shows that most of the disputes brought before 
judicial and non-judicial means were settled and the parties complied with the 
judgments, awards, findings and recommendations. However, in most cases, they 
have had only a limited impact on the behaviour of the parties in the sense that they 
were not successful in changing States’ behaviour so discourage future violations and 
deter the emergence of future disputes.  
 This thesis suggests that all of the dispute settlement mechanisms can be used 
in a collaborative manner. The fact that the parties decide to litigate in international 
courts does not mean that the other mechanisms would be excluded. Before or during 
the course of the judicial proceedings, diplomatic means can always be resorted to. 
Successful environmental dispute resolution depends partly on the readiness of the 
parties to end a dispute and partly on the structure of the dispute settlement 
mechanism. Governments would have to decide what mechanisms could 
accommodate the unique characteristics of international environmental disputes that 
are at issue, taking into account all of the considerations discussed in this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. THE REASONS FOR THIS STUDY 
Disputes are a fact of life and an inevitable feature in any community, including the 
international community, and that means that international environmental law is no 
different from any other area of international law in this respect. There have been 
numerous environmental disputes in the past and we should not expect that situation 
to change radically in the future. So, while not forgetting about trying to develop 
more effective dispute avoidance mechanisms, such as the exchange of environmental 
information and prior consultation, it is important to have the most suitable and 
effective mechanisms available for trying to settle environmental disputes. 1 
International environmental disputes frequently have characteristics that distinguish 
them from other kinds of international disputes,2 and that this raises questions about 
the suitability and effectiveness of the existing dispute mechanisms, especially the 
traditional mechanisms, both judicial and non-judicial, listed in Article 33 (1) of the 
United Nations Charter (UN Charter).3 
 Such characteristics of international environmental disputes include the 
following (though by no means all environmental disputes have all or any of these 
characteristics).4  Firstly, a dispute may be bilateral or multilateral in character. 
Bilateral environmental disputes involve two States, arising often between 
neighbouring States, which is a characteristic that can be found in most cases which 
are brought before dispute settlement mechanisms. Multilateral environmental 
disputes involve more than two States arguing with regard to the protection of the 
environment. It may be the case that a multilateral environmental dispute arises from 
                                                
1 The meaning of the words suitable and effective in this context will be explained in a later chapter. 
2 Richard Bilder, ‘The Settlement of Disputes in the Field of the International Law of the Environment’ 
(1975) 144 Recueil des Cours 139, 154-155. Stephens notes that ‘many inter-state disputes relating to 
environmental protection are distinctive’ see Tim Stephens, ‘Principle 26: International Environmental 
Dispute Settlement’ in Jorge E. Viñuales (ed), The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: 
A Commentary (OUP 2015) 615. 
3 Article 33 (1) lists the means of resolution: ‘negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own 
choice’.  
4 They will be explored in more detail in chapter 2. 
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the fact that the environmental obligations that were breached were owed to the 
international community as a whole (erga omnes obligations) or to all the treaty 
parties to a multilateral convention, not to any specific States (erga omnes partes 
obligations). In this sense, the dispute is not between two States any more, since it 
involves a number of States.  
 Secondly, international environmental disputes frequently have a multi-
dimensional character which includes the complexity of the scientific or technical 
information associated with a dispute and the complexity of questions relating to 
social, economic and political choice. In the first case, the situation may be that 
applicants and respondents support their arguments with scientific and empirical data 
to prove the occurrence or non-occurrence of environmental damage. In the second 
case, the environmental disputes concern not only the legal aspects but often revolve 
around multiple issues such as economic, political and social aspects. 
 Thirdly, international environmental disputes may entail difficulties in 
identifying the source of the alleged breach of an international environmental 
obligation. This is the case, for example, where a State which is suffering from 
transboundary pollution cannot identify, or provide clear and convincing evidence of, 
the State(s) responsible. 
 Fourthly, international environmental disputes may involve complex questions 
of quantifying damages. The case may be more complex if the applicant requests the 
respondent to provide monetary compensation for damage caused to the environment 
due to the lack of criteria to be used in calculating environmental damage that may be 
serious or irreversible.   
 Lastly, international environmental disputes may involve the interpretation 
and application of procedural obligations. International environmental obligations of a 
procedural character, such as the obligation to notify other States of the risk of 
significant transboundary harm and the obligation to conduct an environmental 
impact assessment (EIA), are very important to environmental regimes and are at the 
heart of many shared resources treaties in the sense that they could minimise or 
prevent the likelihood that transboundary harm would occur. It is likely that the States 
which have suffered environmental damage may have a dispute with other States 
claiming the latter’s failure to perform such obligations.   
 The questions that may be asked are: Given that there are a wide variety of 
dispute settlement mechanisms existing in international law, which mechanism can 
 3 
provide for suitable and effective processes or rules of procedure that could facilitate 
the resolution of international environmental disputes that have the aforementioned 
characteristics? Klein stresses that ‘it is important to appreciate the diversity of 
methods available to resolve international environmental law disputes and their 
potential to be tailored to the specific issues and circumstances involved’.5 Therefore, 
a dispute settlement mechanism that can accommodate such distinctive features is 
needed so as to resolve such disputes.  
 This introductory chapter is aimed at: firstly, formulating the research 
hypothesis, the research questions and the scope of this thesis; secondly, explaining 
the research methodology that will be employed; thirdly, clarifying the originality that 
the thesis would display by constituting a contribution to knowledge; and, lastly, 
outlining the overall structure of the thesis. 
2. RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY  
2.1 Research Hypothesis and Research Questions  
The premise upon which this thesis is based is that: 
 Given the characteristics of international environmental disputes, not all 
existing dispute settlement mechanisms available in international law are equipped 
with appropriate structural arrangements, processes and rules of procedure that are 
suitable and effective for settling international environmental disputes. While some 
mechanisms may be suitable and effective for settling a dispute which has certain 
characteristics, others may not be.    
 This study sets up the main research questions as follows: Given the 
characteristics of international environmental disputes, how suitable and effective are 
existing dispute settlement mechanisms? and, to the extent that they are not, what 
changes might be made?   
 In order to answer the main research questions, some sub-questions are asked 
as follows: 
 (1) What is meant by an international environmental dispute and what are its 
characteristics? The objective of asking this research question is to set the scope of 
                                                
5 Natalie Klein, ‘Settlement of International Environmental Law Disputes’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, 
David M. Ong and Panos  Merkouris (eds), Research Handbook on International Environmental Law 
(Edward Elgar 2010) 395. 
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the thesis, namely the cases discussed in the thesis will be those that fall within the 
scope of international environmental disputes. In addition, the characteristics of 
international environmental disputes are the most important issue that needs to be 
identified, since they will be used as a basis for the analysis of the suitability of each 
of the dispute settlement mechanisms that are available in international law. 
 (2) Are the dispute settlement mechanisms that are available in international 
law suitable for settling an international environmental dispute, taking into account its 
characteristics? The reason why this research question is framed in this way is 
because the thesis attempts to find suitable means by examining the nature of each 
dispute settlement mechanism and making an evaluation in order to find out how each 
mechanism can provide processes or procedures that correspond to the special 
characteristics of environmental disputes.   
 (3) Are the dispute settlement mechanisms effective in settling international 
environmental disputes according to the criteria used for evaluating effectiveness? 
Criteria of effectiveness will be established in order to appraise each mechanism.   
 (4) How can the shortcomings for resolving international environmental 
disputes that have been exposed in dispute settlement mechanisms be addressed? 
After examining the suitability and effectiveness of each mechanism, one might, 
presumably, find that some mechanisms have drawbacks in settling this kind of 
dispute.  
2.2 The Scope of the Thesis 
With regard to the scope of the thesis, only the third-party dispute settlement 
mechanisms are the object of this study. For non-judicial means, this covers 
mediation, conciliation and inquiries. For judicial means, this includes the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS) and the arbitral tribunals. However, it will not include the cases brought 
before the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), since the essence of those 
cases had little relevance to international environmental law.6 The Non-Compliance 
Procedures (NCPs) of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and RFMO 
                                                
6 These two cases are Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of 
the River Order (Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, and Sweden v. Poland) 
(Judgment) PCIJ Rep Series A No 23 and Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Netherlands v. Belgium) 
PCIJ Rep Series A/B No. 70.  
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panels established pursuant to the treaties of the Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisations (RFMO panels), which deal with specific kinds of dispute, are also 
studied. It should be noted from the outset that NCPs were not primarily designed as a 
dispute settlement mechanism. The more informal means of settling RFMO disputes 
have been developed precisely to avoid some of the shortcomings of the traditional 
means. However, the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) will not be studied. The main reason is that while some WTO 
disputes have raised environmental issues, such disputes are predominantly addressed 
and resolved with reference to international trade law rather than environmental law. 
 With regard to disputants, the research is confined to studying disputes that 
arise between States. A dispute between non-State actors on the one hand and States 
on the other—such as those cases brought before NCPs which are triggered by 
individuals or by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), as well as cases which 
were decided by human rights judicial bodies concerning environmental issues in the 
human rights context, such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the 
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR)—fall outside the 
scope of this study.  
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
As far as the research methodology is concerned, the approach that this thesis will 
adopt in order to answer the research questions is the positivist tradition of 
international law or doctrinal legal research which includes the analysis of legal texts 
and the output of international courts and tribunals as well as the recommendations of 
non-judicial bodies. The study is desk based. The author has not attempted to 
interview those who have been involved in environmental disputes (such as 
government officials and legal practitioners) nor has he sent questionnaires to such 
people. This is because of the lack of the necessary resources to do so, the difficulty 
of identifying a suitably representative group of people to interview/question and the 
traditional low response rate to questionnaires sent out by students. 
 The methodology that will be adopted to answer the research question about 
the characteristics of international environmental disputes is based on the observation 
and review of a number of actual cases brought before dispute settlement bodies. In 
addition, the thesis will demonstrate the characteristics which are theoretically 
possible. 
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 The study of the issues of suitability and effectiveness is based largely on a 
theoretical rather than an empirical approach. This approach has been adopted for 
various reasons. There have probably been enough examples of the use of judicial 
means, and these examples are publicly accessible, so that an empirical study of 
judicial means would be and has been to some degree possible. The use of mediation 
is often not publicised and there has been only a limited amount of practice, so it is 
simply impossible to make an empirical study of mediation; and while inquiries and 
conciliation are usually more publicised, there have been very few examples of such 
means being utilised to settle international environmental disputes. The same is true 
of informal RFMO means. Thus, in these cases an empirical study is out of the 
question. The position with regard to NCPs is different. While for some MEAs, there 
has been extensive use of NCPs, this has often not been in a situation that could be 
characterised as a dispute.  
 In order to answer the question of how suitable the existing dispute settlement 
mechanisms are, each characteristics of international environmental disputes will be 
tested by comparing them with the inherent nature of each dispute settlement 
mechanism. Their inherent nature will include the structural arrangement of those 
mechanisms, such as statutes or rules of international courts, so that this will answer 
the question of which mechanisms are suitable for which characteristics of 
environmental disputes.  
 When dealing with the question of how effective the existing dispute 
settlement mechanisms are, this question is answered by using a theoretical approach. 
The criteria of effectiveness will be established first to provide as the framework for 
the analysis. In order to lay down these criteria, different theories will be selected 
from the literature in various disciplines, for example, the social sciences, 
international relations and international law. The methodology that will be used in this 
section will be a case-based analysis. All international environmental cases that have 
been brought before international courts and non-judicial means that have been used 
in the past will be examined. 
 The material for research is drawn also from the judgments of all the fora that 
fall within the scope of this study, such as the judgments rendered by the ICJ, the 
ITLOS and the arbitral tribunals with a view to providing clear illustrations of these 
environmental matters. The research will also take into account the practices of non-
judicial bodies relating to environmental dispute resolution such as the 
 7 
recommendations issued by inquiry commissions. All of the judgments, awards and 
recommendations considered are limited to those which was rendered up to the end of 
2015.  
4. ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
The existing literature has focused on those issues concerning the international courts 
and tribunals as well as arbitration that are related to environmental protection and 
this leaves room for studies of other means of dispute settlement.7 Thus, the classic 
study by Richard Bilder focuses almost exclusively on judicial means and says little 
about third-party diplomatic means.8 There are also items in the literature which 
discuss the issue of the role of the international courts in protecting the environment 
but they have failed to address the question of how the other means of dispute 
settlement could be used.9 Although the book by Tim Stephens thoroughly examined 
the challenges of adjudicating environmental disputes, he did not offer concrete 
solutions showing how diplomatic means could work together with judicial means.10 
Moreover, even though some of the literature deals with diplomatic and adjudicative 
means of dispute settlement, the relationships between all those different types of 
dispute settlement have not yet been analysed and, still, diplomatic means have not 
received a great deal of attention.11  
                                                
7 Tim Stephens, International Courts and Environmental Protection (CUP 2009). 
8 Bilder (n 2) 145. 
9 For example, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘Equipping the Court to Deal with Developing Areas of 
International Law: Environmental Law’ in Connie Peck and Roy S. Lee (eds), Increasing the 
Effectiveness of the International Court of Justice: Proceedings of the ICJ/UNITAR Colloquium to 
Celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Court (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1997) 397-444; Phoebe N. 
Okowa, ‘Environmental Dispute Settlement: Some Reflections on Recent Developments’ in Malcolm 
D. Evans (ed), Remedies in International Law: The Institutional Dilemma (Oxford Hart 1998) 157-172; 
Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘The International Court of Justice and Environmental Disputes’ in Duncan 
French, Matthew Saul and Nigel D. White (eds), International Law and Dispute Settlement: New 
Problems and Techniques (Hart Publishing 2010) 17-56; IIias Plakokefalos, ‘International Courts and 
Tribunals and the Implementation of International Environmental Law’ in Sandrine Maljean-Dubois 
and Lavanya Rajamani (eds), La mise en oeuvre du droit international de l'environnement = 
Implementation of International Environmental Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011) 471-514. 
10 Stephens, International Courts and Environmental Protection (n 7) 345-365. 
11  Cesare P.R. Romano, The Peaceful Settlement of International Environmental Disputes: A 
Pragmatic Approach (The Hague Kluwer Law International 2000); Duncan French, ‘Environmental 
Dispute Settlement: The First (Hesitant) Signs of Spring?’ (2006) 19 Hague Ybk Intl L 3, 3-32; Cesare 
P.R. Romano, ‘International Dispute Settlement’ in Daniel   Bodansky, Jutta   Brunnée and Ellen Hey 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (OUP 2007) 1036-1056; Klein (n 5) 
379-400; Tim Stephens, ‘The Settlement of Disputes in International Environmental Law’ in Shawkat 
Alam and others (eds), Routledge Handbook of International Environmental Law (Routledge 2012) 
175-187; José  Juste-Ruiz, ‘The International Court of Justice and International Environmental Law’ in 
Nerina Boschiero and others (eds), International Courts and the Development of International Law: 
 8 
 This thesis also differs from most of the existing literature by its systematic 
focus on the characteristics of international environmental disputes. Other studies did 
not deal with suitability and effectiveness in the way that this thesis going to study. It 
will provide an analysis of the use, suitability and effectiveness of third-party non-
judicial mechanisms that include mediation, conciliation and inquiries in setting 
environmental disputes. In addition, NCPs and RFMO panels will also be studied. 
While the former have been extensively discussed, the latter have never been studied 
before. Not only are there interesting rules of procedure of the RFMO panels that are 
worthwhile to learn about but also there has recently been a case which illustrates 
their operation in practice. 
 This thesis attempts to provide guidance for practitioners on the various 
options for settling an environmental dispute. It is like a toolbox that, when it is 
opened, one will find a wide range of tools within it. In order to choose the most 
suitable one to fix a broken appliance, one needs to know the function of each of the 
tools. Likewise, in order to restore broken relationships, States also need to opt for 
suitable mechanisms. Should States decide to settle disputes by using a particular 
mechanism, they will have a better understanding of what are the benefits that they 
will gain and the key challenges or obstacles that they will have to face. Realising the 
benefits and drawbacks would certainly help them to choose the right forum which 
will suit an international environmental dispute having special characteristics and 
which will suit their own preferences: for example, in a case where the parties are 
concerned with the societal choice, mediation or conciliation, considering their 
dispute settlement process, will probably be the right choice.  
 In addition, this thesis proposes some recommendations that would have a 
chance of being carried out in practice in order to address problems or drawbacks that 
appear to be an obstacle to the better resolution of international environmental 
disputes. 
5. THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This study consists of seven chapters. Following this chapter, chapter 2, ‘The Nature 
of International Environmental Disputes’, provides a working definition of 
international environmental disputes which will be used throughout the thesis. Also, 
                                                                                                                                      
Essays in Honour of Tullio Treves (T.M.C. Asser Press 2013) 383-402; Stephens, ‘Principle 26: 
International Environmental Dispute Settlement’ 599-616. 
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the special characteristics of international environmental disputes will be explained so 
that this paves the way to the later chapters, notably chapter 4, where the issue of the 
suitability of particular dispute settlement mechanisms will be discussed on the basis 
of such special characteristics. Thus, in this chapter, research sub-questions (1) will 
then be answered. 
 Chapter 3, ‘Dispute Settlement and International Environmental Law’, 
examines the nature of the available dispute settlements mechanisms in international 
law. It also briefly discusses the environmentally related cases that have been brought 
before each mechanism in order to give an overview of the actual practice in this 
field.  
 Chapter 4, ‘A Comprehensive Appraisal of the Suitability of Dispute 
Settlement Mechanisms in Settling International Environmental Disputes’, analyses 
the suitability of each mechanism by using the special characteristics explained in 
chapter 2 as the basis of the analysis. This chapter will conclude by showing which 
mechanisms are suitable for settling environmental disputes and which are not. This 
chapter will provide answers to research sub-questions (2). 
 Chapter 5, ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in 
Settling International Environmental Disputes’, is divided into two main parts. The 
criteria for assessing effectiveness will be introduced in the first part before applying 
such criteria with a view to finding out which mechanisms can settle disputes most 
effectively. In this chapter, sub-research questions (3) will be answered 
 Chapter 6, ‘Proposals for Improving International Environmental Dispute 
Settlements’, seeks to propose some ways in which the shortcomings of each of the 
mechanisms identified in the previous chapters, notably chapters 4 and 5, could be 
improved. These proposals will be ones that could be implemented rather than making 
far-reaching proposals which have little or no chance of being adopted. This chapter 
will provide answers to research sub-questions (4). 
 Chapter 7, ‘Conclusions’, summarises the answers to all the research questions 
raised by this thesis and provides some observations with regard to the selection of 
appropriate means for settling international environmental disputes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
International environmental disputes have characteristics that raise questions as to the 
capacity of traditional dispute settlement mechanisms to resolve international 
environmental disputes. This chapter is concerned with identifying those 
characteristics, but before doing that what is needed is to define what is meant by a 
dispute in international law and specifically what is meant by an international 
environmental dispute.   
 This chapter is therefore divided into three sections: the notion of dispute in 
international law, a clarification of the term international environmental dispute and 
the characteristics of international environmental disputes. 
1. THE NOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Generally, it can be clearly seen that dispute-settlement clauses have been included in 
almost all MEAs.1 Obviously, the key concept is the word dispute. What do we mean 
by dispute? Does it have a specific meaning in international law?  
 The purpose of this section is to examine the meaning of dispute in 
international law by surveying the jurisprudence of international dispute settlement 
bodies which has been laid down from the time of the PCIJ to the era of the ICJ. It 
should be noted, however, from the outset that such explanations given by the courts 
were closely linked to the issue of jurisdiction. That is to say, the jurisdiction of 
                                                
1 For example, Art. 18 of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (adopted 3 March 1973, entered into force 1 July 1975) 993 UNTS 243 (hereinafter CITES); 
Art. 13 of the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (adopted 13 November 1979, 
entered into forced 16 March 1983) 1302 UNTS 217(hereinafter LRTAP); Art. 27 of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (adopted 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993) 1760 UNTS 79 
(hereinafter CBD); Art. 14 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 
9 May 1992, entered into force 24 March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107 (hereinafter UNFCCC); Art. 33 of the 
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (adopted 21 May 
1997, entered into force 17 August 2014) 36 ILM 700 (hereinafter Watercourses Convention); Art. 16 
of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters (adopted 25 June 1998, entered into force 30 October 2001) 2161 
UNTS 450 (hereinafter Aarhus Convention).  
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international judicial institutions hinges on the pre-existence of a dispute. 2 
Consequently, the definition of dispute established by international judicial 
institutions is quite strict, in the sense that a disagreement or conflict between States 
should only be qualified as a ‘dispute’ in cases which may be appropriate for 
resolution by certain recognised ‘judicial methods of dispute settlement’.3 As the ICJ 
in the Nuclear Tests case held: ‘The existence of a dispute is the primary condition for 
the Court to exercise its judicial function’.4 Although the understanding of the term 
‘dispute’ is vital for determining a jurisdiction of the Court, no definition of dispute 
can be found in its own Statute. 
1.1 A Landmark Ruling: The Mavrommatis Case 
It was not until the twentieth century that the Court began to formulate the concept of 
dispute. In connection with the meaning of disputes, the ICJ or other tribunals always 
refer back to the classic exposition established by the PCIJ in 1924, in the celebrated 
Mavrommatis case, in which the Court had to ascertain its jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the matter. The PCIJ analyses the term ‘dispute’, which is one of the preliminary 
conditions for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction, and then the Court states that: 
‘A dispute is a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of 
legal views or of interests between two persons.’5 
When examining the judgment rendered by the PCIJ, it can be clearly seen from the 
above dictum that the Court focused on the nature and components of a dispute.6 But 
the definition was quite succinct and it did not give any additional information with 
regard to the concept of dispute. The Court took only a lexical interpretation of the 
                                                
2 See Art. 36 (2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Charter of the United Nations and 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 
1945), 33 UNTS XVI, 145 BSB 832 (hereinafter ICJ Statute). 
3 See Richard B. Bilder, ‘An Overview of International Dispute Settlement’ (1986-1987) 3 Emory JInt'l 
DispRes 1, 4. 
4 Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) (Judgment) [1974] ICJ Rep 457, para. 55 (hereinafter 
the 1974 Nuclear Tests case). See also Shabtai Rosenne and Yaël Ronen, The Law and Practice of the 
International Court, 1920-2005 (4 edn, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006). 
5 The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. United Kingdom) (Judgment) PCIJ Rep Series A 
No 2, 11 (hereinafter Mavrommatis case) (emphasis added).  
6 Georges Abi-Saab, Les Exceptions Préliminaires Dans la Procédure de la Cour Internationale, Étude 
des Notions Fondamentales de Procédure et des Moyens de Leur Mise en Oeuvre (A. Pedone 1967) 
121. 
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meaning of dispute without taking into account the function which the concept of 
dispute should perform.7   
 Although this judicial pronouncement has been criticized for being flawed8 
and although it raises complex theoretical problems, it was expressly adopted on a 
number of occasions by the Court and by arbitral tribunals, like the PCIJ,9 ICJ,10 the 
ITLOS,11 when they had to consider the preliminary question of the Court’s and the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter which is brought before them.  
1.2 The Constitutive Elements of Disputes: The Development of International 
Jurisprudence after the Mavrommatis case 
After the Mavrommatis case, the Court developed some constitutive elements of 
disputes. In the Peace Treaties case, the Court added that a dispute arises if ‘the two 
sides hold clearly opposite views concerning the question of the performance or non-
performance of certain’ international obligations.12 The criterion was sharpened by 
the ICJ in which it viewed that the claim made by one party must be positively 
opposed by the other. This was developed by the Court in the South West Africa 
case.13 In this case, South West Africa contended that the conflict or disagreement 
                                                
7 Antonio  Cassese, ‘The Concept of 'Legal Dispute' in the Jurisprudence of the International Court’ 
(1975) 14 Communication e Studi 173, 180. 
8 Gerhard Hafner criticizes this classical definition on the grounds that it is too wide and too narrow at 
the same time. It is too wide because ‘a mere divergence of views or interests as such, without any 
likelihood of follow-up action by States, is not viewed as sufficient to be submitted to international 
proceedings’ It is too narrow because ‘it is no longer possible to confine international disputes only to 
those between two or more States disagreeing among themselves’, see Gerhard Hafner, ‘The 
Physiognomy of Disputes and the Appropriate Means to Resolve Them’ in The United Nation (ed), 
International Law as a Language for International Relations (Kluwer International Law 1996) 560. 
9 Case concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland) PCIJ Pep 
Series A. No.6, 14 (hereinafter Polish Upper Silesia case); Interpretation of the Judgments Nos. 7 and 
8 PCIJ Rep Series A. No.13, 10-11(hereinafter Interpretation of the Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 case).  
10 South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) (Preliminary Objections) 
[1962] ICJ Rep 319, 328 and 343 (hereinafter South West Africa case) and Case Concerning 
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Georgia v. Russian Federation) (Preliminary Objections) [2011] ICJ Rep 70, para. 30 (hereinafter 
Georgia v. Russian Federation case). 
11 Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan) (Provisional Measures, Order of 
27 August 1999) ITLOS Reports 1999, para. 44 (hereinafter Southern Bluefin Tuna cases). 
12 Interpretation of the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (First Phrase) (Advisory 
Opinion) [1950] ICJ Rep 65, 74. See also the Alleged Violation of Sovereign Rights and Maritime 
Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia) (Preliminary Objections) [2016] ICJ Rep, para. 
50. 
13 This case was about Ethiopia and Liberia alleged against South Africa that it had violated Art. 22 of 
the Covenant of the League of Nations and Art. 22 of the Mandate, since it practiced apartheid, which 
is contrary to such international obligations see South West Africa case, 323. 
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that was alleged to exist was not a dispute of the kind envisaged in Article 7 of the 
Mandate.14 The Court opined that it was necessary to decide the question relating to 
the existence of the dispute. After citing the classic definition of a dispute given by 
the PCIJ, the Court held that:  
‘[i] t is not sufficient for one party to a contentious case to assert that 
a dispute exists with the other party…It must be shown that the 
claim of one party is positively opposed by the other.’15 
Positive opposition means that the complaints formulated by one party against the 
other are in opposition or are denied by the other party.16 This can be determined by 
considering the attitudes of the parties. The evidence of opposing attitudes can be 
found in the position of the parties in the course of consultation,17 diplomatic 
exchanges or official letters communicated between the organs of the parties which 
demonstrate a clear difference of view.18  
 The terms ‘dispute’ and ‘difference of opinion’ have different meanings.19     
A dispute is a situation which contains an element of disagreement or conflict.20 
Nevertheless, a dispute is not a general disagreement, but the term dispute should be 
understood as referring to a ‘certain’ or a ‘specific’ type of disagreement related to a 
reasonably well-defined subject matter of conflict between States21 not merely a 
                                                
14 Art. 7 of the Mandate reads ‘The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise 
between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or 
the application of the provisions of the Mandate, such a dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, 
shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Art. 14 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations’ (emphasis added).  
15 South West Africa case, 328 (emphasis added). 
16 The Court in the Georgia v. Russian Federation case said that ‘To that effect, it needs to determine 
whether Georgia made such a claim and whether the Russian Federation positively opposed it with the 
result that there is a dispute between them in terms of Article 22 of CERD’, see Georgia v. Russian 
Federation case, para. 31. 
17 Case Concerning Certain Property (Liechtenstein v. Germany) (Preliminary Objections) [2005] ICJ 
Rep 6, para. 23. 
18 Ibid, para. 25. 
19 There are several scholars and judges who are of the opinion that the terms ‘dispute’ and ‘difference 
of opinion’ are not identical, for example Judge Rolin-Jacquemyns in his dissenting separate opinion in 
Interpretation of the Statute of the Memel Territory case, See dissenting separate opinion of Judge 
Rolin-Jacquemyns in Interpretation of the Statute of the Memel Territory (Great Britain, France, Italy, 
Japan v. Lithuania)(Preliminary Objection) [1932] PCIJ Series A/B No 47, 258. 
20 Hans Kelsen describes that ‘…[a]ny dispute is a situation whereas not every situation is a dispute’ 
Han Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (Law 
Book Exchange 2000) 360. 
21 J. G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (5 edn, CUP 2011)1; Sydney  D. Bailey, ‘Peaceful 
Settlement of International Disputes’ in K. Venkata Raman (ed), Dispute Settlement Through the 
United Nations (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y Oceana Publications 1977) 81.  
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general attitude of mutual dislike or hostility between them.22 As the Court in the 
Request for an Interpretation of the Judgment of 20 November 1950 in the Asylum 
case clearly states: ‘A dispute requires a divergence of views between the parties on 
definite points.’23 
 As Charles de Visscher observes, a dispute stems from a disagreement 
between States on a certain matter which is sufficiently circumscribed (‘suffisamment 
circonscrit’) to lend itself to definite claims.24 The term differences of opinion 
(divergences d’opinion) can be found in compromissory clauses in some international 
agreements especially the old treaties which concluded before 1945.25 The PCIJ had a 
chance to consider how the existence of a difference of opinion is manifested. In the 
judgments of the PCIJ in the Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case, 
and the Court held that:  
‘a difference of opinion exists as soon as one of the Governments 
concerned points out that the attitude adopted by the other conflicts 
with its own views.’26  
Moreover, the Court stated further that in a difference of opinion:  
‘this condition (the existence of a difference of opinion) could at any 
time be fulfilled by means of a unilateral action on the part of the 
applicant Party.’27 
In some exceptional cases and under express provision, the existence of a difference 
of opinion is left to the discretion of each Party.28 For example, in the Interpretation 
                                                
22 Richard Bilder uses the term ‘a general attitudes of mutual dislike’ to signify that a disagreement 
between two countries cannot attain the qualification of a dispute. See Richard Bilder (n 3), 4.  And see 
also John Collier and Vaughan Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in International Law: Institutions and 
Procedures (OUP 2000) 1. 
23 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 20th November 1950 in the Asylum Case (Colombia v. 
Peru) (Judgment) [1950] ICJ Rep 395, 403. 
24 In the French text it states that ‘suffisamment circonscrit pour se prêter à des prétentions claires’See 
Charles de Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International law (Rev. edn, Princeton University 
Press 1968) 353. 
25 Art. 23 of the 1922 Convention of Geneva concerning Upper Silesia on which it granted the Court's 
jurisdiction when it provided that ‘1. Should differences of opinion respecting the construction and 
application of Articles 6 to 22 arise between the German and Polish Governments, they shall be 
submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice. 
26 Polish Upper Silesia case, 14. 
27 Ibid, 14. 
28 See note 1 in Charles de Visscher, Aspects Récents du Droit Procédural de la Cour Internationale de 
Justice (A. Pedone 1966) 38. 
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of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzów) case, the PCIJ concluded that a 
difference of opinion existed between Poland and Germany ‘as soon as one of the 
Parties considered that there was a difference of opinion arising out of the 
interpretation and application of Articles 6 to 22 of the Convention.’29  
 It should be noted that the context in which it was considered by the PCIJ was 
concerned only with the term ‘difference of opinion’ contained in a specific 
compromissory clause. However, it did not clarify whether the PCIJ intended to draw 
a clear distinction between the concept of a dispute and the concept of a difference of 
opinion. In addition, it was far from clear whether the Court wanted to give those two 
terms different implications, or whether it regarded them as interchangeable.30 What 
is clear is that the PCIJ took a more liberal attitude to establishing the existence of a 
difference of opinion when interpreting the compromissory clause.31 Moreover, what 
can be seen from the PCIJ judgment is that the threshold of being a ‘difference of 
opinion’ is lower than what is required by the existence of a dispute.32 That is to say, 
the condition for the existence of a difference of opinion is less stringent than the 
condition for the existence of a dispute because it does not require any claims or 
counter-claims to be put forward by the parties.  
 The term ‘difference of opinion’ has a similar meaning to the term 
‘divergence’ in the sense that these two terms require a low level of hostility.          
The ICSID Tribunal in Helnan v. Egypt clearly distinguished the terms ‘divergence’ 
and ‘dispute’.33 The Tribunal specified one key point: although the two terms share 
the same element, that is the existence of a disagreement between the parties on 
specific facts or situation, the distinction which can be drawn is that, in the case of a 
divergence, the parties hold different views but without necessarily pursuing the 
difference in any active manner. 34  In the case of a dispute, it should have 
                                                
29 See Interpretation of the Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 case, 11. 
30 Hans Von Mangoldt, ‘ Arbitration and Conciliation’ in Judicial Settlement of International Disputes 
: International Court of Justice, Other Courts and Tribunals, Arbitration and Conciliation: An 
International Symposium (Springer 1974) 521. 
31 See Georges Abi-Saab, Les Exceptions Préliminaires Dans la Procédure de la Cour Internationale, 
Étude des Notions Fondamentales de Procédure et des Moyens de Leur Mise en Oeuvre (A. Pedone 
1967) 126, and especially in footnote 142. 
32 Christian Tomuschat, ‘Comments on Article 36 of the ICJ Statute’ in Andreas Zimmermann, 
Christian Tomuschat and Karin Oellers-Frahm (eds), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: 
A Commentary (OUP 2006) 598. 
33 Helnan International Hotels A/S v Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No ARB/05/19), (Decision 
on Jurisdiction), 17 October 2006, para. 52. 
34 Ibid, para. 52. 
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circumstances which indicate that the parties wish to settle their differences before a 
third party or some other means of dispute settlement. The Tribunal held further that:  
‘different views of parties in respect of certain facts and situations 
become a ‘divergence’ when they are mutually aware of their 
disagreement. It crystallises as a ‘dispute’ as soon as one of the 
parties decides to have it solved, whether or not by a third party.’35 
Concurrent with the above dictum was the opinion of Antonio Cassese, which he has 
suggested in his article written in 1975, that the mere existence of a general 
disagreement would not be sufficient to establish a dispute, but: ‘Disagreement must 
have arisen inasmuch as both parties concerned decided they would not forgo the 
possibility of a judicial settlement’.36  
 Lastly, the term ‘conflict’ shall not be understood the same thing as the term 
‘dispute’ According to Collier and Lowe, the term conflict is use to signify a general 
state of hostility between the parties.37 
 To sum up, the concept of international dispute has been developed for more 
than eighty years by international courts since the Mavrommatis Palestine 
Concessions case. It seems that the criteria for ascertaining the existence of a dispute, 
especially those developed by the PCIJ and ICJ, have always been referred by the 
other tribunal when they have to consider the question of jurisdiction. There is, 
according to the jurisprudences of the courts and the tribunals, a minimum that is 
required in order to establish the existence of an international dispute. It can be 
concluded that an international dispute may be defined as follows:   
It is a situation in which two or more subjects of international law 
have a clash of specific opposing juridical attitudes in relation to the 
interpretation and application of international norms. It is a 
manifestation of opposite views by the parties concerned resulting, 
on the one side, from a concrete claim advanced by one of the 
parties that it must adopt a certain attitude in accordance with 
international law and, on the other side, of the positive opposing of 
                                                
35 Ibid, para. 52. 
36 Antonio Cassese, ‘The Concept of 'Legal Dispute' in the Jurisprudence of the International Court’ 
(1975) 14 Communication e Studi 173, 178. 
37 Collier and Lowe (n 22) 1. 
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this claim by the other party with a view to justifying its conduct 
under international law. The refusal to accede to the claim may be 
conveyed through conduct which expresses an unwillingness to 
accept the other party’s views. 
2. A CLARIFICATION OF THE TERM ‘INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE’ 
Although, as stated above, a definition of dispute in general international law is 
repeated by the PCIJ and the ICJ, it appears to be the case that a definition of an 
international environmental dispute has never been explicitly pronounced by any 
international court or tribunal. The aim of this present section is to discover the proper 
meaning of international environmental disputes which will be used throughout this 
study. 
2.1 The Problem of Defining the Term ‘International Environmental Dispute’ 
It can be observed that there is little consensus about the definition of international 
environmental dispute. There are various commentators who are reluctant and wary of 
giving a definite meaning to the term international environmental dispute. Philippe 
Sands, for example, deliberately avoids defining the term environmental dispute. He 
is of the opinion that:  
‘[i]t is more appropriate to talk about disputes which have an 
environmental or natural resources component than to characterize a 
dispute as an environmental dispute.’38 
Throughout his article, Sands uses other terms, i.e.: ‘disputes having an environmental 
component’, ‘disputes with an environmental element’ and ‘environmentally related 
disputes’ and ‘international environmental dispute’ interchangeably.39 
 Alan Boyle also observes the difficulty in defining the term ‘environmental 
dispute’ and has made the following observations: 
                                                
38 Philippe Sands, ‘Litigating Environmental Disputes: Courts, Tribunals and the Progressive 
Development of International Environmental Law’ in Tafsir Malick Ndiaye, Rüdiger Wolfrum and 
Chie Kojima (eds), Law of the Sea, Environmental Law, and Settlement of Disputes : Liber Amicorum 
Judge Thomas A Mensah (Martinus Nijhoff Publisher 2007) 319.  
39 Ibid, 313, 314, 316, 317. 
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‘[i]t is not easy to identify what are environmental cases; cases may 
raise environmental issues, but they rarely do so in isolation.’40 
Similarly, Tim Stephens is of the view that: 
‘It is increasingly difficult to identify international disputes that are 
solely environmental in character...In reality disputes involving 
environmental issues are almost always intertwined with other 
issues, and with other fields of international law.’41 
From the quotations mentioned above, it is obvious that the difficulty in defining 
environmental dispute is closely linked to its nature. The main argument that scholars 
put forward is that international environmental disputes do not exist in isolation from 
the other fields of international law, such as the law of treaties, the law of state 
responsibility, international trade law, international human rights law, international 
fisheries law, etc. Accordingly, in some cases, a particular dispute is not a purely 
environmental dispute. It is more appropriate to say that some international disputes 
which are brought before the courts have an environmental aspect.   
 It is of the greatest interest to note that the above reasons are always suggested 
when scholars discuss the failure of the ICJ’s Chamber of the Court for 
Environmental Matters which was established in April 1993 for the purpose of 
dealing specifically with environmental disputes.42  The reason why the Chamber of 
the Court for Environmental Matters has been closed down was based on the plausible 
assumption that States rarely considered their disputes as purely environmental 
because international disputes are much more interlinked and integrated with other 
                                                
40 Alan Boyle, ‘Settlement of Disputes Relating to the Law of the Sea and the Environment’ in Kalliopi 
Koufa (ed), International Justice - XXVI Thesaurus Acroasium (Thessalonika : Sakkoulas Publications 
1997) 349. 
41 Tim Stephens, ‘The Settlement of Disputes in International Environmental Law’ in Shawkat Alam 
and others (eds), Routledge Handbook of International Environmental Law (Routledge 2012) 177. 
42 The driving forces behind the formation of this special standing chamber were the developments of 
environmental law and nature protection which have taken place before the ICJ and, therefore, a 
preparation to the fullest possible extent to deal with any environmental case was needed. Since the 
creation of this chamber, it has not yet received any cases, and in 2006 the Court decided not to hold 
elections for a Bench for the Chamber. ICJ, Communiqué 93/20, Constitution of a Chamber of the 
Court for Environmental Matter (19 July 1993), reprinted at <http://www.icj-
cij.org/presscom/files/7/10307.pdf> accessed 10 October 2013, and see <http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=4> accessed 10 October 2013. 
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fields of international law.43 It can be seen that the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case is 
always used as a classic example to justify this assumption. In this case, the 
arguments of both parties were linked to other areas of international law, such as the 
law of treaties and the law of State responsibility. If we examine the argument of the 
parties, we will find that Hungary tried to justify the lawfulness of its termination of 
the treaty by invoking a variety of principles as grounds for terminating the treaty, 
such as a supervening impossibility of performance, a fundamental change of 
circumstances and a material breach of the treaty. 44 Furthermore, Hungary 
substantiated its claims by invoking environmental issues, such as invoking 
substantive elements that it said had changed fundamentally, namely the 
transformation of the treaty into a prescription for environmental disaster.
45
  
2.2 Some Possible Definitions of International Environmental Disputes 
While some scholars avoid providing a definition to the term ‘international 
environmental disputes’, it was explicitly defined by Richard Bilder, Catherine 
Cooper, Cesare Romano and Ellen Hey.  
 In his Hague lectures of 1975 Richard Bilder put forward the following 
definition of international environmental dispute as follows: 
‘...[a]ny disagreement or conflict of views or interests between 
States relating to the alteration, through human intervention, of the 
natural environmental system.’46 
Another scholar who is willing to define the term is Catherine Cooper. She lucidly 
explains that: 
                                                
43 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘The International Court of Justice and Environmental Disputes’ in Duncan 
French, Matthew Saul and Nigel D. White (eds), International Law and Dispute Settlement: New 
Problems and Techniques (Hart Publishing 2010) 54-55; Phoebe N. Okowa, ‘Environmental Dispute 
Settlement: Some Reflections on Recent Developments’ in Malcolm D. Evans (ed), Remedies in 
International Law: The Institutional Dilemma (Oxford Hart 1998) 168; Alan Boyle, ‘The Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros Case: New Law in Old Bottles’ (1997) 8 YIEL 13, 13 
44 Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ 
Rep 7, para. 92 (hereinafter Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case). 
45 Ibid, para. 95. See also the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, Memorial of the Republic of Hungary, Vol 1 
(2 May 1994) para. 10.74. 
46 Richard Bilder, ‘The Settlement of Disputes in the Field of the International Law of the 
Environment’ (1975) 144 Recueil des Cours 139, 153. 
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‘An international environmental dispute exists whenever there is a 
conflict of interest between two or more states (or persons within 
those states) concerning the alteration and condition (either 
qualitatively or quantitatively) of the physical environment.’47 
Writing in 2000, Cesare Romano concludes, after combining three words together 
(disputes, international and environment), that an international environmental dispute 
is: 
‘A conflict of views or of interest between two or more States, 
taking the form of specific opposing claims and relating to an 
anthropogenic alteration of an ecosystem, having a detrimental 
effect on human society and leading to environmental scarcity of 
natural resources.’48 
Ellen Hey suggests that a dispute may be characterised as an international 
environmental dispute when a dispute  
‘[i]nvolves what is generally considered to be an environmental 
treaty, as apparent from, for example, the object and purpose of the 
treaty in question.’49  
If we look at those possible definitions that have been given by scholars, they have 
struggled with the word ‘environment’. Bilder refers to the notion of the ‘natural 
environmental system’ whereas Cooper uses the term ‘physical environment’ both of 
which are extremely broad. Again, Romano introduced the new notion of an 
‘ecosystem’.50 What do we learn from these previous attempts to find a suitable 
definition of international environmental dispute? One thing that can be learnt from 
this lesson is that the notion of the environment is not static but it has been evolving 
                                                
47 Catherine A.  Cooper, ‘The Management of International Environmental Disputes in the Context of 
Canada-United States Relations: A Survey and Evaluation of Techniques and Mechanisms’ (1986) 24 
Canadian Ybk Intl L 247, 249. 
48 Cesare P.R. Romano, The Peaceful Settlement of International Environmental Disputes: A 
Pragmatic Approach (The Hague Kluwer Law International 2000) 29. 
49 Ellen Hey, Reflections on an International Environmental Court (Kluwer Law International 2000) 4. 
50 See the comments on Romano’s definition in Henry W. McGee and Timothy W.  Woolsey, 
‘Transboundary Dispute Resolution as a Process and Access to Justice for Private Litigants: 
Commentaries on Cesare Romano' s The Peaceful Settlement of International Environmental Disputes: 
A Pragmatic Approach (2000)’ (2001-2002) 20 UCLA J Envtl L & Pol'y 109 
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over the course of time. Accordingly, the definition of international environmental 
law may vary from time to time, depending on the changing nature of the notion of 
the environment. Moreover, giving a decisive definition of international 
environmental disputes that is linked to the concept of the environment is not an easy 
task because the notion of ‘the environment’ itself is vague and difficult to identify.51 
 Accepting the difficulty in finding a  decisive definition of the environment, 
this research attempts, in the next section, to introduce a new approach to find a 
suitable definition of international environmental dispute. It should, however, be 
noted that the definition in this study is only a working definition. 
2.3 The Definition of International Environmental Dispute Used in This Study 
This study will not attempt to invent any new definition of the term ‘environment’ 
which may eventually lead us to answer the question of what we mean by an 
international environmental dispute. Nor is this study concerned with finding out 
about which treaties can be counted as environmental. Instead, this study will focus 
on the ‘essential point’ or ‘one of the essential points’ in the conflict between the 
parties. In addition, throughout this study the emphasis is on ‘environmental 
obligation’ which will be used as a determinative factor in judging whether a dispute 
can be categorised as environmental dispute. If the essential point of the claims of the 
parties is primarily concerned with the failure of the subjects of international law to 
fulfill their environmental obligations or disagreement on the meaning and scope of 
an obligation, such disputes may be qualified as ‘international environment disputes’ 
which fall within the purview of this study.52  
 In this study, environmental obligations may be understood as, for example, 
the obligations to provide protection of the physical environment, ecosystems, habitat, 
endangered species, natural heritage and biodiversity; the obligations to conserve and 
ensure the sustainable use of natural resources (both living and non-living); and 
                                                
51 See Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (3 
edn, OUP 2009) 5-6 who say that ‘Inevitably, however, any definition of ‘the environment’ will have 
the Alice-in-Wonderland quality of meaning what we want it to mean’. See for the same opinion in 
Daniel Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (HUP 2010) 10; Lynton 
Keith Caldwell, International Environmental Policy: From the Twentieth to the Twenty-First Century 
(3 edn, Duke University Press 1996) 14. 
52 Philippe Sands once noted that ‘At the root of international environmental conflict lies the actual or 
perceived failure of a state to fulfill its international environmental obligations...’ See Philippe Sands, 
‘Enforcing Environmental Security: The Challenges of Compliance with International Obligations’ 
(1993) 46 J Int'l Aff 367, 371. 
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procedural obligations relating to the environment, such as the right to obtain and 
ensure access to environmental information, the right to participate in environmental 
decision-making and the right to obtain access to justice. It may be a situation where 
one party carries out or is permitted to carry out activities that another party (or 
parties) claims will have deleterious environmental effects. 
 Accordingly, in this study, the following definition of an international 
environmental dispute will be used: 
An international environmental dispute is a situation in which the 
subjects of international law have a clash of specific opposing 
juridical attitudes in relation to the interpretation and application of 
international environmental obligations, whether embodied in 
international treaties, custom or general principles of law recognised 
by civilised nations.  
Only disputes that meet the above definition will be the object of this study. To apply 
the above criteria for determining environmental disputes to some cases, it is clear 
that the Shrimp/Turtle case brought before the WTO was not an environmental 
dispute because the essential point was not concerned with the protection of the 
environment.53 That is to say the parties were not in dispute as to whether sea turtles 
needed to be conserved or how they should be conserved although the WTO 
Appellate Body mentioned the CITES, the CBD, the Convention on Migratory 
Species, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea54 and Agenda 21 of the 
Rio Conference on Environment and Development.55 Rather, they were in dispute 
over the legality of a trade measure. On the contrary, if there are questions of a breach 
of an environmental obligation or the object of the protection is the ‘environment’, 
such as a breach of obligations contained in Part XII of UNCLOS concerning the 
protection and preservation of marine environment, such dispute can be considered as 
environment.  
                                                
53 WTO, United States: Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products—Report of the 
Appellate Body (6 November 1998) WT/DS58/AB/R. 
54 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982, entered into force 16 
November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3, (1982) 21 ILM 1261 (hereinafter UNCLOS). 
55 United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on the 
Environment and Development (adopted at Rio de Janeiro, June 14, 1992), UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 
(Vol I) (1992); 31 ILM 874. 
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 There are two terms, ‘environment’ and ‘ecosystem’, which have been defined 
differently by scholars. The former term could be interpreted broadly as the Arbitral 
Tribunal in the Iron Rhine Railway case had the opportunity to touch upon the issue 
of what the environment is. It noted that the environment could be broadly taken as 
including air, water, land, flora and fauna, natural ecosystems and sites, human health 
and safety and climate.56 The judgment gave us some idea what the environment shall 
encompass. The term ‘ecosystem’ is narrower than ‘environment’ in the sense that it 
can be construed as ‘ecological unit consisting of living and non-living components 
that are interdependent and function as a community’.57 What can be seen from this 
explanation is that the use of the term ‘ecosystem’ focuses the natural balance or the 
interactions between the environment and living organisms inhabited within it.  
 Under such a narrow definition of ‘ecosystem’, it covers mainly the 
biodiversity issues that cannot be interpreted to include other issues such as the 
diversion of international waters which this thesis also intend to study. Thus, this 
thesis prefers to use the term environment instead of ecosystem. In addition, the 
notion of ‘environment’ as defined by the Arbitral Tribunal correspond with the 
physical aspect of the definition proposed in this thesis since it places the emphasis on 
the subject matter rather than biological interdependence or causal relationships.  
3. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES 
The purpose of this section is to sketch the characteristics of international 
environmental disputes. These characteristics can be observed from the actual 
disputes which are found frequently as cases which have been brought before dispute 
settlement bodies. In addition, the section will demonstrate the characteristics which 
are theoretically possible although such a case has not yet happened. It should be 
noted, however, from the outset that not all the characteristics discussed in this section 
are exclusive to environmental disputes, nor does every environmental dispute 
                                                
56 The Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine (‘Ijzeren Rijn’) Railway between the Kingdom of Belgium 
and the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Belgium/The Netherlands) (2005) 27 RIAA 35, para. 58 
(hereinafter Iron Rhine Arbitration). See also Council Directive 79/117/EEC of 21 December 1978 
prohibiting the placing on the market and the use of plant protection products containing certain active 
substances, Official Journal L 033, 08/02/1979 P. 0036 – 0040. 
57 Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses and 
Commentaries thereto and Resolution on Transboundary Confined Groundwater, 1994, ILC, ‘Report of 
International Law Commission on the Work of Its 46th Session’, Ybk ILC, Vol 2, Part 2, 118; See also 
Art. 2 of the CBD which defines this term as ‘a dynamic complex of plant, animal and micro-organism 
communities and their non-living environment interacting as a functional unit’ 
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necessarily have these characteristics, but they can be found mostly in environmental 
disputes than any other international disputes. The ultimate aim of the explanation 
concerning special feature of environmental disputes is to help in paving the way for 
the discussion on the suitability of mechanisms for settling international 
environmental disputes which be will discussed in more details in the chapter 4. 
3.1 International Environmental Disputes May Be Bilateral or Multilateral in 
Character 
3.1.1 Bilateral Character of International Environmental Disputes 
Disputes are inherently binary. This follows from the definition of a dispute, e.g. the 
ICJ’s emphasis on a dispute being one view/position being opposed by another.58 
Considering this point from a geographical perspective, a common situation is that 
environmental disputes involve a dispute between neighbouring States which share 
the same territorially defined natural resources or ecosystem, such as a shared 
hydrographic systems or a shared portion of forest expanding over the territory of two 
States.59 It is no exaggeration to say that ‘geographical proximity is a key factor in 
international disputes’ including international environmental disputes.60 There are two 
situations that would create a dispute between States sharing a common border.  
 Firstly, there is a situation when an environmentally unfriendly activity is 
carried out in one State within its territorial jurisdiction61 and it causes transboundary 
environmentally adverse effects in the territory of another State.62 In this case the 
‘victim’ State may allege that the other State is breaching its international 
environmental obligations. For example, in the well-known case of Trail Smelter 
between Canada and the United States of America (US), the transboundary air 
pollution arose from the operation of a smelter roasting sulphur-bearing ores by the 
                                                
58 South West Africa case, 323 
59 Peter H. Sand, ‘Transnational Environmental Disputes’ in Daniel Bardonnet (ed), Le Règlement 
Pacifique des Différends Internationaux en Europe: Perspectives D'avenir (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1992) 127. 
60 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Danio Campanelli, ‘Neighbour States’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum 
(ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP 2006), online version available 
at <http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e1072?rskey=X3ocfX&result=1&prd=EPIL> accessed 29 June 2016. 
61 Genowefa Grabowska, ‘ Environmental Conflicts In Border Areas ’ in Daniel Bardonnet (ed), Le 
Règlement Pacifique des Différends Internationaux en Europe: Perspectives d'Avenir (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 1992). 
62 Xue Hanqin, Transboundary Damage in International Law (CUP 2003) 3. 
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Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company. The smelter is located in Trail, British 
Columbia, on the Columbia River, about eleven miles from the international boundary 
between Canada and the US.63 
 Secondly, there is a situation that two States have access to the same 
resources, and activities by one State hinder the capability of the other State to exploit 
such shared resources. This may give rise disputes concerning, for example, the 
equitable utilisation of international rivers and lakes or the overfishing or sustainable 
use of marine living resources.   
 It is worth noting that the bilateral dimension of an environmental dispute may 
not necessarily take place between neighbouring States; a dispute may also arise 
between non-neighbouring States. This can be clearly seen in the case of marine 
resources; for example, in the Swordfish case.64 These cases were a dispute between 
EU and Chile concerning swordfish fisheries in the South-Eastern Pacific and was 
brought to the WTO dispute settlement procedure by the EU and before the ITLOS 
special chamber by Chile. In 1990 Chile enacted the law related to the conservation 
and sustainable exploitation of highly migratory swordfish stocks. As a consequence 
of applying this law, vessels cannot land in Chilean ports if such vessels caught 
swordfish in contravention to Chile’s conservation law, regardless of whether 
swordfish is caught in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or the high seas.65 The 
EU strongly opposed the application of this conservation law beyond the EEZ. It 
argued that such act could be considered as a violation of UNCLOS provisions 
concerning high seas freedom. In addition, given that there was no multilateral 
regional organisation in the Southeast Pacific established with a view to preserve 
swordfish, the flag State shall have the sole authority in the high seas. On the other 
hand, Chile claimed that the EU has failed to control the fishing activities carried out 
by vessels flying the flag of any of its member States in contravention of Articles 116-
119 of UNCLOS. Moreover, the EU has also failed to cooperate with Chile as a 
coastal State for the preservation of swordfish in the high seas adjacent to Chile’s 
                                                
63 Trail Smelter Arbitration (US v. Canada) (1941) 3 RIAA 1907 (hereinafter Trail Smelter 
Arbitration). 
64 Case concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-
Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile v. European Union) (Constitution of Chamber, Order of 20 December 
2000) ITLOS Reports 2000 (hereinafter Swordfish case). 
65 The EU invoked this fact before the WTO dispute settlement procedure by claiming that such act 
was in violation of Chile’s obligations of GATT 1994 Art. V concerning free transit of goods through 
the territory of Member States and Art. XI relating to the prohibition on quantitative restrictions on 
imports or exports of products. 
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EEZ as required by Article 64 of UNCLOS. However, the cases was removed from 
the ITLOS and the WTO in 2009, since the parties held the bilateral consultations and 
reached a new Understanding relating to the cooperation for conservation and 
management of swordfish stocks.66  
3.1.2 The Multilateral Character of International Environmental Dispute 
In addition to environmental disputes of a bilateral character there are environmental 
disputes that are concerned with the environmental interests of more than two States 
or the international community in general.  
 For the first category, fresh water disputes, notably those concerning the non-
navigational uses of international watercourses, serve as a good illustration in that 
they involve a number of competing users or several States which share the interest in 
the utilisation of international rivers.67 For the environmental aspects, the disposal of 
wastes conducted by one or more States may affect the other riparian States’ interest 
so as to endanger to human health or undermine the integrity of the river’s ecosystem. 
If the affected riparian States seek compensation for injury, disputes arise in this 
context would certainly not be bilateral dispute but entail several injured States that 
claim for single action of the polluter.  
 The second category of multilateral disputes generally arises from the breach 
of obligations concerning environmental protection that are owed to the international 
community as a whole (erga omnes environmental obligations).68 Thus, if a dispute 
arises, it proceeds beyond the traditional concept of the ‘State A v. State B’ situation 
or an inter partes issue.69 While transboundary pollution between neighbouring States 
                                                
66 Swordfish case (Order of 16 December 2009) ITLOS Reports 2009. See also the suspension of 
proceeding at the WTO, Chile: Measures Affecting the Transit and Importation of Swordfish—
Arrangement between the European Communities and Chile (6 April 2001) WT/DS193/3 and WTO, 
Chile: Measures Affecting the Transit and Importation of Swordfish—Joint Communication from the 
European Union and Chile (3 June 2010) WT/DS193/4/G/L/367/Add.1.  
67 Edith Brown Weiss, International Law for a Water-Scarce World (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
2013) 124. 
68 Shigeta views that the no harm principle (the obligation to prevent), the precautionary principle, the 
obligation to protect the global environment and the prohibition of nuclear tests, the obligations of the 
rational use of the high seas and the obligation to secure a human right to a healthy environment could 
be based for erga omnes environmental claims; see Yasuhiro Shigeta, ‘Obligation to Protect the 
Environment in the ICJ's Practice: To What Extent Erga Omnes?’ (2012) 55 Japanese Ybk Intl L 176, 
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69 Judge Weeramantry also notes in his separate opinion in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case that 
‘international environmental law will need to proceed beyond weighing the rights and obligations of 
parties within a closed compartment of individual State self-interest, unrelated to the global concerns of 
humanity as a whole’ See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, Separate Opinion of Vice-President 
Weeramantry, 118. 
 27 
is usually a problem of a bilateral nature, environmental harm that result from the 
failure of States to comply with their obligations to protect the global environment is 
multilateral in character.  
 Such disputes involve the protection of community values in which activities 
carried out by one state may affect the collective obligations owed to the international 
community as whole, including future generations,70 rather than affecting the legal 
rights or interests of any one particular state.71 This is because such community 
interests are not based on a reciprocal relationship between States, but serve the 
benefit of humankind as a whole.72 With Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
(MEAs) involving erga omnes partes environmental obligations, such as the 
international agreements which have the purpose of protecting the ozone layer or 
preventing climate change, the ‘[n]on-performance by one party defeats the whole 
purpose of the treaty.’73 In addition, the non-performance of States may affect the 
survival of entire human kind.74  
 Three categories of dispute concerning community interests may be 
distinguished.  
 The first category is an environmental dispute concerning common areas. 
These areas are located beyond the limits of any national jurisdiction and are not 
subject to appropriation by States.75 The high seas and outer space are examples 
which come within the concept of the global commons.76 Multilateral environmental 
disputes may arise out of activities which are carried out within global commons areas 
                                                
70 Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, ‘The Concept of International Community in International Law: Theory 
and Reality’ in Isabelle Buffard and others (eds), International Law between Universalism and 
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71 Sand (n 59) 127.  
72 Eva M. Kornicker Uhlmann, ‘State Community Interests, Jus Cogens and Protection of Global 
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73 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘Necessity in International Environmental Law’ (2010) 41 Netherlands Ybk 
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75 See generally in Jutta Brunnée, ‘Common Areas, Common Heritage, and Common Concern’ in 
Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Environmental Law (OUP 2007) 557. 
76 One may argue that Antarctica is a common area. However, Antarctica is a debatable example 
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(adopted 1 December 1959, entered into force 23 June 1961) 402 UNTS 71. 
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and cause adverse effects to the environment there. One example might be the 
allocation or over-exploitation of marine living resources in the high seas, which may 
lead to the reduction of fish stocks. In addition, States may breach the obligation not 
to pollute the marine environment in the high seas.77  Another example is the 
contamination of the environment of outer space which may eventually hinder the 
exploration of—or scientific research into—outer space by other States.78 It should be 
noted that, on the one hand, damage may be caused to the environment of the global 
commons itself—either to the living or the non-living components of these areas—or, 
on the other hand, a dispute may arise in relation to the purely economic loss to the 
other States, in the sense that they cannot fully exercise their rights to exploit these 
natural resources.  
 The second category of dispute concerns common heritage. Common heritage 
has been applied to various areas and resources. In UNCLOS the ‘Area’—the seabed 
and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction—and its resources fall 
within this concept.79 Common heritage resources are subjected to international 
management, and thus disputes may arise from the management or exploitation of 
these resources although in practice none yet have been arisen. 
 The third category is disputes concerning matter of common concern of 
mankind.80 Unlike common areas and common heritage, this kind of dispute is not 
confined to certain areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction of States or their 
resources. Rather, according to the Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge, the term 
common concern implies ‘a common responsibility to the issue based on its 
paramount importance to the international community.’81 In this sense, it is possible 
that environmental processes or protective action take place wholly or partly in the 
areas beyond the jurisdiction of any States or within the jurisdiction of particular 
                                                
77 See the obligation of States related to the protection of the marine environment in Arts. 194 and 207-
212 of UNCLOS. 
78 Kathy Leigh, ‘Liability for Damage to the Global Commons’ (1992) 14 Australian Ybk Intl L 129, 
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79 Art. 136 of UNCLOS. 
80 See Alexandre Kiss, ‘Economic Globalization and the Common Concern of Humanity’ in Alexandre 
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International Environmental Agreement (Kluwer Law International 2003) 6-8. 
81 Lyle Glowka, Françoise Burhenne-Guilmin and Hugh Synge, A Guide to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (IUCN the World Conservation Union 1994) 3. 
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States.82 Examples of common concern are climate change and the protection of 
biological diversity.83 The philosophical foundation of common concern lies in the 
fact that the ‘international community has both legitimate interest in resources of 
global significance and a common responsibility to assist in their protection.’84 
Moreover, neither the global climate nor biological diversity can be considered as 
natural assets to be exploited for the benefit of international community as a whole. 
Rather, they are to be preserved from destruction by human activities.85 Adopting 
measures to tackle environmental degradation and the need for the cooperation of 
States in addressing the problems may be the key point of the concept of common 
concern of humankind.86 
 It should be noted, with regard to multilateral environmental disputes, that a 
distinction can probably be made between interpretation of a legal provision and its 
application. One could envisage a genuinely multilateral dispute in the case of 
interpretation, where, for example, State A argues that a treaty should be interpreted 
to mean X, State B that it means Y, and State C that it means Z etc. With a dispute 
concerning application, it would seem that a multilateral dispute would always have 
to be in the form of X versus Y, where one of X or Y or both of them consists of two 
or more States.87 In any case, the issue between all the States involved would have to 
be identical. In the case where X equals the international community (or most/all the 
parties to a multilateral treaty), X could be a single State representing the international 
community or the other States parties.  
 It is interesting to note that some environmental disputes cannot be easily 
categorised as bilateral or multilateral. There are environmental disputes that are 
concerned with the environmental interests of more than one State. In this sense, their 
multilateral character can be seen from the fact that a number of States are involved in 
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International Environmental Law’ (1996) 34 Archiv des Völkerrechts 426. 
86 Ellen Hey, ‘Common Interests and the (Re)constitution of Public Space’ (2009) 39 EPL 152, 153. 
87 See further in chapter 4, section 2.2.1. 
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such disputes. However, a dispute that is qualified as multilateral may also have a 
bilateral character because each victim State claims a remedy from the wrongdoing 
State individually. But, the dispute cannot be said to have the quality of being wholly 
bilateral as it relates to an issue where there are several victim States involved. The 
Whaling case is a good example that belongs to this ‘in between’ category. In this 
case, Australia instituted proceedings against Japan, and it alleged that Japan had 
breached international obligations concerning an obligation not to kill whales for 
commercial purposes and that JARPA II was a program for commercial whaling 
which was conducted under the guise of a program of scientific research.88 Although 
the Whaling case, in one sense, was a bilateral dispute between Australia and Japan, it 
was not wholly bilateral as it related to an issue where several States disputed Japan’s 
interpretation and application of the scientific whaling exception in the International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.89 In addition, Australia was no longer the 
only one of these States involved in litigation before the ICJ as New Zealand had been 
given permission to intervene. In this sense the case is no longer a bilateral dispute.  
 The multilateral background of this case grew out of the fact that the 
International Whaling Commission (IWC) has repeatedly addressed a number of 
recommendations to Japan with a view to suspending indefinitely the lethal aspects of 
JARPA II.90 A similar call was made by 30 States (including Australia) and the 
European Commission in an aide-mémoire sent to Japan on 21 December 2007.91 The 
hint of hybrid dispute can also be seen in the Counter-Memorial of Japan when it 
claimed that ‘what is in reality a matter of multilateral marine resource management 
has been disguised as a bilateral legal dispute and brought before the Court’.92 
 To sum up, the special characteristics of international environmental disputes 
may cause some difficulties in settling a dispute. The question is that: Are the dispute 
settlement mechanisms suitable for settling bilateral or multilateral environmental 
disputes? This is a question that will be answered in chapters 4.  
                                                
88 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening) (Judgment) [2014] ICJ Rep 
226 (hereinafter Whaling case). 
89 The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (adopted 2 December 1946, entered into 
force 10 November 1948) 161 UNTS 2124 (hereinafter ICRW). 
90 See, for example, IWC, Resolutions 2005-1, ‘Resolution on JARPA II’ (4 July 2005) and 
Resolutions 2007-1, ‘Resolution on JARPA’ (4 June 2007), available at < 
https://archive.iwc.int/pages/search.php?search=%21collection72&k=> accessed 19 June 2016. 
91 Whaling case, Annex 67 to the Memorial of Australia, Volume 1, 311-312. 
92 Whaling case, Counter Memorial of Japan, para. 13. 
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3.2 International Environmental Disputes May Have a Multi-Dimensional 
Character 
3.2.1 The Complexities of Scientific and Technical Arguments in International 
Environmental Disputes 
A first aspect of the possible multi-dimensional character of an international 
environmental dispute is that it may raise complex scientific and technical issues.93 
Scientific and technical information have been used as evidence to substantiate the 
claims of disputants in order to inform and convince decision-makers which is usually 
presented in a competing manner. Undoubtedly, decision-makers need to engage with 
certain scientific and technical aspect and weigh such evidence before making 
decisions. The Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case is a good example of this. The Court had 
to deal with a vast amount of scientific materials which were submitted to it by the 
Republic of Hungary, such as geological evidence, hydrological conditions, surface 
and ground water quality assessments, floodplain ecology and EIA methodology, to 
name but a few.94 In the Whaling case, the ICJ was asked to interpret the term 
‘scientific research’ stipulated in the ICRW.95 It is clear that the highly complex 
scientific evidence with regard to whaling, such as the scientific and technical 
information about methodology that used to collect sample sizes of whales and the 
use of lethal methods, was presented by the parties to the ICJ for appraising Japan’s 
scientific research conducted under the programme called JARPA II in order to 
ascertain whether or not it was consistent with its obligations under the ICRW.96 A 
dispute concerning climate change may also have to be decided on the basis of 
scientific and technical data in order to ascertain the sources of climate change.97 It is 
undeniable that scientific methodology will play an important role in evaluating the 
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compliance of the parties, especially in MEAs.98 Moreover, the role played by science 
in the process of dispute resolution has also been formalised in international 
agreements.99   
3.2.2 The Complexity of Questions About Societal Choice in International 
Environmental Disputes 
A second aspect of the possible multi-dimensional character of an international 
environmental dispute is that it may involve complex questions relating to social, 
economic and political choices which may differ from country to country depending 
on the environmental policy decisions of particular States.100 The protection of fresh 
water is one of the examples. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes notes that ‘disputes 
concerning fresh water are varied. They reflect the many values of water: social, 
ecological, cultural, and economic.’101 When a dispute arise, it is inevitable that these 
wide arrays of elements are intermingled with the legal questions so as to make the 
dispute complex and subtle.  
Two States may have competing interests, namely one State may try to 
develop its own country or boost its own economy by exploiting natural resources, 
such as building a dam,102 and the other State may want to protect the environment. 
According to Bilder, environmental disputes tend to raise issues of balancing benefits 
and gains, apportioning costs and tradeoffs.103 Weighing the benefits of the wished for 
activities against harms to the environment which will occur is necessary for States in 
deciding whether to proceed with the project or not. This situation may eventually 
trigger an inter-state dispute. In the Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, for 
example, Pakistan submitted an application for interim measures and requested the 
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Court of Arbitration to order India to cease work on the Kishenganga Hydro-Electric 
Project (KHEP) until such time as the Court rendered its award on the merits of the 
case.104 Pakistan argued that the continuation of the KHEP might create a risk of 
irreparable prejudice to the flow of the river.105  It is clear from India’s Response that 
it took a different view from Pakistan in continuing to construct the dam. India 
attempted to convince the Court not to grant an interim measure by raising the issue 
of economic necessity and threats to human survival. It claimed that if the Court were 
to adopt interim measures to cease work on KHEP, it would lead to India being 
seriously short of power.106 It would also lead to  ‘enormous financial costs’ to the 
project and would impact the lives of India’s citizens currently engaged in the project 
who would lose their ‘job and their livelihood’.107 The Tribunal did not order India to 
halt any construction activity on the KHEP, since the project would not in and of 
themselves affect the flow of the river. In addition, in the Tribunal’s view, ‘the 
construction of the project would merely be one in which India would have invested 
considerable sums of money without reaping the benefit of the operation of the 
KHEP.’108 Moreover, in the partial award the Tribunal held that India may divert 
water from the KHEP for power generation.109 
It appears that the societal choices of States do not necessarily differ from one 
another at the very beginning when undertaking a joint project. A dispute may arise at 
a later stage when they consider that their interests cannot anymore be reconciled. For 
example, in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, at the ICJ, it came as no surprise at the 
very beginning of the project that Hungary and Slovakia had a mutual interest in 
damming the Danube for several purposes, for example, electricity production, flood 
protection, transportation with a view to enhancing the national economy of the two 
countries. 110  However, the Hungarian Government decided to abandon the 
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construction on its part (the Nagymaros dam) for the reason that the project was no 
longer environmentally or economically viable. The Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case is a 
good example in which the other issues external to legal boundary may be of equal 
important as the legal dimensions. As Assetto and Bruyninckx state in the context of 
this case that ‘environmental conflicts must be combined with conflicts in other areas 
(especially in the political and economic arenas) in order to pose a significant threat to 
national security’.111  
Another example is the dispute concerning whaling. In order to settle the 
dispute, decision-making bodies need to understand not only legal obligations 
associated with whaling but they should also take into account various dimensions, 
such as commercial dimension, aboriginal subsistence whaling, cultural diversity, 
rights of animal and environmental ethics.112 As Fitzmaurice puts it that the whaling 
dispute should be resolved  ‘in a comprehensive and holistic manner’.113 
3.3 International Environmental Disputes May Involve Difficulties in Identifying 
the Source of the Alleged Breach of an International Environmental Obligation 
The identification of the source of the alleged breach of international obligations 
involve two distinct issues: 
 1) Identifying the facts that give rise to a dispute. For example, if oil washes 
up on State A’s beach, it will be necessary to determine where it has come from. It 
could be from an offshore installation on State B’s continental shelf or from an oil 
tanker having the nationality of State C. There is also the case of transboundary air 
pollution that one State emits noxious fumes to the environment and the fumes 
transcend the boundary of that State into the other State’s territory which cause 
adverse effects on the ecosystem as well as the people living in such State. Obviously, 
the situation is not that complex. The State whose interest is infringed can identify the 
source of the breach by supporting its allegation with scientific evidence showing the 
source of the fumes as shown in the Trail Smelter Arbitration where there was only 
the actions of single polluter. Also, the question of which State killed whales for 
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commercial purposes, as in the Whaling case, or which State contaminated the 
international river case, is not difficult to answer. 
 While with bilateral environmental disputes the source of harm and the victim 
are usually clearly identifiable, 114  with many environmental problems, such as 
overfishing, long-range transboundary air pollution and depletion of the ozone layer, 
the responsible State causing environmental harm cannot be easily identified. Even if 
the State that is alleged to be the polluter can be identified, the harm cannot always be 
easily traced as evinced in the Aerial Spraying case. 115  This characteristic of 
international environmental disputes, if not unique, is rarely, if ever, found in other 
disputes in international law.  
 One of the most compelling reasons for the complexity in identifying sources 
of the breach of international environmental obligations involves multiple tortfeasors 
or accumulative actions of several States over a long period of time.116 Ozone 
depletion or the long-range transboundary air pollution problem, for example, may 
not arise from the action of only one State; several States may collectively contribute 
to emitting carbon dioxide and other harmful gases. Consequently, it may not be 
known which States have emitted harmful gases; but even where it is known, it may 
be impossible to quantify the degree of harm caused by each State.117 Another 
challenge is that the damage to the environment may not occur immediately after 
international environmental obligations have been breached. For instance, in the 
climate change context, injury resulting from a breach of international obligations 
may fully manifest only after a long period of time.118 Therefore, one has to collect 
huge amounts of data for several years before making a complaint. Moreover, with 
some kind of environmental harm it may be impossible to identify the wrongdoer, e.g. 
marine pollution and damage caused to seamounts by bottom trawling.   
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 All of those points also lead to the problem of establishing causation between 
the wrongful act and the damage produced. The causal link between the activities 
which are supposed to have caused the harmful effects on the environment and the 
damage to the environment is difficult to establish. 119  This is because some 
environmental problems arise from a combination of various types of pollution 
emanating from different sources over a long period of time affecting a very large 
number of people.120  
 All of the issue described above is a question of fact which the dispute 
settlement means/body would have to determine that question. 
 2) Once the facts have been determined, the next question is whether those 
facts represent a breach of an international obligation by another State. So, in the 
above examples, if it has been determined that the oil comes from State B’s 
continental shelf or State B carries out certain activities which cause the depletion of 
the ozone layer, the next question is whether State B is in breach of an international 
obligation. That will involve asking whether the release of the oil or the emission of 
fumes can be attributed to State B under the rules of State responsibility or whether 
State B has exercised due diligence over the activities of a non-State operator of the 
installation or factory. This is a legal question. 
3.4 International Environmental Disputes May Involve Complex Questions of 
Quantifying Damages 
It is well established in international law that every international wrongful act of a 
State entails the international responsibility of that State. When a State is in breach of 
an international obligation, whether or not the breach is litigated, it is under an 
obligation to make reparation, of which compensation may be one form.121  It is 
possible that when an international environmental dispute arises the victim State may 
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claim compensation for damage.122 Particularly problematic is the assessment of 
compensation to environmental damages. While any other damages, such as damage 
to vessels which may include costs of repair or costs related to the detention of the 
vessel, may not difficult to calculate, environmental damages are not always easy to 
quantify in monetary term.123 How can one assess the ecological damage, such as the 
extinction of certain kind of plants or wildlife or aesthetical, cultural and recreational 
values of the environment, is less clear. Taking this view one may argue that human 
beings are going to treat environmental goods as economic products.124 
James Crawford once noted that:  
‘Damage to such environmental value (biodiversity, amenity, etc – 
sometimes referred to as ‘non-use values’) is, as a matter of 
principle, no less real and compensable than damage to property, 
though it may be difficult to quantify’.125 
Redgwell also observed the difficulty in quantifying loss that ‘many environmental 
components and values do not have an easily ascribed, or any, market value.’126 
However, although quantifying compensation is not easy to assess, this does not mean 
that compensation for environmental damage is completely impossible.127 What might 
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be a problem, as mentioned above, is the establishment of a casual link between the 
breach of environmental obligations and the damage produced. Given that a casual 
link may be difficult to establish, the compensation for damage, as argued by Kiss, 
may be difficult to award in practice.128  
 Furthermore, monetary damages may not be capable of providing effective legal 
remedies which would return the environment back to its status quo ante.129 This can 
be seen, for example, in the climate change context. It is impossible to restore the 
status quo ante although compensation for damage could be paid. The problem with 
the remedies available for breach of international environmental obligations is the 
‘backward looking nature of state responsibility with respect to restitution and 
compensation.’ 130  It can be observed, however, that the international dispute 
settlement bodies usually asked the parties to negotiate131 or indicated measures to be 
adopted by the parties132 rather than awarding the victim States compensation.    
3.5 International Environmental Disputes May Involve the Interpretation and 
Application of Procedural Obligations 
Considering the nature of the normative content of international environmental law, a 
distinction is made between two types of obligations, namely obligations of conduct 
that have a procedural character, on the one hand, and obligations of result that have a 
substantive character, on the other.133 Obligations of result refer to the obligations of 
States which are required to do something with a view to obtaining the required 
results. It should be noted, however, that a dispute concerning the obligations of result 
                                                                                                                                      
has become quite adept at quantifying damage caused by oil pollution, see generally in Mans  
Jacobsson, ‘Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation: An International Regime’ (1996) 1 ULR 260, 
260-273. 
128 Kiss, ‘Present Limits to the Enforcement of State Responsibility for Environmental Damage’ 5. 
129 The Chorzow Factory case indicated that ‘reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out the 
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have 
existed if that act had not been committed’ see Chorzow Factory Case (Indemnity) (Merits) PCIJ 
Ser.A, No.17 (1928), 47-48. 
130 Redgwell (n 118) 267. 
131 Lac Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain) (1957) 24 ILR 101 (hereinafter Lac Lanoux Arbitration), 
101; Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Iceland) (Judgement) [1974] ICJ Rep 3, para. 79; Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros case, para. 155. 
132 Bering Sea Fur Seals Arbitration (1989) 1 Moore’s Int Arb 755 (hereinafter Bering Sea Fur Seals 
Arbitration) and Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor 
(No.12) (Malaysia v. Singapore) (Provisional Measures, Order of 8 October 2003) ITLOS Reports 
2003, (2003) 126 ILR 487 (hereinafter Land Reclamation case). 
133 Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ 
Rep 14, para. 32 (hereinafter Pulp Mills case). 
 39 
is not peculiar to environmental disputes, since other disputes in international law 
generally involve the interpretation of this kind of obligation. Procedural obligations 
have much been an issue in environmental dispute, since a number of cases have been 
brought before adjudicative mechanisms, especially in recent years. A number of 
cases have been brought before adjudicative dispute resolution mechanisms, 
especially in recent year. They include the MOX Plant case,134 Land Reclamation 
case, 135  Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, 136  Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case, 137 
Pulp Mills case138 and the Certain Activities/Construction of a Road cases.139 
  Obligations of conduct that have a procedural character entail obligations to 
achieve a certain procedure, such as the obligation to carry out an Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) in any case of significant transboundary risk which is 
crucially important if a State carry out certain activities in the border area. Moreover, 
there are also the obligation to notify the other States concerning any activity that may 
pose a threat of harm to human health and the environment and the obligation to enter 
into consultation between the States and the obligation to exchange information.140  
The omnipresence of procedural obligations in most international 
environmental treaties and custom could make international environmental disputes 
distinctive from another kind of international disputes. The arbitrators in the Chagos 
Marine Protected Area arbitration make a compelling conclusion when they accept 
that procedural rules exist in international environmental law and ‘such procedural 
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of the Environment: The Procedural Dimension’ in Winfried Lang, Hanspeter Neuhold and Karl 
Zemanek (eds) Environmental Protection and International Law  (Graham & Trotman 1991); Neil 
Craik, The International Law of Environmental Impact Assessment: Process, Substance and 
Integration (CUP 2008).  
 40 
rules may, indeed, be of equal or even greater importance than the substantive 
standards existing in international law.’141 
CONCLUSIONS 
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis developed in this chapter is 
that international environmental disputes are disputes that the essential point is 
concerned with an environmental issue. The definition focuses on the subject matter 
that international law would like to protect rather than paying attention to particular 
treaties. Some treaties, such as UNCLOS, are not wholly concerned with the 
protection of the environment but they might have a section that contains provisions 
aiming at the protection of the environment. If a State claims that another State has 
breached such provisions, an international environmental dispute arises. 
 As far as the features of international environmental disputes are concerned, 
they tend to exhibit certain characteristics but by no means all environmental disputes 
have all or any of these characteristics. Firstly, they may be bilateral or multilateral in 
character. But the most obvious feature that distinguishes environmental disputes 
from other kinds of international disputes is that some environmental disputes entail 
collective obligations—rather than involving merely with reciprocal obligations— 
which are often owed to the international community as a whole or to all the treaty 
parties to a MEA, not to any specific States. Secondly, arguments of parties in a 
dispute may involve technical and scientific issues when substantiating their claims in 
order to persuade international courts or conciliators. Thus, dispute settlement bodies 
need to have the capacity to evaluate such facts before making any decisions. In 
addition, environmental disputes may not only involve legal questions but also 
intertwine with societal aspect including economic and political consideration. 
Thirdly, the sources of harm underlying the dispute are not always easy to identify, 
there might be a number of States contribute to cause environmental harm. In 
addition, the environmental damage might probably emerge after a long period of 
time. Fourthly, in the case where a State requests a dispute settlement body to decide 
on the matter of compensation for injury, the dispute may entail a complex process of 
calculation of the extent of harm and the amount of money that the losing States have 
to pay. Lastly, international environmental disputes may involve the interpretation 
                                                
141 The Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. UK) (2015), para. 322 (hereinafter 
Chagos MPA Arbitration) (emphasis added).  
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and application of procedural obligations. The recent years witnessed an increase in 
the number of cases brought before the ICJ and ad hoc arbitral tribunal that asked 
them to decide, for example, the circumstance that an EIA should be carried out or the 
situation where States need to notify the other States about transboundary harm. It 
must be conceded that non-environmental disputes may also have some or all of the 
five characteristics. In this case, it could be argued that the most obvious types of 
dispute that have some/all of these characteristics are, for example, trade disputes and 
future disputes relating to exploitation in the Area. However, these types of dispute, 
unlike environmental disputes, have their own dedicated dispute resolution 
mechanisms, viz. the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and section 5 
of Part XI of UNCLOS. 
 Given that international environmental disputes have such certain distinctive 
features, the question is that: Are the dispute settlement mechanisms that are available 
in international law suitable and effective for settling an international environmental 
dispute? The next chapter will examine the various mechanisms that available in 
international law for settlement of dispute regarding environmental matters and also 
look at how existing mechanisms have been used. In the next few chapters, there will 
be the analysis of the degree to which existing mechanisms are suited to addressing 
these characteristics, and then determine what could be done differently to take better 
account of the characteristics in dispute resolution. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter attempts to answer the question of what third-party mechanisms are 
available for resolving international environmental disputes. The reasons why this 
chapter attempts to address this question is that we need to know the inherent nature 
and structural arrangement of each mechanism in order to pave the way to further 
analysis with regard to their suitability. Each section will begin with the explanation 
of the nature of those mechanisms before giving further illustration of how such 
mechanisms work in practice by briefly demonstrating international environmental 
disputes that were brought before them. Third-party diplomatic means will be 
discussed first in section 1 followed by judicial means in section 2, Non-Compliance 
Procedures (NCPs) in section 3 and RFMO panels in the last section. The first two 
means are the traditional means of third-party of international dispute settlement, as 
listed, for example, in Article 33 of the UN Charter. NCPs have been developed in 
MEAs since the late 1980s as a way to promote compliance with MEAs but they may 
indirectly have a dispute settlement role. The last means has been developed since 
about 2000 to provide a quick, relatively informal but effective means to resolve 
technical disputes in RFMOs. 
 1. THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMATIC MEANS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE FIELD OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
This section will describe various methods of dispute settlement that are non-judicial 
in nature, focusing particularly on environmental matters. Non-judicial means include 
mediation, conciliation and inquiry and each will be discussed in turn. The reason 
why good offices will not be discussed is that good offices entail a lesser degree of 
involvement of the third party and plays a passive role in the process of dispute 
settlement. They merely encourage disputants to resume negotiation without making 
any proposals for the parties on the basis of their negotiations. 
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1.1 Mediation 
1.1.1 Conspectus: The Nature of Mediation 
Mediation is a form of intervention by a third party. Mediators attempt to bring the 
parties together with a view to resuming negotiations or accepting an offer of 
mediation from a third party, who could be an individual, a State or an international 
organisation.1 In the case of an individual mediator, the mediator should be a person 
who is impartial, has high moral authority and is intelligent in the sense that he is 
equipped with diplomatic skills. On some occasions, international organisations have 
been involved in mediation, such as the UN, the Organisation of American States 
(OAS) and the World Bank. In addition, the States that are in dispute have to agree in 
the first place on the intervention of mediators, either by requesting the mediator to 
act or else the mediator offers its assistance. But what makes mediation different from 
good offices is the degree of involvement of the mediator in the resolution process. 
Basically, mediation involves the active participation of the mediator as opposed to 
the passive role of providing good offices.2 The notion that mediators are involved in 
active participation arises from the fact that mediators not only bring the parties 
together but they will advance proposals and suggestions as part of the process and 
the parties to the disputes may adopt such proposals as a basis for further 
negotiations.3 In this sense, the mediator is acting as a formulator who tries to find a 
formula for assisting the parties in settling the dispute themselves.4 Mediation is 
                                                
1 See Art. 4 of the two Hague Conventions—the1899 International Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes (adopted 29 July 1899, entered into force 4 September 1900) 187 
CTS 410 and the 1907 International Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 
(adopted 18 October 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910) 205 CTS 233—which provide that ‘the 
part of mediator consists in reconciling the opposing claims and appeasing the feeling of resentment 
which may have arisen between the states at variance’. 
2 See Francisco Orrego Vicuña, ‘Mediation’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law (OUP 2010), online version available at 
<http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e61?rskey=VHJ6bY&result=1&prd=EPIL> accessed 27 June 2016. See also John Collier and Vaughan 
Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in International Law: Institutions and Procedures (OUP 2000) 27. 
3 Darwin suggests that there are two kinds of functions of a mediator: 1) The procedural function and 
2) The substantive function. While the former is concerned with bringing the parties to the negotiating 
table, the latter involves a solution to the substance of the dispute see H.G. Darwin, ‘Mediation and 
Good Offices’ in Humphrey Waldock (ed), International Disputes: The Legal Aspects, Report of a 
Study Group of the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies (Europa Publication 
1972) 85-86. 
4 Touva Saadia and William Zartman, ‘Introduction: Mediation in Theory’ in Touva Saadia and 
William Zartman (eds), International Mediation in Theory and Practice (Westview Press 1985) 12. 
The tasks of the mediator are varied. The mediators can be hosts, observers, facilitators, educators, 
manipulators, or advocates. See Martti Ahtisaari and Kristiina Rintakoski, ‘Mediation’ in Andrew F.  
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normally conducted in terms of confidentiality with a view to protecting the parties 
from public interference.5 It can be considered that mediation is a mechanism that 
helps the parties to continue to settle their disputes by means of negotiations. 
 Before the mediator is able to make any proposals leading to a settlement of 
the dispute, the mediator has to get acquainted with the substance of the dispute. 
Usually, the parties will supply the information to the mediator or else his knowledge 
of the facts is limited to what the mediator may have acquired from the news rather 
than formally inquiring into the facts underlying the dispute.6 After gathering all the 
information, the mediator will come up with a possible solution which will take into 
account the essential interests of the parties and be acceptable to all the parties with a 
view to changing the disputants’ perceptions of their behaviour.7 It should be noted 
that the mediation process is flexible; therefore the mediator can employ various 
kinds of techniques that depend largely on the nature of the disputes and the 
willingness of each party to settle the dispute.8 If one party is reluctant or hinders the 
process, the mediator may use diplomatic techniques such as exerting pressure on a 
party by explaining to such a party the adverse consequences there might occur if it 
refuses to settle the dispute or telling the parties of what are the benefits that they 
might get if concessions are made.9  
1.1.2 The Use of Mediation to Settle International Environmental Disputes—An 
Overview  
Mediation has been recognised as one of the means of settlement of international 
environmental disputes. This is reflected in the dispute settlement clause which can be 
                                                                                                                                      
Cooper, Jorge  Heine and Ramesh Thakur (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy (OUP 
2013) 341.   
5 Vicuña (n 2). 
6 J. G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (5 edn, CUP 2011) 26. 
7 See generally in Jacob Bercovitch and Ayse Kadayifci, ‘Exploring the Relevance and Contribution of 
Mediation to Peace-Building’ (2002) 9 PCS 21.  
8 Jacob Bercovitch, Theory and Practice of International Mediation: Selected Essays (Routledge 2011) 
18-19.There are several conditions which make mediations successful: see Jacob Bercovitch, 
‘International Mediation and Dispute Settlement: Evaluating the Conditions for Successful Mediation’ 
(1991) 7 NJ 17. See also Lawrence Susskind and Eileen Babbitt, ‘Overcoming Obstacles to Effective 
Mediation of International Disputes’ in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Rubin (eds), Mediation in 
International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management (Saint Martin's Press 1992). 
9 Merrills states that powerful States are usually requested to act as mediators because they have the 
ability to induce the parties’ behaviour by using the strength of their own position, see Merrills (n 6) 
35. 
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found in several MEAs.10 It is in the nature of mediation that it is often not publicised, 
so that it is difficult to know how widely meditation has been used to settle 
environmental disputes. The only example of mediation concerning an environmental 
dispute of which the author is aware was the Indus waters dispute between India and 
Pakistan.11 The sharing and managing of international watercourses lies at the heart of 
this dispute between the two countries, since India has discontinued its policy of 
allowing the flow of water to Pakistan. In this case, the President of the World Bank 
at first offered his good offices and the parties accepted the offer.12 Although the 
World Bank offered good offices to the parties but the act of the World Bank was 
actually mediation, since it actively participated in the negotiation process by 
advancing the proposals to settle the dispute. The continuation of its active 
involvement in the case was one of the successes of the World Bank in settling the 
dispute.13 Finally, the parties managed to settle their dispute on the basis of one of the 
plan proposed and signed the Indus Waters Treaty with the World Bank acting as a 
signatory of the Treaty.14 In addition, the World Bank also offered financial assistance 
based largely on its lending programs for the purpose of the implementation of the 
Treaty.  
 
                                                
10 Examples include Art. XVIII of the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources (adopted 11 July 2003, not yet in force); Art. 11 (2) Vienna Convention for the Protection of 
the Ozone Layer (adopted 22 March 1985, entered into force 22 September 1988) 1513 UNTS 293, 26 
ILM 1529; Art. 26 of the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea 
Area (adopted 9 April 1992, entered into forced 17 January 2000) 2099 UNTS 197; Art. 16 of the 
Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste and Other 
Matter (adopted 7 November 1996, entered into forced 24 March 2006) 36 ILM 1; Art. 27 (2) of the 
CBD and Art. 33 (2) of the Watercourses Convention. 
11 See generally in Charles Rousseau, ‘Le Conflit sur les Eaux de l' Indus’ (1961) 65 RGDIP 364; 
Niranjan Das Gulhati, Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in International Mediation (Allied Publishers 
1973); Salman M.A. Salman, ‘Mediation of International Water Disputes—The Indus, the Jordan and 
the Nile Basins Interventions’ in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Christina Leb and Mara Tignino 
(eds), International Law and Freshwater: The Multiple Challenges (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013). 
12 See Georges  Fischer, ‘La Banque Internationale pour la Reconstruction et le Développement et 
l'Utilisation des Eaux de l'Indus’ (1960) 6 AFDI 669 ; G.T. Keith Pitman, ‘The Role of the World Bank 
in Enhancing Cooperation and Resolving Conflict on International Watercources: The Case of the 
Indus Basin’ in Salman M.A. Salman and Laurence Boisson de Chazournes (eds), International 
Watercources: Enhancing Cooperation and Managing Conflict (The World Bank 1998) 160. 
13 Salman M.A. Salman, ‘Good Offices and Mediation and International Water Disputes’ in The 
International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed), Resolution of International Water 
Disputes: Papers Emanating from the Sixth PCA International Law Seminar November 8, 2002 
(Kluwer International Law 2003)187. See also Richard Baxter, ‘The Indus Basin’ in Richard  Baxter, 
Ludwick A.  Teclaff and Eileen  Teclaff (eds), The Law of International Drainage Basins (Oceana 
Publications 1967). 
14 For the text of the Treaty see the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (adopted 19 September 1960, entered 
into force 12 January 1961) 491 UNTS 126 (hereinafter the Indus Waters Treaty). See also Asit K.  
Biswas, ‘Indus Water Treaty: The Negotiating Process’ (1992) 17 WI 201. 
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1.2 Conciliation 
1.2.1 Conspectus: The Nature of Conciliation 
Cot defines international conciliation as ‘intervention in the settlement of an 
international dispute by a body having no political authority of its own, but enjoying 
the confidence of the parties to the dispute and entrusted with the task of investigating 
every aspect of the dispute and of proposing a solution which is not binding on the 
parties’.15  The important task of conciliators is to investigate and examine the facts 
that are in dispute. Conciliators undertake in-depth and impartial investigations or 
studies of the details of a dispute.16 The way in which conciliators acquire information 
is in contrast to the methods of mediators in that mediators usually receive 
information from the parties rather than from their own investigations. Due to the fact 
that conciliators have to investigate several aspects of disputes, such as the facts and 
their historical, political and legal aspects,17 conciliators are selected on the basis of 
their particular fields of expertise.18 The investigation process may include hearing 
the parties’ claims and objections and examining witnesses and experts. After the 
investigation process, conciliators will provide solutions to the dispute in the form of 
non-binding recommendations.19 However, the parties are free to refuse the proposed 
report if they see fit. 
 Conciliation has formal procedures which, to some degree, similar to judicial 
means of dispute settlement. Such characteristics of conciliation lead Cot to state that 
conciliation is ‘a half-breed’ means of dispute settlement.20 Although conciliation 
shares several similarities with mediation, such as the recommendatory nature of the 
                                                
15 Jean-Pierre Cot, International Conciliation (Rollo H. Myers tr, Europa 1972) 9. See also Lassa 
Oppenheim, International Law, vol 2 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed, 7 edn, Longmans 1952); Sven M.G.  
Koopmans, Diplomatic Dispute Settlement: The Use of Inter-State Conciliation (T.M.C. Asser Press 
2008) 37.  
16 See the conciliation rules proposed by Henri Rolin in Henri Rolin, ‘La Conciliation Internationale’ 
(1961) 49 AIDI 193. See also the Revised General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes (28 April 1949) 71 UNTS 101. 
17 Cot (n 15) 9. See also D.W. Bowett, ‘Contemporary Developments in Legal Techniques in the 
Settlement of Disputes’ (1983) 180 Recueil des Cours 169, 186.  
18 Koopmans (n 15) 48. 
19 See Art. 21 of UNGA Res 50/50 ‘UN Model Rules for the Conciliation of Disputes Between States’ 
(29 January 1996) UN Doc A/RES/50/50. 
20 Jean-Pierre Cot, ‘Conciliation’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (OUP 2006), online version available at 
<http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e20?rskey=akWKeS&result=1&prd=EPIL> accessed 27 June 2016. Lee also notes that conciliation has 
a hybrid character combining inquiry and mediation. See Roy S. Lee, ‘A Case for Facilitation in the 
Settlement of Disputes’ (1991) 34 German Ybk Intl L 138, 148. 
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final proposals, conciliation entails a formal process of finding a solution with a view 
to settling disputes. Moreover, the investigative powers of conciliators are unlike the 
powers of inquiry commissions. Whereas conciliators will expose the facts only to the 
extent that such exposure will not bring any difficulties to the conciliation process, the 
most important purpose of an inquiry commission’s function is to illuminate the 
dispute.21 
  Conciliation can be in the form of ‘permanent commissions’ or ‘ad hoc 
commissions’ 22  The permanent commissions can exist either by virtue of the 
agreement of the parties in bilateral treaties or as part of an international 
organisation.23 On the contrary, ad hoc conciliation commissions are the type of 
commissions that are normally included in a specific treaty as one of the dispute 
settlement mechanisms. In addition, some ad hoc conciliation takes the form of the 
parties agreeing to resort to conciliation only after a dispute has arisen and they have 
failed to settle it by other means such as the Jan Mayen conciliation.24 Conciliators 
may be selected from a list of experts that has been set up beforehand, when a dispute 
arises under specific treaties. It should be noted that conciliators are never nominated 
by themselves in contrast to mediation where the parties to the dispute may appoint 
mediators or mediators may offer their assistance. 
 Conciliation can be optional or compulsory. Optional conciliation entails a 
system in which the parties have established a conciliation procedure beforehand and 
the parties will decide whether to use it or not. On the other hand, compulsory 
conciliation refers to a system where ‘jurisdiction is granted in the original agreement, 
and therefore a commission can unilaterally be seized.’25 Consequently, the parties to 
the dispute have an obligation to participate in the conciliation proceedings in good 
faith.26  
                                                
21 Merrills (n 6) 66. 
22 Art. 1 of the 1961 Resolution of the Institut de Droit International, Institut de Droit International  
‘Resolution on International Conciliation’ (1961) 49 AIDI 385.  
23 For example, the UNESCO Conciliation and Good Offices Commission on Discrimination in 
Education, see Protocol Instituting a Conciliation and Good offices Commission to be Responsible for 
Seeking the settlement of any Disputes which may Arise between States Parties to the Convention 
against Discrimination in Education (adopted 12 December 1962, entered into force 24 October 1968) 
651 UNTS 362. 
24 See Conciliation Commission on the Continental Shelf Area between Iceland and Jan Mayen: Report 
and Recommendations to the Government of Iceland and Norway (Decision of June 1981) 27 RIAA 1, 
8-9.  
25 Koopmans (n 15) 55. Tullio Treves, ‘Recents Trends in the Settlement of International Dispute’ in 
Cursos Euro-Mediterráneos Bancaja de Derecho Internacional, vol 1 (Aranzadi 1997) 415-416. 
26 See for example in Art. 5 of Annex II to the CBD and Art. 14 (6) of the UNFCCC. 
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1.2.2 The Use of Conciliation to Settle International Environmental Disputes—
An Overview 
Both mandatory and optional conciliation can be found in MEAs.27 For example, 
mandatory conciliation is provided for by, for example, UNCLOS, the UNCCD, the 
CBD, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the 
UNFCCC; 28  while provision for optional conciliation is made in the OSPAR 
Convention.29 Progressive conciliation rules are provided by the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA), i.e. its Optional Rules for Conciliation of Disputes Relating to 
Natural Resources and/or the Environment, which were adopted in 2002.30 These 
rules contain features that are adapted to handling environmentally related disputes 
such as the initiation of procedures by non-state actors and the appointment of 
conciliators with expertise in environmental matters.31 There have been no cases 
settled by conciliation.  
1.3 Inquiry 
1.3.1 Conspectus: The Nature of Inquiry 
In a case where the parties are in dispute about factual issues, inquiry may itself settle 
these issues by creating a basis for the parties to settle their dispute.32 It involves an 
objective investigation or elucidation of the facts that give rise to the dispute by a 
                                                
27 Philippe Sands and Ruth Mackenzie, ‘Guidelines for Negotiating and Drafting Dispute Settlement 
Clauses for International Environmental Agreements’ in The International Bureau of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (ed), International Investments and Protection of the Environment: The Role of 
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms (2001) 314-315. 
28 Art. 297 (3) (b) of UNCLOS; Art. 27 (4) of the CBD; Art. 11 (4) of the Vienna Convention for the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer; Art. 14 (5)-(7) of the UNFCCC; Art. 28 (6) of the Convention to 
Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly 
in Africa (adopted 17 June 1994, entered into force 26 December 1996) 1954 UNTS 3.  
29Art. 32 of the 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East 
Atlantic (adopted 22 September 1992, entered into force 25 March 1998) (1993) 32 ILM 1068 
(hereinafter the OSPAR Convention). 
30 Hereinafter the PCA’s Environmental Rules for Conciliation, for the full text see <https://pca-
cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/01/Optional-Rules-for-Conciliation-of-Disputes-Relating-
to-the-Environment-and_or-Natural-Resources.pdf> accessed 17 February 2014. See also D. Ratliff 
‘The PCA Environmental Arbitration and Conciliation Rules’ (2004) 1 TDM 1,available at 
<www.transnational-dispute-management.com> accessed 19 February 2014. 
31 See the para. (i) of the Introductory Part of the PCA Conciliation Rules. The details will be discussed 
in a later chapter. 
32 Richard M.  Mosk, ‘The Role of Facts in International Dispute Resolution’ (2003) 304 Recueil des 
Cours 9, 32-33. See also Collier and Lowe (n 2) 24; Karl Josef  Partsch, ‘Fact-Finding and Inquiry’ in 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Elsevier 1997) 61. 
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third party, either an impartial individual or a commission. 33  Inquiry may be 
understood in two different senses. Firstly, it may be used in addition to and form part 
of the other means of dispute settlement whether these are non-judicial or judicial 
means.34 Secondly, it is, according to Merrills, ‘a specific institutional arrangement’ 
that States prefer to opt for because they want to have some disputed issue 
independently investigated rather than seeking some other means of dispute 
settlement.35 The ways in which these inquiry bodies obtain or collect the necessary 
information may vary depending on the function assigned to them. These may 
include, for example, hearing all the claims of the parties, examining witnesses or 
visiting the disputed area.36 After acquiring all the evidence, the commission may 
only clarify the disputed facts and submit a written report for the further use of the 
parties. Not only does it submit the report to the parties, the commission may also 
suggest a relevant solution for the parties. It should be noted that if the commission 
also suggests a solution for the parties, the distinction between inquiry and mediation 
or conciliation cannot be easily drawn.37  The outcome of the process of inquiry is 
non-binding and the parties concerned are free to accept or reject the findings.38 
However, in the process of inquiry under Article 5 of Annex VIII to UNCLOS, the 
outcome of the process shall be considered as conclusive as between the parties.39 
Although the outcome is not binding upon the parties, it can have some consequences 
if the inquiries are made public. Edith Brown Weiss interestingly observes that ‘by 
letting the “sun” shine on the facts, civil society, as well as governments and other 
actors, will be pressed to take appropriate actions’.40 
  
                                                
33 See Art. 9 of the 1907 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes.  
34 Agnieszka  Jachec-Neale, ‘Fact-Finding’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law (OUP 2011), online version available at 
<http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e27?rskey=GHXa8S&result=1&prd=EPIL> accessed 27 June 2016. See also Nissim Bar-Yaacov, The 
Handling of International Disputes by Means of Inquiry (OUP 1974) 2. 
35 Merrills (n 6) 41. 
36 UN, Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States (UN Publication 1992) 28. 
37 Ibid, 28.  
38 Lucius Caflisch, ‘Cent Ans de Règlement Pacifique des Différends Interétatiques’ (2001) 288 
Recueil des Cours 245, 278. 
39 Art. 5 (1) provides that ‘The parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the 
provisions of this Convention relating to (l) fisheries (2) protection and preservation of the marine 
environment, (3) marine scientific research, or (4) navigation, including pollution from vessels and by 
dumping, may at any time agree to request a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with 
article 3 of this Annex to carry out an inquiry and establish the facts giving rise to the dispute.’ 
40 Edith Brown Weiss, ‘The Evolution of International Water Law’ (2007) 331 Recueil des Cours 163, 
285. 
 50 
1.3.2 The Use of Inquiry to Settle International Environmental Disputes—An 
Overview 
Inquiry is listed among the means of dispute settlement in several MEAs. 41 
Compulsory inquiry can be found in the Watercourses Convention.42 It is the situation 
where traditional means of dispute settlement have been resorted to and unsuccessful 
in resolving a dispute in this case the disputants can invoke unilaterally the 
compulsory inquiry procedure stipulated in Article 33 (3)-(9) of the Watercourses 
Convention. 
 Considering the practice of inquiry in settling international environmental 
disputes, the only two examples of inquiry that the author have come across were a 
dispute concerning the construction of India’s Baglihar hydroelectric dam on the 
Chenab River between Pakistan and India and the construction of the Danube-Black 
Sea Deep Water Navigation Route between Ukraine and Romania. The first case was 
referred to Professor Raymond Lafitte, a neutral Swiss civil engineer appointed by the 
World Bank.43 The investigation process began in July 2005 and came to an end in 
February 2007. During that period the parties submitted formal written complaints 
which were reminiscent of the process of judicial means of dispute settlement, namely 
the submission of a Memorial, a Counter-Memorial, a Reply and a Rejoinder to the 
neutral expert.44 The neutral expert proposed six technical solutions in response to 
Pakistan’s stance, including, inter alia, a maximum design flood and level of power 
                                                
41 See, for example, Art. XIII of the FAO International Plant Protection Convention (adopted 6 
December 1951, entered into force 3 April 1952) 150 UNTS 67; Art. 11-12 of the Convention on the 
Protection of the Environment between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden (adopted 19 February 
1974, entered into force 5 October 1976) 1902 UNTS 279, 13 ILM 511; Art. 3 (7) of the 1991 
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (adopted 25 February 
1991, entered into force 10 September 1997) 1989 UNTS 309 (hereinafter the Espoo Convention); Art. 
26 (2) of the Convention on the Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Waters of 
the Luso-Spanish River Basins (adopted 20 November 1998, entered into force 31 June 2000); Art. 5 of 
Annex VIII to UNCLOS; and Art. 33 (3)-(9) of the Watercourses Convention. 
42 Art. 33 (3) of the Watercourses Convention. 
43 Pakistan requested that an expert need be appointed by the World Bank and on 15 May 2005 it 
agreed upon the appointment of the neutral expert. See also Art. IX (2) of the Indus Waters Treaty. It 
should be noted that Sands and Peel view that this dispute was settled by conciliation, see Philippe 
Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (3 edn, CUP 2013) 161-162. 
44 See Raymond Lafitte, ‘Baglihar Dam and Hydroelectric Plant: Expert Determination on Points of 
Difference Referred by the Government of Pakistan under the Provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty’ 
(2007) 2, reprinted at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/223546-
1171996340255/BagliharSummary.pdf> accessed 16 February 2014.  
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intake.45 He also, in his final determination, confirmed the Indians’ rights to construct 
gated spillways under the treaty. The outcome was accepted by both parties.46 
 The second dispute arose under the Espoo Convention. The dispute was 
related to the construction and use of the Danube-Black Sea Deep Water Navigation 
Route between Ukraine and Romania.47 In this case, Ukraine approved the project of 
adjustment for navigation of the Bystroe channel which is situated in the Danube 
Delta. The project involved the dredging and deepening works that Romania, the 
neighbouring State, expressed concern in relation to the negative environmental 
impact of the project. Thus, by the initiation of Romania, the Inquiry Commission 
was established in accordance with Article 3 (7) and Annex No. IV of the Espoo 
Convention with the task to find whether or not there was significant adverse 
transboundary impact of the dredging in the Danube River and the dumping of 
dredged spoil on riparian land or at a dump site offshore at sea.48 The Commission 
found that there had been a likelihood of significant adverse transboundary impacts. It 
also proposed measures to mitigate the environmental impacts such as the 
introduction of modern dredging and dumping techniques. 49 
                                                
45 See generally in Salman M.A. Salman, ‘The Baglihar Difference and Its Resolution Process - A 
Triumph for the Indus Waters Treaty?’ (2008) 10 WP 105. 
46 See further in chapter 5, section 2.1.2.1. 
47 Espoo Inquiry Commission, Report on the Likely Significant adverse Transboundary Impacts of the 
Danube Black-Sea Navigation Route at the Border of Romania and Ukraine (2006), reprinted at 
<http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/eia/documents/inquiry/Final%20Report%2010%20July%
202006.pdf> accessed 17 February 2014 (hereinafter the Report of the Espoo Inquiry Commission). 
48 Art 3 (7) provides that ‘if those Parties cannot agree whether there is likely to be a significant 
adverse transboundary impact, any such Party may submit that question to an inquiry commission in 
accordance with the provisions of Appendix IV to advise on the likelihood of significant adverse 
transboundary impact. 
49 See further in chapter 5, section 2.1.2.2. 
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2. JUDICIAL MEANS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
2.1 Arbitration 
2.1.1 Conspectus: The Nature of Arbitration  
Arbitration can be described as ‘the settlement of differences between States by 
judges of their own choice and on the basis of respect for law’.50 The disputing parties 
submit their dispute to arbitral tribunals either jointly by the virtue of a special 
agreement (compromis) concluded between them after the emergence of a dispute or 
by one party unilaterally referring the dispute to arbitration under a dispute settlement 
clause in an existing bilateral or multilateral treaty providing for the settlement of 
future disputes. The parties retain a high degree of control over the process of settling 
their dispute. This can be seen from the power of the parties to form an arbitral 
tribunal, the freedom of the parties to choose the procedures to be followed in the 
arbitration process and the choice of law applicable to the case. 51  This leads 
Holtzmann to observe that the essence of the nature of arbitration is ‘party 
autonomy’.52 In addition, the awards rendered by arbitrators are legally binding as 
between the parties who are obliged to implement them in good faith.53 
2.1.2 The Use of Arbitration to Settle International Environmental Disputes—An 
Overview 
It is common for MEAs to include arbitration as one of the array of dispute settlement 
mechanisms.54 Interestingly, in UNCLOS, arbitration plays an important role as the 
default procedure in a case when the parties to a dispute have not made a choice of the 
dispute settlement mechanisms that are available under Article 287 (1) or if they have 
                                                
50 See the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier between Turkey and Iraq) (Advisory Opinion) PCIJ Rep Series 
B. No 12, 26.  
51 M.C.W. Pinto, ‘The Prospects for International Arbitration: Inter-State Disputes’ in A.H.A. Soons 
(ed), International Arbitration: Past and Prospects (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1990) 92. 
52 Howard M. Holtzmann, ‘Some Reflections on the Nature of Arbitration’ (1993) 6 LJIL 265, 266. 
53 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of its 5th Session (1 June - 14 
August 1953)’ UN Doc A/CN.4/Ser. A/1953/Add. 1, YbILC, 1953, Vol. II, 202. See also Oscar 
Schachter, ‘The Enforcement of International Judicial and Arbitral Decisions’ (1960) 54 AJIL 1, 2. 
54 See, for example, Art. 14 (2) (b) of the UNFCCC; Art. 27 (3) (a) and Annex II Part 1 of the CBD; 
Art. 32 (1) of the OSPAR; Art. 33 (2) of the Watercourses Convention; and Art. 287 (1), Annex VII 
and VIII to UNCLOS. Arbitration may be the only mechanism after the dispute cannot be settled by 
negotiation see Art.13 and Annex B of the Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution 
by Chlorides (adopted 3 December 1976, entered into force 1 February 1979) 16 ILM 242. 
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not chosen the same procedure: in such cases, the dispute shall be submitted to an 
ordinary arbitral tribunal under Annex VII.55 If both States parties to a dispute 
concerning fisheries or protection and preservation of the marine environment have 
chosen Annex VIII as a means of settlement, the case will be brought to special 
arbitral tribunal for the purpose of ensuring that such marine environmental disputes 
may be handled by a tribunal composed of members who are selected on the basis of 
their environmental expertise.56   
 Arbitration has been used to settle several environmental disputes since the 
nineteenth century. International environmental arbitration may be divided into three 
types depending on the will of the parties, which can be described as follows:  
2.1.2.1 Ad Hoc Arbitration 
There appear to have been four ad hoc arbitrations of environmental disputes. The 
Bering Sea Fur-Seals Arbitration between the UK and the US dealt with the right to 
protect fur seals on the high seas,57 the Trail Smelter Arbitration between Canada and 
the US with the emissions from smelters causing air pollution,58 the Lac Lanoux 
Arbitration between France and Spain which dealt with the utilisation of the waters of 
Lake Lanoux 59  and the Iron Rhine Railway Arbitration with the issue of the 
reactivation of a railway line from Belgium to Germany via the Netherlands.60   
2.1.2.2 Arbitration Constituted in Accordance with Annex VII of the UNCLOS 
There have been four arbitrations of marine environmental disputes since UNCLOS 
entered into force in 1994. The subject matter of these disputes are Japan’s unilateral 
Experimental Fishing Programme which was contrary to the Convention for the 
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna in the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases,61 the 
construction and operation of the mixed oxide fuel (MOX) plant in the MOX Plant 
case,62 the effects of land reclamation works having a significant impact on the 
marine environment in the Land Reclamation case.63 Annex VII arbitration was 
                                                
55 Art. 287 (3) of UNCLOS. 
56 Art. 1-2 of Annex VIII to UNCLOS. 
57 See further in chapter 5, section 2.1.3.1 (1) 
58 See further in chapter 5, section 2.1.3.1 (2) 
59 See further in chapter 5, section 2.1.3.1 (3) 
60 See further in chapter 5, section 2.1.3.1 (4) 
61 See further in chapter 5, section 2.1.5.2 (1) 
62 See further in chapter 5, section 2.1.5.2 (2). It should be noted that in this case the PCA acted as the 
registry. 
63 See further in chapter 5, section 2.1.5.2 (3). The PCA also served as the registry.  
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resorted to in the case which was concerned with the establishment of a marine 
protected area (MPA) in the Chagos Archipelago case. One of the points of 
disagreement was that the establishment of MPA around the Chagos Archipelago 
declared by the UK in which Mauritius argued that such declaration was contrary to 
obligations under UNCLOS, since the UK was not a coastal State.64 It should be 
pointed out that of the four UNCLOS arbitrations, only the Chagos MPA Arbitration 
case resulted in a decision on the merits. The tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction 
in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case; Ireland eventually withdrew its application in the 
MOX Plant case; and the parties reached an out of court settlement in the Land 
Reclamation case.  
 In 2016, the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal rendered its decision in the South 
China Sea matter. In this case, one of the Philippines’ submissions was concerned 
with the protection and preservation of the marine environment. 65 The Philippines 
alleged that China had violated several environmental obligations set out in UNCLOS 
since it had engaged in the harvesting of endangered species (giant clams).66 Since 
China failed to prevent such harmful activities, the Arbitral Tribunal held that it has 
breached its obligations under Article 192 and 194 (5) of UNCLOS.67 Moreover, 
China also engaged in the land reclamation and construction of artificial islands, 
installations and structures in such a way as to pollute the marine environment and 
caused damage to the coral reef ecosystem which, in the view of the Arbitral 
Tribunal, China had breached Articles 192, 194 (1) and 194 (5) UNCLOS.68 China 
had also failed to cooperate and coordinate with the other States bordering the South 
China Sea with regard to the protection and preservation of the marine environment 
and failed to communicate of the potential effects of the activities on the marine 
environment. Thus, China had not fulfilled its obligation under Article 206 of 
UNCLOS.69   
 
                                                
64 Chagos MPA Arbitration, Memorial of Mauritius, Vol 1, paras.1.15 and 7.98. 
65 In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration  (Philippines v. China) (Award) (2016) (hereinafter 
the South China Sea Arbitration), electronic version available at https://pca-cpa.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf (accessed 22 November 2016).  
66 Ibid, para. 817. 
67 Ibid, para. 964. 
68 Ibid, para. 983. 
69 Ibid, para. 991. 
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2.1.2.3 Non-UNCLOS Disputes Referred Unilaterally to Arbitration 
There have been two arbitrations of environmental disputes.70 In 2003, there was a 
dispute the between the UK and Ireland concerning the access to environmental 
information as defined by OSPAR Convention.71 By denying Ireland access to the full 
reports concerning the authorisation of a new nuclear facility so as to hinder Ireland to 
be able consider the impacts which the MOX plant might have on the marine 
environment, it claimed that the UK had breached its obligation under Article 9 (2) of 
the OSPAR Convention.72 Recently, the arbitral tribunal has rendered its awards in 
the case concerning the allocation of the waters of the Indus River in the Indus Waters 
Kishenganga Arbitration, the first arbitration since the conclusion of the Indus Waters 
Treaty. The dispute was about the interpretation of the Indus waters which the 
tribunal was required to determine whether India had breached its obligations with 
regard to India’s hydro-electric project and the inter-tributary transfer and bring the 
reservoir level of a run-of-river Plant below Dead Storage Level.73 
2.2 International Courts 
2.2.1 Conspectus: The Nature of International Courts 
The parties to a dispute may submit their claims to be decided by a pre-established 
and permanent international judicial institution, whether they are at a global or a 
regional level. Tomuschat provides four criteria for determining the qualification of 
being an international tribunals that are: 1) tribunals have to apply law 2) the law to 
be applied is international law 3) judges should be independent and 4) judgments of 
international courts are final and are legally binding upon the parties.74 There are two 
                                                
70 It should be noted that there was the Rhine Chloride arbitration concerning the calculation of the 
costs of pollution control amongst all the riparian States of the Rhine. This case will not be discussed 
because the central of the dispute was not primary about the protection of the environment. 
71 Dispute Concerning Access to Information under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention between 
Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Ireland v. UK) (2003) 23 
RIAA 59 (hereinafter OSPAR Arbitration). See further in chapter 5, section 2.1.3.3 (1). 
72 Art. 9 (2) requires States parties to make available information ‘on the state of the maritime area 
[and] on activities or measures adversely affecting or likely to affect it’. 
73 Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, para. 2. See further in chapter 5, section 2.1.3.3 (2). 
74 See Christian Tomuschat, ‘International Courts and Tribunals with Regionally Restricted and/or 
Specialized Jurisdiction’ in Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law 
(ed), Judicial Settlement of International Disputes: International Court of Justice, Other Courts and 
Tribunals, Arbitration and Conciliation (Springer Verlag 1974) 290-311. It should be noted that 
Tomuschat’s four criteria apply equally to arbitral tribunals. The crucial distinction between arbitral 
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international courts with the competence to deal with international environmental 
disputes—the ICJ and the ITLOS. In resorting to international courts, a dispute is to 
be judged by impartial persons who are not selected by the parties just as they please 
(with an exception in the case of judge ad hoc). In contradistinction to arbitral rules in 
which the parties may choose or modify the rules of the procedure, normally the rules 
of international courts cannot be changed by the parties; therefore, the cases will be 
heard in accordance with the detailed procedures established by an international legal 
instruments in advance. For the rules of the ITLOS, however, the parties may propose 
modifications or additions to such rules for their particular case, albeit within certain 
limits.75 
 As far as the jurisdiction of international courts is concerned, the consent of 
the parties is still essential for them to have the jurisdiction to rule on the merits of a 
dispute.76 In the case of the ICJ, States may conclude a special agreement referring 
their dispute to the Court, or they may give general consent to the settlement of a 
category of international disputes by means of an optional clause declaration, so that 
the parties automatically accept the Court’s jurisdiction in relation to any dispute of 
that category or those categories that arises in the future.77 In addition, the jurisdiction 
of the courts can be based on compromissory clauses provided for in particular 
treaties that are in force.78 For the ITLOS, the jurisdiction comprises all disputes and 
all applications submitted to the ITLOS in accordance with UNCLOS or in any case 
submitted pursuant to any other agreement conferring jurisdiction on the ITLOS 
which is accepted by all the parties to that case.79 
 For the ICJ, only States can be parties to contentious cases.80 On the contrary, 
the jurisdiction of the ITLOS is not limited to States, but includes jurisdiction over all 
States parties to UNCLOS, which include three non-State parties, viz. the EU, Cook 
                                                                                                                                      
tribunals and international courts is that the latter are permanent bodies with pre-appointed judges and 
a pre-determined procedure. See also Art. 59-60 of the ICJ Statute.  
75 Art. 48 of the Rules of the ITLOS, ITLOS/8 (17 March 2009) (adopted 27 April 2005) reprinted in 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Basic Texts (Martinus Nijhoff Leiden 2005) 15. 
76 Status of Eastern Carelia (Advisory Opinion) PCIJ Rep Series B No 5, 27.  
77 Art. 36 (2)-(5) of the ICJ Statute. There are 70 States, at the time of writing, which had accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, available at <http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3> accessed 13 March 2014.  
78 Art. 36 (1) of the ICJ Statute 
79 Art. 286 and Arts. 20 and 21 of Annex VI of UNCLOS. 
80 Art. 34 of the ICJ Statute.  
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Islands and Niue.81 With regard to disputes over areas beyond national jurisdiction, 
the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber not only must have jurisdiction over disputes between 
States but it can also settle a dispute between States which are party to the UNCLOS 
and the International Seabed Authority (the Authority).82 Furthermore, the Enterprise 
and natural or juridical persons may also have a standing, either as plaintiffs or 
defendants, before this Chamber.83 
 There is also a possibility for third party intervention, under certain 
circumstances, in the ICJ and the ITLOS.84 The participations of third party States in 
the proceedings is based on the fact that their legal interests may be affected by the 
decision in the case (discretionary intervention) or the interpretation of an 
international agreement to which third party States are also a party (intervention as of 
right).85  
 During the course of the proceedings, international courts may, upon the 
request of one party, issue provisional measures with a view to preserving the rights 
of either party, for the sake of preventing actions that might involve irreparable 
consequences before the conclusion of the proceedings or, as in the case of the 
ITLOS, preventing serious harm to the environment or the fish stocks.86  
2.2.2 The Use of International Courts to Settle International Environmental 
Disputes—An Overview 
2.2.2.1 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
The first environmental case was the Nuclear Tests cases which were brought before 
the Court in 1973. In this case, an environmental aspect can be seen from the 
                                                
81 See for more details in Tullio Treves, ‘International Organization As Parties to Contentious Cases: 
Selected Aspects’ in Cesare Romano, Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Ruth MacKenzie (eds), 
International Organizations and International Dispute Settlement: Trends and Prospects 
(Transnational Publishers 2002) 39-43. 
82 Art. 187 of UNCLOS. 
83 Art. 187 (c) of UNCLOS. 
84 Art. 62-63 of the ICJ Statute; Art. 81-86 of the 1978 Rules of the ICJ (adopted 14 April 1978, 
entered into force 1 July 1978); Art. 31 and 32 of the Annex VI to UNCLOS.  
85 See more details in Andreas  Zimmermann, ‘International Courts and Tribunals: Intervention in 
Proceedings’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(OUP 2006) online version available at 
<http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e37?rskey=y9t0G9&result=1&prd=EPIL> accessed 27 June 2016. 
86 Art. 41 of the ICJ Statute, Art. 291 (1) of UNCLOS, Art. 31 (2) of the Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks (adopted 4 August 1995, entered into force 11 December 2001) 2167 UNTS 3 
(hereinafter the 1995 Agreement). 
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arguments put forward by Australia and New Zealand in relation to French 
atmospheric nuclear testing. According to Australia, the radioactive contamination of 
the environment, such as the soil, the waters of the oceans, lakes, rivers, reservoirs 
and vegetation, may be considered a result of the atmospheric testing of nuclear 
weapons.87 The Court found the case to be inadmissible as there was no dispute due to 
France’s unilateral undertaking to cease atmospheric nuclear testing.88 Twenty-one 
years after the Court delivered its judgment in 1974, France resumed nuclear tests 
which provoked New Zealand to institute proceedings against France again in 1995 
with a view to requesting the Court to examine the situation concerning tests on the 
basis of paragraph 63 of the ICJ’s 1974 judgment.89 It alleged that without the EIA 
having been undertaken, the underground nuclear tests were illegal in international 
law and they might cause an adverse effect to the marine environment.90 However, the 
Court found that the 1974 case was concerned with atmospheric tests whereas the 
1995 case was concerned with underground nuclear tests, so the Court dismissed the 
case on the basis that paragraph 63 of the 1974 Judgment had not been affected.91 In 
1989 the Nauru case was brought before the Court in relation to the effects of 
phosphate mining on the island of Nauru.92 It alleged in its Memorial that Australia, 
as a Trusteeship Authority, had caused ‘the systematic destruction of the Nauruan 
environment’ by phosphate mining.93 Nevertheless, the case was settled by diplomatic 
negotiations in which Nauru received $107 million Australian dollars and assistance 
from Australia.94 Therefore, neither of the cases discussed so far did the Court have to 
apply international environmental law or settle the dispute. 
 The Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case between Slovakia and Hungary might also be 
considered as an international environmental case, since one of the essential point was 
                                                
87 1974 Nuclear Tests cases, (ICJ Pleadings), Vol 1, 3, 5-7. 
88 1974 Nuclear Tests cases, para. 65. See further in chapter 5, section 2.1.4.1 (1). 
89 Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's 
Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case (Order) [1995] ICJ 
Rep 288 (hereinafter 1995 Nuclear Test case). Para. 63 reads as follows ‘However, the Court observes 
that if the basis of this Judgment were to be affected, the Applicant could request an examination of the 
situation in accordance with the provisions of the Statute’. 
90 1995 Nuclear Test case, Further Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures by New Zealand, 
para. 4. 
91 1995 Nuclear Test case, para. 68 (1).  
92 Case Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia) (Preliminary Objections) 
[1992] ICJ Rep 240 (hereinafter Nauru case).  
93 See Nauru case, Memorial of the Republic of Nauru, Vol.1, para. 100 and Memorial of the Republic 
of Nauru, ICJ Pleadings, Vol 1 paras. 206-213. 
94 Agreement between Australia and the Republic of Nauru for the Settlement of the Case in the 
International Court of Justice concerning certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (1993) 32 ILM 1474. 
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concerned with the failure of Slovakia to respect the environmental obligations 
contained in Article 15 of the 1977 Treaty, in the sense that the construction of the 
dams might, as Hungary argued, have adverse effects on the ecosystem of the Danube 
River.95 Hungary could therefore suspend or abandon certain works by invoking a 
state of ecological necessity.96  Briefly, the Court held that Hungary could not 
convince the Court that there was a real grave and imminent peril so that it could not 
invoke a state of ecological necessity to justify its failure to comply with its treaty 
obligations.97 
 International disputes concerning the environment continue to burgeon in the 
ICJ, as can be seen in the Pulp Mills case between Argentina and Uruguay concerning 
the authorisation of Uruguay to construct pulp mills which, as Argentina asserted, 
violated Uruguay’s obligations to prevent pollution and protect the quality of the 
waters of the River Uruguay and its ecosystem provided in the 1975 Statute of the 
River Uruguay.98 The central issue of this case was whether or not Uruguay had 
breached its procedural obligations, such as its obligation to inform, notify and 
negotiate and fulfill its substantive obligations, such as the obligation to act with due 
diligence. The Court held that Uruguay had breached its procedural obligations but 
not its substantive obligations.99  
 Transboundary pollution was also at issue in the Aerial Herbicide Spraying 
case between Ecuador and Colombia. In this case, Ecuador argued that the conduct of 
Colombia in spraying herbicides to destroy coca and poppy plantations in the border 
area had caused damage to people, plants, animals, indigenous communities and the 
environment of Ecuador.100 However, this case was settled by means of negotiations 
and was removed from the list.101  
                                                
95 See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, Memorial of the Republic of Hungary, Vol. 1, paras. 7.17-7.21. See 
further in chapter 5, section 2.1.4.1. 
96 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, para. 39. 
97 Ibid, paras. 54, 57. 
98 See Pulp Mills case, Memorial of Argentina, Vol.1, 120-138. See further in chapter 5, section 
2.1.4.1. 
99 Pulp Mills case, para. 282. 
100 Aerial Herbicide Spraying case, Memorial of Colombia, paras. 6.54-6.134. 
101 Aerial Herbicide Spraying case, (Order) [2013], reprinted at <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/138/17528.pdf > accessed 23 March 2014. See also the Agreement concluded 
between two countries, reprinted at 
<http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/sites/default/files/Litigio%20Nicaragua-Col/acuerdo_firmado.pdf> 
accessed 23 March 2014. 
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 The Whaling case between Australia and Japan, with New Zealand 
intervening, was also an environmental case concerning the protection of whales.102 In 
this case, Australia asserted that Japan had failed to observe its obligation under the 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling not to kill whales for 
commercial purposes by conducting the research programme called JARPA II.103 The 
most recent environmental cases in the ICJ are the Construction of a Road in Costa 
Rica along the San Juan River case instituted by Nicaragua against Costa Rica and 
the Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area case instituted by 
Costa Rica against Nicaragua. In the first case, Nicaragua contended that Costa Rica’s 
construction of a road running parallel and in extremely close proximity to the 
southern bank of the San Juan River threatened to destroy its fragile ecosystem, 
including the adjacent biosphere reserves and internationally-protected wetlands.104 
The Court held that the construction of road caused a risk of significant transboundary 
harm so that Costa Rica was required to carry out an EIA.105 In the second case, Costa 
Rica claimed that the ongoing and planned dredging and the construction of the canal 
carried out by Nicaragua would seriously affect the flow of water to the San Juan 
River, including the wetlands and the national wildlife protected areas located in the 
region, which is contrary to the obligations contained in the 1971 Ramsar 
Convention.106 The Court held that there was no risk of significant transboundary 
harm to the River.107 
2.2.2.2 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) 
The ITLOS has had only one environmental dispute referred to it—the Swordfish 
case. The case was concerned about fisheries for swordfish but the ITLOS did not 
give a judgment on the merits because the case was settled by the parties and 
withdrawn.108 The ITLOS has made orders of provisional measures under Article 290 
(5) in three cases referred to arbitration— the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, the MOX 
Plant case and the Land Reclamation case. The Southern Bluefin Tuna cases 
concerned an issue relating to a high seas fisheries dispute. The provisional 
                                                
102 See chapter 2, section 3.1.3. 
103 Whaling case, Memorial of Australia, Vol.1, 3. 
104 Certain Activities/Construction of a Road cases, Memorial of Nicaragua, Vol.1, 149-151. 
105 Certain Activities/Construction of a Road cases, para. 156.  
106 Certain Activities/Construction of a Road cases, Memorial of Costa Rica, Vol.1, 202. 
107 Certain Activities/Construction of a Road cases, para. 105. 
108 See chapter 2, section 3.1.1. 
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proceedings were considered by the ITLOS pending the constitution of an Annex VII 
tribunal. In this case, Australia and Japan argued that Japan’s conducting of a 
unilateral Experimental Fishing Programme (EFP) in 1998 and 1999 had violated its 
obligations under the UNCLOS which deal with cooperation over the conservation of 
highly migratory species.109 Australia and New Zealand asked the ITLOS to prescribe 
provisional measures and the ITLOS issued provisional measures in August 1999 by 
ordering the parties inter alia to refrain from conducting any EFP and to resume 
negotiations without delay.110 
 In the MOX Plant case and the Land Reclamation case, the ITLOS also played 
an important role in prescribing provisional measures. For the first case, the ITLOS 
held that Ireland and the UK shall cooperate and consult with each other with a view 
to exchanging information, monitoring risks or effects of the operation of the MOX 
plant and devising measures to prevent pollution of the marine environment.111 For 
the second case, the ITLOS, like the MOX plant case, ordered the parties, inter alia, 
to cooperate and enter into consultations in order to establish a group of experts to 
conduct a study with regard to the effects of land reclamation and to propose 
measures to deal with any adverse effect arising from land reclamation.112  
3. NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES 
3.1 Conspectus: The Nature of Non-Compliance Procedures 
A number of MEAs have established groundbreaking treaty-based compliance 
mechanisms known as Non-Compliance Procedures (NCPs) in addition to 
conventional dispute settlement clause. According to the UNEP’s Guidelines on 
Compliance with and Enforcement of MEAs, NCPs can be perceived as ‘a vehicle to 
identify possible situations of non-compliance at an early stage and the causes of non-
compliance, and to formulate appropriate responses including, addressing and/or 
                                                
109 ITLOS, Pleadings, Minutes of Public Sittings and Documents (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004) 
17, 82, Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (Statement of Claim and Grounds on Which It Is Based, 15 July 
1999). 
110 Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, paras. 90 (d) and (e)  
111 MOX Plant case, para. 89. 
112 Land Reclamation case, para. 106.  
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correcting the state of non-compliance without delay’.113 The objectives of NCPs, as 
Fitzmaurice describes them, ‘involve the treatment of compliance, and the effects of 
non-compliance, with treaty obligations in a different manner to that which has been 
traditional in international law’.114   
 NCPs deal with two situations: 1) A situation where the parties have the 
potential to be in a state of non-compliance with their obligations and 2) a situation 
where the parties have actually breached their substantive obligations set out in the 
MEAs and the other parties or treaty bodies raise such breach before NCPs under the 
condition that the State alleged to be in non-compliance does contest that allegation. 
The first situation is concerned with dispute avoidance whereas the second situation is 
concerned with dispute settlement. It is only the second situation that falls within the 
scope of this study. NCPs can be found in several MEAs which deal with, for 
example, marine environment protection, 115 marine pollution prevention, 116 
endangered species protection,117 wildlife and natural habitats,118 air pollution,119 
ozone protection,120 climate change,121 hazardous wastes,122 hazardous pesticides,123 
                                                
113 See para. 14 (d) (2) of the Guideline on Compliance with and Enforcement of MEAs, reprinted at 
<http://www.unep.org/delc/Portals/119/UNEP.Guidelines.on.Compliance.MEA.pdf> accessed 5 April 
2014. 
114 Malgosia  Fitzmaurice, ‘International Protection of the Environment’ (2001) 293 Recueil des Cours 
9, 348.  
115 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the 
Mediterranean (adopted 10 June 1995, entered into force 9 July 2004) Legal basis for establishing the 
procedure: Art. 18, 27; Decision IG 17/2: Procedures and mechanisms on compliance under the 
Barcelona Convention and its Protocols, UNEP(DEPI)/MED IG.17/10 Annex V. 
116 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 
(adopted 13 November 1972, entered into force 30 August 1975) 1046 UNTS 138; Legal basis for 
establishing the procedure: Art. 11; Procedures and Mechanisms Pursuant to Art. 11 of the 1996 
Protocol to the London Convention 1992, Doc. LC 29/17(14 December 2007), Annex 7 (hereinafter the 
London NCP). 
117 CITES; Legal basis for establishing the procedure: Art. XII, XIII; with Appendices I–III; Resolution 
Conf. 11.3 (Rev. CoP16) and Resolution Conf. 14.3 (hereinafter the CITES NCP). 
118 Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (adopted 19 September 
1979, entered into force 1 June 1982) 1284 UNTS 209; Legal basis for establishing the procedure: Art 
13-14; Decision T-PVS (93) 22 Implementation of the Bern Convention: Opening and Closing of Files 
and Follow-Up of Recommendations (3 November 1993). 
119 LRTAP; Legal basis for establishing the procedure: Art. 2 (a), Report of the 14th Session of the 
Executive Body, Decision 1997/2 on the Implementation Committee, Its Structure and Functions and 
Procedures for Review of Compliance, Doc. ECE/EB.AIR/53 (7 January 1998), Annex III, 28-31. See 
also the amendment in Decision 2006/2 on the Implementation Committee, its Structure and Functions 
and Procedures for Review of Compliance, Doc. ECE/EB.AIR/89/Add.1 (5 February 2007), 4 
(hereinafter the LRTAP NCP). 
120 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Ozone Convention) (adopted 22 March 
1985, entered into force 22 September 1988) 1513 UNTS 324; and its Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol) (adopted 16 September 1987, entered into force 1 
January 1989) 1522 UNTS 3; Legal basis for establishing the procedure: Art. 8; Report of the 4th 
Meeting of the MOP, UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, Annex IV  (25 November 1992, 44-46 and amended by 
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EIA, 124  access to environmental information, 125  watercourses, 126  biosafety, 127  and 
plant genetic resources.128 
 The special characteristics of NCPS that can be distinguished from the other 
forms of non-judicial and judicial means of dispute settlement mentioned in the above 
sections may be identified as follows: 
 Firstly, NCPs are usually established, as specific subsidiary bodies of MEAs, 
by a Conference of the Parties (COP),129 a Meeting of the Parties (MOP)130 or by the 
                                                                                                                                      
Decision X/10, Report of the 10th Meeting of the MOP, UNEP/OzL.Pro.10/9 (3 December 1998) 23-
24 (hereinafter Montreal NCP). 
121 The UNFCCC (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107 and the 
Kyoto Protocol; Legal basis for establishing the procedure: Art. 18; Decision 24/CP.7 Report of the 
COP of the UNFCCC, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3 (21 January 2002) 64-77, and see Decision 27/CMP.1 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (30 March 2006) 92-103 (hereinafter the Kyoto NCP). 
122 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal (Basel Convention)(done 22 March 1989, entered into force 5 May 1992) 1673 UNTS 57; 
Legal basis for establishing the procedure: Art. 15 (5)(e); COP Decision VI/12, UNEP/CHW.6/40 (10 
February 2003) 45-50 (hereinafter the Basel NCP). 
123 Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals 
and Pesticides in International Trade (done 10 September 1998, entered into force 24 February 2004) 
2244 UNTS 337; Legal basis for establishing the procedure: Art. 17; Decision RC-3/4 Draft text of the 
Procedures and Mechanisms on Compliance with the Rotterdam Convention, Doc. 
UNEP/FAO/RC/COP.3/26 (10 November 2006), Annex, 27 (pending) (hereinafter the Rotterdam 
NCP). 
124 Espoo Convention; and its Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Espoo 
Convention (SEA Protocol) (adopted 21 May 2003, not yet entered into force); Legal basis for 
establishing the procedure: Art 11 (2); Decision II/4 on Review of Compliance, Doc. ECE/MP.EIA/4 
(7 August 2001), Annex IV, 72-76 which was revised by Decision III/2 on Review of Compliance, 
Doc. ECE/MP.EIA/6 (13 September 2004), Annex II (hereinafter the Espoo NCP). 
125 Aarhus Convention; Legal basis for establishing the procedure: Art. 15; Decision I/7 on Review of 
Compliance, Doc. ECE/ MP.PP/2/Add.8 (2 April 2004) as amended by Decision II/5 on General Issue 
of Compliance, Doc. ECE/ MP.PP/2005/2/Add.6 and its Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer 
Registers (Kiev Protocol) (adopted 21 May 2003, entered into force 8 October 2009); Legal basis for 
establishing the procedure: Art. 22; Decision I/2 on Review of Compliance, Doc. ECE/MP.PRTR/2010 
(20-22 April 2010) (hereinafter the Aarhus NCP). 
126 Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes (adopted 17 June 1999, entered into force 4 August 2005) 38 
ILM 1708; Legal basis for establishing the procedure: Art. 15 of the Protocol; Decision I/2 on Review 
of Compliance, Doc. ECE/MP.WH/2/Add.3 – EUR/06/5069385/1/Add.3 (3 July 2007) (hereinafter the 
Water and Health NCP). 
127 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the CBD (Cartagena Protocol)(done 29 January 2000, entered 
into force 11 September 2003) 2226 UNTS 208; Legal basis for establishing the procedure: Art. 34; 
Decision BS-I/7, Report of the 1st Meeting of the COP, Doc. UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/1/15 (27 
February 2004), Annex I, 98-101 (hereinafter the Cartagena NCP). 
128 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA)(signed 3 
November 2001, entered into force 31 March 2004), 2400 UNTS 303; Legal basis for establishing the 
procedure: Art. 19 (3)(e), 21; Report of the 4th Session of the Governing Body of the ITPGRFA 
IT/GB-4/11/Report, Resolution 2/2011 Procedures and Operational Mechanisms to Promote 
Compliance and Address Issues of Non-Compliance, Appendix A.2 (hereinafter the ITPGRFA NCP). 
129 See for example Art.18 of the Kyoto Protocol which states that ‘The Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session, approve appropriate and 
effective procedures and mechanisms to determine and to address cases of non-compliance with the 
provisions of this Protocol…’. 
130 See Art. 15 of the Aarhus Convention which provides that the MOP shall establish the NCP.  
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Governing Body of the treaty.131 In some cases, however, the COP/MOP itself may be 
assigned to monitor the State parties’ compliance.132 In this sense, non-compliance 
issues will be handled by a mechanism that can be conceived as a collective response 
system to a State’s non-compliance or a multilateral supervision by the parties.133 Due 
to the fact that NCPs are established as part of particular MEAs, NCPs are some kind 
of ‘internal compliance control procedure’134  or ‘endogenous enforcement’135  as 
opposed to a third party dispute settlement which can be view as external procedure.  
 Secondly, NCPs can be characterised as ‘non-confrontational’ means to 
ensure, facilitate and promote compliance with the obligations set out in the MEAs.136 
Apart from this non-confrontational character, they may also be described as non-
adversarial, cooperative, non-judicial or legally non-binding mechanisms. The 
underlying idea of the establishment of the NCPs is that sometimes the source of non-
compliance may come not from the unwillingness of States to comply but their 
inability to comply due to lack of the necessary technical expertise or resources.137 
Therefore, NCPs are designed to assist the relevant non-complying parties to return to 
compliance rather than incriminating non-complying parties. That is to say, insofar as 
NCPs deal with disputes, they provide mechanisms that are softer than traditional 
adjudicative means of dispute settlement which are adversarial and confrontational in 
                                                
131 See Art. 21 of ITPGRFA. See general discussion concerning institutional arrangements in MEAs in 
Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, ‘Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law’ (2000) 94 AJIL 623, 
628, 643-647. 
132 See, for example, Art. 23 (4) of the CBD; and Art. XI (3) of the CITES. 
133 Geir Ulfstein, ‘Dispute Resolution, Compliance Control and Enforcement in International 
Environmental Law’ in Geir Ulfstein, Thilo Marauhn and Andreas Zimmermann (eds), Making 
Treaties Work: Human Rights, Environment and Arms Control (OUP 2007) 132; Susana  Borràs 
Pentinat, ‘Comparative Analysis of Selected Compliance Procedures under Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements ’ in Sandrine Maljean-Dubois and Lavanya Rajamani (eds), La Mise en Oeuvre du Droit 
International de l'Environnement = Implementation of International Environmental Law (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2011) 328; Alan Boyle and James Harrison, ‘Judicial Settlement of International 
Environmental Disputes: Current Problems’ (2013) 4 JIDS 245, 257. 
134 Günther Handl, ‘Compliance Control Mechanisms and International Environmental Obligations’ 
(1997) 5 Tulane J Intl & Comp L 29, 32. 
135 Antonio Cardesa-Salzmann, ‘Constitutionalising Secondary Rules in Global Environmental 
Regimes: Non-Compliance Procedures and the Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements’ (2012) 24 JEL 103, 111. 
136 Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘Means of Ensuring Compliance with and Enforcement of International 
Environmental Law’ (1998) 272 Recueil des Cours 9, 110. 
137 Ronald Mitchell, ‘Compliance Theory: An Overview’ in James Cameron, Jacob Werksman and 
Peter Roderick (eds), Improving Comliance with International Environmental Law (Earthscan 
Publications 1996) 12; Abram Chayes and Antonia H.  Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with 
International Regulatory Agreements (HUP 1995) 13-14. See also para. 5 of the Guideline on 
Communications from the Public published by the MOP to the Protocol on Water and Health which it 
clearly states that ‘The general assumption is that a situation of non-compliance with the Protocol by a 
Party is not the result of its intention to breach the Protocol’s provisions.’  
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character.138 The treaty bodies whose duty is to address the non-compliance issue may 
have a variety of names, such as the compliance committee,139 implementation 
committee140 and standing committee.141 Although they have different names, their 
duties are similar, that is, to deal with compliance with treaty obligations ‘aimed at 
furthering the implementation’ of the MEAs.142 Compliance bodies can vary in the 
nature, size and qualification of the members. All the contracting parties may be 
members of these compliance bodies.143 In some cases, the members are not States 
but legal, scientific or economic experts sitting in a personal capacity.144 Even NGOs 
and industry members can also become members.145 
3.2 The Use of Non-Compliance Procedures—An Overview 
In this section, only non-compliance proceedings that are initiated by States against 
other States will be reviewed (non-compliance proceedings triggered by non-State 
entities and treaty institutions will not be discussed), since they fall within the 
meaning of international environmental disputes provided in this thesis.  
3.2.1 The Espoo Convention 
In 2007 Romania alleged that Ukraine had failed to make available to Romania the 
EIA documentation concerning the Bystroe which was likely to have a significant 
adverse transboundary impact on the environment and that this amounted to non-
compliance by Ukraine with its obligations under the Convention and Ukraine denied 
that it was in non-compliance.146 The Implementation Committee (IC) found that 
Ukraine had failed to comply fully with Article 2 (2) of the Espoo Convention by not 
                                                
138 Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Catherine Redgwell, ‘Environmental Non-Compliance Procedures and 
International Law’ (2000) 31 Netherlands Ybk Intl L 35, 39. 
139 As in Kyoto Protocol. 
140 As in LRTAP. 
141 As in CITES. 
142 Tullio Treves, ‘Introduction’ in Tullio Treves and others (eds), Non-Compliance Procedures and 
Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreement (T.M.C. Asser Press 
2009) 2. 
143 See, for example, the Bureau of the Ramsar Convention and the Standing Committee of the Bern 
Convention. 
144 See, for example, the Barcelona Convention Compliance Committee; the Compliance Group of 
London Protocol; the Kyoto Compliance Committee; and the Aarhus Compliance Committee.  
145 See, for example, the Committee of the World Heritage Convention and the International Review 
Panel of the Dolphin Conservation Agreement. 
146 MOP4 (2008) Romania v. Ukraine (Findings and recommendations further to a submission by 
Romania regarding Ukraine (EIA/IC/S/1)) [27 February 2008] ECE/MP.EIA/2008/6, para. 6. See 
further in chapter 5, section 2.1.5.1 (1). 
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providing a sufficiently clearly regulatory framework in terms of the information 
concerning the decisions for approving the activities and EIA procedures.147  
 In 2009, Ukraine submitted a complaint to the IC alleging that Romanian 
activities related to inland waterways in the Romanian sector of the Danube Delta, 
such as the dumping of dredged materials into the river, caused significant adverse 
impacts on the environment of the territory of Ukraine, as well as on related 
ecosystem components which fall under Appendix I to the Espoo Convention (item 
9).148Ukraine denied those allegations. The IC found that Romania had not breached 
this obligation because the submission by Ukraine proved to be unsubstantiated.149 
However, even though there was no existence of non-compliance, the IC urged the 
parties to enhance bilateral cooperation for the protection of the Danube Delta.150 
 There was a dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia which was concerned 
with the planed building of nuclear power station located in Armenia. Azerbaijan 
alleged that Armenia had failed to comply with its obligations under Articles 3 (5)151 
and (8),152 4 (2),153 5,154 and 6155 of the Convention since it terminated the EIA 
procedure under the Convention and proceeded with the decision-making on such 
planed project. However, the IC found that Armenia was not in non-compliance with 
those Articles but it was in non-compliance with Article 3 (1) instead because it failed 
to notify Azerbaijan as early as possible and no later than when informing its own 
public with respect to the proposed project.156 The MOP to the Espoo Convention 
adopted such findings and requested the IC to follow up and monitor the case.157 
                                                
147 Ibid, paras. 59-60. 
148 Report of the Implementation Committee on Its Eighth Session (Findings and recommendations 
further to a submission by Ukraine regarding Romania (EIA/IC/S/2)) Ukraine v Romania [23-25 
March 2010] ECE/MP.EIA/IC/2010/2, para. 11.  
149 Ibid, para. 51.  
150 Ibid, para. 54. 
151 Art. 3 (5) requires the Party of origin to provide with relevant information regard the EIA procedure 
and proposed activity to the affected Party. 
152 Art. 3 (8) requires the Party concerned to ensure that the public of the affected Party be informed of 
the proposed activity. 
153 Art. 4 (2) requires the Party of origin to furnish the affected Party with the EIA documentation. 
154 Art. 5 requires the Party of origin to enter into consultations with the affected Party on the basis of 
the EIA documentation. 
155 Art. 6 requires the Parties to ensure that, in the final decision on the proposed activity, due account 
is taken of the outcome of the EIA, including the EIA documentation and the Party of origin shall 
provide to the affected Party the final decision on the proposed activity along with the reasons and 
considerations on which it was based. 
156 Report of the Implementation Committee on its Twenty-Sixth Session, ECE/MP .EIA/IC/2012/6, 
Annex I (19 December 2012) para. 51.  
157 Decision VI/2, Part III/A, ECE/MP .EIA/2014/L.3 (21 March 2014), para. 46. 
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 In 2011, Lithuania triggered the NCP against Belarus with regard to its non-
compliance in which the former alleged that the latter’s construction of the nuclear 
power plant had breached its obligations to properly complete the EIA procedures 
under Articles 2 (2),158 (6),159 4 (1)-(2)160, 5 (a),161 and 6 (1)-(2). The IC found that 
Belarus was in non-compliance with its obligations under Article 2 (6), Article 4 (2), 
Article 5 (a) and Article 6 (1) (2), of the Convention.162 
 A dispute emerged again between Azerbaijan and Armenia but this time 
Armenia raised the issue of non-compliance to the IC. Armenia alleged that 
Azerbaijan was in non-compliance with its obligations under Article 2 (4)163 and 
Article 3 (1)164 as well as several paragraphs of MOP decision when it carried out six 
oil and gas projects. However, the IC found that Azerbaijan was not in non-
compliance with its obligations with respect to the projects.165    
3.2.2 The Aarhus Convention 
There has so far been only one case where the proceedings were triggered by a State 
party against another States party. This case was also about the approval by Ukraine 
of the construction of a deep-water navigational canal (the so-called Bystroe Canal 
project) in the Danube Delta and its potential to harm a nature conservation area of 
national and international importance.166 Romania claimed that it had not participated 
in the decision-making procedures during any of the phases of the project. In addition, 
Romania argued further that by ‘failing to ensure that the public affected in the 
Danube Delta was informed early in the decision-making procedure about the fact 
that the project was subject to a national and transboundary environmental impact 
assessment procedure’, Ukraine had breached Article 6 (2) (e) of the Convention.167 
The Implementation Committee found that Ukraine had breached its obligations by 
                                                
158 Art. 2 (2) is concerned with the implementation the Convention by adopting the necessary legal, 
administrative or other measures with respect to the prosed activity, establishing of an EIA procedure   
159 Art. 2 (6) is concerned with the opportunity of the public in the areas likely to be affected to 
participate in relevant EIA procedures regarding proposed activities. 
160 Art. 4 (1)-(2) is concerned with the preparation of the EIA documentation. 
161 Art. 5 (a) is concerned with the consultation on the basis of the EIA documentation. 
162 See further in chapter 5, section 2.1.5.1 (2). 
163 Art. 2 (4) is concerned with general obligation for the Party of origin to ensure that affected Parties 
are notified of proposed activities. 
164 Art 3 (1) is concerned with Obligation to notify. 
165 Report of the Implementation Committee on its Twenty-Eighth Session, ECE/MP .EIA/IC/2013/4, 
Annex  (1 November 2013), para. 78.  
166 Submission ACCC/S/2004/01 Romania v. Ukraine (Finding and Recommendation) [14 March 
2005] ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2005/2/Add.3. See further chapter 5, section 2.1.5.2 
167 Ibid, para. 4. Art 6 is concerned with public participation in decisions on specific activities. 
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failing to provide for public participation in the EIA and environmental decision-
making procedures for projects. It recommended Ukraine to submit a strategy 
indicating the measures it would take to bring its legislation and practice into 
compliance with these obligations.168  
4. RFMO PANELS 
This kind of dispute settlement mechanism is concerned with the conservation and 
sustainable use of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks which are regulated by 
the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement. To this end, there exist the international bodies 
constituted in order to manage fish stocks. This is a form of cooperation among States 
which have fishing interests in particular regions of the high seas to establish regional 
fisheries management organisations (RFMOs).169 Some of these focus particularly on 
highly-migratory species.170 
 Generally, RFMOs have a regulatory power to prescribe conservation and 
management measures, such as catch limits or technical measures for conserving fish 
stocks, which are binding on their member States.  In many RFMOs, the conservation 
and management measures that are adopted by RFMO commissions may be objected 
to by member States.171 Consequently, such measures are not binding on the objecting 
members. This kind of option is called an objection procedure which is different 
among various RFMOs in terms of the details concerning the objecting periods and 
the procedures that are subsequently taken by the objecting States. The latter issue is 
considered further in this section. This is because a particular dispute is an 
                                                
168 Ibid, para. 41. 
169 For example, the South East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (SEAFO), the North Atlantic Salmon 
Conservation Organization (NASCO), the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources (CCAMLR) and the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM); 
for more information see Tore Henriksen, Geir  Hønneland and Are K. Sydnes, Law and politics in 
ocean governance : the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and regional fisheries management regimes 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006); Robin Churchill and Daniel Owen, The EC Common Fisheries 
Policy (OUP 2010) 112-118; Margaret A.  Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish: The Interaction between 
Regimes in International Law (CUP 2011) 38-46; Yoshinobu  Takei, Filling Regulatory Gaps in High 
Seas Fisheries: Discrete High Seas Fish Stocks, Deep-sea Fisheries and Vulnerable Marine 
Ecosystems (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013). 
170 Those RFMOs are the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), 
the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), 
the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) and the Western and Central 
Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC).  
171 See the discussions relating to the objection procedure in Howard S. Schiffman, Marine 
Conservation Agreements: The Law and Policy of Reservations and Vetoes (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2008); Ted L. McDorman, ‘Implementing Existing Tools: Turning Words Into Actions—
Decision-Making Processes of Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs)’ (2005) 20 
IJMCL 423. 
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environmental one, since the essence of the dispute is concerned with the 
conservation of marine resources and the objecting State may claim that the 
conservation and management measures of the RFMO commissions are being 
adopted in ways that are inconsistent with environmental obligations enshrined in the 
international law of the sea. Another form of dispute is that another RFMO member 
may challenge the alternative measures that the objecting State proposes to adopt as 
not being compatible with the RFMO Convention or UNCLOS. This could also be 
viewed as an environmental dispute, particularly if the proposed alternative measures 
threaten the sustainability of a fish stock as will be discussed later in the next section.   
4.1 Conspectus: The Nature of RFMO Panels 
After a dispute arises, there is a kind of dispute settlement mechanism that exists in 
some RFMOs. A dispute has to or may be brought to a panel to review an objection 
and the compatibility of the decision adopted by the RFMO commissions with the 
treaties establishing RFMOs, UNCLOS or the Fish Stocks Agreement.172 To date, this 
kind of dispute settlement mechanism exists in four RFMO conventions.173 These are:  
 1) The Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas 
Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean (SPRFMO Convention)174 
 2) The Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in North-East Atlantic 
Fisheries  (NEAFC Convention)175 
                                                
172 Robin Churchill, ‘Trends in Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea: Towards the Increasing 
Availability of Compulsory Means’ in Duncan French, Matthew Saul and Nigel D. White (eds), 
International Law and Dispute Settlement: New Problems and Techniques (Hart Publishing 2010) 159. 
173There are also not dissimilar mechanisms in other RFMOs, viz. North Pacific: review by 
commission itself, possibly assisted by two advisers (Art. 9); the South East Atlantic Fisheries 
Organisation (SEAFO): review by the commission itself, plus option to refer to an ad hoc panel (Art. 
23-24 of the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fisheries Resources in the South 
East Atlantic Ocean); Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC): technical disputes to non-
binding ad hoc expert panel (Art. XXV (3) of the Antigua Convention); General Fisheries Commission 
for the Mediterranean (GFCM): Disputes to 3-person committee, decisions non-binding (Art. 19 of the 
Agreement for the Establishment of the GFCM).  
174 SPRFMO Convention (adopted 14 November 2009, entered into force 24 August 2012); The legal 
basis for establishing a Review Panel: Art. 17 (5) and Annex II; the text of the Convention is available 
at <http://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Convention-SPRFMO.pdf > accessed 29 November 2014. 
175 NEAFC Convention (18 November 1980, entered into force 17 March 1982) 1285 UNTS 129; 
Amendments to the NEAFC Convention have been adopted in 2004 and 2006 by the NEAFC 
Commission, Contracting Parties have agreed to use the New Convention on a provisional basis 
(pending ratification); The legal basis for establishing an ad hoc review panel appears in chapter 8 of 
the Rules of Procedure of the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) adopted at the 32nd 
Annual Meeting, November 2013 and Annex 1 to these Rules of Procedures; the text of the Convention 
and the Rules of Procedures are available at <http://www.neafc.org/rules/dispute-settlement> accessed 
29 November 2014. 
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 3) The Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest 
Atlantic Fisheries (NAFO Convention)176 
 4) The Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPF 
Convention)177 
 Thus, the discussion in this section and the analysis of the suitability of such 
panels for settling environmental disputes in the next chapter will be centred on those 
RFMO conventions. 
 As far as the nature of such panels is concerned, they are not pre-established 
or permanent institutions like international courts. There are two ways in which 
panels may be established. Firstly, they are set up within a certain period of time after 
an objection is presented by a member of a commission, irrespective of the parties’ 
wishes, so that this makes it similar to a compulsory dispute settlement mechanism. 
This is a special case that can be found only in the SPRFMO Convention.178  
Secondly, considering the non-compulsory language used in the text of the 
convention, it may be established voluntarily by the parties to a dispute.179 The other 
three RFMOs take this approach. In this sense, it is akin to the establishment of 
arbitration in cases where States still have the freedom to decide whether to submit a 
dispute to arbitration. 
 The results of a dispute take in the form of findings, reports or 
recommendations. Normally recommendations cannot be said to have a binding 
quality which the parties have to abide by, but they can choose whether or not to 
adopt such recommendations like the recommendations proposed by mediators or 
conciliators. The binding force of the recommendations of the RFMO panels may 
                                                
176 NAFO Convention (24 October 1978, entered into force 1 January 1979) 1135 UNTS 369; The 
legal basis for establishing an ad hoc panel: Art XIV (7), XV (3) and Annex II to the Convention which 
was amended at 29th Annual Meeting—28 September 2007, NAFO/GC Doc.07/4, Serial No. N5453. 
(The amended Convention has not yet entered into force); the text of the Convention is available at 
<http://www.nafo.int/about/frames/convention.html> accessed 29 November 2014. 
177 WCPF Convention (adopted 5 September 2000, entered into force 19 June 2004) 2275 UNTS 43; 
The legal basis for establishing a review panel: Art 20 (6) and Annex II to the Convention; The text of 
the Convention is available at <http://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/text.pdf> accessed 29 November 
2014. 
178 See Art. 17 (5) which provides that ‘a Review Panel shall be established within 30 days after the 
end of the objection period.’ (emphasis added). 
179 Rather than using the phrase ‘shall be established’, the other three conventions use optional 
language; chapter 8 (1) (c) of the NEAFC Convention uses the phrase ‘may refer the dispute to an ad 
hoc panel’; Art. XIV (7) of the NAFO Convention uses the phrase ‘may at the same time submit the 
matter to ad hoc panel proceedings’ and the WCPF Convention uses the phrase ‘may…seek a review of 
the decision by a review panel’. 
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differ from one another depending on how the draftsmen of the particular RFMO 
Conventions would like to give power to the RFMO panels. The binding force of the 
RFMO’s recommendations can be categorised into three levels: 1) absolutely binding, 
2) binding subject to certain conditions and 3) non-binding. 
 The first category comprises the WCPF Convention. It provides that if the 
review panel finds that the decisions of the Commission need to be modified, 
amended or revoked, the Commission shall, at its next annual meeting, modify or 
amend its decision ‘in order to conform with the findings and recommendations of the 
review panel’.180  
 The second type of binding force can be found in the SPRFMO Convention. 
For the SPRFMO review panel, not every case requires that the findings and 
recommendations must be binding upon the objecting member/s of the Commission 
and the SPRFMO Commission depending on the will of the objecting State/s and the 
Extraordinary Meeting of the Commission, as will described below. In a case where a 
review panel finds that the decisions of the SPRFMO Commission have resulted in 
unjustifiable discrimination against the objecting States and the review panel 
recommends that the alternative measures proposed by the objecting State/s should be 
modified181 or the review panel recommends totally new measures,182 if the objecting 
State/s decide to adopt the measures recommended by the review panel then these 
measures shall be deemed to be binding. What can be seen is that the measures 
recommended by the review panel are binding subject to the adoption of the objecting 
State/s otherwise, if they do not agree with the recommendations, they can choose not 
to adopt and institute the dispute settlement proceedings under the SPRFMO 
Convention instead. The binding force in this kind of case can be said to be a half-
breed mechanism which is a mixture of arbitration and conciliation, but it has a 
tendency to have a larger proportion of arbitration. As Churchill comments  ‘by 
giving the recommendations of the review panel binding force in this way, paragraph 
10 (c) of Annex II of the SPRFMO Convention makes proceedings of the review 
panel much closer to arbitration than the conciliation process they initially appear’.183 
                                                
180 Art. 20 (9) of the WCPF Convention. 
181 Annex II (10) (b) to the SPRFMO Convention. 
182 Annex  II (10) (c) to the SPRFMO Convention. 
183 Robin Churchill, ‘Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea: Survey for 2013’ (2015) 30 IJMCL 1, 
52. 
 72 
 In addition, the findings and recommendations may not become binding if the 
objecting State/s request an Extraordinary Meeting of the Commission and this 
meeting decides not to confirm or modify the recommendations of the review panel 
but to revoke the original decision and replace it with a new one (which may be 
different from the recommendations of the review panel), such that the decisions of 
the Extraordinary Meeting shall become binding on all members of the 
Commission. 184  If the recommendations are confirmed or modified by the 
Extraordinary Meeting such recommendations shall be binding.185  Another situation 
which shows that the decisions of the Extraordinary Meeting are superior to the 
recommendations of the review panel is a case where the review panel finds that the 
decision of the SPRFMO Commission is inconsistent with the provisions of the 
SPRFMO Convention, UNCLOS or the Fish Stocks Agreement but is upheld by the 
Extraordinary Meeting.  If, after reconsidering the decision in the light of those 
findings and the recommendations of the review panel, the Extraordinary Meeting 
still confirms its original decision, the objecting State/s shall implement the decision 
or institute dispute settlement proceedings under the SPRFMO Convention.186 In this 
sense, the recommendations of the review panel are much closer to the binding force 
of conciliation’s proposals in that they have only a recommendatory nature. 
 The third category belongs to the NAFO Convention and the NEAFC 
Convention. The binding nature of the recommendations proposed by the ad hoc 
panel established under the NAFO Convention is somewhat different from those two, 
since there are no provisions which can be taken as implying that the 
recommendations of an ad hoc panel are binding. Article XIV (10) states that an ad 
hoc panel can make recommendations to the Commission in relation to the measures 
that have been objected to by deciding whether or not such measures should be 
modified or rescinded or maintained. In a case where the ad hoc panel finds that the 
measures should be modified or rescinded, the Commission ‘shall meet to consider 
the recommendations of the ad hoc panel’.187 Reading this provision literally and 
comparing it to the other two conventions mentioned above, the Commission does not 
need to abide by the ad hoc panel’s decision. It may decide to amend the objected 
measures, according to the recommendations, or it may take an ad hoc panel’s 
                                                
184 Annex II (10) (e) to the SPRFMO. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Annex II (10) (f)-(h) to the SPRFMO. 
187 Art. XIV (11) of the NAFO Convention. 
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recommendations into account without modifying its measures. The argument that the 
NAFO’s ad hoc panel’s recommendations are not binding can be supported by the 
other provision contained within the dispute settlement clause of the NAFO 
Convention, which provides that where a dispute arises the Contracting Parties to the 
dispute may submit the dispute to ‘a non-binding ad hoc panel’.188 For the NEAFC 
Convention, it does not expressly provide that the recommendations are binding or 
not binding. Given the fact that a recommendation does not have the same authority 
as judgments of ICJ or ITLOS, it can be said that a recommendation is not binding but 
the Commission need to take it into account when adopting further recommendations 
under the Convention.  
4.2 The Use of RFMO Panels—An Overview 
To date, the first—and only—case that has been brought before an RFMO panel is the 
case concerning The Objection by the Russian Federation to a Decision of the 
Commission of the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation.189 
 In this case, Russia claimed that the Conservation and Management Measure 
for Trachurus Murphyi (CMM 1.01) or jack mackerel that was adopted by 
Commission at the first meeting of the SPRFMO in February 2013 was inconsistent 
with the provisions of the Convention and with other relevant international law as 
reflected in the UNCLOS or the Fish Stocks Agreement,190 since Russia did not 
receive a share of the total allowable catch  (TAC) of 360,000 tonnes for the year 
2013, which in Russia’s view was an ‘unjustifiable discriminatory’ action against 
it.191 The reason not to allocate Russia a share of the catch was the lack of clarity of 
                                                
188 Ibid, Art. XIV (10). 
189 See In Proceedings Conducted by the Review Panel Established under Article 17 and Annex II of 
the Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South 
Pacific Ocean with Regard to the Objection by the Russian Federation to a Decision of the 
Commission of the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (Finding and 
Recommendations) 5 July 2013 (hereinafter the Trachurus Murphyi case).  available at 
<https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/History/Russian-Objection-2013/Findings-and-Recommendations-of-
the-Review-Panel-dated-5-July-2013.pdf> accessed 29 November 2014. See further in chapter 5, 
section 2.1.6.  
190 Russia argued that the Decision constitutes a violation of Art. 87, 116, and 119 of UNCLOS and 
Art. 8 of the Fish Stocks Agreement which ‘conveys a principled commitment in international law 
prohibiting discrimination in conservation’. See Trachurus Murphyi case, para. 70.  
191 Objection by the Russian Federation, available at <http://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Commission-
Meeting-1st/Objection/Letter-1-Objection.pdf> accessed 1 December 2014. See also Annex K, 
available at <http://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Commission-Meeting-1st/Report/Annex-K-Russian-
Federation-Statement.pdf> accessed 1 December 2014. 
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the Russian-flagged vessel called the Lafayette (which was a fish processing vessel or 
a mother ship, as was claimed by the other parties, rather than a fishing trawler)192 as 
to whether it was an active fishing vessel in the waters of the Pacific Ocean, thus 
enabling Russia to claim its share of the catch.  
 Russia objected to this decision within the objection period up to 19 April 
2013 and proposed its own alternative measures which established catch limits of jack 
mackerel in respect of the Russian fisheries as equal to 19,944 tonnes. Consequently, 
the decision was not binding upon Russia. In this case, apart from Russia and the 
SPRFMO who submitted written submissions, four other Members of the 
Commission, namely Chile, Chinese Taipei, the EU and New Zealand, also submitted 
written submissions to the review panel in order to support the positions argued by the 
SFRFMO. Only Russia, Chile and the SPRFMO requested an opportunity to be heard 
at the hearing.  
 On 5 July 2013, the review panel provided its findings and recommendations. 
The review panel found that the Conservation and Management Measure for 
Trachurus Murphyi unjustifiably discriminated in form or in fact against Russia 
because there was no convincing argument either in the written or the oral 
submissions to justify why the CMM 1.01 was adopted in a way that excluded Russia 
from participating in fishing activities in 2013. However, CMM 1.01, as the review 
panel said, was not inconsistent with the provisions of the SPRFMO Convention or 
with other relevant international law, as reflected in UNCLOS or the Fish Stocks 
Agreement.  
 With regard to the alternative measure proposed by Russia, the review panel 
found that it was not equivalent in effect to CMM 1.01. Thus the review panel 
proposed a new alternative measure that was equivalent in effect to CMM 1.01, as 
required by paragraph 10 (c) of the Annex II, by requiring that Russia should 
authorise its vessels to catch jack mackerel in 2013 subject to two conditions. Firstly, 
Russia could catch jack mackerel only if it concluded from the data reported to the 
SPRFMO that it was unlikely that the total catch in 2013 would reach the TAC of 
                                                
192 There were several situations leading the other parties to believe that the Lafayette was not a fishing 
trawler, such as the inspection of the French authorities on the Lafayette which found that there was no 
fishing gear or equipment on board. In addition, Peru provided data showing that four of its vessels had 
transshipped 31,275 tonnes to the Lafayette in 2010; see these facts in Trachurus Murphyi case, paras. 
28 and 38. 
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360,000 tonnes. Secondly, Russia could catch jack mackerel only until the SPRFMO 
reported that the TAC of 360,000 tonnes had been reached.193  
CONCLUSIONS 
No one knows how many international environmental disputes there have been or 
currently are, as no kind of register of such disputes is kept. This is equally the case 
with other kinds of dispute in international law. It is likely that there have been a 
considerable number of international environmental disputes. As with other 
international disputes, it is likely that the majority of these disputes have been 
resolved by negotiation between the States concerned.  
 Of the various third-party means that are available to resolve international 
environmental disputes, little use has been made of diplomatic means. As far as 
conciliation and inquiry go, this is in line with the limited use of these means in other 
areas of international law. Nevertheless, given that quite a number of environmental 
treaties provide for conciliation and inquiry, it is perhaps surprising that they have 
hardly been used. One explanation may be that these means are not well-suited to, or 
effective in, settling international environmental disputes because of the 
characteristics of the latter outlined in chapter 2. Whether this is so is explored in 
chapters 4 and 5 below. 
 By contrast with third-party diplomatic means, judicial means have been much 
widely used to settle international environmental disputes. Since 1945 there have been 
on average 1-2 inter-State arbitration. 194  Nine arbitrations have concerned 
environmental disputes, all but one having being initiated since 1997. Thus, in the 
past 20 years or so environmental disputes account for a significant proportion of all 
inter-State arbitrations. In part, this must be due to the possibility of compulsory 
arbitration under UNCLOS, since this accounts for half the environmental 
arbitrations. However, two of the four UNCLOS arbitrations led to a decision on the 
merits, whereas all the other environmental arbitrations did not. The ICJ has heard 
eight environmental cases, five of which were referred to the Court in the past 10 
years, so in the past decade environmental cases have become a significant proportion 
of the Court’s case load. Four of the eight cases did not result in a judgment on the 
                                                
193 Ibid, para. 100. 
194 Christine Gray and Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Developments in Dispute Settlement: Inter-State 
Arbitration Since 1945’ (1992) 63 British Ybk Intl L 97, 97-134. 
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merits. The ITLOS has had only one environmental dispute referred to and that was 
settled before the Tribunal could give a judgment on the merits. One reason why the 
ITLOS has not had more cases is because so few of the parties have chosen it as their 
preferred forum for settling UNCLOS disputes.  
 For NCPs the cases referred by States is low compared with the numbers 
referred by the secretariats of MEAs. On the evidence of this chapter, only six 
environmental disputes have been settled using NCPs. As mentioned earlier, NCPs 
have not been primarily designed as dispute settlement mechanisms.  
 To date only one environmental dispute has been referred using the specialist 
mechanisms of RFMOs for settling disputes arising out of the use of the objection 
procedure. That is not surprising, since only four RFMOs currently have such 
mechanisms, which are concerned with a very specialised form of dispute. 
Furthermore, the fact that such review mechanisms exist may have discouraged States 
from making objections in the RFMOs concerned. This is illustrative of a wider point, 
that the existence of third-party dispute mechanisms may encourage States to settle 
their disputes through negotiation because they do not wish to involve a third party in 
their dispute, especially a judicial third party which can resolve the dispute in a way 
that binds the parties to the dispute.                  
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CHAPTER 4 
A COMPREHENSIVE APPRAISAL OF THE SUITABILITY OF DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS IN SETTLING INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It needs to be recalled that, as was explained in chapter 1, international environmental 
disputes may have special characteristics though by no means all environmental 
disputes have all or any of these characteristics. Such characteristics include: 1) the 
bilateral or multilateral character of international environmental disputes; 2) the 
multi-dimensional character of international environmental disputes; 3) the 
complexity involved in identifying the sources of the breach of international 
environmental obligations; 4) the complexity involved in quantifying damages and 5) 
the interpretation and application of procedural obligations.  
 The research question that will be addressed in this chapter is: How suitable 
are the various dispute settlement mechanisms, as described in chapter 3, for settling 
international environmental disputes that have such characteristics? Thus, the aim of 
this chapter is to consider the suitability of each of the various mechanisms for each 
of these different characteristics in order to appraise their capabilities in dealing with 
such disputes. To this end, each of these characteristics of international environmental 
disputes will be tested by comparing it with the inherent nature of each mechanism— 
including structural arrangements—in order to ascertain their suitability. The present 
chapter will begin by evaluating third-party diplomatic means in section 1 before 
moving on to analyse judicial means in section 2, NCPs in section 3 and RFMO 
panels in section 4.  
1. AN APPRAISAL OF THE SUITABILITY OF THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMATIC MEANS IN 
SETTLING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES    
Before appraising the suitability of diplomatic means, it is worth making the general 
point from the outset that they are not suitable in cases where the parties want a 
dispute to be decided according to rules of law with a binding outcome. 
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1.1 An Appraisal of Mediation 
1.1.1 Suitability for Settling Disputes that may be Bilateral or Multilateral in 
Character 
There are no fixed patterns or rules regulating how mediation will be conducted. 
Mediation proceedings are flexible and they can be tailored to fit any particular 
dispute. The ways in which mediators try to bring the two disputing States together in 
order to resume negotiations—as well as making proposals for them—are essentially 
bilateral. Thus, mediation is well suited for settling bilateral environmental disputes. 
For multilateral environmental disputes, mediation can employ some techniques in 
order to manage and facilitate numerous negotiations among multiple disputants. For 
instance, the mediator may encourage coalitions of disputing States that share the 
same attitude and then each coalition may select a representative to act as their 
negotiator with the representatives of other coalitions. For example, there may be a 
large number of potential participants with a stake in the whaling issue which may 
include whaling and non-whaling States.1 Applying this technique may enable the 
mediator to deal with small segments of the disputing parties while taking into 
account the interests of all the parties. It is plausible to assert that the multiple actors 
involved in international environmental disputes can easily be integrated into the 
mediation process. Lars Kirchhoff is also of the view that ‘…the mediation process 
can more easily be adapted to the size and composition necessary than is possible 
during court proceedings…and in cases where numerous relevant parties do exist, 
mediation offers the opportunity to tailor an adequate process’.2 However, this is 
bound to be problematic in so far as some parties may not give their consent to the 
intervention of the mediator so that the mediator cannot bring all the parties into the 
mediating processes. An additional technique that is available for mediators in dealing 
with a large number of disputants is that when there are several parties who have the 
same view of an issue, the mediator may start to identify the possible primary 
parties—either direct or indirect parties—and encourage them to resume 
                                                
1 John S.  Dryzek and Susan Hunter, ‘Environmental Mediation for International Problems’ (1987) 31 
ISQ 87, 98. 
2 Lars  Kirchhoff, Constructive Interventions: Paradigms, Process and Practice of International 
Mediation (Kluwer Law International 2008) 202. 
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negotiations.3 It is unlikely, as is suggested by the UN Guidance, that all the 
stakeholders can participate directly in the formal negotiations. What the mediator can 
do is to create an inclusive process by facilitating ‘the interaction between the conflict 
parties and other stakeholders and create mechanisms to include all perspectives in 
the process’.4   
 Due to the fact that mediation is a voluntary process, in the cases of erga 
omnes and erga omnes partes environmental claims, the State that is alleged to be in 
breach needs to express its consent to mediate, otherwise mediation will not be 
conducted. For an allegation of a breach of an MEA with erga omnes partes 
obligations, it would not be possible for any State party to initiate mediation 
unilaterally, since there are no MEAs that provide for compulsory mediation. In 
addition, it is possible that a third party could offer to mediate between one or a group 
of States and the State that is allegedly in breach of its obligations,5 for example, in 
the Whaling case, an offer to mediate between, say, the 25 or so States that sent a joint 
protest to Japan over JARPA II and Japan.6 It is also possible, but less likely, that the 
25 States could have suggested to Japan that they should to resolve the dispute 
through mediation. Of course, there is no guarantee in either scenario that Japan 
would agree to mediation.  
1.1.2 Suitability for Settling Disputes of a Multi-Dimensional Character 
Questions relating to scientific and technical issues: Given that mediation can only 
occur with the consent of the parties to the dispute, it is always open to the parties to 
choose a mediator with the necessary expertise. The parties can choose a mediator 
with expertise in the environmental matter at issue. If third parties offer their help to 
resolve a dispute, only the parties involved can make a decision whether to accept 
their help by considering their qualifications (apart from the other considerations, 
such as their independence, political powers, reliability and so on). Suitably qualified 
mediators can provide their technical and scientific expertise when they are assessing 
                                                
3 Chester A.  Crocker, Fen Osler  Hampson and Pamela R.  Aall, Taming Intractable Conflicts: 
Mediation in the Hardest Cases (United States Institute of Peace Press 2004) 97. 
4 The United Nations, The United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation (UN 2012) 11, reprinted at 
<http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/UN%20Guidance%20for%20Effective
%20Mediation.pdf > accessed 27 August 2014. 
5 Kirchhoff (n 2) 204. 
6 See chapter 2, section 3.1.3. 
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the facts of the dispute.7 This is because mediators do not necessarily have to be 
lawyers. Rather, mediators can be reinforced by a multidisciplinary team consisting of 
experts from several fields that are relevant to the international environmental dispute 
in question with a view to reaching acceptable solutions based on sound scientific and 
technical information. A particularly clear illustration of this may be seen in the 
mediation efforts of the World Bank when it mediated the dispute between India and 
Pakistan over the use of the Indus waters. Rather than being composed merely of 
international lawyers, the World Bank appointed engineering advisers—including 
both an American consulting engineering firm and other engineers—in addition to the 
Bank’s legal team.8 Thus, the mediator can be any person or group of persons who 
has the necessary knowledge in handling technical and scientific issues.  
 Mediation is likely to help the parties agree on those experts who can be 
trusted by them or the mediators may suggest that the parties should establish a joint 
inquiry process or a working group to study and determine the relevant scientific and 
technical points in the dispute that is acceptable to the parties.9 With sufficient 
understanding of the scientific and other information the parties may eventually reach 
an agreement. 
 Equally important is the mediated agreement proposed by the mediators. In a 
situation where the mediators are equipped with sufficient knowledge of 
environmental science, they can suggest to the parties, in terms of technical details, a 
way in which they can deal with scientific uncertainty as a consequence of the 
constantly changing nature of environmental knowledge. The mediators may also 
suggest strategies for the parties with a view to addressing any environmental 
problems that may arise in the future, such as the establishment of scientific and 
monitoring bodies to keep them updated on technological progress.10  
 Questions relating to societal choice: Other aspects which may be more 
relevant than legal issues—such as social aspects, or economic aspects—can be taken 
into consideration by mediators, who will probably have more relevant expertise than 
international judges or arbitrators. As was mentioned in chapter 2, the ideologies of 
                                                
7 Jeffrey Z. Rubin, ‘Third-Party Roles: Mediation in International Environmental Disputes’ in Gunnar  
Sjöstedt (ed), International Environmental Negotiation (Sage Publications 1993) 287. 
8 Niranjan Das Gulhati, Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in International Mediation (Allied 
Publishers 1973) 172. 
9 Laura Horn, ‘The Role of Mediation in International Environmental Law’ (1993) 4 ADRJ 16, 28. 
10 Jorge E. Vinuales, ‘Legal Techniques for Dealing with Scientific Uncertainty in Environmental Law’ 
(2010) 43 VandJTransnat'l L 437, 446. 
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States in relation to protecting the environment may fundamentally differ from State 
to State. Mediation may provide, at least in theory, a better process for dealing with 
these ideologically driven disputes than resorting to international litigation. The art of 
ascertaining the underlying causes of the dispute will certainly not be focused merely 
on the legal rights and obligations, but the job of mediators should be to clarify the 
parties’ essential interests and to reach politically acceptable compromises enabling 
the parties to conclude a settlement or resume negotiations with a view to encouraging 
the parties to rethink their environmental policies. For instance, in an international 
watercourse dispute the mediators may exert leverage on one riparian State to move 
from the extreme end of the bargaining continuum in pursuing its development policy 
to construct a dam for the sole benefit of its own country to make some necessary 
concessions by taking other States’ policies for protecting the environment into 
account. However, this does not mean that international law is less important than 
other social factors. It has been suggested that ‘the mediator’s proposals must be in 
full compliance with the applicable rules of international law so as to ensure the long-
term success of such proposals under the rule of law’.11 Thus, the outcome of the 
mediation will have to balance all those elements, including both legal and non-legal 
factors. 
1.1.3 Suitability for Identifying the Source of the Alleged Breach of an 
International Environmental Obligation 
The identification of the facts giving rise to a dispute: The nature of mediation 
requires the active participation of the mediators in the dispute settlement process. 
However, the way in which all information relating to the dispute that would allow 
the mediators thoroughly to understand the sources of the breach of obligations come 
mainly from the parties themselves rather than from their own investigations. So, the 
question may arise as to whether the mediators can use their diplomatic abilities to 
ascertain the sources of the breach. It is possible that in cases where specialised 
international organisations serve as mediators, they will have more particular abilities 
to examine and clarify the facts of the dispute submitted by the parties than do States 
                                                
11 Francisco Orrego Vicuña, ‘Mediation’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law (OUP 2010), online version available at 
<http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e61?rskey=VHJ6bY&result=1&prd=EPIL> accessed 27 June 2016. The UN also supports this 
proposition by suggesting that ‘consistency with international law and norms contributes to reinforcing 
the legitimacy of a process and the durability of a peace agreement. It also helps to marshal 
international support for implementation.’, see The United Nations (n 4) 16. 
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and individuals. For instance, in the international watercourses context, where one 
needs to collect huge amounts of data before concluding whether particular States are 
in compliance with their obligations, international bodies may have the necessary 
knowledge and expertise to perform this function. In addition, in situations of climate 
change where several States, both developed and developing States, are claimed to 
have emitted carbon dioxide, international organisations may be able to serve better as 
mediators than individual States, who may have conflicts of interest, and thus the 
question of the impartiality of the mediators may arise. 
 In cases where the State which is responsible for causing international 
environmental harm cannot be easily identified, the informal procedure of mediation 
may be used to approach the potentially responsible States. Since the criteria of clear 
and convincing evidence, as applied by international courts, may not necessarily be 
the essential element in proving the identity of the wrongdoer, mediators can create 
opportunities for more informal consultations with the potentially responsible States 
in order to raise awareness of the problems. This may be described as a pre-
negotiation stage in which the mediator helps to identify the parties to the 
negotiations.12 It should be noted, however, that although the mediator may try to 
approach the potential wrongdoer State, it is possible that such a State may not give 
its consent to mediation, so preventing further negotiations and thus the eventual 
settlement of the dispute.  
 The determination of a breach of an international obligation: Once the facts 
have been determined by mediators, the next question is: Is mediation suitable for 
determining whether those facts represent a breach of an international obligation by 
another State and whether that State is responsible under the rules of State 
responsibility. If mediators are lawyers they can perform this task, but in practice 
diplomatic means are unsuitable for addressing legal issues, since the main function 
of mediation is to re-establish communication and move the parties towards 
agreement rather than to identify what are the legal consequences arising from an 
internationally wrongful act.    
 
                                                
12 Rubin (n 7) 283. 
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1.1.4 Suitability for Quantifying Damages 
Two questions may be asked when considering the suitability of mediation in 
quantifying environmental damages. Firstly, is it the role of the mediator to suggest 
the payment of damages where appropriate? Secondly, is the mediator equipped with 
the necessary expertise for quantifying damages in this respect? To the first question, 
it is possible that the issue of damages may be raised before the mediators and it is 
also possible that the mediators may suggest that one party should compensate the 
other party for environmental damage. However, it should be noted that the objective 
of mediation does not fall within the responsibility-based paradigm and that mediation 
is not, as Francisco Orrego Vicuña says, ‘typified as a form of imposition, but as a 
form of suggestion, advice, exhortation and proposals’. 13  If one considers that 
compensation for environmental damage is a form of imposition, then it is safe to say 
that mediation may not be the right option for the parties to choose to eliminate 
disputes between them, since ‘at the end of mediation, in fact, it is never possible to 
speak of victors or defeated’. 14  Thus, mediation is unsuitable for quantifying 
damages. 
 Nevertheless, in theory, since mediation is a diplomatic process that is flexible 
enough for one party to make a concession or to accept that it should pay 
compensation for environmental damage, then the second question may be answered 
in the affirmative. This is because, as a matter of principle, mediation processes are 
flexible to allow the mediators to employ various techniques to calculate damages. 
There is also a useful methodology that mediators may use, such as those 
methodologies that have been used to calculate non-commercial environmental values 
by the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC).15 Furthermore, it is 
possible that the mediators would suggest that the parties should establish a 
compensation commission to perform the calculating function in awarding 
environmental damages. 
                                                
13 Vicuña (n 11). 
14 Ibid. 
15 See the Conclusions by the Working Group of Experts on Liability and Compensation for 
Environmental Damage Arising from Military Activities in Liability and Compensation for 
Environmental Damage: Compilation of Documents (Alexandre Timoshenko ed, UNEP 1998) paras. 
39-42. See also UNCC, Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners 
Concerning the Fifth Installment of “F4” Claims, S/AC.26/2005/10, 30 June 2005, paras 57-58. 
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1.1.5 Suitability for Interpreting and Applying Procedural Obligations 
The interpretation and application of procedural obligations are matters of law. The 
question that arises is whether or not mediation can undertake this function. It was 
noted previously that mediation involves the process of bringing the parties together 
on the basis of the proposals which the mediator will be bringing forward. These 
proposals may be based either on legal or non-legal procedures or both. Thus, during 
the course of mediation or at the final stage of the mediation process, the mediators 
may suggest that the parties should accept certain procedural obligations if the 
mediators see fit and if this is appropriate to the process of dispute resolution and for 
the sake of environmental protection. The mediators can propose, for example, that 
the parties should comply with the obligations to notify, inform and consult or even to 
conduct an EIA. Proposing that the parties should accept certain procedural 
obligations can be viewed as an attempt by the mediators to preserve the underlying 
relationship and to move towards cooperation between the disputing parties, which 
are clearly the objectives of mediation. The mediators may make a proposal that will 
enhance the cooperation that allows the parties to co-exist. Considering the inherent 
nature of procedural obligations, a scholar describes such obligations as a ‘soft control 
process’.16 This rationale fits neatly into the concept of dispute settlement by means 
of mediation, since it focuses on the preservation and improvement of the ongoing 
future relationship between the disputing States. The situation is particularly 
important in disputes over the use of international watercourses, in that a riparian 
State inevitably has to share the same river with other riparian States without them 
being able to escape from each other.17   
 In cases where the disputing parties reach a deadlock in trying to resolve their 
dispute and where their positions are hard to reconcile, one of the functions of a 
mediator is to assist the parties to resume negotiations. By proposing soft-control 
measures—such as suggesting that States should initiate consultations with those 
States which are most likely to be affected in respect of the potential risks of 
transboundary pollution—mediators can alleviate the tensions and open the channels 
of communication between the parties again so as to enable them to co-manage the 
                                                
16 Mari Koyano, ‘The Significance of Procedural Obligations in International Environmental Law: 
Sovereignty and International Co-operation’ (2011) 54 Japanese Ybk Intl L 97, 147. 
17 In the context of the Watercourses Convention see generally in Alistair Rieu-Clarke, ‘Notification 
and Consultation on Planned Measures Concerning International Watercourses: Learning Lessons from 
the Pulp Mills and Kishenganga Cases’ (2014) 24 YIEL 102, 102-113. 
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risks of environmentally hazardous activities. In cases where a number of States are 
involved, mediators—notably international organisations, can use communicative 
strategies by facilitating communication between the parties.18 For instance, a State 
that is proposing to commence an activity can communicate the results of an EIA to 
an international organisation which is deemed to be acceptable as a mediator so that 
the results will be further disseminated to the potentially affected States.19 After that, 
the mediator may ask all the parties to negotiate with each other. 
 Thus, in such situations, mediators can help to create an atmosphere that is 
conducive to further negotiation and may reach a settlement. In addition, a mediator’s 
proposal in respect of procedural obligations may be understood as a soft control 
process leading to a settlement of the dispute by means of a soft political process. For 
the reasons explained above, mediation is an appropriate means of settling 
international environmental disputes that need the parties to apply procedural 
obligations.  
1.2 An Appraisal of Conciliation 
1.2.1 Suitability for Settling Disputes that may be Bilateral or Multilateral in 
Character 
Bilateral international environmental disputes can be settled by conciliation, since, as 
has been noted by Jean-Pierre Cot, ‘conciliation is in essence a strictly bilateral 
procedure’.20 The question may be asked how far conciliation is suitable for settling 
multilateral environmental disputes. Two model rules involving conciliation that have 
been drafted by the PCA may be worth mentioning here, i.e. the PCA Conciliation 
Rules21 and the PCA’s Environmental Rules for Conciliation.22 In the introductory 
part of the PCA Conciliation Rules, multilateral disputes are mentioned which reflect 
the intentions of the draftsmen to the effect that conciliation can facilitate the 
                                                
18 Saadia  Touval and I. William  Zartman, ‘Mediation in International Conflicts’ in Kenneth Kressel 
(ed), Mediation Research: The Process and Effectiveness of Third-Party Intervention (Jossey-Bass 
1989) 127. 
19 Phoebe N. Okowa, ‘Procedural Obligations in International Environmental Agreements’ (1996) 67 
British Ybk Intl L 275, 283. 
20 Jean-Pierre Cot, International Conciliation (Rollo H. Myers tr, Europa 1972), 59. 
21 Hereinafter the PCA Conciliation Rules, reprinted at <https://pca-cpa.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/175/2016/01/Permanent-Court-of-Arbitration-Optional-Conciliation-Rules.pdf> 
accessed 12 May 2016.  
22 See chapter 3, section 1.2.2. 
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resolution of multi-party disputes as it states that ‘These Rules are also appropriate for 
use in connection with multiparty disputes, provided that changes are made to reflect 
participation by more than two parties.’23 The parties to a particular dispute can 
adjust these model Rules for use in multi-party disputes and they may consult with the 
Secretary-General of the PCA in relation to the modification of such Rules. As far as 
the PCA’s Environmental Rules for Conciliation are concerned, they have specific 
provisions in relation to the utilisation of natural resources and environmental 
protection that are based primarily on the PCA Conciliation Rules. They also 
recognise the possibility that more than two States may be involved in a dispute.24 
This might be done by incorporating these Rules within a convention that would be 
used for settling future disputes or by incorporating it within a special agreement that 
would be concluded after the dispute has arisen. 
 In international practice, an example of multi-party conciliation can be seen in 
the case concerning the allocation of the assets of the former East African Community 
(EAC) which involved three States, namely Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. These 
three States asked for conciliation from Dr. Victor Umbricht, a Swiss diplomat, to 
make a proposal in relation to the appropriate criteria for the distribution of the EAC’s 
assets.25 Conciliation under Annex V to UNCLOS is also worth referring to, since it 
recognizes the possibility of a multiplicity of parties being involved in a dispute 
concerning the interpretation and application of UNCLOS, including the provisions 
relating to the protection of the marine environment.26 As is reflected in Article 3 of 
Annex V, two or more parties that have the same interest shall appoint two 
conciliators jointly or they shall appoint them separately if they have separate 
interests.27 In addition, where there are two parties to a dispute, each appoints two 
conciliators. The use, in paragraph (h), of the phrase ‘in disputes involving more than 
two parties having separate interests’ clearly indicates that there may be a 
multiplicity of parties.28 The same phrase also appears in Annex II Part 2 of the CBD 
which has the same scheme for the appointment of conciliators as Annex V of 
                                                
23 The PCA Conciliation Rules, 151-152. See also, 214. 
24 See Section (ii) of the introductory part of the PCA’s Environmental Rules for Conciliation, 213.  
25 See for more details of the case Victor Umbricht, ‘Principles of International Mediation: The Case of 
the East African Community’ (1984) 187 Recueil des Cours 307. It should be noted that although 
Umbricht considered himself to be acting as a mediator, in reality his efforts fell within the definition 
of conciliation. 
26 Art. 284 of UNCLOS. 
27 See Art. 3 (g) of Annex V to UNCLOS.  
28 See Art. 3 (h) of Annex V to UNCLOS. 
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UNCLOS, since the draftsmen may have realised that several States may have an 
interest in the protection of the biological diversity of a particular State.29 However, 
detailed procedures for dealing with multilateral disputes are not provided in Annex V 
to UNCLOS, although Article 4 allows the conciliation commission to determine its 
own procedure, which may include inviting any State party to contribute its views.30 
This means that in disputes involving more than two parties the conciliation 
commission may decide to adapt the procedures to those that are suitable for multi-
party disputes. In practice, it would seem perfectly suitable, provided that the number 
of disputants was not excessively large, e.g. it could not be easily used if a dispute had 
20 or more parties. It should be pointed out that none of the procedures discussed in 
this subsection have yet been used.  
 For a dispute involving an alleged breach of an erga omnes (partes) 
obligation, it is possible that conciliation could be initiated by a third party that offers 
its help to settle a dispute or that a State can suggest the State allegedly in breach of 
such obligations that it seeks to settle a dispute through conciliation. As with 
mediation, there is no guarantee that the State concerned will accede to conciliation. 
For erga omnes partes environmental claims, it appears that some multilateral treaties 
have provided for compulsory conciliation so as to allow any party to the dispute to 
initiate conciliation unilaterally. The CBD and the Vienna Convention for the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer have provisions that allow for the unilateral initiation 
of conciliation in a case where the parties to the dispute have not accepted the same or 
any procedure: i.e. arbitration or the ICJ.31 Any of the parties to a dispute arising 
under the UNFCCC and the UNCCD can also submit the dispute to conciliation if 
negotiations, good offices or mediation are unsuccessful.32  
1.2.2 Suitability for Settling Disputes of a Multi-Dimensional Character 
Questions relating to scientific and technical issues: Conciliation is suitable for 
dealing with highly technical issues of international environmental disputes, since its 
structural arrangements are flexible enough for the parties to appoint environmental 
experts as conciliators, or external experts could be easily appointed to assist the 
conciliators. The ways in which conciliators obtain technical information may come 
                                                
29 See Art. 2 of Annex II, Part 2 of the CBD. 
30 See Art. 4 of Annex V to UNCLOS. 
31 See Art. 27 (4) of the CBD and Art. 11 (4) of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer. 
32 See Art. 14 (5)-(7) of the UNFCCC and Art. 28 (6) of the UNCCD. 
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from various sources. If a conciliation commission is made up of international 
lawyers, diplomats or politicians, it may need assistance from technical experts. 
Some examples may illustrate how conciliation commissions have resorted to external 
experts to acquire technical knowledge relevant to the dispute. In order to understand 
the geology and geophysics of the continental shelf area between Jan Mayen and 
Iceland, for the purpose of recommending the continental shelf boundary, the 
Conciliation Commission in the Jan Mayen case33 made use of the expertise of 
geological experts. Also, in the case concerning the allocation of the assets of the 
former EAC, Dr. Victor Umbricht extensively availed himself of advice from 
technical experts who included accountants, financial experts and engineers. After the 
technical experts had submitted their draft reports to Dr. Umbricht, he passed them on 
to the governments for their comments. The reports were used as the basis of the 
proposals and for the parties’ negotiations.34  
 Questions relating to societal choice: Given that conciliation is a method that 
undertakes an objective investigation and evaluation of all aspects of a dispute,35 the 
complexities of questions involving social, economic and political factors associated 
with international environmental disputes may easily be taken into account when 
settling a dispute if the parties opt for conciliation. Therefore, the solution 
recommended by a conciliation commission may not be based solely on its 
interpretation of the relevant law.36 This may be called ‘political conciliation’, as 
opposed to ‘legal conciliation’.37 Susani states that ‘the application of the law is not 
the primary purpose of conciliation. Parties elect this procedure because of their 
desire to have other considerations taken into account’.38 A conciliation commission 
                                                
33 The Conciliation Commission was made up of three lawyers and diplomats: Elliot L. Richardson 
(Chairman), Jens Evensen (Conciliator for Norway), Hans Andersen (Conciliator for Iceland). 
34 J. G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (5 edn, CUP 2011) 67. 
35 UN, Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States (UN Publication 1992) 45. 
36 See, for example, what the Virginia Commentary notes about the function of the conciliation under 
Annex V to UNCLOS which states that ‘The proposal made to the parties should contain everything 
which the conciliation commission considers appropriate to enable the parties to reach an amicable 
settlement of the dispute…’ (emphasis added) Myron H. Nordquist, Shabtai Rosenne and Louis B. 
Sohn (eds), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, vol V (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 1989) 321. See also Lucius Caflisch, ‘The OSCE Court of Conciliation and 
Arbitration: Some Facts and Issues ’ in Michael Bothe, Natalino Ronzitti and Allan Rosas (eds), The 
OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security: Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and 
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (Kluwer Law International 1997) 391. 
37 Sven M.G.  Koopmans, Diplomatic Dispute Settlement: The Use of Inter-State Conciliation (T.M.C. 
Asser Press 2008) 128-129. However, these two kinds of conciliations can be mixed together, since the 
conciliators need to consider both legal and non-legal factors.  
38 Nadine Susani, ‘Conciliation and Other Forms of Non-Binding Third Party Dispute Settlement’ in 
James Crawford and others (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP 2010) 1103. 
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may be directed to apply societal factors by the parties’ agreements. Thus, the 
Conciliation Commission in the Jan Mayen case took other factors, apart from legal 
questions, into account when making their recommendations by virtue of Article 9 of 
the Agreement concluded between Iceland and Norway, which provided that ‘the 
Commission shall take into account Iceland’s strong economic interests in these sea 
areas, the existing geographical and geological factors and other special 
circumstances.’39 This case was a ‘politically delicate and emotive’ dispute40 and 
customary international law relating to continental shelf delimitation ‘was far from 
completely crystallized’,41 so that conciliation seemed to be the right option to solve 
this problem, since it could provide fair solutions which could be accepted by the 
parties, taking into consideration other societal factors that would not necessarily be 
relevant in a claim as of right.42 In the Jan Mayen case, the will of the parties to allow 
the Commission to take other factors into account when making the recommendation 
was clearly provided for in the agreement. However, in the absence of the parties’ 
mandating the conciliation commission to apply specific factors, conciliation, by its 
nature, has to be as an essential feature and it requires the use of methods that are 
sufficiently flexible, even though they are relatively formal, so that a conciliation 
commission is able to consider other societal factors. As is shown in the East African 
Community case, an effort was made to settle the dispute by taking into account 
equity and fairness in relation to matters such as economic need, not by applying strict 
legal rules.43 The application of equity is supported by Van Asbeck when he claims 
that:  
‘le concept de « conciliation » dans le sens d'une simple transaction, 
d'un « do ut des », d'un « split the difference », basés sur des 
considérations d’équite, que dirais-je, d’équité pratique, équité de 
common sense ou peut-être plutôt d’efficacité, d’opportunité 
                                                
39 Art. 9 of the Agreement between Norway and Iceland on Fishery and Continental Shelf Questions, 
Vol 2124, I-37025. 
40 Robin Churchill, ‘Maritime Delimitation in the Jan Mayen Area’ (1985) 9 MP 16, 25. 
41 Elliot L. Richardson, ‘Jan Mayen in Perspective’ (1988) 82 AJIL 443, 445. 
42 Ibid, 449. 
43 See Victor Umbricht, Multilateral Mediation: Practical Experiences and Lessons (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1989) 246 and 267. 
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politique, dans le seul but d’écarter un obstacle, abstraction faite de 
toute justification en droit de la décision.’44 
It should be borne in mind that the ultimate goal of conciliation is to settle a dispute 
by recommending the terms of a settlement that will be acceptable to the parties, so 
that if applying international law would be more likely to exacerbate the relationships 
between the disputants, rather than reducing the tensions, such recommendations 
would run counter to the main objective of conciliation, which means that the 
conciliators should avoid going in that direction. With regard to the applicable rules 
which are extraneous to law and which a conciliation commission may apply, Cot has 
rightly pointed out that:   
‘This calls for a package deal incorporating elements of equity, 
contra legem if necessary. Reference to international law may well 
hinder the solution of the conflict. If one of the parties to the dispute 
has a clearly unfounded legal case, stating the law may well amount 
to pouring oil on the flames.’45 
This proposition confirms the suitability of conciliation in dealing with a dispute in 
which the essential points in the conflict are closely intertwined with complex societal 
factors, as is exhibited in international environmental disputes. 
1.2.3 Suitability for Identifying the Source of the Alleged Breach of an 
International Environmental Obligation 
The identification of the facts giving rise to a dispute: In appraising its suitability in 
this regard, two aspects are relevant and both need to be considered. Firstly, the issue 
is concerned with the suitability of conciliation in performing the task of an inquiry 
with a view to identifying the source of a breach. Identification of the source of a 
breach of an international environmental law is a question of fact which conciliators 
should elucidate by using certain techniques before proposing any recommendations. 
In-depth investigation of the facts of a dispute is an essential function of conciliation, 
in contrast to mediation in which the inquiry function plays only a minimal role. 
                                                
44 F. M.  van Asbeck, ‘La Tâche et l'Action d'une Commission de Conciliation’ (1956) 3 NTIR 1, 7. 
45 Jean-Pierre Cot, ‘Conciliation’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (OUP 2006) online version available at 
<http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e20?rskey=LuCXjO&result=1&prd=EPIL> accessed 27 June 2016. 
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Therefore, conciliation is a dispute settlement mechanism that is suitable for finding 
out which States have caused pollution of the environment.  
 Secondly, despite the fact that conciliation has to undertake an inquiry 
function, the question that needs to be asked is: Does a conciliation commission have 
sufficient competence to ascertain the sources of a breach of international 
environmental obligations in cases where it is difficult to identify which States are 
causing environmental harm? To answer this question, the preliminary point that 
needs to be examined entails establishing the burden of proof that a conciliation 
commission will probably have to apply. Usually the burden of proof, as Cot has 
noted, falls mainly on the parties, in that ‘they are obliged to prove their allegations’ 
and ‘they are bound to aid the Commission in its investigation of the facts’.46 In this 
situation, there is a risk that the facts will not be uncovered if a party is unable to 
prove its allegations because, for example, it lacks sufficient scientific evidence to 
convince the conciliators who has been causing environmental harm. However, a 
certain flexibility is expected here when a conciliation commission can perform an 
independent inquiry of its own and ‘when the information provided by the parties 
does not elucidate questions of fact’.47 This is one great advantage of conciliation, 
since conciliators can play an inquisitorial role in investigating the facts of the dispute 
rather than relying solely upon the information submitted by the parties. A 
conciliation commission may have more of the necessary ability to examine the facts 
thoroughly than do individual States.   
 As has been mentioned in the previous section in the discussion concerning 
mediation, in cases where the States causing environmental damage cannot be easily 
identified, mediators may employ diplomatic techniques to approach the potentially 
responsible States and encourage them to enter the negotiation process. A conciliation 
commission cannot use such techniques, such as those concerning the art of using the 
political strength of conciliators or the technique of introducing special inducements 
into the disputants’ calculations. Nor can the technique of exerting political pressure 
on the potentially responsible States be employed. This is because, as with arbitration, 
it has to be impartial, since it has ‘no independent authority and carries no political 
clout’48 in examining the dispute. However, it can be argued that, in theory, if the 
                                                
46 Cot, International Conciliation (n 20) 190. 
47 Ibid, 192. 
48 Cot, ‘Conciliation’ (n 45). 
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parties to a dispute authorise it to do so, a conciliation commission could approach a 
third State. 
 The determination of a breach of an international obligation: Another issue is 
whether conciliation is suitable for legal determination and issues of State 
responsibility, for example whether the facts relating to who is causing the pollution 
can be attributed to a particular State or whether the State has shown due diligence. 
This is a legal question in which conciliation does not appear to be suitable for 
engaging with legal consequences arising from a breach of international 
environmental obligations because conciliation, like mediation, does not primarily 
address legal issues although, in theory, it can perform this task if the parties so 
request.49 Determining legal consequences under the rules of State responsibility 
could lead to a deterioration in the relationship between the parties which might make 
it difficult for them to accept.  
1.2.4 Suitability for Quantifying Damages 
In considering whether or not conciliation is suitable for quantifying environmental 
damages, one needs to ask, first, whether a conciliation commission could be 
entrusted with the task of awarding environmental damages. It is important to note 
that the quantifying of damages by a conciliation commission entails the application 
of traditional state responsibility in the context of international environmental 
problems, so that the question may be: Does this task contradict the nature of 
conciliation? Clearly, a conciliation procedure is a kind of diplomatic means of 
dispute settlement and such a procedure seems to help the disputants move towards 
compromise solutions rather than engaging in the issue of a State’s responsibility. 
However, conciliation, by its very nature, still has a role to play in considering legal 
disputes. Unlike mediation that in its very nature is not a form of imposition, 
conciliation, as Susani observes, ‘appears to be a method of dispute resolution which 
does not exclude questions of responsibility’. 50  In this sense, a conciliation 
commission can recommend environmental damages, although this task may be 
considered a secondary function as opposed to its primary task which is focused on 
reaching a compromise. Another reason that seems to justify the idea that conciliation 
can award environmental damages stems from the fact that a conciliation procedure is 
                                                
49 Susani (n 38) 1104. 
50 Ibid, 1100. 
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flexible and the parties still have autonomy and are able to control the process; 
therefore, the mandates of conciliation commissions are also determined by the 
parties. Consequently, it is clear, but unprecedented in the environmental field, that a 
conciliation commission can perform this task—if the parties agree to authorise it—of 
attempting to calculate environmental damages. The parties may determine this 
mandate of the conciliation commission in the agreement between them. An analogy 
can be made with the Letelier and Moffit case, where an inquiry was used for the same 
purpose. 
 Nevertheless, even though conciliation can engage in the quantifying of 
environmental damages, the effectiveness of conciliation in performing this task 
should not be over-emphasized. Susani is of the opinion that:  
‘conciliation does not appear to be an effective method of engaging 
a State’s responsibility, since the law is not the principal basis of it. 
In contrast, if ARSIWA are seen as a tool allowing for the 
maintenance of good relations between States, then conciliation still 
has an important role to play’.51  
Ultimately, the perception of a conciliation commission in relation to its role is 
crucial. If recommending damages would aggravate the situation or would endanger 
an amicable settlement, the conciliation commission may refuse to do so. Another 
option for a conciliation commission that wishes to refrain from touching upon the 
question of a State’s responsibility is to recommend ex gratia payments, without 
accepting formal legal responsibility. Obtaining ex gratia payments for environmental 
damage may retain the underlying philosophy of conciliation in reaching a 
compromise solution and maintaining good relations between States. 
 Secondly, does a conciliation commission have the ability to quantify 
environmental damages? Quantifying environmental damages is not an easy task 
which a conciliation commission can perform alone without any assistance from 
experts in other relevant fields. Although a conciliation commission is usually made 
up of international lawyers or diplomats, 52  when faced with highly technical 
                                                
51 Ibid, 1104. ARSIWA stands for the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts. 
52 See for example the list of conciliators nominated under Article 2 of Annex V to UNCLOS, 38-44, 
available at <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXI/XXI-
6.en.pdf> accessed 14 September 2014.  
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questions, such commissions could readily avail themselves of the relevant expertise. 
For example, economists may help a conciliation commission to create a framework 
that can be used as a basis for the calculation of the damages to be paid by using 
economic theories such as the valuation of environmental resources.53 A conciliation 
commission may propose these criteria as guidelines for the compensation of 
environmental damages or it may recommend the parties to set up working groups or 
compensation commissions specifically to perform this task specifically. 
1.2.5 Suitability for Interpreting and Applying Procedural Obligations 
The suitability of conciliation for the interpretation and application of procedural 
obligations can be appraised by considering the ability of conciliation commissions to 
handle the legal aspects of a dispute. Conciliators may encounter problems with the 
application of the law, since the parties may substantiate their claims by using legal 
argumentation. It is crucial to note that conciliators can interpret and apply 
international law in the settlement of disputes if the parties so request. This was 
evinced by the Italian-Swiss Permanent Conciliation Commission established under 
the Italo-Swiss Treaty of Conciliation and Judicial Settlement of 1924, in which the 
parties asked the Commission to interpret the law and it was deemed appropriate to 
consider in the first place the legal aspects of the dispute, enabling itself thereafter to 
take into account the factual element.54 The role of law is apparent, since some model 
rules and multilateral treaties prescribe the mandate of a conciliator to take account of 
legal matters. For instance, the PCA’s Environmental Rules for Conciliation include a 
clause concerning the role of the conciliator when conducting the conciliation 
proceedings, stating that he may take into account ‘the relevant law’.55 In addition, the 
legal conclusions could be incorporated into the final report of the conciliation 
commission. This can be seen, for example, in a clause in UNCLOS that suggests that 
conciliators shall include all questions of law that are relevant to the matter in dispute 
in its recommendations as the commission may deem appropriate.56  The legalistic 
element that is incorporated in the conciliation clauses of multilateral treaties 
indicates that international environmental law will be applied to the dispute. It may be 
                                                
53 Tarcísio Hardman Reis, Compensation for Environmental Damages under International Law: The 
Role of the International Judge (Wolter Kluwer 2011) 132-133. 
54 Italian-Swiss Permanent Conciliation Commission, October 9, 1956, (1958) 25 ILR, 316. See also 
Merrills (n 34) 63. 
55 Art. 7 (3) of the PCA’s Environmental Rules for Conciliation. 
56 Art. 7 (1) of Annex V to UNCLOS. See also Art. 2 of the Annex to Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (VCLT). 
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that there will be no difficulties for conciliators to interpret and apply procedural 
international environmental obligations, since a conciliation commission is usually—
but not exclusively—composed of lawyers and diplomats.  
 As has been previously noted in section 1.1.5 above, procedural obligations, 
such as EIAs, have become well established in international environmental law, 
which can be discerned from State practice, and international courts have become 
inclined to accept those obligations as an integral component of international legal 
norms. The next question that may be raised as a corollary is whether and how far a 
conciliation commission can take those procedural obligations and aspects of 
environmental jurisprudence into account and use them as a basis for the preparation 
of the conciliators’ proposal. A good illustration of this can be seen in the Report of 
the Conciliation Commission in the Jan Mayen case. In defining the terms of the 
settlement, the Conciliation Commission recognised the importance of State practice 
and court decisions by explicitly explaining that ‘Although not a court of law, the 
Commission has thoroughly examined State practice and court decisions in order to 
ascertain possible guidelines for the practicable and equitable solution of the 
questions concerned’. 57  Thus, conciliators can, when suggesting the terms of 
settlement, recommend that disputants in an international environmental dispute 
should perform procedural obligations.  
 Proposing that the parties should perform certain environmental procedural 
obligations does not amount to ‘pouring oil on the flames’, to borrow Cot’s words.58 
This is because procedural obligations are soft-control measures corresponding to a 
strategy of conciliation that attempts to avoid controversial legal assessments as much 
as possible, without any judgments being passed, or national sovereignties being 
violated.59 
                                                
57 Jan Mayen Continental Shelf (Iceland v. Norway) (Report and Recommendations to the Government 
of Iceland and Norway) (1981) 62 ILR 108, 125. 
58 See section 1.2.2 of this chapter at footnote 45. 
59 Henri Rolin, ‘L' Heure de la Conciliation Comme Mode de Réglement Pacifique des Litiges’ (1957) 
AE 3, 19. 
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1.3 An Appraisal of Inquiry 
1.3.1 Suitability for Settling Disputes that may be Bilateral or Multilateral in 
Character 
Inquiry commissions have usually been constituted in order to settle bilateral disputes 
such as those in the Dogger Bank incident between the UK and Russia,60 the Red 
Crusader incident between Denmark and the UK61 and the Letelier and Moffit case 
between the US and Chile.62 Inquiry has never been used to investigate multi-party 
disputes. Nevertheless, it would be possible for several States to agree to establish an 
inquiry commission to identify disputed facts among them. An illustration of this 
possibility can be seen in Article 33 of the Watercourses Convention, where it is 
recognised that there may be a situation in which two or more parties have a dispute 
concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention. Inquiry is the only 
compulsory settlement procedure that may be invoked unilaterally by any of the 
parties after other methods fail.63  
 Like mediation and conciliation, the allegation of a breach of an MEA with 
erga omnes (partes) obligations, it is possible that the disputants may agree to resolve 
their dispute through an inquiry which is depends entirely on the willingness of all the 
parties. It is worth noting that under the Watercourses Convention, an inquiry can be 
initiated unilaterally by any of the parties to the Watercourses Convention if the 
parties are unable to settle a dispute through negotiations or non-judicial means.64 By 
allowing any States parties to initiate an inquiry, it does correspond to the concept of 
obligation erga omnes (partes) in that it contains the element of community interest 
which goes beyond the interest of riparian States. This kind of interest can be traced 
                                                
60 Richard Ned Lebow, ‘Accidents and Crises: The Dogger Bank Affair’ (1978) 31 NavalWarCollRev 
66; Tobias H Irmscher, ‘Dogger Bank Incident (1904)’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP 2006), online version available at 
<http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e1032?rskey=DyMer0&result=1&prd=EPIL> accessed 27 June 2016. 
61 See The Red Crusader (Denmark v. UK)(1962) 35 ILR 485; 29 RIAA 521. See also Gérard  Timsit, 
‘Le Fonctionnement de la Procédure d'Enquête dans l'Affaire du Red Crusader’ (1963) 9 AFDI 460; 
Ximena Hinrichs Oyarce, ‘Red Crusader Incident (1961)’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP 2007) online version available at 
<http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e1211?rskey=ULbq3Z&result=1&prd=EPIL> accessed 27 June 2016. 
62 Stefanie Schmahl, ‘Letelier and Moffitt Claim’ inibid (2008). 
63 See for more details Stephen McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses (2 edn, OUP 2007) 
515-516. 
64 Art. 33 (3) of the Watercourses Convention. See also Alistair Rieu-Clarke, Ruby Moynihan and 
Bjørn-Oliver Magsig, UN Watercourses Convention User’s Guide (IHP-HELP Centre for Water Law 
2012) 242. 
 97 
back to the jurisprudence of the PCIJ in the River Oder case where it touched upon 
this issue under the notion of a community of interest of riparian States in which it 
held that ‘This community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a 
common legal right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of all 
riparian States in the uses of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of any 
preferential privilege of any one riparian State in relation to the others.’65  
1.3.2 Suitability for Settling Disputes of a Multi-Dimensional Character 
Questions relating to scientific and technical issues: As far as technical issues 
connected with international environmental issues are concerned, inquiry may assist 
the parties to clarify technical facts. While one State may rely on a particular set of 
scientific information when it claims that another State has committed a breach of its 
international environmental obligations, the other State may use other sources of 
information which are totally different from the latter to put forward counter-claims in 
the course of defending its position. Inquiry is suitable for settling environmental 
disputes which have a complex technical character, especially in the field of 
international watercourse disputes, because of the expertise represented on an inquiry 
commission. McCaffrey points out that a dispute ‘can often be most effectively 
avoided or resolved by referring questions to experts for investigation and report.’66  
In addition, membership of an inquiry commission is not limited to judges or lawyers 
but may also include technical and special experts.67 In the Baglihar hydroelectric 
dam case, the parties appointed an expert, Professor Raymond Lafitte, a Swiss civil 
engineer, who acted with the assistance of hydrologists and also lawyers, to 
investigate some technical matters.68  
                                                
65 Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Order 
(Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, and Sweden v. Poland) (Judgment) 
[1929] PCIJ Rep Series A No 23, 27. There is a numerous literature that support the concept of 
community interest and common concern: see for example, Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Collective Action in the 
Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of International Water Resources Law’ (1996) 90 
AJIL 384, 384-415; Edith Brown Weiss, ‘The Coming Water Crisis: A Common Concern of 
Humankind’ (2012) 1 TEL 153, 153-168; Patricia Wouters and A. Dan Tarlock, ‘The Third Wave of 
Normativity in Global Water Law: The duty to Cooperate in the Peaceful Management of the World's 
Water Resources: An Emerging Obligation Erga Omnes?’ 23 JWL 51, 51-65. 
66 Stephen C. McCaffrey, ‘Sixth Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses’ (UN Doc. A/CN.4/427 & Corr.1 and Add.1) YbILC, Vol II (1), 69, para. 57. 
67 See the introductory part (e) of PCA Optional Rules for Fact-Finding Commissions of Inquiry, 170. 
68 See <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/223546-
1171996340255/BagliharSummary.pdf> accessed 16 September 2014. 
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 Questions relating to societal choice: The search for the causes of an incident 
is a primary function of any inquiry. An inquiry commission must provide ‘an 
intelligible account of the chain of events’69 which means that it is certainly not 
confined to the legal aspects of a dispute. In the Dogger Bank incident, the parties 
requested the Commission to ‘inquire into and report on all the circumstances’ 
connected with the incident.70 In some cases the parties would like to know the exact 
geographical point where the incident actually occurred.71 By the same token, in 
environmental disputes, the parties may agree to set up an international commission 
of inquiry to aid the resolution of a dispute as to the cause of, for example, 
transboundary pollution, to find out where the pollutions originated, as well as the 
surrounding circumstances giving rise to an international environmental dispute. For 
example, in an international watercourse dispute that involves the equitable utilisation 
of a watercourse, an inquiry has flexible procedures which can take non-legal factors 
into account, such as economic and societal considerations pertaining to the use of 
international waters.72   
1.3.3 Suitability for Identifying the Source of the Breach of an International 
Environmental Obligation 
The identification of the facts giving rise to a dispute: The identification of the source 
of a breach may be considered as finding the facts giving rise to a dispute (e.g. the 
source of pollution). Thus, inquiry is a suitable means to discover which State is the 
origin of the environmental harm, since its primary function of it is to discover the 
truth of the incident or to find out who did what, and when? It may not be beyond the 
ability of the commissioners to inquire into the causes of transfrontier environmental 
problems involving two or more States. Inquiry, in a case where the causal link 
between environmental harms and the conduct of particular States is not firmly 
established, is a time-consuming and laborious task which requires the use of several 
techniques of inquiry. Generally, the techniques of finding facts include the reviewing 
                                                
69 Nissim Bar-Yaacov, The Handling of International Disputes by Means of Inquiry (OUP 1974) 77. 
70 Art. II of the Agreement of Submission: The International Commission of Inquiry Between Great 
Britain and Russia arising out of the North Sea Incident, reprinted in ‘Finding of the International 
Commission of Inquiry Organized under Article 9 of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes, of July 29, 1899: The International Commission  of Inquiry between Great 
Britain and Russia arising out of the North Sea Incident’ (1908) 2 AJIL 929, 929.  
71 See the Tavignano, Camouna and Gaulois cases between France and Italy, James Brown Scott (ed) 
The Hague Court Reports (OUP 1916) 417. 
72 Attila Tanzi and Enrico Milano, ‘Article 33 of the UN Watercourses Convention: A Step Forward 
for Dispute Settlement?’ (2013) 38 WI 166, 167. 
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of written submissions of the parties or even NGOs, site visits to specific locations, 
and meetings with various environmental experts, and inquiry commissions are 
capable of doing all those things. 
 The determination of a breach of an international obligation: Once the facts 
have been determined, the next issue is whether inquiry can be used to consider legal 
questions with regard to the existence of a breach of an international environmental 
obligation and the legal consequences arising from such a breach. In practice, inquiry 
is not usually employed to address legal issues. Like mediation and conciliation, it is 
not suitable for performing such a task. 
1.3.4 Suitability for Quantifying Damages 
The question in this respect may be: Can an inquiry commission, apart from 
identifying the facts of a dispute, recommend environmental damages?  The answer is 
that it depends entirely on the willingness of the parties to entrust an inquiry 
commission with the task of clarifying the compensation which falls within the 
purview of the responsibility-based paradigm. It may therefore be helpful to consider 
the practices of the international commissions of inquiry with a view to ascertaining 
how they approached this issue.  
 The issue of the responsibility of States was one of the central issues in the 
Dogger Bank incident, in which the parties mandated the Commission to inquire into 
‘the question as to where responsibility lies, and the degree of blame attaching to the 
persons found responsible’.73 The words and phrases that appeared in the Agreement 
for the Inquiry, namely responsibility, degree of blame and person found responsible 
might make one think that the parties mandated the Commission to exercise judicial 
functions. However, Bar-Yaacov explained that in this case the Commission 
exercised the investigatory function of finding out the ‘factual responsibility’ rather 
than ‘legal responsibility’ since ‘the finding that Admiral Rojdestvensky’ was 
responsible for giving the order to fire and for the resulting damage is in itself a 
finding of fact’.74 What can be discerned from this explanation is that the legal 
consequences which flowed from the Commission’s findings and the finding of the 
facts which constituted a breach of international law are distinguishable from each 
                                                
73 See Art. II of the Finding of the International Commission of Inquiry Organized under Article 9 of 
the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, of July 29, 1899, by the 
International Commission of Inquiry between Great Britain and Russia Arising out of the North Sea 
Incident, reprinted at (1908) 2 AJIL 929, 929-930. See also Scott (n 71) 404. 
74 Bar-Yaacov (n 69) 76. 
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other. While the former is an issue for the parties or an arbitral tribunal attempting to 
consider the legal consequences, such as the payment of damages or the awarding of 
damages, the latter is perceived as genuinely a function for an inquiry commission to 
perform.75 In addition, in this case the Commission was not asked to determine the 
amount of compensation that Russia should pay and the parties accepted the decision. 
On the basis of this finding, Russia was willing to pay damages of 65,000 pounds to 
the victims of the incident.76 Therefore, whether or not compensation for damages 
will be paid depends largely on the will of the parties and how far they accept the 
findings of international commissions of inquiry. 
 Another pertinent case concerning compensation for damages is the Letelier 
and Moffitt case. In this case, the dispute arose between the US and Chile over the 
assassination in the US of Mr Orlando Letelier del Solar, the former Chilean Foreign 
Minister and Mrs Ronni Karpen Moffitt, a US citizen, by agents of the Chilean 
government. The US had sought compensation from Chile on behalf of the families of 
Letelier and Moffitt. The parties agreed to establish a commission, whose duties were 
to investigate and report upon the facts surrounding the incident77 and to determine 
the amount of compensation to be paid, ex gratia, by Chile to the US for the death of 
those persons in accordance with the applicable principles of international law.78 This 
case is very interesting because it shows that inquiry is a flexible method that can be 
used to determine the compensation due for any loss or damage, rather than solely 
discovering the facts of the dispute in the traditional sense. The Commission also 
determined and applied the principle concerning compensation that was established in 
the Chorzow Factory case.79 The amount of compensation to be paid included, for 
example, the loss of financial support suffered by the families80 and moral damages.81 
The interesting point which is worth noting is that in determining the amount of the 
compensation the Commission referred to the jurisprudence of the PCIJ in relation to 
                                                
75 Ibid, 81. 
76 Irmscher (n 60) para. 8. See also the answer of Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman to the question put by 
Mr. Cremer in the House of Commons, HC Deb 12 November 1906, vol 164, cc1066-7. 
77 Dispute concerning Responsibility for the Deaths of Letelier and Moffitt (US v. Chile) (1992) 25 
RIAA 1, 4   
78 Ibid, para. 1.  
79 Ibid, para. 21. 
80 Ibid, para. 26. 
81 Ibid, para. 31. 
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the general principle of compensation in international law and the practice of the 
juridical organs of the inter-American system with regard to moral damages.82  
 By way of analogy, it is possible that the parties to an international 
environmental dispute might entrust an inquiry commission with the task of 
determining environmental damages. Although some environmental damages cannot 
be calculated in financial terms, or by restoring the status quo ante, inquiry is a 
relatively flexible method in applying other useful approaches to environmental cases, 
for example by taking into account the practices of the UNCC and the International 
Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPCF), including a method for assessing non-
market environmental values.83 However, the process of determining compensation, 
in the light of the UNCC experience, is far from easy, since it requires highly 
qualified commissioners who have the relevant expertise. 
 On this characteristic, since this is a consequence of a finding of a breach of 
an obligation, which is something that is normally beyond the competence of an 
inquiry commission, it follows that assessing compensation (or any other remedy) 
will also normally also be beyond their competence. However, as shown in the 
Letelier and Moffitt, the parties could ask an inquiry commission to determine 
damages but in this case the claim of payment was in the form of ex gratia payment 
through diplomatic channels in order to maintain goodwill between the parties 
without acknowledging any international legal responsibility. Thus, inquiry is 
unsuitable for recommending damages which are based on the responsibility-based 
paradigm. 
1.3.5 Suitability for Interpreting and Applying Procedural Obligations 
The next issue is whether an inquiry commission can clarify the interpretation and 
application of procedural obligations? Such interpretation and application is a matter 
of law which does not relate to fact-finding or the investigatory function of this 
method.  
                                                
82 Ibid, para. 31.  
83 See generally in IOPCF, Claims Manual (October 2013 Edition) 38-40, reprinted at 
<http://www.iopcfunds.org/uploads/tx_iopcpublications/claims_manual_e.pdf> accessed 22 June 2016. 
See also IMO and UNEP, IMO/UNEP Guidance Manual on the Assessment and Restoration of 
Environmental Damage Following Marine Oil Spills (CPI Books Limited 2009) 9-29. 
 102 
 Collier and Lowe have clearly stated that ‘This method of settlement, as the 
name suggests, does not involve the investigation or application of rules of law’84 
Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell are of the same opinion when they state that: 
‘Commissions of inquiry will normally deal only with inquiry, a particularly 
important issue in many environmental disputes’. 85  It may be unusual for a 
commission of inquiry to suggest that the parties should accept certain procedural 
obligations, but what it can do is to ascertain some facts that are relevant to or are 
considered to be elements of procedural obligations. In this sense, a commission can 
do no more than provide assistance to the disputants in applying and interpreting the 
obligations by themselves, rather than dealing directly with the application or 
interpretation of legal obligations. This might arise, for example, in relation to the 
conduct of an EIA. If the terms of reference were to be drafted, the parties might 
request an inquiry commission to investigate and report on the following points: 
 a) The likelihood that a proposed activity may cause substantial pollution of 
or significant adverse impact on the environment (which is a question of fact),86 thus 
triggering the obligation of the State proposing the activity to carry out an EIA.  
Inquiry can investigate the precise nature and effects of the planned activity or assess 
the risks of activities that are likely to cause significant environmental harm. The 
ILC’s Commentaries on its Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm 
from Hazardous Activities rightly point out that ‘the term “significant” is not without 
ambiguity and a determination has to be made in each specific case. It involves more 
factual considerations than legal determination.’87 
 b) If an EIA has been undertaken, an inquiry commission, if requested by the 
parties, could investigate the degree of adequacy of an EIA. The UNEP Goals and 
Principles provide that ‘the environmental effects in an EIA should be assessed with a 
degree of detail commensurate with their likely environmental significance.’88 An 
inquiry commission would inquire into all the circumstances with a view to finding 
                                                
84 John Collier and Vaughan Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in International Law: Institutions and 
Procedures (OUP 2000) 24 (emphasis added). 
85 Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (3 edn, 
OUP 2009) 264-265 (emphasis added). 
86 As in the Danube-Black Sea Deep Water Navigation Route case, see chapter 3, section 1.3.2. 
87 Draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, with commentaries 
2001, YbILC, Vol 2 Part 2, 52. 
88 Principle 5 of the UNEP Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment, see 
<http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/publications/reports/rsrs/pdfs/rsrs122.pdf> accessed 28 September 
2014. 
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out whether the EIAs had already met internationally agreed standards. This is a 
factual determination. 
 c) If an EIA has been undertaken, an inquiry commission may investigate the 
time when the EIA was conducted to determine whether or not it had taken place 
prior to the implementation of the proposed project.89 Investigating the exact timing 
of the initiation of an EIA can be considered as a factual determination.  
2. AN APPRAISAL OF THE SUITABILITY OF ADJUDICATION IN SETTLING 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES       
It should be noted at the beginning of this section that adjudicative dispute settlement 
mechanisms, unlike diplomatic means, are suitable where the parties want a dispute to 
be decided according to rules of law with a binding outcome. 
2.1 An Appraisal of Arbitration 
2.1.1 Suitability for Settling Disputes that may be Bilateral or Multilateral in 
Character 
 Given that arbitration is bilateral in character, it can facilitate the settlement of 
disputes between two States. In practice so far most environmental disputes that have 
been referred to arbitration have been bilateral disputes such as that relating to 
transboundary air pollution, i.e. the Trail Smelter case or the utilisation of 
international rivers. However, traditional arbitration does admit that there can be more 
than one State on each side if they have the same interest. One example is the 
Southern Bluefin Tuna arbitration where there were two claimants, Australia and New 
Zealand. But one could think of more truly multilateral situations, such as say those of  
damage caused by climate change, where it would not be a simple case of one or more 
claimants against one or more respondents. The PCA rules seem to refer to the first 
type of multilateral situation referred to above as they envisage one or more claimants 
                                                
89 See Pulp Mills case, para. 205; Certain Activities/Construction of a Road cases, paras. 104 and 153; 
Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Partial Award), para. 450; Advisory Opinion on 
Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in 
the Area (2011) ITLOS, Seabed Disputes Chamber, para. 147. 
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bringing a case against one or more respondents in each case, not necessarily 
comprising States.90  
 One of the advantages of arbitration, notably ad hoc arbitration, is that the 
rules of procedure may be selected beforehand so that the parties could choose 
suitable procedures for multilateral environmental disputes. There is the PCA 
Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or the 
Environment that allow for multilateral disputes to be submitted to arbitration.91 It 
recognises that the Rules may be used in relation to disputes between two or more 
States with regard to access to and utilisation of natural resources.92 The language 
used in the PCA’s Environmental Rules for Arbitration—such as in Article 3, which 
reads: ‘the party or parties initiating recourse to arbitration…shall give to the other 
party or parties…a notice of arbitration’—signify the possibility that there may be 
multiple claimants or multiple respondents in an international environmental dispute. 
It also provides for multiparty appointment of arbitrators in Article 7 (4) which states 
that where there is more than one respondent, the respondents shall jointly appoint an 
arbitrator.93 These Rules can either be incorporated within the dispute settlement 
provision in a convention used for settling future disputes or else incorporated within 
a special agreement concluded after the dispute has arisen. Article 1 (1) states, ‘all 
parties have agreed in writing that a dispute that…has arisen between them shall be 
referred to arbitration’. The Rules clarify that the phrase ‘agreed upon in writing’ 
would include a wide range of forms which are ‘provisions in agreements, contracts, 
conventions, treaties, the constituent instrument of an international organization or 
agency or reference upon consent of the parties’. Moreover, it is not necessary that the 
parties should define their dispute as an environmental one in the first instance in 
order to adopt these Rules because they provide that ‘the characterization of the 
disputes as relating to natural resources and/or the environment is not necessary for 
jurisdiction where all the parties have agreed to settle a specific dispute under these 
Rules’.94 This provision does accept that the definition of the environment and of 
                                                
90 See the Guidelines for Adapting the PCA Arbitration Rules to Disputes Arising under Multilateral 
Agreements or Multiparty Contracts. 
91 Hereinafter PCA’s Environmental Rules for Arbitration, reprinted at <https://pca-cpa.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/175/2016/01/Optional-Rules-for-Arbitration-of-Disputes-Relating-to-the-
Environment-and_or-Natural-Resources.pdf> accessed 16 May 2106. 
92 Ibid, 184. 
93 Ibid, Art. 7 (4). 
94 Art. 1 of the PCA’s Environmental Rules for Arbitration.  
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natural resources is controversial. Consequently, the Drafting Committee of the 
Optional Rules intended to prevent any protracted debates between parties about such 
a definition.95  
 Recently, PCA’s Environmental Rules for Arbitration have been incorporated 
in the arbitration clause of the Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for 
Damage Caused by the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on 
Transboundary Waters to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Waters and International Lakes and to the 1992 Convention on the 
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents.96 So far, there has been only one 
bilateral dispute between an investor and the State that has applied the Rules to the 
proceedings.97 Given that arbitration is flexible, since the parties can choose the rules 
of procedures that can facilitate multiparty-disputes, this makes arbitration suitable for 
settling multilateral environmental disputes. 
 However, it depends on the willingness of the parties, since they can 
determine who can be involved in the process of dispute settlement. For example, the 
ability of States A, B and C to participate would depend either on all the parties 
agreeing to this or on the compromissory clause making provision for this. After a 
dispute arises, the disputing parties—which can be two or more than two States—may 
submit their dispute to arbitral tribunals either jointly by virtue of a special agreement 
(compromis) or by one party unilaterally referring the dispute to arbitration under a 
dispute settlement clause in an existing bilateral or multilateral treaty providing for 
the settlement of future disputes.   
 For ante hoc arbitration, procedural rules may be governed by a treaty 
conferring jurisdiction which concluded before a dispute arises. It can be said that if 
States choose to use the PCA Environmental Rules, this would increase the 
effectiveness of the arbitration, since it can bring potential parties into the process of 
dispute settlement in a case where the dispute involves multilateral parties.    
                                                
95 Dane P. Ratliff, ‘The PCA Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources 
and/or the Environment’ (2001) 14 LJIL 887, 891. 
96 See Art. 14, full text available at <http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/civil-
liability/documents/protocol_e.pdf> (Not yet in force) accessed 17 June 2016. 
97 Naftrac Limited (Cyprus) v. State Environmental Investment Agency of Ukraine, Award of 4 
December 2012, PCA (unreported). No further information is available for this case, since it was 
unreported by the PCA. This case was cited in Roda Verheyen and Cathrin Zengerling, ‘International 
Dispute Settlement’ in Cinnamon P.  Carlarne, Kevin R. Gray and Richard  Tarasofsky (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law (OUP 2016) 243, at footnote 17. 
 106 
 Where a dispute involved an alleged breach of an MEA with erga omnes 
partes obligations, it would be possible for a State (acting as an agent of the 
international community) to initiate arbitration either by trying to find a treaty that 
provided for the unilateral initiation of arbitration, such as arbitration under the 
CBD98 or the UNFCCC,99 or with the agreement of the State that is alleged to be in 
breach. In the latter situation there is no guarantee that the State concerned will agree 
to arbitration. 
2.1.2 Suitability for Settling Disputes of a Multi-Dimensional Character 
Questions relating to scientific and technical issues: In cases where technical issues 
are among the key questions of an international environmental dispute, there are 
several ways that can ensure that arbitral tribunals have sufficient capacity to decide 
scientific and other non-legal questions.100  
 Firstly, due to the fact that the parties possess ultimate control over the 
procedure in ad hoc arbitration, they may include provisions concerning the 
procedures by which an arbitral tribunal may acquire or apprehend technical 
information from experts. For example, in the Trail Smelter Arbitration, Article II of 
the compromis provided that each party could designate a scientist to assist the 
Tribunal.101 In addition, Technical Consultants, assisted by meteorologists, were also 
appointed for the purpose of conducting extensive meteorological investigations and 
providing a report accordingly.102 The Tribunal used the Technical Consultants’ 
findings as a source of information when examining the detailed régime relating to the 
restriction of the release of sulphur dioxide which could occur in the future by, inter 
alia, setting a standard known as the maximum permissible sulphur emissions.103 
What makes the appointment of technical experts to assist a tribunal particularly 
interesting is that they can play a very significant role in helping the tribunal to 
                                                
98 Art. 27 (3) (a) and Annex II, Part 1of the CBD. 
99 Art. 14 (2) (b) of the UNFCCC. 
100 Gabrielle  Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Arbitration and the Need for Technical or Scientific Expertise’ in 
The International Bureau of the PCA (ed), Arbitration in Air, Space and Telecommunications Law: 
Enforcing Regulatory Measures: Papers Emanating from the Third PCA International Law Seminar, 
February 23, 2001 (Kluwer Law International 2002) 286. 
101 See Art. II, Trail Smelter Arbitration. 
102 Trail Smelter Arbitration, 1966. 
103 Ibid, 1975. See also R. S. Dean and R. E. Swain, Report Submitted to the Trail Smelter Arbitral 
Tribunal (United States Government Printing Office 1944) 290-293. 
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resolve the dispute successfully. 104  Arbitral tribunals have adopted a proactive 
approach to consulting experts, as has been exemplified by several cases.105 For 
example, in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case the parties agreed that if there 
was any question regarding the reasonableness and practical effects of any regulations 
related to fisheries, the Tribunal could refer such a question to a commission of three 
expert specialists in such matters.106 In the Bering Sea Fur-Seals Arbitration a 
commission of experts was established for the purpose of finding the facts in 
connection with the life of seals and proposing measures for their protection and 
preservation.107 In the Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, although this was 
not an environmental case, which was decided by the Tribunal constituted under 
Annex VII to UNCLOS, the Rules of the Procedures explicitly provided that the 
Arbitral Tribunal may upon notice to the parties appoint one or more experts to report 
to it on the specific issues that are to be determined by the Tribunal.108 The use of 
experts in this case was extensive. The Tribunal appointed Prof. Hans van Houtte, an 
international law professor, as the independent expert to review Suriname’s 
proposal(s) for the removal or redaction of documents.109 In addition, the Tribunal 
also appointed Mr. David H. Gray as the Tribunal’s hydrographic expert to draw and 
explain the maritime boundary line between the two States in accordance with 
international hydrographic and geodetic standards.110 
 More recently, in the South China Sea Arbitration, the role played by the 
Tribunal-appointed experts was very important since the Arbitral Tribunal relied 
extensively on the relevant information provided by them in deciding the case.111       
It sought an independent opinion from the Professors of coral reef ecology to consider 
                                                
104 Gillian Mary White, The Use of Experts by International Tribunals (Syracuse University Press 
1965) 160; Arthur K. Kuhn, ‘The Trail Smelter Arbitration—United States and Canada’ (1941) 35 
AJIL 665, 666. 
105 Francesca Romanin  Jacur, ‘Remarks on the Role of Ex Curia Scientific Experts in International 
Environmental Disputes’ in Nerina Boschiero and others (eds), International Courts and the 
Development  of International Law: Essays in Honour of Tullio Treves (T.M.C. Asser Press 2013) 449. 
106 Art. III of the Special Agreement between the United States of America and Great Britain (27 
January 1909), see The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (UK v. US) (1909) 11 RIAA 167, 176. 
107 Bering Sea Fur Seals Arbitration, 799 and 808. 
108 Art. 11 (3) Rules of Procedure for the Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to UNCLOS 
Pursuant to the Notification of Guyana dated 24 February 2004. 
109 Order No 3, 12 October 2005. See also Order No. 4, 12 October 2005. 
110 Order No 6, 27 November 2006. See also Award of the Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to 
Article 287, and in accordance with Annex VII of UNCLOS in the Matter of an Arbitration Between 
Guyana and Suriname, 17 September 2007, para. 108. 
111 See Art. 24 of the Rules of Procedure with regard to the appointment of independent expert, 
available at http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/233 (accessed 23 November 2016). 
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whether China’s engagement in harvesting of endangered species112 and in artificial 
island-building activities had caused severe damage to the marine environment.113     
It is undeniable that in the case like this in which scientific environmental information 
is very crucial for the weighing evidence, the Arbitral Tribunal could not evaluate the 
facts without the assistance of the experts.  
 A second way in which arbitral tribunals may be suitable for deciding 
technical questions is if the parties to a dispute appoint relevant technical experts as 
the arbitrators.114 A particularly clear illustration of this may be seen in the Indus 
Waters Kishenganga Arbitration where Howard S. Wheater, a professor of hydrology, 
was appointed as one of the arbitrators.115 By appointing a hydrological expert as one 
of the arbitrators, the tribunal could properly deal with the question of whether or not 
India could deplete or bring the reservoir level of a run-of-river Plant below the Dead 
Storage Level (DSL) under any circumstances. Without scientific knowledge it would 
have been difficult for the tribunal to have applied the facts to the law in order to find 
out whether India had breached the Indus Waters Treaty. It is interesting to note that 
India argued, in its objection to the admissibility of the case, about the 
appropriateness of the tribunal for settling this highly scientific and complex question 
by claiming that such questions should be handled by a Neutral Expert rather than by 
the arbitral tribunal. Nevertheless, the tribunal was relatively confident about its 
capability to deal with such technical issues because the composition of the arbitral 
tribunal ‘points to its competence in technical matters’.116 The fact that a highly 
qualified engineer was one of the arbitrators meant that the tribunal was a suitable 
forum to deal with technical issues.117 For this reason, the tribunal rejected India’s 
arguments in this respect and held that ‘no dispute brought before a court of 
arbitration could be rendered inadmissible merely on the ground that it involved a 
technical question’.118    
                                                
112 See for example in the South China Sea Arbitration, paras. 848, 851, 955, 957 
113 See for example in Ibid, paras. 855, 857, 977, 978-983. 
114 Higgins also says that ‘the ad hoc formation of a tribunal can enable the necessary non-legal 
expertise to be found among the arbitrators’. See Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The Desirability of Third-Party 
Adjudication: Conventional Wisdom or Continuing Truth?’ in J.E.S. Fawcett and Rosalyn  Higgins 
(eds), International Organization: Law in Movement: Essays in Honour of John McMahon (OUP 
1974) 44. 
115 Para. 4 (b) (ii) of Annexure G to the Indus Waters Treaty. 
116 Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, para. 486. 
117 Ibid, para. 486. 
118 Ibid, para. 487. 
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 The question of the role of experts applies equally to arbitration tribunals set 
up under certain mechanisms, for example, the role of the experts prescribed by the 
PCA’s Environmental Rules for Arbitration. The Rules allow an expert to play a 
significant role in settling environmental disputes. They provide the option that the 
parties can appoint arbitrators who possess expertise and experience in environmental 
issues—both on legal and scientific issues—from the lists provided by the Secretary 
General.119 However, the parties are not limited to choosing from the PCA lists but 
they can choose from among their own candidates. If an arbitral tribunal is faced with 
technical difficulties it may appoint one or more experts to provide a report on 
specific issues.120 The Rules also provide for the appointment of expert witnesses 
from the list provided by the Secretary General in a case where there is a conflict 
between the parties relating to scientific evidence that has been presented by both 
parties.121 It can be said that the Rules put significant emphasis on the role of experts. 
Thus, arbitration under the auspices of the PCA is desirable for the settling of 
technical and complex questions in international environmental disputes.122  
 As far as the expertise of arbitral tribunals under UNCLOS are concerned, 
according to Annex VII of UNCLOS, every State Party can nominate an arbitrator 
who has some experience of maritime affairs.123 What is clear from this provision is 
that it allows a person who is not a lawyer to be able to sit on the bench, although in 
practice all Annex VII arbitrators used so far have been lawyers. Annex VIII of 
UNCLOS goes even further than Annex VII in respect of the nomination of experts 
when it provides that the Parties shall be entitled to nominate experts who are 
knowledgeable about fisheries, 124 the protection and preservation of the marine 
                                                
119 See Art. 6, Art. 8 (3) and Annex 2 Specialized Panel of Arbitrators Established Pursuant to the 
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environment,125 marine scientific research126 or navigation.127 Thus, a dispute may be 
more satisfactorily resolved. 
 Questions relating to societal choice: Turning now to questions about societal 
choice that are associated with international environmental disputes, arbitration is an 
appropriate mode for settling non-legal disputes or it may be conferred to act as an 
‘amiable compositeur’.128 That is to say it may detach itself from merely legal 
questions and take particular factors—such as political, economic and social 
choices—into consideration when deciding a case if the parties to a dispute explicitly 
agree to this. An arbitral tribunal can decide a case ex aequo et bono, and may only 
take a decision ex aequo et bono if that is explicitly authorized by the parties. If it is 
not so authorized it is difficult to see how a tribunal could take societal and other 
factors into account. The desires of the parties may even be one of the bases for 
making a decision that the tribunal has to bear in mind. The Trail Smelter Arbitration 
may stand as an example of this, where the parties clearly stated in Article IV of the 
Convention For The Final Settlement Of The Difficulties Arising Through 
Complaints Of Damage Done In The State Of Washington By Fumes Discharged 
From The Smelter Of The Consolidated Mining And Smelting Company, Trail, 
British Columbia that ‘The Tribunal…shall give consideration to the desire of the 
High Contracting Parties to reach a solution just to all parties concerned.’129  A 
question that may arise in this respect is what was a solution just to all? It may be that 
the parties did not want the tribunal to apply the law but simply wanted the interests 
of both the affected farmers and the owners of the smelter (the Consolidated Mining 
and Smelting Company ‘Cominco’) to be taken into account.130  What the tribunal 
actually did in this case was a solution which was just to all the parties and that would 
allow the continuation of the operation of the smelter on the one hand and ensure that 
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the damage would not occur in the future on the other.131 As McCaffrey convincingly 
states: ‘the Tribunal must have believed the high standard to be necessary in 
achieving a balance or “just” resolution…: do not shut down or curtail the operations 
of the smelter unless it is demonstrably causing some serious damage’.132 
2.1.3 Suitability for Identifying the Source of the Alleged Breach of an 
International Environmental Obligation 
The identification of the facts giving rise to a dispute: The suitability on this matter is 
concerned with the investigatory powers of an arbitral tribunal and its technical 
expertise in ascertaining the sources of the breach. Normally, a tribunal does not play 
an active role in finding the facts that are pertinent to a dispute except in a case where 
the parties agree that a tribunal should inquire in depth into a question of fact. It 
normally relies on the information presented by the parties in their written 
submissions in which they must prove that an actual breach has occurred, rather than 
performing the task of an inquiry itself. If environmental harm cannot be clearly 
identified, it is hard for the tribunal to settle the dispute. There must be an actual 
wrongdoer State not being merely a potential wrongdoer State. The practice of the 
arbitral tribunal in affirming the cause of damage in the Trail Smelter Arbitration also 
signified the need for a high degree of burden of proof for a State to invoke the 
responsibility of another State for damages.133 The tribunal pronounced that the injury 
would have to be established by ‘clear and convincing evidence’.134 Undoubtedly, if 
an arbitral tribunal takes this approach, then some environmental disputes will not be 
settled since the party cannot easily establish the causal connection between the 
source of the pollution and injury.135 Thus, arbitral tribunals are not well suited for 
discovering the facts giving rise to an environmental dispute where these are 
uncertain.  
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 The determination of a breach of an international obligation: Arbitration 
usually decides a case on the basis of law.136 It is well suited for determining whether 
those facts, when known, constitute the breach of an international environmental 
obligation and what are the legal consequences arising from such a breach in the light 
of the rules of State responsibility, which are the legal issue. 
2.1.4 Suitability for Quantifying Damages 
There seem to be three distinct questions: (1) Is a tribunal empowered to award 
compensation where this is considered to be an appropriate form of reparation for the 
breach of an international obligation? (2) Does a tribunal have the expertise and the 
means to determine the amount of compensation? (3) Are there adequate rules of 
international law to guide a tribunal? 
 For the first question, since a tribunal has an inherent power to decide whether 
a State has breached an international obligation, it follows that it must also have an 
inherent power to decide on the consequences of a breach, i.e. what remedy should be 
awarded (again, unless it is explicitly prohibited by the parties from doing so). This 
function may be clearly set out in a dispute settlement clause annexed to a particular 
treaty or in a special agreement concluded after a dispute arises, so that arbitrators are 
obliged to follow the instructions of the parties. As in the Trail Smelter Arbitration, 
one of the duties that was imposed upon the Tribunal was to award compensation.137 
 The second question is concerned with the expertise of a tribunal to calculate 
the amount of damages. Undoubtedly, the calculation of damages is not about the art 
of interpretation of the law but arbitrators need experts from the other sciences to 
assist them. It is much more difficult if it has to calculate environmental damages in 
monetary terms. The Trail Smelter Arbitration still stands as the only instance of a 
case in which the arbitral tribunal quantified damages in monetary terms.138 The 
tribunal awarded 78,000 US dollars for the transboundary pollution damage caused by 
the Trail Smelter. It is useful to look at the processes whereby the arbitral tribunal 
assessed and calculated these damages in order to assess the suitability of arbitration 
as a mode of dispute settlement. The outcome of the award of the tribunal has 
provoked criticism from scholars about the way in which the tribunal took this 
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approach. Alfred Rubin said that the arbitral tribunal focused merely on the tangible 
damage which was measurable only in monetary terms and did not touch upon the 
issue of intangible damage, such as the compensation for the damage caused to the 
environment.139 He interestingly asked questions which the tribunal left unanswered 
i.e. ‘What money damages result from so polluting the air that eagles are endangered 
as a species? Or sparrows? What is the present value of saplings whose market value 
cannot be determined for another fifty years? Or wild flowers? Must injury be 
suffered before international responsibility is fixed?’140  
 The third question is concerned with the adequacy of international law which 
can provide guidance with regard to environmental damages. International law 
relating to this matter is sparse. One guidance that can be referred to is UNCC’s 
approach, which can give an idea of how to assess damages. However, arbitration is 
flexible in terms of its applicable law. That is to say, apart from the fact that a tribunal 
can choose the applicable law of its own accord, the parties can ask the tribunal to 
apply the law concerning environmental damage or the current practice in relation to 
this matter by putting the applicable law in the compromis which is not limited to 
international law. In the Trail Smelter Arbitration the applicable law used for 
determining the damage was also the tort law concept of damage in domestic law. The 
compromis empowered the tribunal to apply ‘the law and practice followed in dealing 
with cognate questions in the United States of America as well as international law 
and practice’.141 The tribunal’s findings show that it relied on the practice of the 
American courts relating to ‘nuisance’ or ‘trespass’.142  Therefore the compensable 
damage would be considered in the light of the reduction in the value of the land 
caused by the fumigations.143 For the farm land, the reduction of value was calculated 
on the basis of, for example, the amount of the reduction of the crop yield arising 
from injury to crops.144  Although the tribunal did not take into account the issue of 
environmental damage that could not be calculated in monetary terms, one lesson can 
be drawn from the Trail Smelter Arbitration, namely that the compromis can refer to 
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the practice which should be adopted in the case. Applying this to the present-day 
context, the parties could make reference to, for example, the relevant practice of the 
French Court of Cassation which has just recognised and confirmed the decision of 
the Court of Appeal in the Erika Judgement on the possibility of obtaining 
compensation for pure environmental damage, which is described as ‘damage to non-
marketable environmental resources that constitute a legitimate collective interest’.145 
Therefore, it can be said that the applicable law for calculating environmental 
damages may not be confined to international law. The parties may request a tribunal 
to apply other laws or practices if they see that it will help a tribunal to deal with this 
issue. 
2.1.5 Suitability for Interpreting and Applying Procedural Obligations 
Given that the interpretation and application of procedural obligations are matters of 
law, arbitration is a legal settlement of a dispute in which it is bound to apply and 
interpret the law. Thus, arbitration is a suitable forum for interpreting and applying 
procedural obligations found in treaties or crystallised as customary international law. 
Procedural obligations have been developed relatively well, as is reflected in several 
arbitral decisions. To begin with the obligation to notify, the Lac Lanoux Arbitration 
seems to be the first significant arbitral case that mentioned the procedural obligations 
in the context of the utilisation of waters. When initiating the scheme concerning the 
diversion of waters, the tribunal held that the State ‘could not be denied the right to 
insist on notification of works or concessions which are the object of a scheme’.146  
 As far as the obligation to exchange information and consultation is 
concerned, this can be discerned from the pronouncements of the arbitral tribunal in 
the MOX Plant case. In this case, the tribunal affirmed the provisional measures 
prescribed by ITLOS that requested the parties to cooperate and enter into 
consultation in order to ‘exchange further information with regard to possible 
consequences for the Irish Sea arising out of the commissioning of the MOX plant’.147 
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In the same line, with the decision of the MOX Plant case, the tribunal in the Land 
Reclamation case also ordered Malaysia and Singapore to enter into consultation with 
a view to exchanging information on—and assessing the risks or effects of—
Singapore’s land reclamation works.148 
 Turning to the obligation to conduct an EIA, the Land Reclamation case 
provides an illustration of how the tribunal accepted the importance of conducting an 
EIA when it ordered the parties to form a group of independent experts to conduct a 
study in relation to the effects of Singapore’s land reclamation.149 Another case is the 
Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, where the tribunal found it appropriate to 
interpret and apply the Indus Waters Treaty in the light of ‘the customary 
international principles for the protection of the environment in force today’.150 One 
of the principles that the tribunal mentioned in its decision was the customary 
international law principle that requires a State to conduct an EIA. The tribunal just 
reaffirmed this procedural obligation by quoting the full statement concerning EIA 
that appeared in the Pulp Mills case.151  
 One may conclude that, in practice, the arbitral tribunals have not found 
themselves in a difficult position in affirming procedural obligations.  
2.2 An Appraisal of the International Courts 
2.2.1 Suitability for Settling Disputes that may be Bilateral or Multilateral in 
Character 
In appraising the suitability of the international courts for the settling of international 
environmental disputes which are bilateral or multilateral in character, it is 
appropriate to consider their pre-established rules of procedure to see whether they 
can facilitate the settling of these types of international environmental disputes. 
 The rules of procedure of the international courts are essentially based on the 
principle of bilateralism in that ‘there are two parties in contentious cases, and that for 
third parties an adversarial contentious proceeding is res inter alios acta’.152 Although 
                                                
148 Land Reclamation case, para. 106 (1) (b). 
149 Land Reclamation case, para. 106 (1) (a) (i). 
150 Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, para. 452. 
151 Pulp Mills case, para. 450. 
152 Shabtai  Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920-2005: Volume III 
Procedure (4 edn, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006) 1439. See also Terry Douglas Gill, Litigation 
 116 
bilateral environmental disputes fit relatively well with the bilateral dispute settlement 
paradigm of international litigation, some problems remain unresolved. The 
jurisdiction of international courts over international environmental disputes is one of 
the most obvious problems. The jurisdictional problem has attracted particular 
criticism from several scholars.153 The main argument which they have put forward 
arises from the fact that most international environmental cases have been brought 
before the judicial bodies in which their jurisdiction was based upon the 
compromissory clause provided in particular bilateral treaties. In the case of the ICJ, it 
could not exercise its jurisdiction over those issues that fall outside the scope of the 
compromissory clause, even though such environmental harms are germane to the 
case.154 As was shown in the Pulp Mills case, the Court found that it had no 
jurisdiction over the environmental issues concerning visual, noise and odours 
pollution since Article 36 of the 1975 Statute provided no basis for the claim 
advanced by Argentina.155 Thus, the environmental issues arising from this case might 
not be able to be handled in a comprehensive way. In order to decide the case more 
comprehensively by applying rules of international law that they consider relevant to 
the dispute, all States should make a declaration under Article 36 (2) of the Statute 
that is free of any reservations concerning environmental disputes.156 Nonetheless, 
given the current practice on this provision, the likelihood of this happening is remote 
in the extreme. Even though the States accept the compulsory jurisdiction, there is a 
possibility that some States may make a declaration excluding environmental issues 
from the jurisdiction of the international courts.157  
 With the ITLOS, the question of jurisdiction is more complex. Firstly, an 
environmental dispute may cover matters falling both within and outside UNCLOS, 
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as exemplified in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case,158 but the ITLOS can only deal with 
the former aspects. Secondly, the ITLOS can only be used if both parties to a dispute 
have made a declaration selecting it as their preferred means of settlement (in practice 
relatively few States have done so)159 or the parties to a case that has been referred to 
Annex VII arbitration agree to refer it to the ITLOS, as has happened in several cases, 
e.g. the Swordfish case in which the case was transferred to a Special Chamber of 
ITLOS.160 
 For multilateral environmental disputes involving several States, it is possible 
for two or more States to be joined together as multiple applicants161 or multiple 
respondents162 as happened in environmental cases, for example, in the Southern 
Bluefin Tuna case and Nuclear Tests cases.163 This situation may be called a ‘plural 
party’ situation.164 Doing that upholds the bilateral paradigm of judicial dispute 
settlement, since the parties are grouped into two procedural parties in which each 
group shares the same interest. Therefore, litigating in such a situation may cause the 
same sort of jurisdictional problems as in cases such as the pollution of international 
watercourses in which a numbers of States, such as three or four affected riparian 
States, wish to jointly institute proceedings. For example, if States A, B and C allege 
that State D has polluted an international river that flows through all those States and 
has caused serious damage to the ecological system of the river, which means that 
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State D is breaching its environmental obligations which are set out in an international 
agreement relating to the use of this river and which has been concluded between 
them. It may be possible for States A, B and C—the potential parties—to instigate 
contentious proceedings in the ICJ and become the parties to the dispute. However, 
there could also be a problem with jurisdiction, e.g. if States A and D had made 
declarations under the optional clause, but B and C had not. Also, it is still doubtful 
how the judicial bodies would handle a situation where a large number of States 
suffer a breach of environmental obligations, such as climate change cases. In a case 
where more than one State would like to file a complaint, the suitability of the 
international courts is still questionable.  
 One may put the question that: Would the intervention be a procedure that can 
broaden the participation of the other potential parties so that they can participate in 
the proceedings? As for the ICJ, the intervention may be granted under Article 62 of 
the ICJ Statute.165 A State will intervene without having the status of being a party but 
as an intervener that wishes to defend an interest of a legal nature which might be 
affected by the decision in the case. However, it is doubtful whether a State can 
intervene as a party. There is a possibility of party intervention in a case where one or 
both of the parties in the proceedings give consent to the intervention. As Hugh 
Thirlway observes, this is not a clear proposition to the effect that an intervention as a 
party will be allowed under Article 62 or ‘whether it follows simply from an 
application of the principle of consent as creative of international jurisdiction’.166  
 As far as the typology of intervention in the ICJ is concerned, there are two 
Articles that provide certain conditions that States need to fulfill before they can 
intervene in a case. Under Article 62 of the ICJ Statute, a State has to provide proof 
that its interests of a legal nature may be affected by a decision, which is very difficult 
to prove where actual environmental damage may be difficult to quantify.167 Thus, the 
possibility in a case where several States, without being directly injured, could 
intervene in proceedings under this Article with a view to protecting common 
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interests is very low. This led Wolfrum to say that ‘this form of intervention is not 
suited to serve community interests; it is tailored to the traditional bilateral approach 
toward solving international disputes’.168  
 As has been mentioned in chapter 2, there has been a burgeoning of 
environmental obligations that are owed to the international community and any 
breach of such obligations involves the interests of the international community as a 
whole. Consequently, international courts in which the procedures are inherently 
bilateral may not be the proper fora to address multilateral environmental disputes.169 
 In an international environmental context, sceptics often question the way in 
which the international courts are equipped with appropriate rules and procedures that 
allow public interest international environmental cases to be litigated. 170  More 
concretely, if erga omnes treaties have been breached, for example the climate change 
Conventions or the CBD, the question that needs to be asked in connection with this 
issue is who has the standing to bring a claim against a breaching State. 
 In answering these questions, the jurisprudence of the international courts 
must be examined to ascertain whether and to what extent they have accepted the 
erga omnes character of the obligations relating to the protection of the global 
environment which may give rise to their having standing before them. The ICJ has 
not touched upon the issue of global environmental protection directly. But in the 
Question Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite case between Belgium 
and Senegal the ICJ held in the context of the Convention against Torture which has 
an erga omnes partes character that ‘any State party to the Convention may invoke 
the responsibility of another State party with a view to ascertaining the alleged failure 
to comply with its obligations’.171 Applying this approach to the environmental 
context, all States parties have an interest in compliance with international 
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environmental obligations under MEAs which have an erga omnes partes character 
and they may sue any State party that they consider to be in breach of their 
obligations under the MEA, although they may not qualify as directly injured States. 
However, this position has not yet been clearly confirmed by the ICJ although it had a 
chance to address this issue in the Whaling case. 
 In that case, the ICJ did not question Australia’s standing to challenge Japan’s 
alleged non-compliance with the Whaling Convention. This would imply that all the 
other States parties to the Convention which share a common interest could raise the 
issue of a breach to their obligation to protect whales. However, the Court did not 
expressly address this matter in its Judgment,172 but it seems that the obligations 
embodied in the Whaling Convention are obligations erga omnes partes in that each 
and every party has the standing to bring a case before the Court without having to 
demonstrate that it is specially affected by the breach of such obligations. 173 
Comparing the Belgium v. Senegal case with the Whaling case, one will find that the 
Court adopted the same approach with regard to the question of actio popularis.174 
However, it is probably too early to draw a general conclusion that the ICJ will grant 
standing in future environmental cases, since it did not hold expressly any view about 
the scope of this right and the appropriate remedies thereof.175 There still remains the 
problem whether: As in these two cases the parties’ standing relied on the treaties, is 
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it possible for a State to bring a case in the absence of a multilateral treaty by claiming 
that they are representing the international community as a whole? The answer is still 
unclear. 
 There are also signs of a more open attitude towards standing with regard to 
obligations erga omnes partes. In 2011, the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the ITLOS 
held that each State Party to the UNCLOS ‘may also be entitled to claim 
compensation in light of the erga omnes character of the obligations relating to 
preservation of the environment of the high seas and in the Area.’176 To support this 
view, it referred to Article 48 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility which 
certainly suggests the possibility of cases being brought by non-injured States.177   
 In protecting the marine environment from seabed activities conducted in the 
Area, there is a possibility for the International Seabed Authority (the Authority), an 
autonomous international organisation, to initiate contentious proceedings against 
member States or contractors in the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber. 178  Since the 
Authority is an international organisation that is established under UNCLOS and the 
1994 Agreement, it can probably be said that the Authority is endowed with the legal 
personality to act on behalf of the international community as a whole.179 Therefore, a 
multilateral environmental dispute in this case may be taken to litigation by the 
international body rather than by individual States.  
2.2.2 Suitability for Settling Disputes of a Multi-Dimensional Character 
In appraising the suitability of the international courts when they are faced with 
international environmental disputes that have a multi-dimensional character, two 
points need to be examined, namely 1) the capabilities of the courts and tribunals to 
handle the complexities of scientific and technical arguments put forward by the 
parties in the case, and 2) the ways in which the courts and tribunal deal with the 
complexity of questions about societal choice. 
 Questions relating to scientific and technical issues: To begin with the 
complexities of scientific and technical issues, the parties usually bring to the 
                                                
176 Advisory Opinion on Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities 
with Respect to Activities in the Area (2011) ITLOS, Seabed Disputes Chamber, para. 180. 
177 Art. 48 provides that ‘Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of 
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(b) the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole.’ 
178 Art. 187 of UNCLOS. 
179 Art. 137 (2) of UNCLOS. 
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proceedings a large amount of scientific evidence to support their claims in 
international environmental disputes.180 It should be noted from the outset that the 
task of the international courts is to interpret international law and evaluate all the 
evidence presented by the parties in order to determine whether their claims that the 
other party is breaching international environmental obligations are supported by 
sufficient evidence, rather than to assess scientific evidence to determine the existence 
of international environmental harm.181 In addition, in the oral phase, expert witnesses 
may be introduced by the parties and this will also require the cross-examination of 
the experts by each party.182  
 It is apparent that, apart from their recognized competence in international 
law, the ICJ or ITLOS judges are unlikely to possess expertise in relation to scientific 
issues,183 and this is one of the bases of the criticism that they are unsuitable for 
considering environmental disputes. However, a court has the option to seek 
information from or arrange for the attendance of a witness or an expert to give 
evidence on its own initiative before applying scientific facts to international law in 
order to make sound legal decisions on these matters.184  
 Despite the fact that the ICJ has the power to appoint experts to give technical 
opinions, it appears to be reluctant to do so.185 In the Pulp Mills case, the Court felt 
that it was capable of assessing the scientific evidence for itself when the Court stated 
that: 
                                                
180 Catherine A.  Cooper, ‘The Management of International Environmental Disputes in the Context of 
Canada-United States Relations: A Survey and Evaluation of Techniques and Mechanisms’ (1986) 24 
Canadian Ybk Intl L 247, 251; Elihu Lauterpacht, Aspects of the Administration of International 
Justice (Cambridge Grotius Publications Limited 1991) 17. Judge Peter Tomka has accepted that 
‘scientific evidence will play a key role’ in environmental disputes, see the Statement by H.E. Judge 
Peter Tomka, President of the International Court of Justice, at the Plenary Session of the St. 
Petersburg International Legal Forum, 15 May 2013, 2, available at <http://www.icj-
cij.org/presscom/files/4/17374.pdf> accessed 27 May 2016. 
181 Pulp Mills case, para. 236. See Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma in 
this case at para. 4. See also Harrison (n 153) 509. 
182  Art. 65 of the ICJ Rules. 
183 The selection of the 21 judges of the ITLOS is not based on scientific or technical criteria, but it is 
based on having the highest reputation for fairness and integrity and of recognized competence in the 
field of the law of the sea: see Art. 2 of Annex VI to UNCLOS. See David Anderson, ‘Scientific 
Evidence in Cases Under Part XV of the LOSC’ in Myron H. Nordquist and others (eds), Law, Science 
and Ocean Management (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007) 511-512. 
184 Art. 50 of the ICJ Statute and Art. 62 of the ICJ Rules. For the ITLOS see Art. 289 of UNCLOS and 
Art.15 of the ITLOS Rules.  
185 Anna  Riddell and Brendan  Plant, Evidence before the International Court of Justice (British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law 2009) 353; Kolb states that ‘[u]p to the present time it 
has (perhaps excessively) refrained from appointing its own experts’ see Robert Kolb, The 
International Court of Justice (Alan Perry tr, Hart Publishing 2013) 929. See also Art. 289 of 
UNCLOS. 
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‘It is the responsibility of the Court, after having given careful 
consideration to all the evidence placed before it by the Parties, to 
determine which facts must be considered relevant, to assess their 
probative value, and to draw conclusions from them as 
appropriate’.186 
This paragraph provoked a serious dissent from Judges Al-Khasawneh and Bruno 
Simma. They criticised the failure of the Court to resort to experts when assessing and 
evaluating highly complex scientific and technological facts before arriving at the 
final conclusion that Uruguay had not breached its substantive obligations. In their 
view ‘the Court on its own is not in a position adequately to assess and weigh 
complex scientific evidence of the type presented by the Parties’.187  
 In the Whaling case, scientific evidence was also important in determining 
whether Japan had breached its obligations in authorizing and implementing JARPA 
II in the Southern Ocean. In this case, scientific experts were called on by the parties 
to provide both written statements and oral observations. There were also 
examinations and cross-examinations of the experts and the judges also had a chance 
to ask the experts questions. However, the Court did not seek the assistance of other 
external sources of expertise under Article 50 of the ICJ Statute but relied solely on 
the scientific experts called by both parties, where the central issue was whether the 
JARPA II was ‘scientific research’ and whether it existed for ‘purposes of scientific 
research’. In order to determine the legality of this programme, the Court needed to 
consider various complicated technical issues—such as the use of lethal sampling, the 
selection of whale sample sizes etc—which would have required experts to assist the 
Court in attempting to weigh the evidence and reach a decision.188 There are several 
places in the judgment where the Court attempted to separate the function of the 
Court in applying the law and the function of appraising scientific evidence. 189 
                                                
186 Pulp Mills case, para. 168. 
187 Ibid, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma, para. 4. 
188 Makane Moïse Mbengue, ‘Between Law and Science: A Commentary on the Whaling in the 
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(scientific opinions) as scientists…must be distinguished from the interpretation of the Convention’ 
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Obviously, judges are not scientists and therefore they need the assistance of experts, 
who should be independent, to examine, evaluate and weigh scientific facts, rather 
than party-appointed experts who will be less impartial than independent court-
appointed experts.190 
 With regard to the use of experts by the ICJ, Sir Robert Jennings once noted 
that the ICJ frequently resorts to invisible experts or experts fantômes. He noted that 
the Court ‘has indeed not infrequently employed cartographers, hydrographers, 
geographers, linguists, and even very specialised legal experts to assist in the 
understanding of the issues in a case before it; and has not on the whole felt any need 
to make this public knowledge or even to apprise the parties.’191 Experts fantômes 
have the drawback that the parties cannot cross-examine them or comment on their 
reports so that it may affect the transparency and openness of the Court in hearing 
cases as well as undermining the Court’s evidential weight.192 The ICJ tends not to 
change its position in not resorting to court-appointed experts so that scientific 
questions may not be handled appropriately.193  
 Questions relating to societal choice: As far as the complexities of questions 
about societal choice are concerned, the international courts are not an appropriate 
forum to answer questions relating to social, economic and political choices. This is 
                                                                                                                                      
variable…has scientific advantages over another’ para.172 and ‘such an inquiry is not to second-guess 
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Romano claims that the reasons why the international courts and tribunals are reluctant to rely on 
external experts are, inter alia, the fear that experts will enter the judges’ province so that they might 
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in Société Française pour le Droit International (ed), Le Droit International Face aux Enjeux 
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because their primary task is to interpret and apply international law rather than taking 
other social factors into consideration. In judicial proceedings the question must be: 
what is the law that is to be applied in the case?  As was mentioned in chapter two, 
environmental policy may differ from State to State. A recent example is Japanese 
whaling policy that runs against the policy of other members of the IWC to amend 
commercial whaling.194  No matter how different the opinions of Japan and the 
antiwhaling States were, when this issue was brought to the ICJ the Court could 
examine only the law that was applicable to the case, which was Article VII of the 
ICRW, paragraphs 10 (e) and (d), paragraph 7 (b) and paragraph 30 of the Schedule 
of the ICRW. Moreover, it stated that  
‘The Court is aware that members of the international community 
hold divergent views about the appropriate policy towards whales 
and whaling, but it is not for the Court to settle these differences.’195 
It is possible, if the parties agree, to permit the courts and tribunals to decide a case on 
the basis of ‘ex aequo et bono’ or equitable considerations. However, no parties have 
yet requested the international courts to do so in international environmental disputes. 
2.2.3 Suitability for Identifying the Source of the Alleged Breach of an 
International Environmental Obligation 
The question is: Do the ICJ or ITLOS have any investigatory power in this regard? As 
with arbitration, the international courts rely on the facts presented to them by the 
parties rather than finding out the facts by themselves. Disputants play a crucial role 
in convincing the ICJ or ITLOS to adjudicate according to their requests. Thus, the 
sources of harm and the responsible State should, to some extent, be identified. When 
instituting contentious proceedings, the claimant State will argue or claim that the 
other State is breaching an international obligation. If it cannot identify who is the 
breaching State, it is impossible to bring a claim before the international courts 
because an applicant State must indicate in its application the State against which the 
claim is being brought.196  
 Taking litigation over climate change as an example, it is possible that a small 
island State located in the Pacific Ocean may make a decision to sue the US in the 
                                                
194 See Keiko  Hirata, ‘Why Japan Supports Whaling’ (2005) 8 JIWLP 129, 136. 
195 Whaling case, para. 69. 
196 Art. 38 (1) of the ICJ Rules. See also the same provision in Art. 54 (1) of the ITLOS Rules. 
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ICJ, claiming that the US has emitted CO2 and contributed to climate change, which 
in turn may have an adverse effect on its territory by causing it to sink under the 
ocean as sea levels rise. There are at least four questions in this example: (1) has the 
US emitted CO2?; (2) have these emissions caused sea level rise?; (3) if so, is the 
degree of US emissions sufficient on their own to have caused sea level rise to the 
extent that it has inundated the applicant?; and (4) do the US emissions constitute a 
breach of an international obligation? Questions (1) – (3) are factual (scientific) 
questions and therefore a court is not well-suited to deal with them in the case where 
the source of harm could not be easily identified. The proving of the causal 
relationship between the wrongful conduct and the damage produced may not be an 
easy task. This is because there is uncertainty surrounding the causes of climate 
change. The question may be asked whether the sinking of the claimant State can be 
wholly or even partially attributed to the actions or omissions of the defendant 
State.197 The contributions to climate change may not necessarily come solely from 
human causes but also from natural causes.198 As for question (4), it is a legal 
question which a court is well suited to answer if it has reliable answers to questions 
(1) – (3). 
 As the international courts do not investigate questions of which States have 
caused environmental harm, a claimant State may also face legal obstacles in 
determining the responsible State because environmental harm may arise from the 
cumulative actions of several States in polluting the environment.199 For this reason, 
the affected State might not have any convincing evidence to demonstrate that a 
cause-and-effect relationship exists between a breach of international obligations and 
the ensuing damage. The standard of proof that the Court may apply when it is 
exercising its determinative function is relatively high because the claimant has to 
provide clear evidence of the ‘facts which it has found to have existed’200 when 
                                                
197 See Michael G. Faure and André Nollkaemper, ‘International Liability as an Instrument to Prevent 
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claiming that the environment is being polluted by the defendant State.201 In the Pulp 
Mills case, Argentina could not successfully convince the Court that Uruguay had 
breached its substantive obligation to prevent pollution and preserve the aquatic 
environment because it failed to provide clear evidence to substantiate its claims. 
With regard to the issue concerning the use of technology for pulp manufacturing that 
is said to have been used in a way that was such as to cause harm to the environment, 
Argentina presented scientific evidence but the Court held that ‘no clear evidence has 
been presented by Argentina establishing that the Orion (Botnia) mill is not in 
compliance with the 1975 Statute.’202 In several paragraphs the Court stated that it 
was not convinced by the evidence provided by Argentina and it also mentioned that 
the causal nexus between Uruguay’s actions and the harmful effects on the river 
environment did not seem to the Court to have been established. The Court observed 
in relation to the presence of harmful substances that ‘Argentina has not 
however…adduced clear evidence which establishes a link between the nonylphenols 
found in the waters of the river and the Orion (Botnia) mill.’203  
 It should be noted that the Pulp Mills case was bilateral in character. In this 
case, the source of harm (Uruguay) and the victim (Argentina) were clearly 
identifiable but the victim failed to provide clear evidence to demonstrate any breach 
of substantive obligations. 204  In multilateral environmental disputes involving 
multiple tortfeasors it is, a fortiori, even harder to prove the identity of the breaching 
State, such as CO2 emitters or land-based polluters, and also the causal relationship is 
difficult, if not impossible, to establish. Consequently, the international courts may 
not be the appropriate place to settle international environmental disputes that exhibit 
these characteristics.  
                                                
201 For the determinative function of the Court in a situation where the Court is asked to determine 
whether a party has breached its obligations see Katherine Del Mar, ‘The International Court of Justice 
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2.2.4 Suitability for Quantifying Damages 
As a preliminary point, it should be noted that when international obligations are 
found to have been breached, the breaching State has a duty to make reparations, of 
which compensation may be one form which can be awarded to the injured State. The 
international courts have the power to enforce this duty. A reference can be made to 
the Chorzów Factory case in which the PCIJ addressed the question of compensation 
for damage in general international law.205  
 A breach of international environmental obligations falls within the general 
principle. In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case concerning environmental damage, the 
ICJ accepted the difficulty involved in quantifying damages and stressed the 
importance of vigilance and prevention instead. It noted that damage to the 
environment often has an ‘irreversible character’ which in turn exposes ‘the 
limitations inherent in the very mechanism of reparation of this type of damage’.206    
 One may ask whether international courts have the expertise and the means to 
determine the amount of damages when dealing with environmental disputes. 
Quantifying damages for environmental harm may be a difficult and complicated task 
which means that international judges alone cannot handle this issue effectively 
without the assistance of experts in the other fields related to the environment. The 
UNCC, which was established as a result of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait, illustrates how multi-disciplinary teams of experts can assist in quantifying 
environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources. According to Olufemi 
Elias, a legal adviser at the UNCC, the F4 Panel, where claims with regard to 
environmental damage may be heard and compensation may be sought, was assisted 
by experts in subjects ‘such as chemistry; toxicology; biology (including 
microbiology, marine biology, biological oceanography, marine zoology and plant 
pathology); medicine; epidemiology; environmental, ecological and natural resource 
economics; geology (including geochemistry, hydrology, geo-ecology); atmospheric 
sciences; oil spill assessment and response; rangeland management and 
                                                
205 Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland) (Claim for Indemnity) (Merits) PCIJ Ser. A, No 17 
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accounting.’207 It is doubtful how far the international courts would be willing to seek 
the assistance of experts to determine reparation for environmental damage and how 
far they would take the practice of the UNCC into account.  
2.2.5 Suitability for Interpreting and Applying Procedural Obligations 
For the purpose of assessing the suitability of the international courts for the purpose 
of interpreting and applying procedural environmental obligations, it might be 
appropriate to examine the function of the international courts. Interpretation and 
application of procedural obligations are a matter of law and, basically, they are a 
judicial activity. It is the process whereby the international courts attempt to interpret 
the meaning of a text and determine the consequences, which according to the text, 
should follow in a given situation.208 As they encompass the resolution of disputes on 
the basis of law decided by judges who have competence in international law, the 
international courts are a suitable forum to perform this task. 
 As far as the normative content of procedural obligations is concerned209, they 
are now not in a state of flux in which States should avoid litigation in international 
courts.210 The Pulp Mills case confirms this assertion. The ICJ interpreted and 
confirmed that the obligation to conduct an EIA had attained the status of ‘general 
international law’211 by looking at the practice of States, which is supported by opinio 
juris, before giving this authoritative statement. 212  Also, the ICJ clarified the 
circumstances in which an EIA must be carried out.213 As Judge Kooijmans observed 
in his separate opinion in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, where international law is in 
a state of flux, litigation should be avoided and thus a State ‘may prefer to settle such 
disputes by other means than judicial settlement because it is convinced that such 
other means may lead to a resolution of the issue which in the end will be more 
                                                
207 Olufemi Elias, ‘The UN Compensation Commission and Liability for the Costs of Monitoring and 
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satisfactory for all States concerned.’214 When procedural obligations become a core 
issue of the case, the international courts have not found themselves in an awkward 
position where they have would have to decide unfamiliar concepts.215 Thus, they are 
suitable for the purpose of interpreting and applying environmental procedural 
obligations. 
3. AN APPRAISAL OF THE SUITABILITY OF NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES IN 
SETTLING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES 
For the purpose of making an appraisal of the suitability of NCPs, it should be noted 
from the outset that the non-compliance mechanisms established under MEAs are not 
identical, but they vary to a greater or lesser extent. In addition, NCPs are only 
suitable for trying to resolve disputes relating to the interpretation or application of 
MEAS that have an NCP mechanism. They cannot be used for the generality of 
environmental disputes, unlike diplomatic means and unlike courts and arbitral 
tribunals (subject to some reservations about their jurisdiction). There is no single 
universal mechanism to deal with non-compliance questions. This section will attempt 
to answer the questions of suitability by considering some of the common 
characteristics that are shared among different NCPs as a basis for the discussion and 
it will attempt to draw the appropriate conclusions therefrom. It should be noted that 
NCPs are not necessarily, or perhaps even primarily, dispute settlement bodies. 
3.1 Suitability for Settling Disputes that may be Bilateral in Multilateral in 
Character 
Their suitability for settling a bilateral dispute may be tested by considering the 
designs of the triggering mechanisms under particular NCPs. If the settlement of 
disputes by international courts in essence consists of a bilateral procedure, the same 
is true for some NCPs that have adopted a bilateral approach to the settling of disputes 
by compliance committees (hereinafter CC). The system of triggering the procedures 
for non-compliance proceedings by a State party with respect to another party is 
shown in the submission by Romania alleging that Ukraine had failed to observe its 
obligations concerning EIA under the Espoo Convention, or the case where Romania 
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alleged that Ukraine had breached the obligations set out in the Aarhus Convention.216 
In addition, NCPs are not constrained by the consent-based system in which the 
consent of all the parties needs to be obtained before the instigating of proceedings. In 
this sense, NCPs are suitable to be chosen for this role in settling bilateral disputes.  
 With regard to the number of parties that can bring a non-compliance issue 
before the CC, there are some NCPs, such as the Espoo Convention,217 the Montreal 
Protocol,218 the LRTAP,219 the Aarhus Convention,220 and the Protocol on Water and 
Health, which clearly provide that a submission may be brought before the Committee 
by one or more parties.221 Thus, some NCPs are suitable for settling multilateral 
environmental disputes arising from a particular MEA. In relation to multilateral 
international environmental disputes involving a breach of multilateral treaty 
obligations owed to all the States which are parties, the questions that need to be 
raised for the purpose of appraising the suitability of NCPs is: Whether NCPs can 
facilitate the settlement of multi-party international environmental disputes in ways 
that allow States parties other than injured States the standing to seek compliance with 
MEAs which have an erga omnes partes character and the breach of which affects all 
the States parties equally? 
 What can be found is that those NCPs with triggering processes that were 
designed to allow any other State party to initiate proceedings are well suited to the 
notion of erga omnes partes which underlies several MEAs.222 Some of these NCPs 
allow any party to trigger compliance procedures with respect to another party’s 
compliance which is often referred to as a party-to-party trigger with no requirement 
that the submitting States must be injured or specifically affected States. It should be 
observed that since the objective of NCPs is to protect a ‘common treaty interest’,223 
any party can trigger these proceedings, regardless of the infringement of any 
individual interest, because breaches of obligations under MEAs ‘usually affect all 
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parties equally rather than any particular party or parties specifically’. 224  In 
international agreements, such as the Montreal Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol, in 
connection with a breach of the obligations by one party ‘its concern is not disputes 
between two (or a small number of) parties, but rather disputes pitting a single party 
against the other parties as a group’.225 Therefore, the NCP triggering channels are 
designed to serve this purpose. Fitzmaurice and Redgwell have rightly pointed out 
that a ‘NCP is a multilateral and collective procedure’ and that a NCP ‘is more 
consistent with the nature of environmental treaty obligations, with the forum of the 
IC reflecting this collective character and possessing ‘an erga omnes aspect’’226 
3.2 Suitability for Settling Disputes of a Multi-Dimensional Character 
Questions relating to scientific and technical issues: In deciding the question of non-
compliance involving technical issues, the qualifications of the members of the CC 
are of the utmost importance for assessing its suitability to fulfill this function. When 
considering the qualifications of those members of CCs who have to deal with the 
multi-dimensional character of the issue of non-compliance, what can be seen is that 
some NCPs set out the qualifications of members of CCs which require them to be 
persons who are competent in scientific, technical, socio-economic, legal or other 
fields.227 Some NCPs, such as the NCP of the Barcelona Convention, clearly provide 
that in the election of the members of the Committee a balance of scientific, legal and 
technical expertise needs to be achieved.228 However, not all NCPs use personal 
expertise as a basis for the selection of the members of CCs but also base the 
composition of members of CCs on the principle of equitable geographical 
                                                
224 Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, ‘Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law’ (2000) 94 AJIL 623, 
644. 
225 Thomas Gehring, ‘International Environmental Law Regimes: Dynamic Sectoral Legal Systems’ 
(1990) 1 YIEL 35, 51. 
226 Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Catherine Redgwell, ‘Environmental Non-Compliance Procedures and 
International Law’ (2000) 31 Netherlands Ybk Intl L 35, 50; See also Antonio Cardesa-Salzmann, 
‘Constitutionalising Secondary Rules in Global Environmental Regimes: Non-Compliance Procedures 
and the Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (2012) 24 JEL 103, 115; Francesca 
Romanin Jacur, ‘Triggering Non-Compliance Procedures’ in Tullio Treves and others (eds), Non-
Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental 
Agreements (T.M.C Asser Press 2009) 375. 
227 For example, Para. 3.2 of Annex 7 to the London NCP; Para. 6 of the Kyoto NCP; Para. 2 of the 
Aarhus NCP; Para.5 of the Water and Health NCP; Para.3 of the Cartagena Protocol NCP; Para.3 of 
the ITPGRFA NCP; Para. 3 of the Annex to decision RC-3/4, Draft text of the procedures and 
mechanisms on compliance with the Rotterdam Convention. 
228 Para. 11 of the Barcelona NCP. 
 133 
representation, a balance between developed and developing countries, and gender 
balance.229  
 NPCs may acquire information with regard to non-compliance from different 
sources such as information given by experts. Some technical questions may be 
handled by specialised bodies which work collaboratively with the CC. By way of 
illustration, it is worthwhile to consider the sources of information which both the 
branches (EB and the Facilitative Branch (FB)) which were established under the 
Kyoto Protocol use in deciding the question of implementation. According to the 
procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance under the Kyoto Protocol, each 
branch can base its deliberations on any relevant information provided by a wide 
variety of sources (apart from the information given by a party that has submitted a 
question of implementation with respect to another party) such as those from the 
reports of expert review teams, reports of COPs, the subsidiary bodies under the 
Convention and the Protocol, and the other branch.230 In addition, each branch may 
seek expert advice.231 Unlike the ICJ, which is reluctant to seek advice from experts 
publicly when it is faced with complex technical questions in a dispute, it appears that 
the EB has no hesitation in resorting to experts for advice. It once even accepted 
explicitly that ‘the highly technical nature of the questions of 
implementation…requires the enforcement branch to seek assistance from experts. 
Advice from experts will facilitate the branch’s further understanding of the questions 
of implementation…’232 
  Some CCs work in collaboration with other technical treaty bodies so that the 
CCs can seek expert advice from the internal organs established under particular 
MEAs. Among those scientific and technical bodies are, for example, the Expert 
Review Team of the Kyoto Protocol, the Biosafety Clearing House Mechanism of the 
Cartagena Protocol 233  and the Cooperative Programme for the Monitoring and 
Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP) of 
the LRTAP Convention.234 It can be concluded that scientific and other questions will 
be appropriately addressed by NCPs.  
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 Questions relating to societal choice: Where non-compliance leads to a 
dispute, the question arises as to whether a NCP is limited to establishing whether or 
not there has been non-compliance or whether it may consider the social and 
economic issues that may lie behind a case of non-compliance. 
 It should be observed that a CC usually has a duty not only to determine the 
actions or omissions of a State that is alleged to have breached its obligations but also 
to identify the causes of such non-compliance. For example, the Basel NCP clearly 
provides that the Committee shall consider any submission that is made to it in 
relation to a non-compliance issue ‘with a view to determining the facts and root 
causes of the matter of concern and assist in its resolution’.235 In the Kyoto Protocol, 
in a case where the Enforcement Branch (EB) of the Kyoto NCP has determined that 
a Party is not in compliance with its obligations, it shall take into account the cause, 
type, degree and frequency of the non-compliance of that party when making a 
declaration of non-compliance.236 Most, if not all, NCPs require the CC to find out the 
root causes of non-compliance in order to assist non-complying parties to return to 
respecting their obligations. Diagnosing the real problem with regard to the difficulty 
in implementing the obligations of an MEA is a crucial way to facilitate compliance.  
3.3 Suitability for Identifying the Source of the Alleged Breach of an 
International Environmental Obligation 
The identification of the facts giving rise to a dispute: It may be appropriate to start 
appraising the suitability of NCPs for identifying the source of a breach of an 
international environmental obligation by considering the processes through which 
NCPs acquire information in relation to non-compliance. 
 Do they have the investigatory powers to identify questions of fact that can 
eventually enable them to conclude that the defaulting State has actually been in 
breach of its obligations? The position varies from one NCP to another but they all 
have some investigatory powers, as the following examples show. 
 The EB under the Kyoto NCP has a very complex system for identifying the 
sources of any breach of an international obligation set out in the Kyoto Protocol. The 
EB has the duty to identify whether parties alleged to be in non-compliance have 
observed the followings obligations: (1) their assigned commitments to limit and 
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reduce emissions (2) issues concerning methodology and the communication of 
information (inventories, reports) (3) eligibility criteria for flexibility mechanisms.  
None of these obligations can easily be examined without the complicated systems 
created under the Kyoto NCP. These include the information gathering process, 
through the registry techniques and the reporting system, and forms of information 
processing such as checks, compilation and communication.237 
 The CC of the Aarhus Convention has several processes for gathering 
information in order to enable it to reach a decision on cases of non-compliance. The 
means of gathering information can be categorised into three groups, namely 1) easily 
accessible and no-cost or low-cost means of obtaining information 2) obtaining 
information by contacting external sources 3) costly and more complicated means.238 
For the first group, the information may come from several sources, such as 
international organizations that are active in the relevant field, reports from the 
Parties, Committee members, the literature and the Internet.239 As for the second 
group, the information may be provided by national and international experts from 
governments, academia, the private sector and non-governmental organizations.240 
The last group is concerned with invitations of experts to meetings of the Committee 
and visits by Committee members and/or the secretariat to carry out on-the-spot 
information gathering and appraisals.241 There are various ways in which the CC may 
choose to determine a breach of international obligations depending on the 
complexity of the cases which are brought before it. What is obvious is that the CC 
plays an active role in ascertaining the facts rather than relying solely on single 
sources of information. Considering the information gathering process, what can be 
concluded is that the CC actually has, to some extent, various investigatory powers. 
This conclusion can be confirmed by the fact that, in certain circumstances, the CC, 
with the consent of any of the parties concerned, is empowered to perform a fact-
finding function or on-the-spot information gathering. This kind of acquisition of 
information is conducted through the visits of experts with a view to establishing the 
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facts and assessing the situation of alleged non-compliance in those cases where, for 
instance, the situation of alleged non-compliance is and continues to be serious, and 
the CC lacks essential information or else the case presents serious uncertainties.242 
 Another interesting point concerns those cases where the sources of the breach 
cannot be easily established. This raises the question of how NCPs deal with this 
situation. This point can be made by reference to the provision which empowers a CC 
to accept a submission of a submitting party concerning non-compliance. For 
example, the EB of the Kyoto NCP has to undertake a preliminary examination of 
questions of implementation to ensure that the question before it is supported by 
sufficient information or that it is not de minimis or ill-founded.243 This means that it 
can reject a de minimis or ill-founded submission. Reading through this provision, 
three words need to be interpreted: ‘sufficient’, ‘de minimis’ and ‘ill-founded’. What 
is the benchmark for appraising the quality of a submission as being insufficient or 
that the submission can be considered to be well-founded? No specific standard can 
be found in the practices of the CC. However, it is possible that if a submitting party 
or a treaty institution cannot establish a link of causality by supporting its submission 
with adequate information, then the submission is inadmissible. This kind of 
provision appears in almost all NCPs and it may create some problems within some 
MEAs, such as the London Dumping Protocol. There may be situations where there is 
insufficient information to substantiate an allegation that a particular State has 
disposed of wastes or other prohibited matters on the high seas. In this event, the 
Compliance Group will reject the submission on the basis that it was an unidentifiable 
source so that the submission could be viewed as an ill-founded allegation. It can be 
concluded that if the sources of a breach are not clearly identifiable then NCPs may 
not be the right forum to bring up the issue of non-compliance. 
 The determination of a breach of an international obligation: Once the factual 
questions have been established and the source of harm could be identified, the 
question is that: Are NCPs suitable for determining the legal question whether such 
facts represent a breach of an international obligation? Normally, a CC’ s task is to 
examine the facts in the light of the primary rules set out in particular MEAs in order 
to determine whether there has actually been non-compliance. If they find that the 
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State fails to meet the standard provided, a CC will then declare that State to be in 
non-compliance. Terminologically, it is unclear how that the word ‘breach’ differs 
from ‘non-compliance’.244 What is clear is that the declarations of non-compliance 
made by CCs involve a process of the application of law that is akin to the judicial 
activity of courts and tribunals, although these mechanisms differ radically. Thus, 
NCPs are a suitable forum for addressing legal issues. 
3.4 Suitability for Quantifying Damages 
There are three important questions which need to be asked in relation to the issue of 
the suitability of NCPs for quantifying damages: Is it the role for CCs to award 
compensation? Is a CC empowered to award compensation? And if the answers to 
these questions is ‘yes’, how suitable is a CC for determining the amount of 
compensation? 
 Awarding compensation to an injured State or States245 for a breach of 
international environmental obligations is not a function of NCPs at all, since the 
most important objective of the creation of NCPs is to maintain the stability and 
solidarity of particular MEAs and to improve compliance by ensuring that the 
defaulting State can return to full observance of its obligations again, rather than to 
provide reparation after the events have occurred and ‘not necessarily to incriminate 
for non-compliance’. 246  Fitzmaurice and Redgwell have clearly stated that ‘the 
primary objective of NCPs is to ensure a return to compliance with treaty obligations 
rather than to require reparation by the defaulting state for the harm caused to another 
state or states for breach of international obligations.’247 Nonetheless, it could be 
argued that if one were to examine the situation in terms of the law on State 
responsibility, the remedy that a CC would seek would be restitution, i.e. returning the 
non-complying State to a state of full compliance. 
 Quantifying damages is based on the responsibility-based paradigm which is 
contrary to the nature of NCPs, since NCPs were created to overcome the difficulties 
in applying the concept of state responsibility in the context of international 
environmental problems. As Merrills has pointed out, ‘traditional law of state 
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responsibility, though necessarily the basis of treaty obligations, is at the same time a 
crude and unsatisfactory instrument for encouraging performance.’ 248  Therefore, 
NCPs are not a suitable mechanism if the affected party would like to be awarded 
compensation for environmental damage, since the nature of NCPs is not consistent 
with a responsibility-based concept. 
3.5 Suitability for Interpreting and Applying Procedural Obligations 
Generally, the possible consequences of non-compliance are not concerned with 
procedural measures, such as the recommendation of the CC requiring the defaulting 
State to carry out an EIA, to guarantee rights of access to information or to guarantee 
access to justice in environmental matters with a view to bringing about full 
compliance with the treaty concerned. But in NCPs it seems that CCs are only faced 
with having to consider such obligations where they are part of the substance of the 
treaty. 
 There are two NCPs that are concerned directly with procedural obligations, 
namely the Aarhus Convention NCP and the Espoo Convention NCP. The Aarhus 
Convention takes a rights-based approach in protecting the rights of individuals in 
environmental matters, can approach ontaining three pillars: 1) access to information, 
2) public participation and 3) access to justice. One case concerned the failure of 
Ukraine to observe its obligations since public participation was not provided.249 The 
soft measure taken by the Implementation Committee was to request Ukraine to 
improve its legislation and practice so as to make them consistent with its 
international obligations.250 The Espoo Convention deals with the obligations of 
States concerning EIA, which entails two major obligations: 1) the obligations of the 
party of origin where the proposed activity will take place to notify the affected party 
and to allow full participation of the affected parties in the domestic EIA 
procedures251 2) the obligation of the party of origin to give the affected party notice 
of the proposed activity and the EIA documentation.252 
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 It can be concluded that NCPs are not generally designed to deal with issues 
of the interpretation and application of procedural obligations, but instead they focus 
on specific substantive obligations within particular MEAs.   
4. AN APPRAISAL OF THE SUITABILITY OF RFMO PANELS IN SETTLING 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES 
Before analysing the suitability of review panels, it should be noted from the outset 
that this applies to a very narrow category of environmental dispute, namely disputes 
relating to the use of the objection procedure in those RFMOs that provide a review 
mechanism, and that the discussion of suitability is solely in the context of this narrow 
category of dispute. 
4.1 Suitability for Settling Disputes that may be Bilateral or Multilateral in 
Character 
The design of the review procedures can be said to be a bilateral structure, like that of 
courts, tribunals, and arbitration, in which one party submits its arguments to a review 
panel and the other party submits its counter-arguments.253 There is no reason to 
believe that a review panel is not a suitable forum for settling a bilateral dispute. 
 For multilateral disputes, the RFMO panels have procedures that are perfectly 
suited for settling a dispute in which several States may also have interests in 
objections to the conservation and management measures of the RFMO. The RFMO 
conventions recognise that there will be situations where more than two parties in a 
dispute are seeking a review of the decisions of a commission.254 There is also a 
provision that allows other States to intervene in panel proceedings, which is more 
like intervention in judicial proceedings. In section 6 to Annex II of the SPRFMO 
Convention, it clearly provides that ‘any member of the Commission may submit a 
memorandum to the Review Panel concerning the objection under review and the 
Panel shall allow any such member of the Commission full opportunity to be heard’ 
and this opportunity was widely used in the one case to date.255 A similar provision 
can also be found in the NAFO Convention, the NEAFC Convention and the WCPF 
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Convention where they grant the right to any Contracting Party which is not a Party to 
the dispute to make written and oral submissions to the ad hoc panel.256 There is also 
a fascinating provision in the NAFO Convention that allows another party, which is 
not originally a party to a dispute but who later wishes to become a party to a dispute, 
to participate in the process of establishing an ad hoc panel and to join the 
proceedings, unless the original Parties to the dispute disagree.257 Thus, this kind of 
procedure is unrestricted since member States, apart from those that object to the 
decision, can join the proceedings without showing that they are injured or have been 
specifically affected in the sense that is usually required to become a party to a 
dispute. As Schiffman notes, in the context of the SPRFMO Convention, ‘This 
attempt by the drafters of the SPRFMO Convention to subject objections to a form of 
multilateral review is innovative and reflects a trend in this direction by newer 
RFMOs’.258  
 Such procedures are suitable for high seas fisheries disputes, which by their 
nature are inherently multilateral in character. That is to say, conservation and 
management measures adopted by a commission of particular RFMOs nearly always 
include a catch management measure in the form of a total allowable catch as one of 
the conservation measures which, in turn, is divided into quotas and then is allocated 
to different State members of such RFMOs. If a member or members present an 
objection to a commission’s decision in this matter, other members’ interests may be 
affected in the sense that such objections may affect the total catch or the question of 
whether the TAC will be exceeded.  
 Moreover, the nature of the procedure is also multilateral.259 Taking the 
SPRFMO as an example, an objection to a measure automatically triggers the 
establishment of a review panel, it does not depend on the initiation of proceedings by 
the Commission or by another member. It is true that the Commission plays a crucial 
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role in determining the composition of the panel, but when it does so it is acting on 
behalf of the members generally. Furthermore, while Article 17 of the SPRFMO 
Convention makes provision for written submissions by the members of the 
commission, it does not explicitly provide for submissions by the commission 
itself.260 Thus, a dispute before a SPRMO panel is a true multilateral dispute.  
4.2 Suitability for Settling Disputes of a Multi-Dimensional Character 
Questions relating to scientific and technical issues: Conservation and management 
measures are involved with technical matters. As the ICJ noted in the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction case: ‘According to international law, in order for a measure to be 
characterized as a “conservation and management measure”, it is sufficient that its 
purpose is to conserve and manage living resources and that, to this end, it satisfies 
various technical requirements.’261 The Court then concluded that ‘International law 
thus characterizes “conservation and management measures” by reference to factual 
and scientific criteria.’262 
 A review panel can serve the purpose of disentangling the complexity of 
technical and scientific questions because of its composition in which not only 
lawyers are members but also scientists and technical experts. For instance, the 
SPRFMO review panel has to be composed of ‘experts whose competence in the 
legal, scientific or technical aspects of fisheries’263 which shall be appointed from ‘the 
list of experts in the field of fisheries drawn up and maintained by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) pursuant to Annex VIII, article 
2, of UNCLOS or a similar list maintained by the Executive Director’.264 In the 
Trachurus murphyi case, the chairperson of the SPRFMO Commission appointed Sra. 
Valeria Carvajal as one of the members of the panel who had special expertise in the 
field of fishing engineering. The other two members were two international lawyers: 
Professor Kamil A. Bekyashev, who was appointed by Russia, and Professor Bernard 
H. Oxman, who served as the third member and as the Chairman appointed by both 
the parties. However, it should be noted that in this case, the panel failed to establish 
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whether the La Fayette had actually caught any fish, since it was claimed to be a 
factory mothership, not a trawler that was actively fishing Trachurus species in either 
2009 or 2010.  It is not clear why the panel failed to do so. The reason may be 
because the panel lacked the necessary expertise, or because of a lack of time, since 
the panel is obliged to provide its findings within 45 days of its constitution so that it 
may not have enough time to consider this matter. 
 Seeking advice from experts is possible for a panel that is constituted under 
the NAFO Convention. It may seek information and technical advice from any person 
or body that it deems appropriate upon receiving the consent of the parties, although 
the panelists may be selected from any person who has qualifications in the legal, 
scientific or technical aspects of fisheries.265  
 It can be concluded that RFMO review panel procedures require qualified 
persons who can deal with scientific and technical issues and therefore such panels 
are suitable for addressing technical questions. 
 Questions relating to societal choice: As far as the societal dimension of such 
disputes is concerned, it seems at first sight that a panel may not take non-legal 
factors into account when making a recommendation since there are no explicit 
provisions allowing it to do so. This is because, generally, a panel is mandated to 
apply the relevant provisions of certain conventions, for example UNCLOS, the Fish 
Stocks Agreement,266 the convention establishing the RFMO concerned, and any 
other rules of international law that are not incompatible with the RFMO 
conventions.267  
 However, some of the RFMO conventions leave some room for non-legal 
matters. The NAFO Convention also adds ‘generally accepted standards for the 
conservation and management of living resources’ as one of the applicable rules to be 
applied by an ad hoc panel.268 It is interesting to consider the question what are the 
generally accepted standards for the conservation and management of living 
resources: Do they include non-legal guidelines or non-legal factors? McDorman 
expresses doubts about this type of clause when he says that ‘it is unclear whether 
“generally accepted standards” implies customary law or whether, and more likely, it 
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allows a court or tribunal to examine appropriate resource management practices that 
are not of a law-creative quality.’269 Some standards provide that the ecosystem-
based approach may be included as an accepted standard.270  
 It should be noted, however, that in the SPRFMO Convention the two terms, 
namely ‘findings’ and ‘recommendations’, are clearly distinguished from one another. 
Whereas the review panel has to restrict itself to the legal text before deciding the 
case and issuing its findings, the recommendations may not necessarily be proposed 
as a result of legal interpretation. It could, arguably, detach itself from the law and 
allows societal factors, such as, to borrow McDorman’s words, those ‘resource 
management practices that are not of a law-creative quality’ to play a role in resolving 
a dispute. The other Convention which uses the terms ‘findings’ and 
‘recommendations’ is the WCPF Convention.271  
 In addition, although the RFMO conventions require a review panel to apply 
UNCLOS, it can nonetheless make a recommendation that takes into consideration 
economic and social factors, since Article 119 of UNCLOS acknowledges that 
conservation measures for living resources on the high seas shall also be adopted in a 
way that will produce the maximum sustainable yield as qualified by the relevant 
environmental and economic factors, as well as the special requirements of 
developing States.272 Thus, a review panel may have broad discretion to select other 
dimensions of a dispute rather than just the law when providing its recommendations 
relating to conservation and management measures.  
4.3 Suitability for Identifying the Source of the Alleged Breach of an 
International Environmental Obligation 
A panel is designed to review the consistency of a decision of a RFMO commission 
with the principle of non-discrimination and various treaties, including the constituent 
of the RFMO concerned, UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks Agreement and the 
acceptability of the objecting State’s proposed alternative measures. If a panel finds 
that a decision that has been adopted is inconsistent with such principles or treaties, 
there is a breach of the environmental obligations or a breach of the obligation not to 
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discriminate contained therein. Therefore, a panel has the competence to perform this 
task. However, the question may be asked: Does it have any investigatory power to 
ascertain the fact that leads to such a breach?    
 In identifying the sources of a dispute, there are different techniques using 
different mechanisms that must be applied before rendering a judgment or proposing 
any recommendations. RFMO panels take the traditional approach of acquiring 
information by relying on the submissions of the parties. In the Trachurus murphyi 
case, the review panel did not play any active role in finding the facts which they 
would use as a basis for deciding the case. The information that the review panel 
relied on came solely from the written submissions and oral presentations of the 
parties to the dispute. This is akin to the technique which international courts and 
arbitrations use in deciding a case. 
 It should be noted, however, that if a dispute is about question of whether an 
RFMO measure is consistent with the relevant treaties, this is purely a legal 
determination that would not seem to require any facts to be investigated.    
4.4 Suitability for Quantifying Damages 
The question in relation to this issue is that: is it the function of a panel to quantify 
damages? To answer this question, it is necessary to consider the constituent treaties 
that establish a panel. For example, the SPRFMO Convention elaborates what the 
findings and recommendations shall be. They shall, according to paragraph 10 of 
Annex II, deal with 1) whether the decision of the Commission can be considered as a 
form of discrimination in form or in fact against the objecting member or members of 
the Commission; 2) whether the decision of the Commission is inconsistent with the 
SPRFMO Convention, UNCLOS or the Fish Stocks Agreement; 3) whether the 
alternative measures presented by the objecting member or members of the 
Commission have an equivalent effect to the decision that has been objected to and 4) 
if the alternative measures do not have an equivalent effect, what new measures 
should it recommend? 273  A similar provision can also be found in the other 
conventions, such as the NAFO Convention, in which an ad hoc panel’s 
recommendations are limited to the question of the compatibility of the objection with 
                                                
273 See para. 10 of the Annex II to the SPRFMO Convention. 
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the grounds provided and the question of whether or not the decision of the 
Commission shall be modified, rescinded or maintained.274 
 Thus, it is evident that it is not a panel’s function to award compensation for 
environmental damage, since the primary function of a panel is to review a decision 
adopted by a certain RFMO commission rather than to deal with an assessment of 
financial loss as a result of environmental damage and lost fishing opportunities. In 
addition, although a panel can propose recommendations, it is most unlikely that a 
panel would award compensation because its function is to deal with the 
appropriateness of conservation and management measures and to suggest suitable 
measures if it deems that the original measures need to be amended. Thus, a panel is 
not designed to allow the panelists to engage in the role of awarding damages.  
4.5 Suitability for Interpreting and Applying Procedural Obligations 
As has been mentioned in each of the sections of this chapter, the interpretation and 
application of procedural obligations are matters of law. Thus, a panel would have no 
difficulty in performing this task were it required to do so if a panel consists primarily 
or entirely of lawyers. The circumstances in which it might have to apply procedural 
obligations would seem to be limited, though not entirely non-existent. For example, 
since the function of a panel is to assess the compatibility of RFMO measures with 
various treaties, it would have to interpret or apply any procedural obligations found 
in those treaties. 
 By way of illustration, as far as the obligation to carry out an EIA is 
concerned, there might be a dispute with regard to the interpretation or application of 
a decision adopted by a RFMO concerning bottom fishing activities which requires 
that the vessels of its members shall not engage in bottom fishing until assessments 
have been carried out to ensure that such fishing would not have any significant 
adverse impacts on vulnerable marine ecosystems (or permits vessels to carry out 
bottom fishing without having carried out an EIA).275 Some members of the RFMO 
might object to this decision on the grounds that that it was, for example, inconsistent 
with Article 206 of UNCLOS which provides that States shall assess the potential 
                                                
274 See also Art. 20 (6) and (8) of the WCPF Convention and para. 10 of Annex II to the WCPF 
Convention. 
275 Conducting an EIA before engaging in bottom fishing activities has been an issue which RFMOs 
have been asked by the General Assembly to take measures to implement in its resolutions but they 
have still not been fully implemented; see UNGA Res 61/105 (6 March 2007) UN Doc A/RES/61/105 
para. 83 (a)-(d); UNGA Res 64/72 (19 March 2010) UN Doc A/RES/64/72 paras. 119 (a)-(d), 120, 122 
and 123. 
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effects of such activities on the marine environment in cases where planned activities 
under State jurisdiction or control may cause substantial pollution of or significant 
and harmful changes to the marine environment. This would create the need for a 
panel to deal with this issue. In practice, the NEAFC Commission has adopted and 
amended recommendations concerning bottom fishing activities since 2008 and no 
objections have yet been presented.276  
 Nevertheless, the possibility of setting up a panel to interpret and apply such 
procedural obligations does not necessarily mean that its findings and 
recommendations will contain in an operative part which orders the objecting 
members and the commission to perform some kind of procedural obligation, such as 
providing a recommendation asking the parties to set up a group of experts to conduct 
an EIA, to perform general duties of co-operation and to fulfill their obligations 
concerning prior notification, consultation and negotiation. Instead, a panel might 
only have to determine the scope of the obligations contained in Article 206 of 
UNCLOS and the compatibility of the RFMO measures with them. The reason is that 
a panel’s discretion is constrained by the constituent treaties establishing the panel. 
Rather than providing recommendations that a panel considers appropriate to settle a 
dispute, its recommendations must be confined to its role in the RFMO in question. 
The most that a review panel might do is to suggest a new set of EIA rules to amend 
or replace the old ones that it sees as inappropriate.    
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has considered the suitability of various dispute settlement mechanisms 
for settling international environmental disputes. The suitability of each of these 
means has been analysed on the basis that international environmental disputes have 
five special characteristics that distinguish them from the other kinds of disputes that 
arise international law. 
 Characteristic 1: Judicial and non-judicial mechanisms can be used perfectly 
well to settle bilateral international environmental disputes. Multilateral disputes do 
not fit neatly into the rules and procedures of the international courts. However, the 
                                                
276 See Recommendation XVI: 2008; Recommendation XIII: 2009; Recommendation XI: 2010; 
Recommendation XV: 2011; Recommendation XIII: 2013; see the consolidated text of all NEAFC 
recommendations on the regulating of bottom fishing, available at 
<http://www.neafc.org/system/files/Consolidated%20bottom%20regulations%20amended%20by%20r
ecommendation%2012%202013.pdf> accessed 28 November 2014. 
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jurisprudence of the ICJ has shown an inclination to allow cases involving the 
interpretation and application of treaties which have an erga omnes partes character 
to be litigated in the ICJ although, formally, they are usually bilateral when litigated, 
as in the Whaling case. For the purpose of arbitration, there are the PCA’s 
Environmental Rules for Arbitration that allow for multi-party environmental 
disputes.  Non-judicial mechanisms are the most flexible means for the settlement of 
multilateral international environmental disputes since their rules and procedures are 
not fixed beforehand and they can be adapted according to each type of international 
environmental dispute. There is a set of model rules, i.e. the PCA’s Environmental 
Rules for Conciliation which States can choose to adopt as the framework for the 
conciliation process. Non-judicial means can employ various techniques to facilitate 
the settlement of multi-party international environmental disputes. For erga omnes 
(partes) environmental claims, a third party may offer its help to mediate, conciliate 
or investigate the dispute. It depends of the willingness of all the parties whether or 
not to accept such an offer unless there is a provision that allows any State parties to a 
particular treaty to initiate mediation, conciliation or inquiry unilaterally. NCPs and 
RFMO panels are suitable for settling multilateral environmental disputes since their 
nature is not confined to a bilateral paradigm but their process of settlement is 
designed to be able to deal with multi-party disputes or erga omnes partes 
environmental claims.   
 Characteristic 2: With regard to the multi-dimensional character of 
international environmental disputes, the suitability of each means of dispute 
settlement in dealing with scientific and societal issues has been analysed in this 
chapter. International judicial organs may not be suitable for dealing with scientific 
questions since they may not possess the necessary expertise, although they can 
appoint experts to provide or assess technical information, but in practice they appear 
to be reluctant to do so. In addition, societal factors may not be considered by 
international courts as issues that are relevant to the case since their focus is on the 
legal questions. Arbitration is more flexible than international courts in the sense that 
the parties still retain their ultimate control over the procedures, so they can select 
non-lawyers with the relevant expertise to act as arbitrators or they can mandate the 
arbitral tribunal to make use of technical consultants. Societal factors may be 
considered by arbitral tribunals if the parties wish them to be taken into account when 
deciding a case. Non-judicial means are also suitable for settling environmental 
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disputes that involve societal factors that are extraneous to legal questions or complex 
scientific questions. This is because their recommendations can take into account 
other factors which are considered to be the root causes of the conflict between the 
parties. For the purpose of addressing non-legal questions, non-judicial mechanisms 
are more flexible in terms of selecting persons with the required expertise who will 
serve as mediators, conciliators or inquiry commissions. NCPs and RFMO panels can 
deal relatively well with non-legal questions, since the members of a compliance 
committee or panel are not necessarily lawyers. 
 Characteristic 3: There are two distinct aspects of the identification of the 
sources of breaches of international environmental obligations. For the first aspect 
(the identification of the facts that give rise to a dispute), conciliation and inquiry are 
good for this factual issue. Non-judicial means can serve to facilitate this function 
very well since they can use diplomatic techniques to ascertain the sources of a 
breach, especially through inquiry, which in its very design is concerned directly with 
this function. NCPs have an investigatory function in ascertaining the sources of 
disputes with a view to improving compliance with specific environmental treaty 
regimes. The suitability of international courts is not promising because they do not 
have the appropriate capacities to identify complex cases, such as those involving 
complex technical questions about the sources of a breach. Another reason is that they 
tend not to take on the inquisitorial power that is necessary to perform this function. 
This is also true for arbitration, but if the parties wish an arbitral tribunal to do this 
they can design the rules and procedures which will correspond to their desire. Also, 
RFMO panels are unsuitable for this purpose. For the second aspect (the 
determination of whether the facts represent a breach of an international obligation), 
diplomatic means are unsuitable for addressing the legal issues. On the contrary, 
judicial means and NCPs are suitable for determining a breach of an international 
environmental obligation. 
 Characteristic 4: International courts can award damages. Like international 
courts, arbitral tribunals can award compensation and can be quite flexible in the 
sense that the parties may mandate them to apply certain criteria for assessing 
damages which they see as useful to their case, such as those from the UNCC, the F4 
Panel. Quantifying damages is not part of the function of non-judicial mechanisms. 
However, the parties may ask the commissioners to provide recommendations in this 
regard, probably not in the form of compensation but may be in the form of ex gratia 
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payment. Furthermore, with their flexibility in term of the rules and procedures they 
apply, various criteria in assessing damages can be employed. NCPs and RFMO 
panels are not designed to deal with the quantification of environmental damages. 
Rather, in the case of NCPs, they perform a recommendatory function in inducing the 
breaching States to comply with their obligations again and, in the case of RFMO 
panels, they propose appropriate measures for the parties to adopt with a view to 
strengthening their compliance with treaties.   
 Characteristic 5: With regard to the interpretation and application of 
procedural obligations, international courts and arbitral tribunals can perform this task 
very well, since these kinds of legal activities and procedural obligations are now not 
in a state of flux, so that they should have no difficulty in interpreting and applying 
them. Non-judicial means can also perform the function of interpretation and the 
application of procedural obligations very well, since their nature is diplomatic, a 
field in which soft-control measures, such as suggesting to the disputants that they 
perform particular procedural obligations, is a suitable solution to be adopted. 
However, NCPs are generally not suitable for this purpose, with the exception that in 
some cases they have to deal directly with the procedural obligations that are set out 
in particular treaties such as the Aarhus Convention and the Espoo Convention. As for 
RFMO panels, they may have a chance to become involved in the interpretation and 
application of procedural obligations when they have to deal with those conservation 
measures which have a procedural element.  
 To sum up, judicial means are suitable for deciding bilateral environmental 
disputes and interpreting and applying procedural obligations. They are not suitable 
for deciding cases involving multiple parties, multidimensional disputes, quantifying 
environmental damages or identifying the sources of a breach of environmental 
obligations, except for ad hoc arbitration, where parties can set up arbitral procedures 
which suit a specific characteristic of the environmental disputes at issue. Diplomatic 
means, NCPs and RFMO panels, are suitable for deciding bilateral and multilateral 
disputes, multidimensional disputes, identifying the sources of a breach (except for 
NCPs and RFMO panels). They are not suitable for awarding environmental damages 
and interpreting and applying procedural obligations (except for some NCPs, e.g. the 
Aarhus NCP, the Espoo NCP, the Basel NCP, or the Rotterdam NCP) but conciliation 
and mediation may do this if they were to be asked for by the parties. 
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 Furthermore, apart from the nature of the disputes described above, whether a 
particular dispute settlement means is suitable for settling a particular environmental 
dispute depends also on two main factors: (1) the wishes of the parties and (2) the 
type of dispute. 
 (1) The wishes of the parties: As with any type of inter-State dispute, the 
suitability of any particular dispute settlement mechanism depends on what the parties 
want. Thus, the parties will choose diplomatic means if they want to retain control of 
the dispute, avoid the unpredictability, cost and time of litigation, are willing to 
compromise without necessarily basing the solution on the strictly legal position etc. 
Conversely, the parties will choose legal means if they want a legally binding 
outcome, based on the law and are not concerned about the cost and speed of 
litigation. Judicial means may also be attractive for weaker States in asymmetric 
power relationships. 
 (2) The type of dispute: NCPs and RFMO panels cannot be used for many 
kinds of environmental disputes and therefore they will be unsuitable for such 
disputes. Judicial means will also be unsuitable for environmental disputes in which 
which there is no possibility for a court to have jurisdiction.   
 It would be worth making the point at the end of these conclusions, that the 
fact that a particular means may be suitable does not necessarily mean that it will be 
used in practice to any great extent. This seems to be the case with non-judicial 
means, as described in chapter 3. Other factors apart from suitability come into play 
in determining the choice of dispute settlement means by the parties to an 
environmental dispute. Such factors include effectiveness, and this is the issue that 
will be considering in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
MECHANISMS IN SETTLING INTERNATIONAL  
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL CLARIFICATION 
In the last chapter, the question of the suitability of each mechanism in settling 
international environmental disputes was addressed. The purpose of this chapter is to 
evaluate the effectiveness of dispute settlement mechanisms, an issue that is distinct 
from the question of suitability. While suitability is largely concerned with the 
appropriateness of particular mechanisms by considering the special characteristics of 
international environmental disputes and the characteristics of each dispute settlement 
mechanism, effectiveness is about the measurement of the mechanism’s ability to 
bring about intended outcomes.  
 There are two main research questions that need to be asked: 
 1. What are the criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of international dispute 
settlement mechanisms? 
 2. How far do the various means available for settling international 
environmental disputes discussed in chapter 3 meet such criteria? 
 In answering the first question, it is appropriate to establish methodological 
guidelines from the outset. One might begin with the definition of effectiveness: what 
does ‘effectiveness’ mean? According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the ordinary 
meaning of effectiveness is ‘the degree to which something is successful in producing 
a desired result; success’.1 However, there is no clear and coherent definition of 
effectiveness in international law.2 There are vast bodies of studies relating to the 
theory of effectiveness that have attempted to offer criteria or indicators that would 
help to assess effectiveness in relation to particular subject matters.  For example, 
                                                
1 Available at <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/effectiveness> accessed 24 
March 2015. 
2 See Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts (OUP 2014) 4. Chambers also 
notes that the term effectiveness ‘is randomly used in legal discussion but rarely defined consistently in 
the world of public international law’: see W. Bradnee  Chambers, Interlinkages and the Effectiveness 
of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (UN University Press 2008) 97. 
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there are studies that attempt to measure the effectiveness of international 
environmental regime,3 the effectiveness of international environmental treaties4 and 
the effectiveness of international courts.5  Although there is a body of literature that 
has developed criteria of effectiveness, for instance, criteria for evaluating judicial 
effectiveness, such criteria have been criticised by other scholars for their lack of 
reliability and utility.6 Consequently, several attempts have been made to create 
different tools to measure effectiveness, claiming that these would help to fill the gap 
and offer a new approach to answering the question of effectiveness. What can be 
seen is that there are no agreed criteria of effectiveness in existence. This leads 
Gabriela Kütting to state that ‘Effectiveness means distinctly different things to 
different communities’.7 When one wants to evaluate effectiveness, certain criteria 
must be created according to the subject matter that one wants to appraise and the 
research questions that one asks.  
 What part 1 of this chapter seeks to do is to introduce criteria of effectiveness 
that can be used for evaluating four different dispute settlement mechanisms, 
including judicial and non-judicial means, NCPs and RFMO panels. Although criteria 
for assessing the effectiveness of judicial means have been developed by scholars, no 
attempt has yet been made to develop a set of criteria that suitable for all four of the 
means of dispute settlement considered in this thesis. It should be noted from the 
outset that the formulation of the theoretical foundations for the criteria for assessing 
effective dispute settlement cannot be selected from a single theory of effectiveness 
propounded by particular scholars. Rather, different theories will be selected by 
borrowing from the existing literature in various disciplines, for example, the social 
sciences, international relations and international law, and using these as guidelines 
for establishing the criteria that no one else has tried to develop before. This approach 
that Shany calls ‘intellectual borrowing’—which means borrowing similar conceptual 
                                                
3 See, for example, Oran R. Young, ‘Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Existing 
Knowledge, Cutting-Edge Themes, and Research Strategies’ (2011) 108 PNAS 19853, Carsten Helm 
and Detlef Sprinz, ‘Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes’ (2000) 44 
JCR 630 
4 W. Bradnee Chambers, ‘Towards an Improved Understanding of Legal Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Treaties’ (2004) 16 Geo Int'l Envtl L Rev 501. 
5 Shany (n 2). 
6 For example, Shany criticised the criteria proposed by Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, see ibid, 5; 
Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, ‘Judicial Independence in International Tribunals’ (2005) 93 Cal L 
Rev 1. 
7 Gabriela  Kütting, Environment, Society and International Relations: Towards More Effective 
International Agreements (Routledge 2000) 3. 
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frameworks from one or more sciences with a view to overcoming the methodological 
limits of the other sciences.8 The set of indicators of effectiveness developed in the 
present chapter are not intended as an exhaustive list and they will be evaluated only 
for their relevance to the investigation of the settlement of an international 
environmental dispute. 
 After establishing criteria for determining the effectiveness of dispute 
settlement mechanisms, parts two of this chapter will apply these criteria to the four 
different dispute settlement mechanisms mentioned above by discussing both in 
general terms and using case studies as examples. Thus, the second research question 
will then be answered in this part, based upon the experiences of the dispute 
settlement systems in judicial and non-judicial contexts. 
 Due to the fact that, in this chapter, the same set of criteria of effectiveness 
will be used to assess both judicial and non-judicial means of dispute settlement, there 
is a terminological issue that needs to be clarified. The phrase decision makers as used 
below includes judges, arbitrators, mediators, conciliators, commissions of inquiry, 
non-compliance committees and RFMO panels. Likewise, when using the word 
decisions this should be understood to include judgments of international courts, 
arbitral awards, recommendations of mediators, conciliators and RFMO panels, 
findings of commissions of inquiry and decisions of non-compliance committees. 
1. DETERMINING THE CRITERIA OF EFFECTIVE MECHANISMS FOR THE 
SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES  
1.1 Input Criteria  
1.1.1 Procedural Indicators 
One way of determining effectiveness, as suggested by scholars, is to consider the 
process of dispute settlement. The procedural indicators involve the ways in which the 
processes of dispute settlement are designed. Effectiveness can be measured against a 
process that allows all the relevant potential parties to participate in the process.9 The 
question that may then arise is whether the dispute is bilateral or multilateral in scope. 
It is clear that bilateral international environmental disputes may not create any 
                                                
8 Shany (n 2) 5. 
9 Ibid, 61. 
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difficulty in determining which actors can participate in the process. On the contrary, 
in a case where the environmental problems themselves have had a widespread effect 
on a number of States, the participatory scope of the dispute settlement process should 
be commensurable with the scope of such problems. In this case, the focus is on the 
participation of the States those are genuinely parties to the dispute in the strict sense. 
The question is whether there is any mechanism that is open to wider participation, 
providing a way for several parties to file a complaint.  An inclusive and open process 
that allows all parties to participate in the process in a competent manner in 
multilateral international environmental disputes would increase the chance of 
effectiveness in settling a dispute. 10  To sum up, effectiveness is evaluated by 
considering whether all potential parties can participate in the process of dispute 
settlement  
1.1.2 Structural Indicator 
Structural indicator will consider the structural arrangements of dispute settlement 
mechanisms. Effectiveness may be evaluated by looking at the qualifications of 
decision-makers.11 Guzman is of the opinion that ‘a better judge produces higher 
quality decisions –– decisions that are more likely to reach accurate conclusions with 
respect to the facts and the law.’12 Settling an international environmental dispute may 
require special expertise in the field of international environmental law and also 
understanding of technical issues to produce reasonable and high quality outcomes. 
Therefore, effectiveness is tested by considering whether or not the particular 
mechanisms consist of proficient decision makers who have special knowledge of 
international law relating to the environment—or the systems which can provide 
assistance for decision makers on environmental issues that they are not familiar with.  
 It should be noted that these criteria mentioned in 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 focus on the 
structure and procedure of dispute settlement mechanisms which can be assessed by 
considering statutes, rules and procedures in order to ascertain the effectiveness of 
each mechanisms. However, these issues have been dealt with in chapter 4 in the 
context of suitability. As far as procedural indicator is concerned, the issue of the 
participation of all potential parties in the process of dispute settlement has already 
                                                
10 Lawrence Susskind and Jeffrey Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to 
Resolving Public Disputes (BasicBooks 1987) 24. See also Kütting (n 7) 35. 
11 Andrew T. Guzman, ‘International Tribunals: A Rational Choice Analysis’ (2008-2009) 157 U Pa L 
Rev 171, 205. 
12 Ibid, 205. 
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been discussed in chapter 4 with regard to the suitability of each mechanisms in 
settling multilateral environmental disputes.13 For structural indicator, the issue has 
been analysed in chapter 4 with regard to the suitability of each mechanism in settling 
international environmental disputes of a multi-dimensional character.14 Therefore, in 
this chapter, procedural and structural indicators will not be applied to the four 
different dispute settlement mechanisms. 
1.2 Output Criteria  
1.2.1 Resolution of a Dispute and Its Effect on States’ Behaviour  
This is the criterion that is the key objective and the most salient to the settlement of a 
dispute. Dispute settlement mechanisms are designed to solve disputes that are at 
issue between the disputants. The question that may arise is: Have the key issues been 
settled? Armin Von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke state in the context of judicial 
settlement that this ‘leans on the hope that the authority of judicial decisions leads to 
an end of a dispute that might otherwise even unleash a looming potential for violent 
confrontation.’15 Dinah Shelton is of the same view when she claims that ‘conflict 
resolution is a way to avoid self-help and escalation of conflicts by channeling the 
dispute to a third-party decision maker’.16 Effectiveness in this sense is also linked to 
the achievement of the goal of a dispute settlement mechanism.17 For example, the 
creation of the ICJ, a principal judicial organ of the UN, has its goal in the peaceful 
settlement of disputes, although there are no explicit provisions stating this objective 
in the ICJ Statute, since this is ‘a matter of common understanding among the 
drafters’.18 Also, the ICJ in the LaGrand case held that ‘the function of this Court is to 
resolve international legal disputes between States’. 19  Clearly, an effective 
mechanism, whether judicial or non-judicial, should attain its goal in resolving a 
dispute between parties.  
                                                
13 See chapter 4, sections 1.1.1, 1.2.1, 1.3.1, 2.1.1, 2.2.1, 3.1 and 4.1. 
14 See chapter 4, sections 1.1.2, 1.2.2, 1.3.2, 2.1.2, 2.2.2, 3.2 and 4.2. 
15 Armin Von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, ‘On the Functions of International Courts: An Appraisal in 
Light of Their Burgeoning Public Authority’ (2013) 26 LJIL 4953. See also Karel Wellens, 
Negotiations in the Case Law of the International Court of Justice (Taylor and Francis 2014) 279. 
16 Dinah Shelton, ‘Form, Function, and the Powers of International Courts’ (2008-2009) 9 Chi J Int'l L 
537, 558. 
17 Shany (n 2) 40-42. 
18 Ibid, 165. 
19 LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America)(Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures) 
[1999] ICJ Rep 9, para. 25. 
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 Another point is the theory that equates effectiveness with the compliance 
rates of the parties with a decision. This theory has been supported by several 
scholars. For example, Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter are of the view 
that they will measure ‘the effectiveness of a supranational tribunal in terms of its 
ability to compel compliance with its judgments by convincing domestic government 
institutions, directly and through pressure from private litigants, to use their power on 
its behalf.’20 Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo take the view that ‘a tribunal is effective 
if states comply with its judgments. Compliance can be measured in terms of a 
compliance rate: the number of complied-with judgments divided by the total number 
of judgments.’ 21  However, there are scholars who make a distinction between 
effectiveness and compliance rates. According to them, a high level of compliance 
does not mean that a tribunal is effective in resolving a dispute. Rather, the ability of 
international courts to induce or encourage States that lose a case to comply with their 
obligations again is more important than compliance rates. In this sense, low levels of 
compliance may be considered as effective if the judgment of the international courts 
can change the behaviour of losing States and avoid future violations of legal rules.  
As Guzman states, ‘even when a state fails to comply with a tribunal's ruling, the 
tribunal may be effective at promoting compliance if it imposes sufficient costs on the 
state to discourage future violations of the underlying legal rule.’22 
 Both views are equally reasonable. In the case of the first view, if there has 
been compliance, the key issues are likely to have been settled. Conversely, if the 
issues have been settled, there is likely to have been compliance. In turn, if the key 
issues have been settled, it means that such a mechanism is effective. The second 
view also provides an additional indicator that focuses on the influence of a decision 
on the patterns of behaviour of States and ‘the ability to enhance compliance with the 
associated substantive obligation’,23  especially where a decision can, borrowing 
Guzman’s words, discourage future violations of international environmental rules so 
                                                
20 Laurence R. Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication’ (1997) 107 Yale LJ 273, 290. 
21 Posner and Yoo (n 6) 27. 
22 Guzman (n 11) 187. 
23 Ibid, 188. See also Ronald B.  Mitchell, ‘Institutional Aspects of Implementation, Compliance, and 
Effectiveness’ in Urs Luterbacher and Detlef Sprinz (eds), International Relations and Global Climate 
Change (MIT Press 2001) 224. 
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as to deter the emergence of future disputes.24 Taking these two views together is an 
appropriate approach to assess the effectiveness of such mechanisms. 
 Therefore, in this chapter, the effectiveness of dispute settlement mechanisms 
in settling international environmental disputes will be assessed by considering 
whether: 
 1) the key issues in a dispute have been settled; 
 2) the losing State complied with the decision; 
 3) the decision had any wider effect on the behaviour of the States parties to 
the dispute. 
 The third consideration should be treated with caution. This is because one has 
to ensure that behavioural changes of States are a direct effect of the decision and do 
not arise from other factors. This means that a decision can be seen as having 
‘materially influenced the behavioural change’.25 It has to be recognised here that it 
may not always be easy to know if there is a causal connection. Behaviour changes 
can be observed from documentary evidence that show that there is a causal 
connection which will be quoted at appropriate points later in the chapter. 
1.2.2 Mechanisms to Induce Compliance 
Before a decision is given, much time and effort will be used by the parties and 
decision-makers in the process of dispute settlement. In a case where both of them—
or the losing State—refuse to comply with the decision explicitly or implicitly, one 
can ask the question of how the decision-maker will deal with this situation. Are there 
mechanisms to encourage the parties to comply with the decision? In this sense, it is a 
matter of effectiveness that entails the availability of a mechanism that can induce 
compliance with a decision. This is because there is the likelihood that a dispute may 
be prolonged if a decision is ignored.   
 The availability of means to induce compliance with decisions can be used as 
an indicator of effectiveness. This is a phase that is called the post-decision-making 
phase—the period that involves the question of what happens after the decision-
makers have performed their task. Therefore, the effectiveness in this regard will be 
                                                
24 See also Richard Bilder, ‘The Settlement of Disputes in the Field of the International Law of the 
Environment’ (1975) 144 Recueil des Cours 139, 162. 
25 Laurence R. Helfer, ‘The Effectiveness of International Adjudicators’ in Cesare Romano, Karen J. 
Alter and Chrisanthi Avgerou (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (OUP 2013) 
469. See also Michael A.  Mehling, ‘Betwixt Scylla and Charybdis? Effectiveness in International 
Environmental Law’ (2002) 13 Finnish Ybk Intl L 129, 151. 
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assessed by considering whether or not particular dispute settlement mechanisms have 
systems that are designed to induce compliance. 
 To sum up, the criteria that will be applied in part 2 of the chapter are: 1) 
resolution of a dispute and its effect on States’ behaviour and 2) the availability of 
mechanisms to induce compliance. Thus, the discussion effectiveness focuses purely 
in terms of outcomes leaving aside the discussions of procedural and structural 
indicators for the reason stated above. 
2. APPLYING THE CRITERIA OF EFFECTIVENESS TO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
MECHANISMS: OUTPUT CRITERIA  
2.1 Resolution of a Dispute and Its Effect on States’ Behaviour 
In this section, as has been explained in detail in section 1.2.1, resolution of a dispute 
and its effect on States’ behaviour will be considered to see whether the key issues 
have been settled, whether the losing State complied with the decision and whether a 
State has changed its behaviour as a direct consequence of the decision. In answering 
these questions, the approach used in this section will be a case-based analysis in 
which cases that have been brought before international courts and non-judicial means 
in the past will be examined. This approach is different from the approach in chapter 
4 which is to look at the issues more theoretically by examining the features of 
different mechanisms. This cannot really be done for assessing dispute resolution and 
compliance, since the answers to the research questions would be that the mechanisms 
are supposed to resolve disputes, the parties are supposed to comply and change their 
behaviour. It should be noted, however, from the outset that this approach has 
limitations. Such limitations include the difficulty of making generalisations about 
dispute solving and compliance from a small number of cases. In this section 
conciliation will not be discussed, since there have been no cases settled by this 
means. 
2.1.1 Mediation 
The only case that was settled by mediation of which the author is aware was the case 
concerning the Indus waters dispute between India and Pakistan. The key issue of this 
case is the equitable sharing and managing of the water of the rivers in the Indus 
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Basin. The dispute was concerned with the legal rights of India and Pakistan in the 
waters of the rivers that flowing into Pakistan through India.26 India cut off the flow 
of waters to the canal that flowed through the boundary line and claimed the 
proprietary rights in the waters of the rivers situated in its territory and Pakistan could 
not claim any share of the waters.27 Pakistan, as a lower riparian State, claimed that it 
had the right to the uninterrupted flow of waters according to the rules of international 
law and equity based on the historic use of the river, and India, as the upper riparian 
State, had to divert the waters accordingly.28 At that time, there was no treaty between 
them to regulate the use of the waters. The dispute was finally settled by the World 
Bank after 8 years from the time that the World Bank had begun to mediate the 
dispute. Throughout 8 years, a series of dialogues had been taking place.29 Also, there 
were the Bank proposals as well as the parties’ own proposals and plans that had been 
negotiated and discussed before they culminated in the conclusion of the Indus 
Waters Treaty (IWT) which can be considered as the outcome of the process of 
dispute settlement. The mediation in this case was a continuous process in which the 
ultimate outcome was produced in the form of a treaty as a result of negotiations 
between all the parties as well as the mediator rather than being produced in the form 
of a judgment made by judges. 
 The Bank brought the parties together and encouraged them to sign the IWT 
on 19 September 1960, which can be considered as a success on the part of the Work 
Bank which acted as mediator.30 The two main things that were the key factors in 
contributing to the settlement of the dispute were the possibility of increasing the 
amount of water by the construction of works and the ability of the World Bank to 
encourage the participation of several States to provide international financial support 
for the works, which was a kind of ‘quasi-imperial third-party inducement to the 
successful resolution of the dispute’.31 In addition, with specialist knowledge of the 
                                                
26 S.C. Agrawal, ‘Legal Aspects of the Indo-Pakistan Water Dispute’ (1958) 21 SCJ 157, 159. 
27 See the Inter-Dominion Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of 
Pakistan on the Canal Water Dispute between East and West Punjab (signed 4 May 1948) 54 UNTS 
45. See also Friedrich Joseph Berber, ‘The Indus Water Dispute’ (1957) 6 Indian Ybk IntAff 46, 52. 
28 Ibid, 52. 
29 See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, ‘Indus Waters’ Press Release No. 380, 
10 December 1954 cited in Niranjan Das Gulhati, Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in International 
Mediation (Allied Publishers 1973) 135. 
30 Salman M.A. Salman and Kishor Uprety, Conflict and Cooperation on South Asia's International 
River: A Legal Perspective (Kluwer Law International 2002) 57. 
31 See Jagat S. Mehta, ‘The Indus Water Treaty: A Case Study in the Resolution of an International 
River Basin Conflict’ (1988) 12 Natural Resources Forum 69, 75. See also Stephen McCaffrey, The 
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World Bank concerning the use of international watercourses, Lammers notes that ‘it 
has been the considerable merit of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development to have brought about the settlement of the Indus basin waters dispute 
through skillful mediation by providing technical and financial assistance.’32  In 
settling the dispute, it helped to establish a new regime applicable to the utilisation of 
the Indus.33 In this sense, this kind of dispute can hardly be settled by international 
courts because, as has been noted by Charles Rousseau, 
‘le règlement d'un différend fluvial est beaucoup moins, en droit 
international, un problème d'interprétation du droit existant qu'un 
problème d'élaboration d'un droit nouveau et que, dans cette mesure, 
il peut difficilement être résolu par l'application des procédures 
arbitrales ou judiciaires habituelles.’34 
It can be said that the key issue with regard to the use of Indus waters was settled and 
the parties followed what the World Bank attempted to do.   
 In relation to behavioural changes, it can be said that the parties modified their 
behaviour after the treaty was signed as a result of the mediation carried out by the 
World Bank. The conclusion of the treaty means that the parties are obliged to respect 
the obligations contained in the Treaty. Neither of the sides could uphold their 
previous positions once the treaty was signed. Their behavioural changes in allocating 
the waters are undoubtedly a direct consequence of the existence of the treaty which 
is regarded as an achievement of the World Bank mediation. The treaty allocates three 
western rivers (the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab) to Pakistan and three eastern 
rivers (the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej) to India. The treaty changed Indian 
behaviour in the sense that it cannot claim exclusive rights to the water based merely 
                                                                                                                                      
Law of International Watercourses (2 edn, OUP 2007) 291. Australia, Canada, Germany, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, the UK, the US and the World Bank signed the Indus Basin Development Fund 
Agreement with a view to contributing grant money to the establishment and functioning of the Indus 
Basin Development Fund, (signed 19 September 1960, entered into force 12 January 1961) 444 UNTS 
259.  
32 Johan G. Lammers, Pollution of International Watercourses: A Search for Substantive Rules and 
Principles of Law (Nijhoff 1984) 310. See the same view of Judge Stephen M. Schwebel who observed 
in that ‘the Indus Waters Treaty was a great achievement of Pakistan and India and of the World Bank’ 
PCA Press Release, the Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v. India), September 2012, 
available at <http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=1970> accessed 16 June 2015. 
33 Georges  Fischer, ‘La Banque Internationale pour la Reconstruction et le Développement et 
l'Utilisation des Eaux de l'Indus’ (1960) 6 AFDI 669, 683. 
34 Charles Rousseau, ‘Inde et Pakistan: Conclusion du Traité du 19 Septembre 1960 Relatif à 
l'Utilisation des Eaux de l'Indus’ (1961) 32 RGDIP 364, 376. See also Berber (n 27) 61. 
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upon the fact that it is the upper riparian. Moreover, given the fact that India accepted 
the principle of payment as requested by Pakistan for the deviation of water in Indian 
Territory, India endorsed the principle of limited territorial sovereignty of the upper 
riparian State which meant that it automatically renounced its previous position.35 
Instead, the principle of equitable utilisation would be applied in this case. However, 
after the conclusion of the Treaty, two disputes arose with regard to the application of 
the Treaty and allegations of non-compliance. They will be discussed below in the 
sections concerning inquiry and arbitration.  
2.1.2 Inquiry 
2.1.2.1 Baglihar Hydroelectric Dam 
There is a case concerning the construction of India’s Baglihar hydroelectric dam 
between Pakistan and India that has been referred to inquiry for settlement and need 
to be appraised as to the effectiveness of inquiry in settling the disputes. This case is 
the first dispute arose under the IWT after it had entered into force. As to the point of 
law, the dispute was essentially about the breach of obligations contained in the IWT, 
especially those provided in Annexures, namely the provisions in Part 3 of Annexure 
D with regard to the New Run-of-River Plant. Pakistan claimed that the construction 
of the Pondage was not conform with the requirements36 and was not based on 
‘correct, rational and realistic estimates of maximum flood discharge at the site’.37 
India disagreed with Pakistan. 
 The dispute was decided by Professor Raymond Lafitte with the support of 
Professor Laurence Boisson de Chazourne, both were appointed by the World Bank. 
The final decisions were produced in the form of a so-called Expert Determination. It 
mainly dealt with the assessment of hydrological information. Professor Lafitte, 
recommended 6 technical solutions for the parties to settle the dispute, namely 
maximum design flood, spillway (ungated or gated), spillway (the level of the gates), 
artificial raising of the water level, pondage and the level of the power intake38 
supported its findings with technical information in terms which the Neutral Expert 
                                                
35 Salman and Uprety (n 30) 61. 
36 Para. 8 (c) of Annexure D to the IWT provides that ‘The maximum Pondage in the Operating Pool 
shall not exceed twice the Pondage required for Firm Power’.  
37 Raymond Lafitte, ‘Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant: Expert Determination: On Points of Difference 
Referred by the Government of Pakistan under the Provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty’ (2007) 4. 
38 Ibid, 8-20.  
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(NE) regarded as ‘state of the art’ standards.39 All of these technical issues required 
Professor Lafitte to interpret the obligations set out in the IWT with the assistance of 
lawyers taking into account ‘a spirit of goodwill and friendship and ‘a co-operative 
spirit’40 as well as ‘the best and latest practices in the field of construction and 
operation of hydro-electric plants.’41   
 Although the findings of the inquiry were, to some extent, unfavourable to 
India in the sense that some of the structures of the dam, not the overall designs, were 
incompatible with the criteria provided in the IWT, such as the modification of 
pondage capacity and lowering the height of the existing dam structure from 4.5 
meters to 3 meters, the findings seemed to be more receptive to the Indian side than to 
the Pakistani side.42 The findings were interpreted in different ways by the parties. 
India took the view that the findings ‘confirm that India's design has been compliant 
with the basic principles of the Indus Waters Treaty’.43 For Pakistan, the findings 
confirmed that the building of the dam, to some extent, was incorrect and that it was a 
breach of the IWT. Although the findings seemed to favour Pakistan, in reality it was 
disappointed with the findings, since the inquiry overruled some of the arguments that 
it put forward.44 That is to say the issue of spillway gates remained unaddressed.45 
Nevertheless, Pakistan took the view, at least in its official stance, that this case was a 
‘win-win situation’46 and ‘the difference has been removed and it is, therefore, not 
considered as a dispute’ which made it unnecessary to raise the issue before an 
                                                
39 Ibid, see Determination D 2 (p. 10); D 3 (p.11); D 4 (p.15); D 5 (p.16, 17); D 6 (p.18) such state of 
the art standards that the NE referred to are those of, for example, information in the Bulletin of the 
International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) and ICOLD guidelines and sound engineering. 
40 Ibid, 5. 
41 Ibid, 5. 
42 Robert G.  Wirsing, Christopher  Jasparro and Daniel C.  Stoll, International Conflict over Water 
Resources in Himalayan Asia (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 92. See also BBC, ‘World Bank Rules on 
Kashmir Dam’ (13 February 2007) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6356061.stm> 
accessed 10 June 2015. 
43 See Indian positions, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, ‘Baglihar Dam Cleared by 
Neutral Expert’ (12 February 2007), available at <http://www.mea.gov.in/press-
releases.htm?dtl/2287/Baglihar+Dam+cleared+by+neutral+expert> accessed 12 June 2015. 
44 See the interviews of members of the Pakistani team conducted by Wirsing, Jasparro and Stoll (n 42) 
92, the details appeared in footnote 25. See also Amer Rizwan  Khattak, ‘World Bank Neutral Expert's 
Determination on Baglihar Dam: Implications for India-Pakistan Relations’ (2008) 61 PH 89, 96. 
45 See <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/223546-
1171996340255/BagliharSummary.pdf> accessed 12 June 2015. 
46 Nabiha Gul and others, ‘Pakistan's Foreign Policy Survey January - June 2007—Staff Study’ (2007) 
60 PH 3, 4. 
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arbitral tribunal.47 Therefore, it can be concluded that the findings of the inquiry 
brought the dispute to an end, since both the parties accepted the findings and India 
agreed to comply with them.48 It has been reported that the structure of the dam was 
constructed according to the conditions provided in the findings.49 With regard to 
behavioural changes it can hardly be said that the parties have changed their 
behaviour in utilising the Indus waters in the light of the IWT, since another dispute 
arose between them concerning the application and interpretation of the Treaty. The 
dispute was brought before judicial mechanism and will be discussed below in the 
Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration.   
2.1.2.2 Danube-Black Sea Navigation Route Project 
In this case, Romania and Ukraine were in dispute with regard to the likelihood of 
significant transboundary impacts on the Danube-Black Sea navigation route at the 
border between the two countries. The inquiry commission was established in 
accordance with the provisions of Appendix IV to the Espoo Convention.50 The key 
issue that the inquiry commission was asked to advise on was whether or not the 
project would have the likelihood of having significant adverse transboundary 
impacts on the construction and use of the Navigation Route and ‘the dredging and 
maintenance of the entrance channel and the rifts in the Danube River and the 
dumping of dredged spoil on riparian land or at a dump site offshore at sea’ carried 
out by Ukraine.51 For the purpose of measuring the effectiveness of the inquiry in 
settling the dispute, it is appropriate to frame the question in this way: Were the 
findings of the inquiry commission accepted by both the parties? In 2006, the report 
of the inquiry commission came out, in which it concluded unanimously that there 
had been a likelihood of significant adverse transboundary impacts on six subjects, 
such as the impact of the dredging or deepening of the rifts which could lead to the 
loss of floodplain habitats, impacts on the turbidity of marine waters and impacts on 
                                                
47 See the Pakistani position in this regard in ibid, 4 and see Art. IX  and Annexure G (Court of )of the 
1960 Indus Waters Treaty. See also Dawn-Editorial, ‘Verdict on Baglihar Dam’ (14 February 2007) 
<http://www.dawn.com/news/1069839> accessed 13 June 2015. 
48 Embassy of India, ‘Baglihar Dam Cleared by Neutral Expert’ (12 February 2007), see particularly 
para. 14, available at <https://www.indianembassy.org/archives_details.php?nid=926> accessed 13 
June 2015.  
49 See Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, para. 469. See also Balraj Sidhu, ‘The Kishenganga 
Arbitration: Transboundary Water Resources Governance ’ (2013) 43 EPL 147, 158. 
50 See generally in Bogdan Aurescu, ‘The Ukrainian “Bystroe Canal” Project in the Danube Delta: 
Between Political Interest and International Environmental Law’ (2006) 59 RHDI 553. 
51 The Report of the Espoo Inquiry Commission, 9.  
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the increase of suspended sediment concentration.52 The inquiry commission also 
recommended that a Bilateral Research Programme should be established with a view 
to dealing with the scientific information and knowledge concerning the operation of 
dredging a Navigation Route and working in collaboration with the other international 
research activities.53 Furthermore, measures to mitigate the environmental impacts 
were proposed, such as the introduction of modern dredging and dumping 
techniques.54  
 As stated in the document released by Ukraine entitled ‘Final Decision Taken 
by Ukraine Concerning the Full Scale Implementation of the Danube-Black Sea 
Navigation Route Project in the Ukrainian Part of the Danube Delta’, Ukraine adopted 
several measures to comply with the recommendations of the inquiry commission, 
such as those of establishing a comprehensive environmental monitoring programme, 
changing the old technique of dredging activities to good modern practices and 
creating an international expert group with a view to facilitating cooperation with 
Romania in relation  to the identification and assessment of transboundary impacts on 
the ecological status of the Danube Delta.55 A number of measures were adjusted to 
take account of the findings of the inquiry commission. To ensure that it complied 
with the obligation set out in the Espoo Convention, Ukraine informed Romania about 
the implementation of maintenance dredging activities. Romania was also furnished 
with the EIA documentation and a consultation was carried out. Based on the 
information provided, one can perceive behavioural changes of Ukraine in dredging 
the Danube, since it expressly stated in the document that it intended to follow the 
recommendation of the inquiry commission.56 The ways in which the Danube is used 
have changed, since the findings were given. Efforts to comply with the 
recommendations have been demonstrated by Ukraine, since more environmentally 
                                                
52 Ibid, 58-59. 
53 Ibid, 63. 
54 Ibid, 63. 
55 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, ‘Final Decision Taken by Ukraine Concerning the Full Scale 
Implementation of the Danube-Black Sea Navigation Route Project in the Ukrainian Part of the 
Danube Delta’ (17 January 2008) this document was addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Romania, available at 
<http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/MoP2decisions/Ukraine/Bystroe/Final%20
decision%20Ukraine%20Bystroe.pdf> accessed 11 June 2015. See more details in Annex 4 and Annex 
5 of this document.  
56 See for example in the Summary Report on the Assessment of Likely Transboundary Environmental 
Impacts of the Danube-Black Sea Navigation Route in the Ukrainian Part of the Danube Delta which 
was submitted to the Espoo Implementation Committee, available at 
<http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/eia/documents/ImplementationCommittee/eia.ic.s/eia.ic.s.
1/BCP_TEIA_30dec08_sect_5.pdf> accessed 11 June 2015. 
 165 
friendly techniques have been introduced, and cooperation between the parties has 
been strengthened. All of these changes are the fruit of the work of the inquiry 
commission. However, according to the Compliance Committee of the Espoo 
Convention, the full compliance with the obligations of the Espoo Convention in 
relation to the project needs to be further improved and bilateral agreement between 
the two States still needs to be further developed in order to bring about the full 
implementation of the Convention.57 
2.1.3 Arbitration 
2.1.3.1 Ad Hoc Arbitration 
Before discussing the cases, it should be noted from the outset that some cases need to 
be excluded from the discussion, since there is very limited information on tracking 
what happened after the awards and because of their age and subject matter they are 
less significant for the law of environmental protection.58  
(1) The Bering Sea Fur-Seals Arbitration 
The dispute was concerned with the preservation of seals that lie outside the exclusive 
control of any one State. The US established exclusive jurisdiction over sealing 
activities in the area which was beyond the limits of US territorial waters so as to 
prevent British vessels from hunting seals.59 British vessels engaging in sealing 
activities were seized by the US authorities.  
 The arbitrators were faced with the question which the parties asked them to 
indicate whether the US had any right, and if it had, ‘what right of protection or 
property in the fur-seals frequenting the islands of the US in the Bering Sea when 
                                                
57 See the Meeting of the Parties at its Sixth Session, Decision on Review of Compliance (Decision 
VI/2) (Geneva, 2-5 June 2014) ECE/MP.EIA/20.Add.1—ECE/MP.EIA/SEA/4.Add.1 paras. 15-28, 
available at  <http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/eia/decisions/Decision_VI.2.pdf> accessed 
11 June 2015>. 
58 Those cases are (1) Helmand River Delta cases The first award was rendered in 1872 see the full text 
in Frederic John Goldsmid, Eastern Persia: An Account of the Journeys of the Persian Boundary 
Commission 1870-71-72, vol 1 (Macmillan and Co. 1876) 410-414. The second award was rendered in 
1905 see details of the awards in C.U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads 
Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, vol 13 (Superintendent Government Printing 1933) 
283-286; (2) the San Juan River Cases (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (1898) 5 Moore Intl Arbitrations 
4704 and (3) the Kushk River cases see the text in Georg Friedrich de Martens and others, Nouveau 
Recueil Général de Traités et Autres Actes Relatifs aux Rapports de Droit International: Continuation 
du Grand Recueil de G. Fr. de Martens vol 13 (2 ème série edn, Dieterich 1888). 
59 The US enacted the act entitled ‘An Act to Prevent the Extermination of Fur-Bearing Animals in 
Alaska’ which was made unlawful to kill fur seal in the islands of St. Paul and St. George: see Bering 
Sea Fur Seals Arbitration, 763-764. 
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such seals are found outside the ordinary three-mile limit?’60 The majority of the 
arbitrators decided this question in the negative by pronouncing that ‘the US has not 
any special right of protection or property in the fur seals frequenting the islands of 
the US in the Bering Sea, when such seals are found outside the ordinary three-mile 
limit’.61      
 Having found that the US had no property rights in or right of protection and 
preservation of the fur seals in the Bering Sea found outside the ordinary three-mile 
limit, the tribunal needed to determine regulations for the proper protection and 
preservation of the fur seals according to the 1892 Arbitration Treaty between Great 
Britain and the United States.62 To achieve this task, a Joint Commission was 
established with a view to providing assistance to the arbitrators. The regulations 
adopted by the Commission required63   
 1. Both States to prohibit their citizens from killing, capturing or pursuing fur 
seals within a zone of sixty miles in radius about the Pribilov Islands 
 2. Both states to observe the period from 1st May to 31st July as a closed 
season for taking fur seals on the high sea, in the part of the Pacific Ocean, inclusive 
of the Bering Sea.  
 3. Fur-seal fishing operations to be carried out only by sailing vessels  
 4. The use of nets, firearms and explosives to be prohibited in fur-seal fishing 
operations. 
 After the award was rendered, the US legislated the Act of Congress entitled 
‘An Act to give effect to the Award rendered by the Tribunal of Arbitration at Paris, 
under the treaty between the United States and Great Britain, concluded at 
Washington, February 29, 1892, for the purpose of submitting to arbitration certain 
questions concerning the preservation of the fur-seals’ with the same content as 
provided in the award for carrying into effect the award of the Tribunal. This means it 
can be concluded that the dispute was successfully resolved and the award was, 
                                                
60 Art. VI of the Convention between the Governments of the United States and Her Britannic Majesty, 
Submitting to Arbitration the Question which have arisen between those Governments concerning the 
Jurisdictional Rights of the United States in the Waters of Behring Sea (signed 29 February 1892) see 
the text in US, Message from the President of the United States: Transmitting a Convention Signed at 
Washington, February 29, 1892, between the Governments of the United States and Her Britannic 
Majesty, Submitting to Arbitration the Questions which Have Arisen between those Governments 
Concerning the Jurisdictional Rights of the United States in the Waters of Bering, Sea, etc. 
(Washington 1982) (hereinafter the UK-US Convention).  
61 Bering Sea Fur Seals Arbitration, 920. 
62 See Art. IX of the UK-US Convention. 
63 Bering Sea Fur Seals Arbitration, 949-951. 
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undoubtedly, complied with by the US.64 As far as the effect of the award on the 
behaviour of the parties is concerned, although it was reported that the regulations 
proved to be ineffective, since the catch from pelagic sealing increased and the seal 
herd continued to decline65, the two States collaborated with each other to amend the 
regulations and instituted independent scientific investigations to deal with the issue.66 
Consequently, the US strengthened the regulations by enacting a law prohibiting 
American citizens from being involved in pelagic sealing at any time or place.67 After 
the scientific investigations were completed, the position of the US changed. It took 
the view that the Award’s regulations were ‘wholly inadequate to protect and preserve 
the seal herd’.68 Therefore, with a view to protecting the seal herd from destruction, it 
wished to internationalize the award rendered by the Tribunal by inviting Japan and 
Russia to adhere by the award through the conclusion of a treaty.69 Finally, the 1911 
Convention for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals in the North Pacific 
Ocean was concluded.70 All of these outcomes can be understood to be a direct 
consequence of the award which was designed to change the behaviour of States in 
terms of improving their cooperation in conserving seals. That is to say the award has 
had some influence on the subsequent practices of States in relation to the 
preservation of seals from extinction, such as the conclusion of the later treaties, and 
it could also be regarded as a stepping-stone towards further cooperation.71 Moreover, 
the award also, in the words of Sands and Peel, ‘shaped the form and content of 
subsequent agreements to conserve marine living resources’.72 
 
 
                                                
64 Acts of Congress, President’s Proclamations, Regulations Governing U.S. Vessels, Acts of 
Parliament, Orders in Council, Pertaining to the Fur-Seal Fisheries in Behring Sea and North Pacific 
Ocean (Government Printing Offices 1896) 23. 
65 See William  Williams, ‘Reminiscences of the Bering Sea Arbitration’ (1943) 37 AJIL 562, 584. 
66 Wilfred H. Osgood, Edward A. Preble and George H. Parker, The Fur Seals and other Life of the 
Pribilof Island, Alaska, in 1914 (Government Printing Office 1915) 22. 
67 Ibid, 22. 
68 Editorial Comment, ‘The Fur Seal Question’ (1907) 1 AJIL 742, 746. 
69 Ibid, 746-747. 
70 Convention between Great Britain, Japan, Russia and the United States Requesting Measures for the 
Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals in the North Pacific Ocean (signed 7 December 1911) (1911) 
214 CTS 80.  
71 Cesare P.R. Romano, The Peaceful Settlement of International Environmental Disputes: A 
Pragmatic Approach (The Hague Kluwer Law International 2000) 48. 
72 Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (3 edn, CUP 
2013) 400. 
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(2) The Trail Smelter Arbitration 
The Trail Smelter Arbitration between Canada and the US is the first dispute that 
involves transboundary air pollution. The dispute was about the operation of the 
Smelter which was carried out at Trail, Canada, around eleven miles from the 
international boundary between Canada and the US. The Trail smelter emitted sulphur 
dioxide across the border so as to caused damage to the property in the state of 
Washington. The parties agreed to constitute a Tribunal in order to decided the 
questions which were relating to the indemnity or compensation that shall be paid, 
measures and régime that shall be adopted or maintained by the Trail smelter. 73  
 In this case, after the Tribunal pronounced the classic passage that no State has 
the right to use its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the 
territory of other States, it held that the Dominion of Canada was responsible in 
international law for the conduct of the Trail Smelter and had violated its international 
obligations.74   
 The Tribunal imposed a régime with a view to controlling the emission of 
sulphur dioxide fumes from the smelter, which included a number of measures such 
as the restriction of the emissions expressed in terms of tons per hour. Finally, in 
answering the question relating to indemnity or compensation, the Tribunal held that 
an indemnity shall be paid in the event of future damage. In addition, the US shall pay 
not in excess of $7,500 in any one year for the reasonable costs of investigations as 
compensation.75 
 The régime was accepted by the Canada and the US in which $20,000,000 
were spent with this regard by the Canadian firm.76 Compensation was paid to the US 
‘as a consequence of the decision of the international tribunal’.77 Also, the Company 
that owned the smelter removed more sulfur dioxide releasing from the stacks than it 
was taken from the stacks of all other smelters operated in the North American 
Continent combined.78 Judging from what the parties agreed after the decision was 
                                                
73 Ibid, 1908. 
74 Ibid, 1965. 
75 Ibid, 1980. 
76 Alfred P. Rubin, ‘Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration’ (1970-1971) 50 Or L Rev 
259, 272. 
77 The amount of money paid by Canada appeared in the Exchange of Notes Constituting an 
Agreement Supplementing the Convention of 15 April 1935 Relating to Claims on Account of 
Damages Caused by Fumes Emitted from the Smelter at Trail, British Columbia, 151 UNTS 171. 
78 John E. Read, ‘The Trail Smelter Dispute’ (1963) 1 Canadian Ybk Intl L 213221. 
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rendered, the long-standing dispute between them was successfully resolved and they 
modified their behaviour with regard to air pollution control. 
(3) The Lac Lanoux Arbitration 
The central issue of this case was whether the French utilisation of the waters of Lake 
Lanoux, which lies wholly within French territory, was a breach of the Treaty of 
Bayonne and the Additional Act for the joint use of the waters. Spain, the lower 
riparian State, alleged that the project related to energy production proposed by 
France would affect its right in term of the quantity of water that it would receive and 
the project could only be carried out with prior conclusion of an agreement of the 
parties.79 
 The Tribunal gave the Award which can be divided into two main issues.80 
Firstly, the Tribunal held that the diversion of the waters of Lake Lanoux with the 
restitution of an equivalent quantity of waters executed by France did not violate the 
rights of Spain, which did not constitute a breach of the Treaty of Bayonne and the 
Additional Act, since it would not alter the waters of the Carol.81 Secondly, under the 
Treaty of Bayonne and the Additional Act, France was not subjected to the necessity 
of a prior agreement for the execution of the Electricité de France scheme which 
meant that Spain did not have the right to approve or disapprove of the scheme, so 
that France did not breach the Treaties when it carried out the scheme without prior 
agreement between them.82 But France still had duties to inform and consult with 
Spain in good faith as well as to take Spanish interests into account.83 Since France 
was not in a breach, the issue of compliance and possible behavioral changes of 
France does not arise. However, it should be noted that the arbitration did settle the 
dispute in the sense that relations between France and Spain concerning the use of the 
waters of Lac Lanoux became more harmonious after the award because in 1958 they 
concluded an agreement setting up a regime with regard to the development of Lac 
Lanoux considering the award rendered by the Court of Arbitration.84  
 
                                                
79 Lac Lanoux Arbitration. 
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83 Ibid, 
84 Agreement Relating to Lake Lanoux (with an arrangement concerning the lake’s development) 
(signed and entered into forced 12 July 1958) 796 UNTS 235.  
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(4) The Iron Rhine Arbitration 
In the Iron Rhine Arbitration between Belgium and the Netherlands, the dispute was 
about the reactivation of an old train line linking the port of Antwerp in Belgium to 
the Rhine basin in Germany, via the Netherlands.85 Belgium had an intention to 
modernise this railway in the Dutch territory with a view to achieving its economic 
interests as well as combating global warming.86 The central issue of the dispute were 
the application of Dutch for such a reactivation and the allocation of costs associated 
with the modernisation plans in which the Netherlands argued that Belgium should 
bear all costs including the costs required for compliance with Dutch environmental 
legislations.87  
 The Tribunal held, after it had stated that rules of international law relevant to 
the protection of the environment were applicable between the parties in the 
interpretation of the conventional regime for the Iron Rhine railway88, that in 
developing the project—which corresponds to Belgian economic needs—
environmental protection measures needed to be taken into account as ‘an integral 
component of such a project’89 so as to make a reconciliation with the Netherlands’ 
legitimate environmental concerns.90 Furthermore, the costs and expenses of the 
environmental measures required by Netherlands law should be integrated into 
Belgium’s project of the reactivation of the Iron Rhine railway as part of its exercise 
of its right of transit.91 The Tribunal further held that the parties should share the 
obligations to bear the costs and financial risks in equal parts with regard to any 
tunnel for environmental protection that may be built in the area that was designated 
as a national park or a silent area.92 However, the Tribunal did not determine which 
measures ‘will be sufficient to achieve compliance with the required levels of 
                                                
85 Iron Rhine Arbitration, para. 16. 
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environmental protection’.93 This question needed to be investigated by a committee 
of independent technical experts which the Tribunal asked the parties to set up not 
later than four months from the date of this Award.94  
 Given that the Tribunal considered all major questions of law, it contributed to 
the settlement of the dispute.95 After the Award was rendered, they reached an 
agreement on further works and activities on development of the reactivation of the 
Iron Rhine and established a Commission of Independent Experts (COD) to supervise 
such activities as well as to make a proposal for the division of costs between the two 
States based on the binding decision of the Tribunal.96 Nonetheless, the Award has 
had a limited impact on the behaviour of the parties because as of 2015 the line had 
not been reopened and the project is on hold for the time being, because of the 
disagreement about the execution and funding of the project.97 
 
2.1.3.2 Arbitral Tribunals Constituted in accordance with Annex VII of the 
UNCLOS 
The issue of effectiveness does not arise unless the arbitral tribunals have decided the 
merits of a dispute. Those cases where the arbitral tribunals found that they had no 
jurisdiction to rule on the case will therefore be excluded from this section. These 
cases are the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, the MOX Plant case and the Land 
Reclamation case. The only case that needs to be analysed is the Chagos Marine 
Protected Area case.98  
 In the Chagos Marine Protected Area case, several legal issues were 
addressed by the Tribunal such as the continental shelf claims beyond 200 miles but 
the most relevant part of the Award to international environmental issues is perhaps 
the 4th submission of Mauritius with regard to the compatibility of the UK’s 
declaration of the MPA with the UNCLOS provision that deals with the conservation 
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96 Final Report: Social Cost Benefit Analysis: Iron Rhine (13 February 2009) 55. See also ProRail,  
‘IJzeren Rijn’ <https://www.prorail.nl/projecten/ijzeren-rijn> accessed 19 June 2016.  
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and preservation of the marine environment. Mauritius claimed that such declaration 
affected Mauritius’s rights and was not for conservation purposes but for the 
extension of the UK’s use of the waters around the Chagos Archipelago99 and 
resettlement claims of the archipelago’s former residents.100 The UK argued that the 
true purpose of the establishment of the MPA was purely environmental measure.101 
 The Tribunal held that ‘in establishing the MPA surrounding the Chagos 
Archipelago, the United Kingdom breached its obligations under Articles 2(3), 56(2), 
and 194(4) of the Convention’.102 That is to say, the UK had failed to perform its 
obligation to have due regard for or to engage in prior consultation with Mauritius, 
since its rights may have been ostensibly affected by the declaration of the MPA. In 
addition, the MPA, as a kind of measure necessary to protect the marine environment, 
was established in a manner that could be defined as unjustifiable interference with 
Mauritian fishing rights in the territorial sea because the UK had shown no evidence 
to convince the Tribunal that it significantly engaged with Mauritius to provide an 
explanation for the need of MPA and to explore less restrictive alternatives.103 At the 
time of writing, it is too early to appraise UK’s actions in responding to the award in 
order to test the effectiveness of the arbitration since the judgment was just delivered. 
It remains to be seen how the UK comply with the award. 
2.1.3.3 Non-UNCLOS Disputes Referred Unilaterally to Arbitration 
(1) The OSPAR Arbitration 
In the OSPAR arbitration, Ireland claimed that the UK breached its obligation provide 
in Article 9 (2) of the OSPAR Convention by refusing to provided unredacted 
information concerning UK’s commissioning and the operation of the MOX plant at 
Sellafield so as to prevent Ireland from reviewing the economic justification of the 
MOX Plant.104 The UK refused to disclose such information on the ground that it 
would affect commercial confidentiality.105 Although the Tribunal found that it had 
the jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the case, it held that Ireland’s claim for 
information did not fall within Article 9(2) of the OSPAR Convention. Therefore, the 
                                                
99 Chagos MPA Arbitration, Memorial of Mauritius, Vol 1, para. 1.15. 
100 Ibid, para. 7.98. 
101 Chagos MPA Arbitration, Memorial of the UK, para. 3.74. 
102 Chagos MPA Arbitration, para. 547 (B).  
103 Ibid, para. 541. 
104 OSPAR Arbitration, Memorial of Ireland, para. 3. 
105 OSPAR Arbitration, Counter-Memorial of the UK, para. 1.6. 
 173 
UK had not breached its obligations under that provision. Since UK was not in a 
breach, the issue of compliance and possible behavioral changes does not arise. 
(2) The Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration 
 In the Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, the central issue of the dispute 
was whether India’s delivery of waters of the Kishenganga/Neelum River into another 
tributary in order to operate the hydroelectric power project (KHEP) was permitted 
under the IWT.106 Pakistan claimed that the India’s uses of the Kishenganga River 
would affect Pakistan’s hydroelectric projects and the other uses107 because, under 
Article III (1), it ‘shall receive unrestricted use all those waters of the Western Rivers 
which India is under an obligation to let flow’,108 except for the use of, inter alia, the 
generation of the hydro-electric power.109 India invoked such exception to construct 
and operate the hydro-electric power project.110  
 The Court of Arbitration accepted that India had the right to divert the waters 
from the Kishenganga River for the purpose of power generation through the 
Kishenganga Hydroelectric Project with some circumscriptions that India should 
perform the followings obligations:  
 1. A minimum flow downstream to be released from the KHEP dam at 9 m3 
per second, a level that was significantly lower than the Pakistani claim of 100 m3 per 
second and higher than the Indian claim of 4.25 m3 per second, should be maintained 
for natural flows 
 2. Drawdown flushing technique to remove sedimentation for the purpose of 
maintaining the reservoir water level should not be employed, in the present project 
and all of the future projects, except in the case of an unforeseen emergency 
 India claimed that the verdict of the Court of Arbitration could be considered 
as a victory and this helped to confirm that India did not violate the IWT.111 Looking 
carefully at the contents stated in the Award, neither India nor Pakistan could claim a 
victory, since the Court of Arbitration did not uphold the original claims of the 
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parties. For India, although it could proceed with the project, some modifications 
would need to be made to maintain a minimum flow. As Crook argues, what the 
Court of Arbitration attempted to do was that it ‘sought to interpret and apply the 
Treaty in ways intended to maintain the careful balance of rights and obligations that 
the negotiators of the Indus Waters Treaty in the 1950s struggled to attain.’112 
 The question remains whether the parties have changed their behaviour after 
the Court of Arbitration rendered the Award. In this case, behavioural changes should 
be considered within the framework of the IWT to see if the parties will respect the 
obligations provided. For India, its behavioural changes need to be seen in terms of 
whether it is complying with the Awards and the IWT. As the Awards did not hold 
that India should not build dams on the river, India may construct the dam as long as 
its constructions of hydropower are in compliance with the obligations provided in the 
Treaty as interpreted in the Award.  
 Nowadays, several new hydropower dams are being built—such as Bursar, 
Gyspa and Sawalkot—which may cause damage to Pakistan in respect of the timing 
of the flows of the rivers.113   
  It is hard to predict whether India will comply with the obligations and 
Pakistan will stop claiming that India is violating the Treaty. There is a possibility that 
a dispute may arise under this Treaty at any time. The root causes of the dispute over 
the utilisation of the Indus waters cannot be easily resolved, since the two States have 
a very long history of political tensions which may impede any future collaborations 
between them in respect of harnessing the river. Viewed in a larger context, what can 
be seen from the Indus waters dispute is that, even though the dispute has actually 
been settled, the conflicts between the two States have hardly been attenuated merely 
by the fact that the dispute was put into the dispute settlement mechanism provided by 
the IWT. The heart of the problem lies in the ‘discontentment and mistrust between 
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the Parties’114 and ‘lower riparian anxieties’115 due to the fear that India would 
obstruct the flow of the river which means that Pakistan keeps on claiming that India 
is violating the IWT. The growing demand for water is a factor that can create a 
dispute between the two States. Thus, the overall behavioural changes in terms of 
using the Indus waters do not depend solely on the outcome of the Court of 
Arbitration. Bharat Desai and Balraj Sidhu have rightly pointed out that ‘persistent 
complaints by Pakistan that India is violating the IWT and its efforts to drag the 
matter to an international dispute settlement forum at every available opportunity— 
emanating from deeply entrenched distrust and compulsions of domestic politics— 
need to be squarely addressed on a priority basis.’116 If India and Pakistan had good 
relations, that might ensure that the Indus waters would be used in a more 
collaborative manner than has happened in the present situation. So the conclusion 
that seems to follow that the two disputes relating to the application and interpretation 
of the IWT which have been settled have had a limited impact on the behaviour of the 
parties.  
 To sum up, the experiences of arbitration shows that arbitrations settled the 
Bering Sea-Fur Seals and Trail Smelter cases and could influence the parties’ 
behaviour. However, in the Iron Rhine and the Indus Waters Kishenganga 
Arbitrations, the disputes were settled but the parties’ behaviour has not changed.  
2.1.4 International Courts 
2.1.4.1 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
In analysing the cases it is appropriate to start by looking at the key environmental 
issues which were disputed between the States before examining whether they have 
been settled. To do this, the cases will be discussed in chronological order. This 
discussion will not include the Fisheries Jurisdiction case because it was concerned 
mainly with a zone of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction extended by Iceland rather than 
the protection of fish stocks or the marine environment. The Nauru case and the 
Aerial Herbicide Spraying will also be excluded because the cases were settled by 
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means of negotiations and were removed from the list. The 1995 Nuclear Test case 
will not be discussed, since the ICJ dismissed New Zealand’s request to examine the 
merit of a case. In addition, the Certain Activities/Construction of the Road cases will 
also not be discussed because, at the time of writing, the Court has just rendered the 
judgement. It is too early to appraise Costa Rica’s actions in responding to the 
judgement in order to test the effectiveness of the ICJ. It remains to be seen Costa 
Rica’s policy on this matter to see whether it would conduct an EIA for the future 
project or how far it could strengthen cooperation with Nicaragua so as to prevent 
adverse impact to the environment. 
(1) The 1974 Nuclear Tests case 
To begin with the 1974 Nuclear Tests case concerning French atmospheric nuclear 
testing, the environmental obligation raised by Australia and New Zealand was that 
the radioactive fall-out would contaminate the environment. Principle 21 of the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration was also raised by Australia during its oral pleadings. 
However, the Court did not touch upon any principle of international environmental 
law when deciding the case. It based its decision on the principle of unilateral acts so 
as to make the French general announcement in 1974 that it would cease all 
atmospheric nuclear testing in the South Pacific a binding obligation and the French 
announcement meant that there was no longer a dispute.117 The dispute was settled, 
since France stopped atmospheric testing in 1974, although it continued to carry out 
underground tests in the South Pacific which led to New Zealand’s attempt to reopen 
the case many years later.  
(2) The Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case 
In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case between Slovakia and Hungary, one of the key 
environmental issues argued by Hungary was that the construction of the dams by 
Slovakia could be considered as a breach of Article 15 of the 1977 Treaty between the 
two States such as to have an adverse effect on the ecosystem of the Danube River.118 
In this case a ‘state of ecological necessity’ was raised by Hungary as grounds for the 
suspension of the 1977 Treaty and the abandonment of the works. The Court was not 
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convinced by Hungary’s argument, since Hungary could not prove the existence of a 
state of necessity, which should be one of grave and imminent peril. For this reason, 
Hungary ‘would not have been permitted to rely upon that state of necessity in order 
to justify its failure to comply with its treaty obligations’.119 In the operative part of 
the judgment the Court held that Hungary was not entitled to suspend the Treaty and 
abandon its works at Nagymaros.120 For Slovakia, the Court ruled that it was entitled 
to continue to build the Variant C installation unilaterally, but it was unlawful when it 
proceeded to put it into operation.121 In addition, the Court asked the parties to 
negotiate in good faith taking into account the ways in which the objectives of the 
1977 Treaty could be achieved.122 
 There has been a problem relating to the implementation of the judgment 
which the dispute cannot be said to have been settled. This is partly because the Court 
did not set out in detail how the future operation of the Project could be finally carried 
out  ‘but merely set the parameters within which the agreement should be negotiated 
and provided the option to bring the matter back to court if necessary’.123 Nor did the 
Court clarify the amount of water to be released into the main riverbed by Slovakia as 
reparation for its internationally wrongful act, since it unilaterally used diverted water 
for its own benefit in the Gabčíkovo area in such a way that it deprived Hungary of its 
right to an ‘equitable and reasonable share of the natural resources of the Danube’.124 
After the judgment was rendered, the parties started to negotiate, from October 1997 
until now, on the issue of how to implement the judgment. Even though a series of 
bilateral negotiations have taken place, the parties still cannot reach a mutual 
agreement. This is because the judgment is interpreted differently by the parties.125 
Insisting on its decision not to build the Nagymaros dam, Hungary based its 
interpretation on the fact that the parties should determine the legal consequences 
arising from the judgment and that, in the course of interpretation, three frameworks, 
as stated in paragraph 141 of the judgment, should be taken into account, namely the 
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objectives of the 1977 Treaty, the norms of international environmental law and the 
principles of the law of international watercourses.126 Slovakia, nevertheless, argues 
that the goal of the negotiations is to adhere to the objective of the 1977 Treaty, which 
is still in force, and this implies that Hungary is not released from the obligation to 
construct the dam in order to fulfill the objective of the 1977 Treaty, although the 
Court expressly held that ‘there is no longer any point in building it’.127 This situation 
seems to arise from a reluctance of Slovakia to accept the legality of this statement.128 
Still, the parties have been trying to negotiate in order to find a way out but the 
problem is still unresolved. Also, a solution on the matter of the amount of water to be 
discharged back into the riverbed remains to be achieved.129 The present situation is 
far from what the Court asked the parties to do, since the Court held that ‘the joint 
régime should be restored’130 but Slovakia is the only State that operates the dam. 
Szabó states that ‘it seems that the parties are very close to realising that they have 
exhausted all possibilities and that they will inevitably have to ask for assistance from 
a third party. The obvious solution would be to return to the ICJ to ask for an 
additional judgment’.131  
 The ICJ did not settle the dispute in the sense that its judgment is not clear 
enough, so that this has allowed the parties to interpret the judgment in different 
ways.132 There was also Slovakia’s request for an additional judgment in 1998 with a 
view to execute the judgment and that the case remains pending.133  
(3) The Pulp Mills case 
In the Pulp Mills case between Argentina and Uruguay, the key issue was Argentina’s 
allegation that the construction of pulp mills by Uruguay was a breach of the 
obligations contained in the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay to prevent pollution 
and provide protection of the quality of the waters of the River Uruguay and its 
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ecosystem. The Court held that Uruguay had breached the procedural obligations 
under Article 7 to 12 of the Statute of informing, notifying and negotiating, but it had 
not breached the substantive obligations contained therein. The judgment did not 
specify the concrete measures required to implement the judgment or to prevent 
ecological deterioration of the River Uruguay but merely declared the breach of 
Uruguay and, consequently, that appropriate satisfaction had been established.134   
 After the ICJ delivered its decision, the parties signed an agreement that ended 
the several years long dispute between them.135 It seems that the ICJ contributed to 
the settlement of the dispute judgment and influenced the content of the agreement. 
This is because soon after the decision was rendered, the presidents of the two States 
decided to establish a monitoring plan for the Orion mill as stated in the judgment.136 
Also, a scientific committee was established to monitor the River Uruguay.137 There 
is a compulsory requirement that a State wishing to carry out any activity shall 
consult with the Administrative Commission of the River Uruguay (CARU) before 
making any decision with a view to controlling and preventing the pollution of the 
River Uruguay.138 It is clear that the parties complied with the judgment considering 
the Agreement establishing this committee which makes a reference to the ICJ 
judgment.139 After that, in 2011, the presidents signed the Declaration of Buenos 
Aires adopting the report submitted by the scientific committee which, considering 
the various attempts of the parties to negotiate and implement the judgment, marked 
the end of the dispute between them.140 Recently, Uruguay has authorised an increase 
in the plant’s production which then provoked strong opposition over this issue from 
the Argentinian president, stating that this action ‘affects the environmental 
sovereignty of Argentina, violates treaties between the two nations, as well as the 
Hague's own rulings.’141 If Argentina had been properly informed, notified and 
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consulted by Uruguay in relation to the increase of the plant’s production, the new 
dispute between the parties would not have arisen and this suggests that the ICJ was 
not successful in changing States’ behaviour so discourage future violations and deter 
the emergence of future disputes.     
(4) The Whaling case 
In the Whaling case between Japan and Australia, the central issue revolved around 
the conduct of Japan in carrying out a scientific research programme called JARPA II, 
which Australia claimed that Japan failed to comply with its obligations set out in the 
ICRW Convention. The key issue of the case has been settled by the ICJ after it 
delivered the judgment, in favour of Australia, that interpreted the conduct of Japan as 
a violation of Article VIII paragraph 1 of the ICRW Convention, because JARPA II is 
not a programme for the purpose of scientific research, considered in terms of the 
programme’s design and implementation.142 After the judgment had been delivered, 
on 18 April 2014, Japan adopted a policy relating to future whale research 
programmes and it stated that it would comply with the judgment by cancelling the 
second phase of the JARPA II in the Antarctic.143 Japan’s stance reflects the direct 
influence of the Judgment and this shows the effect which it has had upon Japan’s 
internal policy. In addition, there were the chains of events which seemed to imply 
that Japan was willing to comply with the wider spirit of the judgment. In Japan’s 
opening Statement to the 65th Meeting of the IWC, it revealed its intention to submit a 
new research plan in the season 2015/2016 based upon international law and scientific 
evidence to the Scientific Committee of the International Whaling Commission 
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(IWC) by the autumn of 2014, which reflected the criteria mentioned in the 
Judgment.144 In this regard, it would also reduce the number of whales to be taken in 
the Antarctic.145 Therefore, the annual sample size for Antarctic minke whales would 
be reduced from 935 to 333.146 Nevertheless, the revised plan was commented on by 
the international panel of experts (the Review Panel), who stated that not enough 
information to determine whether lethal sampling is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of improving the precision of biological and ecological information related 
to the Antarctic minke whales and of improving the understanding of the Antarctic 
marine ecosystem. 147  It recommended that the programme should be further 
improved.148  
 With regard to behaviour changes, it seems that Japan has not changed its 
behaviour, since it has not ceased scientific whaling in the Antarctic by the use of 
methods that require the killing of a considerable number of whales. In this sense, 
future violations of the Treaty could occur. The fact that recently Japan, after the ICJ 
had rendered the judgment of the Whaling case, made a reservation on any dispute 
arising out of, concerning, or relating to research on, or conservation, management or 
exploitation of, living resources of the sea supports this point. Thus, the ICJ will not 
have a jurisdiction over the future whale research program or any fisheries 
conservation disputes in relation to living resources which Japan intend to carry out in 
the same area again.149 
 
                                                
144 See Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, ‘Japan’s Opening Statement to the 65th 
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4&chapter=1&lang=en#EndDec> accessed 17 June 2016. 
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(5) The Certain Activities/Construction of the Road cases 
The Certain Activities/Construction of the Road cases are the most recent judgment of 
the ICJ. It held that Nicaragua did not breach procedural environmental obligations to 
carry out an EIA, notify and consult as well as substantive obligations not to cause 
any transboundary harm because the dredging programme carried no risk of 
significant transboundary harm with respect to the flow of the Colorado River or to 
Costa Rica’s wetland. On the contrary, the ICJ decided the construction of the road 
along the San Juan River by Costa Rica caused a risk of significant transboundary 
harm. Hence, by failing to carry out an EIA before commencing the project, Costa 
Rica had breached its procedural obligation. What the ICJ requested Costa Rica to do 
was to prepare an appropriate EIA for any further works in the border area if they 
carried a risk of significant harm. Moreover, the ICJ considered that Costa Rica would 
have to consult in good faith with Nicaragua to determine measures to prevent or 
minimise significant transboundary harm. For the substantive obligation, the Court 
concluded that Costa Rica did not breach substantive obligations such as increasing 
the sediment level of the River, causing significant harm to the river’s ecosystem and 
water quality. Finally, the Court expected that Costa Rica would continue its due 
diligence obligation to monitor the effects on the environment and the mitigation 
works for reducing the adverse effects of the construction project on the environment.  
At the time of writing, it is too early to appraise Costa Rica’s actions in responding to 
the judgement in order to test the effectiveness of the ICJ. It remains to be seen Costa 
Rica’s policy on this matter to see whether it would conduct an EIA for the future 
project or how far it could strengthen cooperation with Nicaragua so as to prevent 
adverse impact to the environment. 
 To sum up briefly: the experiences of the ICJ indicates that in three (the 1974 
Nuclear Tests case, Pulp Mills case and Whaling case) of the five cases examined the 
ICJ settled the dispute brought before it (the exception being the Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros case, and in the Certain Activities/Construction of the Road cases, it is too 
soon to say what the impact of the Court’s judgment will be). However, in the Pulp 
Mills and Whaling cases the Court has failed to influence the parties’ behaviour in 
complying with the wider spirit of the judgments. Thus, in the Pulp Mills case, a new 
dispute seems to have arisen although the parties had signed the agreement after the 
judgment was rendered. As for the Whaling case, at first, Japan agreed to comply with 
 183 
the judgment by cancelling the JARPA II programme, but it has not abandoned 
scientific whaling by the use of methods that require the killing of a large number of 
whales and later it made a reservation on the dispute concerning scientific research so 
the jurisdiction of the ICJ would be precluded for the future case. Thus, the ICJ could 
halt the disputes temporarily but it could not guarantee compliance with the wider 
spirit of its judgments. 
2.1.4.2 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) 
It should be noted from the outset that ITLOS has yet to give a decision on the merits 
in an environmental case. All the cases that will be discussed here are provisional 
measures orders under Article 290(5) of UNCLOS made pending constitution of the 
Annex VII tribunal. In addition, it is not the role of the ITLOS in a provisional 
measure order to settle a dispute but the prescription of provisional measures is a 
significant tool to respond to international environmental disputes in a timely 
manner150 and prevent serious harm to the marine environment pending the final 
decision. 151  Thus, it is worthwhile to consider the ways in which the ITLOS 
contributed to the settlement of the dispute even though that was not their function at 
this stage.  
(1) The Southern Bluefin Tuna cases 
In the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, the provisional measures were granted by the 
ITLOS in 27 August 1999, where the key points of these measures were that of the 
limitation of annual catches in which all three parties — Australia, Japan and New 
Zealand — had to ensure that their catches would not exceed the annual national 
allocation at the levels which were agreed by the Commission for the Conservation of 
Southern Bluefin Tuna of 5,265 tonnes for Australia, 6,065 tonnes for Japan and 420 
tonnes for New Zealand.152 In addition, the ITLOS requested all the parties to refrain 
from conducting an experimental fishing programme.153  
 After the provisional measures were issued, the parties held negotiations to 
find a way out which seemed to display  ‘a positive and constructive atmosphere and 
reflected the desire of the three parties to the Commission to move from the previous 
                                                
150 Tim Stephens, International Courts and Environmental Protection (CUP 2009), 44-45. 
151 See Art. 290 (1) of UNCLOS. 
152 Southern Bluefin Tuna case, para. 90 (1) (c). 
153 Ibid, para. 90 (1) (d). 
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period of difficulty to a period of co-operation’.154 It was reported that, in the 1999 
fishing season (1 March 1999 - 29 February 2000), Japan decreased the upper limit of 
catch by taking voluntary measures to limit the catch to 6,065 tonnes so as to comply 
with the ITLOS’s provisional measures.155 However, the actual catch was 5,354 
tonnes.156 In the 2000 fishing season (1 March 2000-29 February 2001), Japan further 
decreased the upper limit of catch from 6,065 to 4,578 tonnes, but this limit was later 
amended to the previous limit after the Arbitral Tribunal revoked the provisional 
measures so as to bring the actual catch to 6,027 tonnes.157 Australia also complied 
with the provisional measures, since the catch in the 1999 and 2000 seasons were 
5,257 and 5,160 tonnes, respectively.158 In New Zealand the total catch did not exceed 
the level of 420 tonnes and did not engage in an experimental fishing programme, as 
required by the provisional measures.159 Considering the above information with 
regard to the amount of southern bluefin tuna caught by those three parties, the 
conclusion can be drawn that the provisional measures to certain extent managed to 
preserve against serious harm to the environment. The case was then preceded to the 
Arbitral Tribunal which found that it did not have the jurisdiction to rule in the case.  
 The outcome of this case seemed to bring back a good atmosphere in which 
the parties could be induced to negotiate and cooperate in order to normalise their 
relations.160 For its part, New Zealand opined that ‘by bringing this case…have 
caused a greater readiness on Japan’s part to improve the scientific basis of any future 
joint experimental fishing programme and to reduce the tonnage that would be taken 
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if such a programme were to be agreed.’161 Australia insisted in its positions that 
experimental fishing programmes should not be conducted unilaterally and that it 
would try to settle the dispute amicably for the purpose of conservation and optimum 
utilisation of the Southern Bluefin Tuna stock.162 For Japan, it took the view that the 
award ‘urges self-restraint upon the parties, promotion of negotiations, and the 
utilization of an independent third party (a tribunal constituted under the CCSBT) for 
that purpose’163 and it pledged to establish a comprehensive conservation regime 
which includes third parties such as the Republic of Korea and Taiwan.164 
 All the positions presented by the parties which seemed to be ‘positive 
elements of the litigation process’ led Shabtai Rosenne to draw the conclusion that 
‘there is no doubt that those promising expectations of the parties were the direct 
outcome of the carefully crafted provisions in the Award that related to the 
provisional measures prescribed by ITLOS’.165 
 The dispute was not completely settled until 28 May 2001, when Australia 
announced the end of the dispute, resulting in the cancellation of sanctions imposed 
by Australia prohibiting Japanese fishing vessels to enter in its waters since 1998166 
and the establishment of a scientific programme endorsed by the Commission for the 
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna so as to replace the Japanese experimental 
fishing programme.167 
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(2) The MOX Plant case 
In the MOX Plant case which started life in the ITLOS, provisional measures were 
sought by Ireland pending the establishment of an arbitral tribunal under Annex VII to 
UNCLOS. The ITLOS ordered the parties to cooperate and enter into consultations so 
that the parties could exchange information with regard to the consequences of the 
commission of the MOX plant, to monitor risks and the effects of the operation and to 
devise measures to prevent the pollution of the marine environment.168 To show their 
intention to comply with the order, on 17 December, the UK submitted the initial 
report to the ITLOS and Ireland in order to inform them of the steps that the UK had 
taken.169  
 Given that fact that, in the arbitral proceedings, the parties still disputed the 
question of whether or not the cooperation between the parties had been enhanced, the 
issue of the parties’ compliance with the Order cannot be promptly answered without 
considering the stances of both parties and the arbitral award. While the UK alleged 
that it proposed to review the existing arrangements for cooperation and monitoring 
but ‘Ireland has not yet to respond’,170 Ireland rebutted this allegation by contending 
that what the UK claimed may be defined as ‘a gross misinterpretation of the facts’ in 
order to discredit Ireland.171 In fact, the parties have attempted to restore their 
cooperation since the ITLOS Order was made. Several meetings and public 
consultations were held and sensitive security information as well as reports relevant 
to the operation of the MOX Plant were provided by the UK.172 What can be seen as 
the aftermath of the ITLOS order was that, at least, the cooperation between Ireland 
and the UK had actually been improved. As Ireland stated in the Reply submitted to 
the Arbitral Tribunal173 and it confirmed in the Order No 3 of the Arbitral Tribunal 
that ‘there had been some improvement in the processes of co-operation and the 
provision of information’.174 Furthermore, these improvements can be considered as 
being a direct consequence of the ITLOS Order in which the Arbitral Tribunal 
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accepted that ‘it is satisfied that since December 2001, there has been an increased 
measure of co-operation and consultation, as required by the ITLOS Order.’175 It 
should be noted, however, that the MOX Plant never began to operate so the need for 
co-operation became largely academic. 
(3) The Land Reclamation case 
In the Land Reclamation case, the ITLOS prescribed provisional measures which 
required both parties to cooperate with each other by establishing a group of 
independent experts for the purpose of conducting a study with regard to the effects of 
Singapore’s land reclamation works and proposing measures to deal with any adverse 
effects. In addition, the parties shall exchange information on Singapore’s land 
reclamation works, including assessing the risks or effects of such works. It should be 
noted that the ITLOS did not grant the provisional measures as Malaysia had 
requested, so as to make Singapore academics view the outcome as a ‘victory for 
Singapore’.176 Later, the Group of Experts (GOE) was formed and it submitted the 
report to both Governments on 5 November 2004 with a view to responding to what 
the ITLOS held in the provisional measures, in which it found that the work had not 
caused any serious impact.177 The report was accepted by both States and it seemed 
that the process of negotiation, on the basis of the findings of the GOE, to settle the 
dispute went quite very well and was conducted in a spirit of goodwill. This was, as 
was accepted by the Singapore Foreign Minister, partly because of ‘the involvement 
of an objective third party—ITLOS…—which made possible an impartial and 
objective assessment of the facts of the case and the merits of the competing 
arguments.’178 The dispute was successfully settled, without the need of the Annex 
VII arbitral Tribunal to deal with the merits, after the provisional measures had been 
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prescribed, culminating in the conclusion of the agreement between the parties which 
was signed on 26 April 2005.179 The evidence signifying that the dispute was resolved 
appeared in paragraph 13 of the agreement, where the parties concluded that the 
agreement ‘is a full and definitive settlement of the dispute with respect to the land 
reclamation and all other issues related thereto.’180 In the said agreement, the parties 
complied with the provisional measures in that they also agreed to expand the 
mandate of the bilateral cooperation programme, the so-called Malaysia-Singapore 
Joint Committee on the Environment (MSJCE), so as to include the exchange 
information with regard to the environment in the Straits of Johor and to monitor the 
ecological conditions.181 
 It is not an exaggeration to conclude that the provisional measures had a direct 
impact on the ways in which the parties carried out further negotiations to find 
practical solutions to the dispute, as Wolfrum noted that the provisional measures 
were ‘instrumental in bringing the parties together and providing a successful 
diplomatic solution to the dispute’. 182 In addition, by requesting the parties to 
cooperate, the ITLOS adopted a ‘pragmatic approach’183 which ‘would assist the 
parties in finding a solution.’184 It can be concluded that the effectiveness of the 
ITLOS in settling this case is evident, which leads Koh (then an Agent for Singapore) 
and Lin to draw the lessons learnt from the case with regard to the trustworthiness of 
the ITLOS that these  ‘third-party processes…are very useful tools to break impasses 
and to bring disputes to an amicable resolution. Often, the parties themselves would 
have politicised the dispute to the extent that it is difficult for either party to step back 
or compromise without third-party intervention.’185   
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 Considering whether the parties have changed their behaviour after the dispute 
ended, what one might find is that the obligations to inform, notify and consult have 
been strengthened. Recently, two of Malaysia’s land reclamation works ignited 
environmental concerns on Singapore’s side. Malaysia has indicated that it would 
share some information about the works, including EIAs with Singapore, and has 
promised to commit to ‘fulfilling its obligations under international law and will take 
all necessary measures to avoid any adverse transboundary impact’.186 This situation 
has demonstrated that, at very least, Malaysia has been aware that, in a case where the 
projects could have a significant impact on the environment, the projects should not 
be carried out unilaterally but that consultation needs to be carried out and relevant 
information should be shared, although, at the time of writing, Singapore has not yet 
received such EIAs and the process of consultation is still ongoing.187     
2.1.5 Non-Compliance Procedures  
2.1.5.1 The Disputes under the Espoo Convention 
The discussion below will be confined to two cases that are the Romania v. Ukraine 
case and the Lithuania v. Belarus case because in these cases the Committee found 
that Ukraine and Belarus were in non-compliance. The other three cases, the Ukraine 
v. Romania, the Azerbaijan v. Armenia and the Armenia v. Azerbaijan case,188 have 
been closed, since the Committee found that they were not in non-compliance and, 
therefore, the issue of compliance and behavioral changes does not arise. 
(1) The Romania v. Ukraine case 
Having found that Ukraine had breached its obligations under the Espoo Convention, 
the Implementation Committee (IC) urged, inter alia, Ukraine to stop work of the 
project, repeal without delay the final decision concerning the implementation of the 
project and not to implement Phase II of the project until it fully complied with the 
                                                
186 See MFA Press Release: Transcript of Senior Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Masagos 
Zulkifli's Reply to Parliamentary Questions, 9 July 2014, available at 
<http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media_centre/press_room/pr/2014/201407/press_20140709.print
able.html?status=1> accessed 19 June 2016. 
187 MFA Press Release: Transcript of Second Minister for Foreign Affairs Grace Fu’s Reply to the 
Parliamentary Question and Supplementary Questions, 19 January 2015, available at 
<http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media_centre/press_room/pr/2015/201501/press_20150120.print
able.html?status=1> accessed 19 June 2016. 
188 See chapter 3, section 3.2.1. 
 190 
Convention.189 The findings of the IC received a positive response from Ukraine 
when it decided to repeal the final decision, as urged by the IC, and further steps to 
comply with the Convention were also proposed which the IC appreciated as an 
important step for future compliance.190  It is important to note that although some 
obligations were fulfilled, some were not such as the domestic legislative frameworks. 
Rather than leaving Ukraine to bring its legislation into line with the Convention 
alone, the MOPs offered technical advice to Ukraine.191 At the time of writing the 
MOPs was still requesting Ukraine to bring the project into full compliance with the 
Convention by the end of 2015 and also requested it to cooperate and consult with 
Romania, as well as encouraging the two States to develop bilateral agreement for 
improving implementation of the Convention.192 
(2) The Lithuania v. Belarus case 
The central issue of this case was whether Belarus had breach its obligations with 
regard to the EIA procedure under the Convention. The Committee found that Belarus 
was in non-compliance with its obligations under Article 2 (6), Article 4 (2), Article 5 
(a) and Article 6 (1) (2) of the Convention. The MOP adopted several measures and 
requested Belarus to, inter alia, complete the EIA procedures such as ensuring that 
due account has been taken of the outcome of the EIA documentation, providing to 
Lithuania the final decision on the proposed activity and continuing the procedure of 
transboundary EIA on the basis of the final EIA documentation. 193 After the 
recommendations were proposed, a number of developments took place and bilateral 
dialogue have been exhausted which signified that Belarus attempted to comply with 
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the recommendation.194 But the dispute was not completely settled judging from the 
facts that some issues need to be further implemented, since they were neglected by 
Belarus, such as update of the EIA report, co-arrangement of public hearings in 
Lithuania.195 Also, the parties still disagreed on scientific and technical details about 
the implementation of the recommendations. Lithuania expressed its grave concern 
about, for example, the lack of substance in the EIA documentation provided by 
Belarus and methodology used in determining the siting.196 Recently, the Committee 
proposed that the parties should establish a joint expert commission to assess Belarus 
compliance with the Convention since the Committee, in this specific case, did not 
have sufficient technical and scientific knowledge to do so.197 While Lithuania was in 
favorable toward the proposal, Belarus disagreed with the establishment of this kind 
of joint commission claiming that it would unlikely be resultative, in part because of 
the ground reason of the mistrust forming between them and it preferred to exhaust all 
possible avenues through bilateral consultations.198 Since the dispute is still ongoing, 
it remains to be seen how the issue could be settled. 
2.1.5.2 The Dispute under the Aarhus Convention 
The dispute over the Bystroe Canal project, in which Romania alleged that Ukraine 
had breached the Convention was decided by the Committee in 2005.199 Having found 
that there was a breach of Article 6 (2) (e) of the Convention by Ukraine, the CC 
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and Environmental Protection of the Republic of Belarus Mrs. Iya Malkina at the 35th session of the 
Implementation Committee of the Espoo Convention (31 March 2016), available at 
<http://minpriroda.gov.by/en/news-en/view/speech-of-the-head-of-belarusian-delegation-first-deputy-
minister-of-natural-resources-and-environmental-1832/> accessed 19 June 2016. See also Report of the 
Implementation Committee on its Thirty-Fifth Session, ECE/MP .EIA/IC/2016/2, Annex  (12 May 
2016), para. 20. 
199 MOPs to the Aarhus Convention, Report of the Second Meeting, Decision II/5b, (13 June 2015), 
available at 
<http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2005/pp/ece/ece.mp.pp.2005.2.add.8.e.pdf> 
accessed 19 June 2016. 
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requested Ukraine to modify its domestic law so as to comply with its international 
obligation. The follow up decisions adopted by the MOPs from 2005 to present, show 
a slow progress of implementation of the MOP’s decision although Ukraine shows its 
willingness to rectify its legislation and practice.200 For this reason, the MOPs 
requested the secretariat and the Compliance Committee, as well as invited 
international and regional organisations and financial institutions, to provide advice 
and assistance to Ukraine for implementing the measures.201 As reported in the Fourth 
and Fifth Meeting of MOPs in 2011 and 2014, the situation of non-compliance had 
not improved, since ‘no real and efficient steps have been taken’202 and Ukraine 
remains in non-compliance up until the present.203 
 After surveying the compliance of the parties to selected NCPs, some tentative 
assessments can be made. The main type of dispute brought before NCPs involved 
practices of parties in implementing international obligations set out in particular 
conventions into their domestic law. From the experience reviewed, when compliance 
committees make a recommendation it seems that parties are receptive to the findings 
in the sense that the parties usually show their willingness to comply with the 
recommendation. However, the willingness to comply and their ability to achieve 
what compliance committees have recommended need to be distinguished. In all 
cases described above, the non-complying States have not achieved full-compliance. 
One of the advantages of NCP is that an NCP body still monitors implementation of 
the non-complying party on a regular basis by adopting follow-up decisions until the 
parties concerned have fulfilled their obligations. Also, a NCP plays an active role in 
finding further solutions in the case where there have been a matters of further 
disagreement between them, for instance, by proposing the establishment of an expert 
commission to assess compliance of the losing State as shown in the dispute between 
Lithuania and Belarus under the Espoo Convention. It should be noted that NCP 
                                                
200 MOPs to the Aarhus Convention, Report of the Third Meeting, ECE/MP .PP/2008/L.8/Add.6, (4 
April 2008), available at 
<http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2008/pp/mop3/ece_mp_pp_2008_L_8_add_6_
e.pdf> accessed 19 June 2016. 
201 Ibid, para. 5. 
202 MOPs to the Aarhus Convention, Report of the Fourth Meeting, ECE/MP.PP/2011/L.19, (13 April 
2011), available at 
<http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/mop4/Documents/ece_mp_pp_2011_L_19_e.pdf> 
accessed 19 June 2016. 
203 MOPs to the Aarhus Convention, Report of the Fifth Meeting, ECE/MP.PP/2014/CRP.10, (30 June-
1 July 2014), available at <http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/mop5/Documents/In-
session_docs/ECE.MP.PP.2014.CRP.10.ENG.pdf> accessed 19 June 2016. 
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process initiated by party-to-party trigger has been unpopular, since it can be 
considered as an unfriendly act. Therefore, States will choose to do this only if their 
major interests are at stake.204 
2.1.6 RFMO Panels 
The dispute was concerned with the decision of the SPRFMO Commission not to 
allocate Russia the total allowable catch of jack mackerel which Russia claimed that 
such action was unjustifiably discriminated against action against it. 205  Russia 
objected to this decision and proposed its own alternative measures. Having found 
that the failure to allocate the total allowable catch of 360,000 tonnes of jack mackerel 
resulted in unjustifiable discrimination against Russia and the alternative measure 
proposed by Russia was not equivalent in effect to CMM 1.01, the review panel 
recommended the use of an alternative measure. Given the fact that Russia did not 
institute dispute settlement proceedings under the SPRFMO, this means, on the one 
hand, that the recommendation became binding and Russia was expected to comply 
with it and, on the other hand, that the SPRFMO commission should allocate a quota 
for Russia in future years. The SPRFMO commission complied with the 
recommendation by adopting the Conservation and Management Measure for 
Trachurus murphyi CMM 2.01 in 2014,206 which allocated Russia a quota of 13,445 
tonnes.207 As for Russia, it wrote to the Acting Executive Secretary confirming its 
commitment to follow the Recommendation made by the Review Panel.208 It can be 
concluded that both parties followed the recommendations and the key issue of the 
dispute has been settled. With regard to behaviour change, the SPRFMO commission 
has allocated Russia a quota of 15,100 tonnes in 2015209 and 2016.210 
                                                
204 Susana  Borràs Pentinat, ‘Comparative Analysis of Selected Compliance Procedures under 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements ’ in Sandrine Maljean-Dubois and Lavanya Rajamani (eds), La 
Mise en Oeuvre du Droit International de l'Environnement = Implementation of International 
Environmental Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011) 343. 
205 See chapter 3, section 4.2.  
206 See SFRFMO, ‘CMM 2.01 Conservation and Management Measure for Trachurus murphyi’, 
reprinted at <https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/Meetings-2013-plus/Commission-Meetings/2nd-
Commission-Meeting-2014-Manta-Ecuador/Annex-G-CMM-2.-01-Trachurus-Murphyi.pdf> accessed 
19 June 2016. 
207 But note that this amount was not regarded as setting a precedent. 
208 SPRFMO, ‘Russian Federation Accepts’ (8 July 2013), available at <http://www.sprfmo.int/new-
meetingpage-News/archive-news/russian-federation-accepts-recommendations/> accessed 19 June 
2016. 
209 SPRFMO, ‘CMM 3.01 Conservation and Management Measure for Trachurus murphyi’, reprinted 
at <https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Meetings/Meetings-2013-plus/Commission-Meetings/3rd-
Commission-Meeting-2015-Auckland-New-Zealand/Annex-H-CMM-3.-01-for-Trachurus-Murphyi-
rev2.pdf> accessed 25 June 2016. 
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2.2. Mechanisms to Induce Compliance 
In this subsection, the issues that will be discussed revolve around the post-decision-
making phase where a decision has been rendered and the losing party refuses to 
comply with it. Thus, the availability of mechanisms to induce or compel the losing 
party to comply will be explored below.   
2.2.1 Mediation, Conciliation and Inquiry 
These methods are non-binding, there is no obligation to comply and, therefore, the 
possible need for a compliance mechanism does not arise. In practice, as these 
methods are purely consensual, non-compliance is unlikely to be a problem in 
practice. Although there is no obligation to comply, the parties need to take the 
principle of good faith into account. To engage in dispute settlement procedure in 
good faith can be considered as a general principle of law and a principle of 
customary international law.211 Whatever mechanism the parties choose (judicial or 
non-judicial means), they have to respect and settle their dispute in good faith in a 
spirit of cooperation. As the ICJ in the Aerial Incident case held that ‘The Court's lack 
of jurisdiction does not relieve States of their obligation to settle their disputes by 
peaceful means. The choice of those means admittedly rests with the parties under 
Article 33 of the United Nations Charter. They are nonetheless under an obligation to 
seek such a settlement, and to do so in good faith in accordance with Article 2, 
paragraph 2, of the Charter.’212 This means that even if the parties choose non-judicial 
mechanisms in which their recommendations are non-binding, the parties shall 
consider them in good faith. For example, in the Watercourses Convention, it 
explicitly states that the parties concerned shall consider the recommendation 
provided by the inquiry commission in good faith.213  
                                                                                                                                      
210 SPRFMO, ‘CMM 4.01 Conservation and Management Measure for Trachurus murphyi’, reprinted 
at <https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Fisheries/Conservation-and-Management-Measures/CMM-4.01-T-
murphyi-2016-4Mar2016.pdf> accessed 25 June 2016.  
211 Guy Goodwin-Gill, ‘State Responsibility and the ‘Good Faith’ Obligation in International 
Law’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Dan Sarooshi (eds), Issues of State Responsibility before 
International Judicial Institutions (2004) 75, 88. See also Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as 
Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (CUP, 1994) 105. 
212 Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India) (Judgment) [2000] ICJ 
Rep 12, para. 53. See also paras. 5 and 11 of the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of 
International Disputes. 
213 Art. 33 (8) of the Watercourses Convention. 
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2.2.2 Arbitration 
In principle, the execution of awards cannot be carried out by arbitral tribunals 
themselves. Nor are there other institutions with the competence to enforce arbitral 
awards rendered by inter-State arbitral tribunals. Compliance with awards depends 
solely on the parties to a dispute, since ‘recourse to arbitration implies an undertaking 
to implement the tribunal’s award(s) in good faith (bona fide)’.214 However, the 
execution of arbitral awards could possibly be brought to tribunals again as shown in 
the OSPAR Convention which stipulates that ‘any dispute which may arise between 
the parties concerning…the execution of the award may be submitted by either party 
to the arbitral tribunal which made the award’.215 This kind of provision could serve 
as a good model for other treaties. In addition, since failure to comply with an arbitral 
award is a breach of an international obligation, it would be possible for the winning 
party to take action against a non-complying losing party either by taking counter-
measures or by bringing it before an international court if it can find a jurisdictional 
basis for doing so. The optional clause of the ICJ is one possibility if both parties have 
a declaration under it. 
2.2.3 International Courts 
The sole enforcer of the ICJ’s judgment is the Security Council (SC) as provided in 
Article 94 (2) of the UN Charter, which states that ‘If any party to a case fails to 
perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, 
the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems it 
necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect 
to the judgment.’216 It should be noted that the SC cannot take action at its own 
initiative but only in a case where a party refers the matter to it.217 This means that 
other members of the UN that are not parties to the dispute cannot invoke this Article 
to enforce the ICJ’s judgment. However, they may raise the issue of non-compliance 
with the judgment with the SC or the General Assembly by showing that the non-
compliance will result in international friction or give rise to a dispute and, should 
that dispute persist, it may be likely to endanger the maintenance of international 
                                                
214 Charles H. Brower II, ‘Arbitration’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law (OUP 2007). 
215 Art. 32 (10) (b) of the OSPAR Convention.  
216 Art. 94 (2) UN Charter.  
217 Hermann Mosler and Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘Article 94’ in Bruno Simma (ed), The Charter of the 
United Nations: A Commentary, vol 2 (2 edn, OUP 2002) 1177. 
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peace and security.218 This is the only way in which other States than the States which 
are parties to the case and that have an interest in protecting the environment can have 
recourse to these provisions. As far as the measures that the SC may adopt are 
concerned, these may include a wide range of measures depending on the discretion 
of the SC, such as ‘measures which it deems appropriate to contribute to ensure 
compliance with the judgment’.219 Judge Koroma claims that ‘the effectiveness of the 
Court’s international dispute settlement results from…the compliance mechanism 
underpinning it within the institutional framework provided by the United Nations, 
above all its Security Council.’220 However, Article 94 has never yet been used and 
therefore there must be some doubt as to its value. It could not be used against a 
permanent member of the SC or against a State sufficiently close to a permanent 
member as the latter would veto a draft resolution.   
 Unlike the ICJ, the ITLOS’s judgments cannot be enforced in the same 
manner, nor does UNCLOS provide for any other enforcement mechanism. 221 
Nonetheless, failure to comply with a court judgment is a breach of an international 
obligation set out in Article 296 (1) UNCLOS,222 thus allowing the winning State to 
take counter-measures against the non-complying losing State—which is difficult for 
a weaker State to do that against a stronger State—or even possibly to bring a new 
case against it as Nicaragua is currently doing with Colombia alleging that Colombia 
has failed to comply with the ICJ’s judgment of 2012 delimiting the maritime 
boundary between the two States.223  
2.2.4 Non-Compliance Procedures 
There are various possible penalties that can be imposed on persistent non-complying 
parties that are still in non-compliance with a NCP decision. In practice, the 
COP/MOP usually reviews implementation at its next meeting following a decision of 
                                                
218 Art. 34 UN Charter.  
219 Mosler and Oellers-Frahm (n 217) 1177. 
220 Abdul G. Koroma, ‘The Binding Nature of the Decisions of the International Court of Justice’ in 
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Marcelo Kohen (eds), International Law and the Quest for Its 
Implementation/Le Droit International Et La Quete de Sa Mise En Oeuvre: Liber Amicorum Vera 
Gowlland Debbas (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010) 432. 
221 In relation to the enforcement of decisions of the Seabed Disputes Chamber it is expressly stated in 
Art. 39 of the ITLOS Statute that ‘the decisions of the Chamber shall be enforceable in the territories of 
the States Parties in the same manner as judgments or orders of the highest court of the State Party in 
whose territory the enforcement is sought’. 
222 Art. 296 (1) provides that ‘Any decision rendered by a court or tribunal having jurisdiction under 
this section shall be final and shall be complied with by all the parties to the dispute’. 
223 Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. 
Colombia) (Application Instituting Proceedings) [2013] 24. 
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a compliance committee on the basis of the information submitted by the non-
complying parties to the compliance committee before the COP/MOP meeting, which 
the committee will examine and report to the COP/MOP. By the nature of the NCPs, 
which involve the resolution of a dispute in a cooperative manner and which put the 
emphasis on providing advice or assistance to the non-complying parties, the 
enforcement of the NCPs’ recommendations and findings is slightly soft as can be 
seen from the language used in the follow-up decisions in cases where the non-
complying parties are still not in compliance with their obligations. For example, 
when MOPs would like the non-complying parties to fulfill their obligations, they 
usually use nuanced words—such as encourage, urge, invites, express 
disappointment, remain concerned and recommend—in order to raise awareness of 
the ongoing non-compliance or to accelerate and put pressure on the parties 
concerned to change their domestic law or practice in line with the particular MEAs, 
as shown specifically in the LRTAP NCP.224 In addition, specific measures to put 
pressure on the non-complying parties may include the submission of a report 
showing the progress they have made and lists of specific ways of achieving 
compliance.225 Also, the issuing of a formal caution to the Parties concerned, along 
with recommendations to the non-complying parties, is a possible response, such as 
recommending them to consider accommodating an expert mission with a view to 
getting expert opinion on possible ways to implement the decisions of NCPs, as in the 
case of Aarhus NCP. Should a state of non-compliance continue, stronger measures 
would be applied, such as the suspension of special rights and privileges accorded to 
the non-complying parties under the particular conventions.  
 The most striking feature of the enforcement of measures against the repeated 
non-complying parties can be seen under the CITES and the Montreal Protocol 
enforcement that involved the use of trade restrictions or prohibitions of listed 
substances. For the CITES, the Standing Committee can advise parties to ban the non-
complying parties from international trading in CITES specimens, or encourage 
suspension of trade in specimens of one or more CITES species, or in all CITES 
species, or impose restrictions of the right to vote at one or more meetings of the 
                                                
224 See Tuomas Kuokkanen, ‘Practice of the Implementation Committee under the Convention on 
Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution’ in Ulrich Beyerlin, Peter-Tobias Stoll & Rüdiger Wolfrum, 
eds., Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
2006) 45-46. See also in case of repeated non-compliance in the Rotterdam Convention and the 
Stockholm Convention. 
225 See also in the case of repeated non-compliance in the Montreal Protocol. 
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Conference of the Parties, or declare the ineligibility of a Party to be a member of the 
Standing Committee, or impose the loss of the right of a Party and its experts to 
receive documents for meetings, or declare the ineligibility of a Party to receive other 
financial assistance from the Convention.226 
2.2.5 RFMO Panels 
All four RFMOs, except the WCPF Convention, already have an array of measures to 
deal with non-complying States, either in their constituent conventions or in measures 
adopted by them. For the SPRFMO Convention, it provides a special dispute 
settlement process where an objecting State does not accept the panel’s 
recommendations. The objecting States can choose to institute dispute settlement 
proceedings under this Convention which are those compulsory proceedings pursuant 
to Part VIII of the 1995 Agreement where the dispute concerns straddling stocks.227 
The same provision can also be found in the NAFO Convention, the SEAFO 
Convention the NEAFC Convention in which the parties can also submit the dispute 
to proceedings pursuant to Section 2 of Part XV of the UNCLOS.228 
 In addition, it is possible that the issue of non-compliance could be raised at 
the meeting of the RFMOs. As RFMOs are international organisation which has legal 
personality, they have general powers to adopt a decision with regard to non-
complying States. The general power of RFMOs derive from a catch all provision 
allowing them to adopt any measures necessary for achieving the objective of the 
treaties of RFMOs.229 For example, they might adopt decisions at the internal level 
stating that non-complying States shall not enjoy the right of casting votes and make 
any objection with regard to conservation measures such as decrease catch limits until 
such State has complied with the recommendations. This might induce compliance 
and discourage further non-compliance.  
                                                
226 Interpretation and Implementation of the Convention: Possible Measures for Non-Compliance, 
Document Prepared by the CITES Secretariat for the 46th Meeting of the Standing Committee, 12-15 
March 2002, SC46 Doc. 11.3, para. 13, available at 
<https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/com/sc/46/46-11-3.pdf> accessed 19 June 2016. The measures 
are currently used on a regular basis. The same measures can be seen in the Aarhus Convention, in the 
Protocol on Water and Health. 
227 Para. 10 (b)-(c) of Annex II to the SPRFMO Convention. 
228 Art. XV (6) of the NAFO Convention, Art. 24 (4) of the SEAFO Convention and Para. 42 (e) of the 
Rules of Procedure of the NEAFC Convention. 
229 See Art. 10 (1) (n) and (o) of the WCPF Convention; Art. VI (5) (h) of the NAFO Convention; Art. 
8 (p) of the SPRFMO Convention; Art. 6 (3) (o) of the SEAFO Convention; Art. 4 (1) of the NEAFC 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has examined the effectiveness of each of the dispute settlement 
mechanisms in dealing with an international environmental dispute. In doing so, 
criteria of effectiveness have been established with a view to using them as a 
framework and assessing each of the mechanisms in the light of those criteria. The 
effectiveness is measured in terms of outcomes.  
 1) Resolution of a dispute and its effect on States behaviour: For the first 
criteria, the effectiveness of dispute settlement mechanisms in settling international 
environmental disputes will be assessed by considering whether 1) the key issues in a 
dispute have been settled, 2) the losing State complied with the decision and 3) has 
the decision had any wider effect on the behaviour of the States parties to the dispute. 
It has to be acknowledged that applying such criteria to the real cases has some 
limitations because there are so few cases except in relation to NCPs. One should not 
conclude that a pattern of compliance or noncompliance in relation to a particular 
dispute settlement mechanism that has been found in this chapter will necessarily 
represent the general pattern that might emerge with many more cases. This means 
that any conclusions about the relative effectiveness of different mechanisms in terms 
of this criterion must be tentative. 
 Those cases which were brought before the judicial means, notably the ICJ, 
seemed to be settled when the judgments or awards were rendered but, in some cases, 
such as the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case and the Pulp Mills case, the parties 
hardly changed their behaviour in relation to issues of the dispute that is the question. 
At least the judgments or awards could temporarily halt the worsening relations 
between States or even establish a regime of regulating the pollution, as shown in the 
Trail Smelter Arbitration where the tribunal adopted several measures in order to 
restrict emissions or to strengthen cooperation, as shown in provisional measures 
order in the Land Reclamation decided by the ITLOS and to provide the criteria for 
killing whales for scientific research purposes, as shown in the Whaling case. 
 As regards non-judicial means, experience shows that the parties complied 
with the recommendations of the mediators, inquiry committees, compliance 
committees and RFMO panels. Nevertheless, the situation with regard to behaviour 
changes, in some cases, especially those cases which were brought before some 
NCPs, still needs to be further modified, either because of the lack of financial 
resources or the tardiness in enacting domestic law. 
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 2) Mechanisms to induce compliance: the effectiveness can be evaluated by 
looking at the existence of mechanisms to induce compliance. It is clear that non-
judicial means have no mechanisms to induce compliance and they do not need to 
have, whereas in the case of non-compliance with judicial decisions, especially the 
ICJ’s judgments, the SC can, in theory, play this crucial role even though, in practice, 
it has never adopted any measures to induce the losing party to comply. Even in cases 
of arbitration where an award may not be enforceable, like the ICJ’s judgments, the 
parties can use other ways to induce the losing party to comply, for instance by 
bringing the dispute as a new case to the ICJ and adopting counter-measures. For the 
ITLOS’s judgments, UNCLOS does not provide any mechanism to enforce the 
judgment but it is still possible to bring a new case against the losing party, since 
failure to comply with a judgment can be considered a breach of an international 
obligation.  
 However, with some NCPs, there are measures, such as the denial of benefits 
under the MEA concerned and trade restrictions, to induce repeated non-complying 
parties to comply. For RFMOs panels, there are dispute settlement mechanisms under 
UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks Agreement if an objecting State does not accept the 
panel’s recommendations. In addition, RFMOs, as an international organisation, can 
deal with the issue of non-compliance instead of resorting to external bodies to 
compel losing States to implement recommendations. This can be done through 
adopting a wide rage of measures to put pressures on them such as suspending their 
right to vote. To conclude, NCPs and RFMO panels would seem to have more 
effective compliance mechanisms than judicial means, notably arbitration. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL  
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
After having discussed the questions of the suitability and effectiveness of dispute 
settlement mechanisms in settling international environmental disputes in chapters 4 
and 5, what was found was that those mechanisms have some drawbacks that appear 
to be a hindrance to the better resolution of environmental disputes. The aim of this 
chapter is to suggest ways in which these drawbacks could be remedied and the 
dispute settlement mechanisms improved. Thus the main research question is: How 
could the dispute settlement mechanisms that are available in international law be 
improved? The proposals in this chapter are based primarily on the main findings of 
the shortcomings of each of the mechanisms identified in the previous two chapters. 
In addition, there are other shortcomings that were not mentioned in chapters 4 and 5 
because they do not fit neatly into the issue of suitability or effectiveness. They are 
discussed in this chapter so as to give a complete picture of lingering problems and 
solutions. 
 It should be noted from the outset that the proposals that I am going to suggest 
would have a chance of being carried out in practice rather than putting forward 
proposals that are merely theoretical, abstract or very difficult to implement. 
Therefore, this chapter will not propose creating a new institution, such as an 
international environmental court, which has received fierce criticisms due to having 
no real benefit in relation to the dispute settlement system in international law and 
being completely impractical,1 the proposals in this chapter will not propose creating 
                                                
1 See for example in Ellen Hey, Reflections on an International Environmental Court (Kluwer Law 
International 2000); Ole W. Pedersen, ‘An International Environmental Court and International 
Legalism’ (2012) 24 JEL 547 and Alan Boyle and James Harrison, ‘Judicial Settlement of International 
Environmental Disputes: Current Problems’ (2013) 4 JIDS 245; For the supporters of international 
environmental courts see Alfred Rest, ‘An International Court for the Environment: The Role of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration’ in The International Bureau of the PCA (ed), International Alternative 
Dispute Resolution: Past, Present and Future: The Permanent Court of Arbitration Centennial Papers 
(Kluwer Law International 2002) 53-65; Stephen Hockman, ‘An International Court for the 
Environment’ (2009) 11 Env L Rev 1; Kenneth F. McCallion and H. Rajan Sharma, ‘Environmental 
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a new institution nor propose, for example, amending the ICJ Statute, since it would 
require any amendment to be ratified by two-thirds of UN members including all 
permanent members of the Security Council, a requirement that in practice would be 
extremely hard to fulfill.2     
1. PROPOSAL FOR ADDRESSING THE WEAKNESS OF NON-JUDICIAL MECHANISMS 
The problem that is evident in the settlement of disputes by non-judicial mechanisms 
is the difficulty in selecting mediators, conciliators or inquiry commissions with 
expertise in environmental issues with sufficient diplomatic qualities. This is 
supposed shortcoming that could emanating from these mechanisms in the case where 
the parties choose their own decision-makers. 
 One way to overcome this weakness would be to create a roster of experts 
who can perform the dispute settlement and who are readily available for the 
disputing States, as the PCA does for arbitration or a roster of conciliators under 
UNCLOS.3 Rosters of experts could be established under international organisations 
or other institution whose interest is in the protection of the environment. UNEP may 
be the primary organisation that needs to consider this issue. It is worthwhile to 
ponder the practice of the Work Bank, since it can provide some guidance on how 
other organisations can learn from the Bank’s role in this matter. In this connection, 
the Operational Policies on Projects on International Waterways of the World Bank 
Operational Manual can be considered as a crucial policy to be applied in a dispute 
arising from the utilisation of international waterways, for instance the hydroelectric, 
irrigation or industrial projects that are financed by the Bank, which in turn may cause 
pollution.4  The function of the Bank is to stand ready in order to assist riparians in 
achieving ‘the efficient use and protection of the waterway’ which can be done 
                                                                                                                                      
Justice without Borders The Need for an International Court of the Environment to Protect 
Fundamental Environmental Right’ (1999-2000) 32 GeoWashJInt'l L& Econ 351; Joost Pauwelyn, 
‘Judicial mechanisms: Is there a need for a World Environment Court?’ in W. Bradnee  Chambers and 
Jessica F.  Green (eds), Reforming International Environmental Governance: From Institutional Limits 
to Innovative Reforms (United Nations University Press 2005) 150-177. 
2 Art. 69 of the ICJ Statute. 
3 See Art. 2 of Annex V to UNCLOS. See the list of conciliators at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/settlement_of_disputes/conciliators_arbitrators.htm> accessed 19 June 
2016.  
4 See The World Bank, ‘Operation Manual 7.50—Projects on International Waterways’ (Revised 
March 2012) (hereinafter Operation Manual 7.50), available at 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,
contentMDK:20064667~menuPK:64701637~pagePK:64709096~piPK:64709108~theSitePK:502184,0
0.html> accessed 29 September 2015. 
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through the promotion of cooperation and goodwill among riparians.5 The implication 
is that the Bank is ready to act as a third party in providing assistance to help the 
parties to resume their cooperation which in turn may bring the dispute to an end. 
 Furthermore, for the purpose of enhancing ‘the authority of its mediation or 
conciliation function’,6 according to Rule 6 of the Operational Manual, the Bank ‘may 
appoint one or more independent experts to examine the issues’ where the proposed 
project is objected to by the other riparians. The appointment of experts in this case is 
something akin to the establishment of an inquiry commission, but what is different 
from the normal inquiry process is that the parties do not need to find a person who 
will have the proper qualifications for settling water disputes or waste time in drafting 
the procedures or determining the tasks of such experts as the Bank does so. This is 
because the Bank has a roster of highly qualified independent experts maintained by 
the vice-presidency for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development 
(ESDVP) which consists of ten names and is updated at the beginning of each fiscal 
year.7  One or more experts will be selected by the ESDVP with two restrictions, 
namely that such experts are not nationals of any of the riparians of the waterways in 
question and the experts may not have any other conflicts of interest in the matter.8  
With regard to the terms of reference that the experts need to follow, these are set out 
beforehand by the ESDVP and the Regional Vice-President (RVP) which involves the 
examination of the Project/Program Details, assisted by the Bank where necessary.9  
Finally, when the experts have completed their task, a report should be submitted to 
the RVP and the ESDVP. Nevertheless, their technical opinion is not meant to be 
definitive but is subject to the review of the RVP and the ESDVP and the opinion is 
not intended to determine the rights and obligations of the riparians.10  
 The established practices of the Bank could be used as a guideline for other 
international organisations, such as the International Union for Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN), if they wish or are requested to play a role in settling international 
environmental disputes. There may be two forms of assistance that international 
                                                
5 Ibid. 
6 Atilla Tanzi, ‘Recent Trends in International Water Law Dispute Settlement’ in The International 
Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed), International Investments and Protection of the 
Environment: The Role of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms (Kluwer Law International 2001) 153. 
7 See Rules 8 and 12 of the Operation Manual 7.50.  
8 Ibid, Rule 9. 
9 Ibid, Rule 10. 
10 Ibid, Rule 12. 
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organisations could offer to the disputing parties. The first is that international 
organisations could themselves be directly involved in the process of dispute 
settlement, acting as mediators, conciliators or fact-finders. This requires international 
organisations to set up mandates and draft guidance in the same way as the Bank 
drafted the Operational Manual. The second possibility is that international 
organisations could facilitate the deliberations of the disputing parties by providing a 
list of experts which the parties could choose in consultation with the competent 
organs of the international organisation concerned without the latter getting directly 
involved in a case or proposing any recommendations for the settlement of the dispute 
to the parties.   
 It is also worth referring to the recent development of the potential role played 
by the UNEP in settling international environmental disputes which States may 
consider to be a very useful and time-saving strategy.11 UNEP nowadays, stands 
ready either to offer its own technical expertise to provide impartial and trusted advice 
or to provide assistance for ongoing mediation. As it has clearly stated that ‘UNEP’s 
expertise is available to international mediation processes where technical natural 
resource know-how can play a constructive role and complement the mediation 
team’s competencies. This service can be related to disputed natural resources or 
using shared natural resources as a platform for cooperation and confidence building 
between the parties.’12 States should be encouraged to resort to this service—known 
as ‘environmental diplomacy support’—to settle their disputes where technical natural 
resource know-how is an issue.13  
 Another option for States is mediation provided by the UNDPA. Since 2006, 
the UNDPA’s Mediation Support Unit (MSU) has managed a mediation roster which 
has around 300 mediation experts in various fields, including the environment, in 
response to different aspects of the mediation process.14 In addition, the Department 
also manages the Standby Team of Mediation Experts who are full-time mediation 
                                                
11 In 2011, the UNGA requested the Secretary-General to develop guidance for more effective 
mediation; see Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Conflict 
Prevention, and Resolution UNGA Res 65/283 (28 July 2011) A/RES/65/283. UNEP, in response to 
the request, carried out research with regard to the mediation of resources disputes taking into account 
the past practices.  
12 UNEP, ‘Environmental Diplomacy and Mediation Support’, available at 
<http://www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/Introduction/ECP/EnvironmentalDiplomacy/tabid/105991/
Default.aspx> accessed 29 September 2015. 
13 Ibid. 
14 UN, Department of Political Affairs, ‘Diplomacy and Mediation’, available at 
<http://www.un.org/undpa/diplomacy-mediation> accessed 29 September 2015. 
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experts which are ready to be deployed upon the request of the UN’s officials and 
other non-UN mediators engaged in mediation efforts.15  Their duty is to provide 
technical advice—such as setting an agenda, or drafting the texts of agreements—to 
these persons. The Team is composed of those members who have expertise in 
several aspects of the mediation process and one of them has expertise in the issue of 
natural resources.16  
 Given that non-judicial mechanisms take place if the parties consent, it 
depends upon States’ willingness whether or not they prefer to resort to the above-
explained options.  
2. PROPOSALS FOR ADDRESSING THE WEAKNESSES OF JUDICIAL MECHANISMS 
2.1 Addressing the Problem of the Lack of Mechanisms to Induce Compliance 
with Arbitral Awards or the ITLOS Judgments 
As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the shortcomings of the 
arbitration process is the lack of mechanisms to enforce an international arbitral 
award.17 The question is how can the existing mechanisms make a contribution to the 
implementation process in this post-adjudicative phase and play a role in facilitating 
or inducing a losing State that refuses to abide by the award to comply with the 
award. While recognising the fact that the winning party can take action against a 
non-complying losing party by bringing it before an international court, the proposal 
below will provide ways in which other mechanisms can induce compliance.   
 Two types of cases may be distinguished. Firstly, there may be a dispute in 
which MEAs are at issue before the international arbitral tribunals, since some MEAs 
that have a dispute settlement clause providing for arbitration.18 Secondly, a dispute 
may arise from an alleged breach of the environmental obligations set out in the 
convention other than a MEA. To begin with the first type of case, it might be 
suggested that the plenary organs of the MEA, namely Conferences of the Parties 
                                                
15 UN, Department of Political Affairs, ‘Standby Team of Mediation Experts’ (2014) 
<http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SBT-Fact-Sheet-2014_0.pdf> accessed 29 
September 2015. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See chapter 5, section 2.2.2. 
18 To date, there have been no such cases. Part of the reason for this is that NCPs remove some of the 
need for other forms of dispute settlement. 
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(COPs) or Meetings of the Parties (MOPs), if these kinds of institutional 
arrangements exist, may perform the task of inducing compliance. This task can be 
perceived as one of the functions of COPs/MOPs in keeping under review and 
supervising the implementation of the substantive obligations provided in particular 
conventions. For instance, this situation might arise if an arbitral tribunal pronounced 
that a State had failed to observe the obligations in the CBD and afterwards such a 
losing State refused to execute the arbitral award. The issue of non-compliance may 
be raised to the CBD COP, since one of its functions in supervising the 
implementation is to ‘consider and undertake any additional action that may be 
required for the achievement of the purposes of this Convention in the light of 
experience gained in its operation’.19 Non-compliance with the arbitral award seems 
to undermine the Convention’s regime in the sense that the State found in breach of 
the CDB’s obligations denies the need to comply with the obligations that it is bound 
to fulfill so as to achieve the objectives of the Convention. The kinds of sanctions that 
the CBD COP could impose include the suspension of voting rights or soft measures 
such as naming and shaming that State. For the UNFCCC, the COP may adopt ‘the 
decisions necessary to promote the effective implementation of the Convention’.20 
This broad provision would allow the COP to become involved in the issue of non-
compliance with the award of the losing State, since persistent non-compliance could 
lessen the effectiveness of the Convention which is, in turn, requires actions to be 
taken. Given the fact that the dispute is adjudicated by impartial arbitrators who can 
examine the conduct of a State which is alleged to be in breach of its obligations, an 
arbitral decision which finds that a State has actually violated these obligations can be 
considered as the authoritative determination or evidence which COPs/MOPs can take 
into account when considering a decision to adopt particular sanctions. 
 Another way of inducing compliance would be to expand the scope of the 
functions of NCPs so as to include a situation where there is non-compliance with an 
arbitral award. Such non-compliance may be counted as one of the forms of non-
compliance with the obligations set out in MEAs which can be taken as falling within 
the process of NCPs. The issue can be raised by the winning in the arbitral 
proceedings, or by any parties to the MEA in question or NGOs, depending upon the 
triggering provision of the MEAs. Given the fact that NCPs can facilitate the parties 
                                                
19 See Art. 23 (4) (i). 
20 See Art. 7 (2) UNFCCC. 
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in fully complying with their obligations in those cases where a party is found to be in 
non-compliance, the same principle could be applied also in a situation where the 
losing State could not execute the arbitral award. If the source of failure in complying 
with the arbitral award stems from the lack of financial or human resources, 
appropriate assistance could be provided to the losing State. Sanctions are possible if 
the losing State completely denies that it has any obligation to execute the arbitral 
award in good faith even though it has the full capacity to do so. Thus, hard sanctions 
adopted by NCPs in this case are required in order to maintain the effectiveness of the 
convention regime.  
 A second situation is where the subject matter of the dispute is not about a 
convention under which COPs/MOP has been established, but other kinds of 
environmental treaty that have established some form of supervisory body, such as the 
OSPAR Convention, UNCLOS and watercourses conventions. It might be suggested 
that the institutions established under these conventions could perform the task of 
inducing compliance. For instance, the institutions established under particular 
international watercourses conventions in the form of international joint watercourses 
commissions. For example, the Mekong River Commission,21 the Administrative 
Commission of the River Uruguay (CARU)22 or the International Commission for the 
Protection of the Rhine23 could also play this role. It should be noted that those 
institutions do not have a direct duty to enforce the arbitral award, but the absence of 
explicit provision or of a special organ that is focused particularly on this matter does 
not prevent them from exercising their implied powers which are necessary to fulfill 
their functions. Edith Brown Weiss observes that ‘one can conceive of the function 
more broadly as one of facilitating implementation of agreed obligations and 
providing means to strengthen compliance with the obligations and programs’.24 This 
could be done through the adoption of measures that urge or induce the losing State to 
                                                
21 Art. 18 (B) of the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong 
River Basin broadly entrusted the Council with the duty of making ‘decisions necessary to successfully 
implement this Agreement’ (1995) 34 ILM 864.  
22 The ICJ in the Pulp Mills case held that CURU is ‘a joint mechanism with regulatory, executive, 
administrative, technical and conciliatory functions, entrusted with the proper implementation of the 
rules contained in the 1975 Statute governing the management of the shared river resource’ Pulp Mills 
case (Provisional Measures) (Order) [2006] ICJ Rep 113, para. 81. 
23 See the tasks of the Commission in Art. 8 of the Convention on the Protection of the Rhine (12 April 
1999), available at 
<http://www.iksr.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokumente_en/convention_on_tthe_protection_of__the_r
hine.pdf> accessed 8 October 2015. 
24 Edith Brown Weiss, International Law for a Water-Scarce World (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
2013) 177. 
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execute the judgment. Furthermore, there might be a case where the parties did not 
comply with the award because of their lack of capacity to handle the technical 
matters. The technical body, if there is one, that was established under the 
watercourses conventions may provide assistance to the parties in order to help them 
comply with the award. 
 For UNCLOS,25 it does not have some form of NCP but there is the meeting 
of States parties which is not designed to play a supervisory role. Rather, it deals 
mainly with administrative and financial matters of the ITLOS.26 However, it has 
adopted some substantive decisions with regard to the implementation of UNCLOS, 
such as submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
(CLCS).27 It might be possible, in theory, that the Meeting might discuss and decide 
on the issue of non-compliance with arbitral decisions. For example, in the case where 
the UK does not comply with the Chagos MPA award, the Meeting could urge or 
request the UK to adopt measures in order to comply with the judgment. Through this 
control, the Meeting’s decisions could, to some extent, put some pressure on non-
complying States.  
 There are some cases where there is no supervisory body, e.g. in the Iron 
Rhine arbitration. In such situation, countermeasures might be resorted to as shown in 
the El Chamizal case where Mexico exercised countermeasures against the US for not 
complying with the arbitral award.28 Non-judicial means could be used such as 
mediation as exemplified in the Beagle Channel case where Argentina refused to 
execute the arbitral award.29  
                                                
25 See chapter 5, section 2.2.3. 
26 Art. 391 (2) of UNCLOS. See the discussion of the parties whether or not the Meeting can supervise 
the implementation of UNCLOS in Report of the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties (29 June 
2011) SPLOS/231, paras. 119-120.  
27 See, for example, Decision regarding the date of commencement of the ten-year period for making 
submissions to the CLCS set out in article 4 of Annex II to UNCLOS, SPLOS/72 (29 May 2001) and 
Decision regarding the workload of the CLCS and the ability of States, particularly developing States, 
to fulfill the requirements of article 4 of annex II to UNCLOS, as well as the decision contained in 
SPLOS/72, paragraph (a), SPLOS/183 (20 June 2008). 
28 See Philip Jessup, ‘El Chamizal’ (1973) 67 AJIL 423. 
29 Beagle Channel Arbitration, (Argentina v. Chile) (1977) 52 ILR 93. See the declaration of Argentina 
which declared that the award was null and void in Argentina—Chile: Exchange of Diplomatic Notes 
concerning the Beagle Channel Arbitration, (1978) 17 ILM 738. See also Thomas  Princen, 
‘Internationaltional Mediation—The View from the Vatican— Lessons from Mediating the Beagle 
Channel Dispute’ (1987) 3 NJ 347. See also Benedetto Conforti, International Law and the Role of 
Domestic Legal Systems (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1993) 5, footnote 6. The text of the Treaty is 
reproduced in Argentina—Chile: Negotiation and Conclusion of Border Dispute Agreement, (1985) 24 
ILM 1. 
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2.2 Addressing the Problems Relating to Scientific and Technical Evidence  
Dealing with scientific and technical evidence is one of the thorniest problems for the 
judicial mechanisms, especially the ICJ as has been analysed in the previous two 
chapters.30 Such evidence is of cardinal in order to ascertain the facts that give rise to 
a dispute. Therefore, judges need to determine such facts carefully, especially in 
environmental cases. There are three possible ways that may help judges to 
familiarize themselves with the evidence are as follows:     
2.2.1 Drawing on the Work of an Existing Inquiry Commission 
Where a fact-finding body had investigated the same set of facts of a dispute prior to 
the referral of that dispute to a court, the latter could draw on the report of the body 
concerned when deciding the case.31 This was done by the ICJ in the case concerning 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, where it considered the Report of the 
Porter Commission.32 The report was the outcome of the work conducted by the 
Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Illegal Exploitation of Natural 
Resources and other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo which 
was set up by the Ugandan Government in May 2001. Referring to the Report, the ICJ 
stated:  
‘The Court moreover notes that evidence obtained by examination of 
persons directly involved, and who were subsequently cross-
examined by judges skilled in examination and experienced in 
assessing large amounts of factual information, some of it of a 
technical nature, merits special attention. The Court thus will give 
                                                
30 See chapter 4, section 2.2.2. These problems are unlikely to happen in the conrext of arbitration since 
parties to a dispute can appoint relevant technical experts as the arbitrators: see chapter 4, section 2.1.2. 
The proposals below are concerned with the shortcomings in the context of the ICJ and ITLOS. 
31 It should be noted that, the Court in the Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration had to consider the 
relevance of the findings of inquiry conducted by Professor Lafitte in the Baglihar dam case. Given 
that the Court was not asked to consider with the same set of facts as in the Baglihar dam case (i.e. 
Pakistan had not asked the Court to reverse the Baglihar determination, nor had it asked for the 
dismantling of the Baglihar dam) it held that such findings were irrelevant to the present case because 
the findings in the Baglihar dam case have not a general precedential value beyond the scope of that 
case. See the Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, paras. 469-470. 
32 Final report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegation into Illegal Exploitation of 
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2001 (May 
2001-November 2002), Kampala, November 2002. To the best of author’s knowledge, this case is the 
only case that the dispute has been the subject of fact-finding been subsequently referred to the ICJ. 
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appropriate consideration to the Report of the Porter Commission, 
which gathered evidence in this manner.’33 
 In this case the Report had already been accepted by the parties. In general, it 
should not cause any difficulty for a court to give weight to an inquiry report where 
the parties have accepted the findings. The findings will carry more weight if the 
inquiry is conducted by reliable international organisations. The parties should request 
international organisations, such as the UNEP or the World Bank, to perform the 
function of fact-finders. In this way, judicial and non-judicial means can work 
collaboratively in settling a dispute. 
 If the parties have not accepted the findings and afterwards they choose the 
judicial means as a forum to settle the dispute, how should a court treat those 
findings? It would seem that a court should not completely disregard such evidential 
material but it must consider the reliability of the persons or the institutions which 
produced the findings. If the findings emanate from skilled commissions, then the 
mere fact that the parties refuse to accept the findings would not devalue them. A 
court can probably take the findings into account as a reliable source of evidence. It 
would be unwise to ignore findings that have been produced by impartial 
examination. At least, it can save time for a court to engage in the examination of 
complex facts by appointing its own experts in order to shed light on the factual 
question.  
2.2.2 Enhancing the Use of Site Visits  
Rather than sitting on the bench and contemplating the evidence submitted by the 
parties, a court could play a more active role in obtaining the evidence from the place 
or locality to which the international environmental dispute relates. In situ inspections 
may help the Court to acquire a better understanding of the issues at stake and allow it 
to make a comprehensive assessment of the facts and apply them to the legal 
obligations. Clearly, site visits will ‘make it easier for the Court or tribunal to reach its 
conclusion’.34 Article 66 of the Rules of the Court empowers the Court to make a visit 
                                                
33 Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda) (Judgment) 
[2005] ICJ Rep 168, para. 61. 
34 Shabtai Rosenne, ‘Visit to the Site by the International Court’ in Emile Yakpo and Tahar Boumedra 
(eds), Liber Amicorum: Mohammed Bedjaoui (Kluwer International 1999) 472. See also Philippe 
Sands, ‘Water and International Law: Science and Evidence in international Litigation’ (2010) 22 ELM 
151, 161. 
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in the area that is in dispute. The ICJ, either proprio motu or at the request of a party, 
may exercise its functions with regard to the obtaining of evidence on the spot.35  
 Lessons can be learned from the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case in which the 
Court visited the dams before it rendered its judgment.36 In this case, the visits to the 
site were not initiated by the Court itself but instead Slovakia proposed this idea and 
Hungary agreed to it. This case serves as an example of how the parties may invite the 
Court to visit a site. After having consulted with each other, a protocol was concluded 
by the parties on 14 November 1995, agreeing on the matters of the site visit program, 
the ways in which the presentations of the delegations of each party were to be made, 
the press coverage and the costs of the visits which they agreed to share equally. On 3 
February 1997, the Agreed Minutes were signed subsequently with a view to 
providing more details on how the Court’s visit could be conducted. The Court then, 
on 5 February 1997, issued the Order to adopt the arrangements proposed by the 
parties as stated in the Protocol and the Agreed Minutes.37 Formal presentations by 
both parties were made before the judges had a chance to go to the area of wetland 
where Hungary claimed that the ecosystem was affected by the operation of the dam. 
Interestingly, on-site experiments were also carried out to demonstrate to the judges 
that there actually were environmental harms. For Slovakia’s part, it certainly had to 
prove that the operation of the barrage system would not cause any harm to the 
ecosystem. Comments upon the other party’s presentations were made immediately 
after the end of each presentation, which signified that a proper balance was 
maintained in order to provide full opportunities to both parties in demonstrating the 
evidence to the judges. However, the Court makes no reference to what it found in its 
site visit in its judgment. That may suggest that the Court did not find the visit all that 
valuable. By contrast in the Bay of Bengal case, the arbitral tribunal does mention its 
site visit in its award and the impression is given that the tribunal found it useful.38 
  It should be borne in mind that the site visit in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros 
case was an exceptional case where both parties were of the same view that a site visit 
would be beneficial in settling the dispute. There are two stumbling blocks that may 
hinder the use of site visit provisions. Firstly, if the site visit were to be initiated by 
                                                
35 See also Art. 44 (2) of the ICJ Statute which provides that ‘The same provision shall apply whenever 
steps are to be taken to procure evidence on the spot’. 
36 See the details in Peter Tomka and Samuel S. Wordsworth, ‘The First Site Visit of the International 
Court of Justice in Fulfillment of Its Judicial Function’ (1998) 92 AJIL 133. 
37 Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros case (Order of 5 February 1997) [1997] ICJ Rep 3.  
38 The Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangladesh v. India) [2014] para. 263. 
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one of the parties, it might be the case that the other party would refuse to take part in 
the site visit arrangements, taking the view that the site visit was not necessary to the 
case. Consequently, the site visit would not occur, as is shown in the South West 
Africa case, where proposals made by South Africa asking the Court to visit the 
Territory of South West Africa.39 Secondly, where the Court has played an inactive 
role in obtaining evidence by its own initiative, there is less likelihood of proprio 
motu site visits. The costs of any logistical arrangements that may be incurred during 
a visit may also be a deterrent factor. To avoid those difficulties, the parties should 
negotiate with a view to agreeing on the arrangements before proposing them to the 
Court, as was done in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case. Thus, the most important 
factor of the site visit is the cooperation of all the parties, including the dispute 
settlement bodies themself.40 In addition, the Court needs to change its mindset in 
relation to on-site investigations in those international environmental cases which 
involve complex facts. It is doubtless true that this issue depends on the discretion of 
the Court, as it decided in the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute to reject 
the request of El Salvador to visit the disputed area because it was unnecessary to do 
so.41  
2.2.3 Enhancing the Use of Court-Appointed Experts  
As has been explained in the chapter 4, there have been criticisms of the reluctance of 
the ICJ, especially in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case and the Pulp Mills case, to 
appoint experts to provide scientific or technical assessment of the evidence presented 
by the parties so to assist judges in fulfilling their judicial function.42 The ICJ or the 
ITLOS may proprio motu set up an inquiry commission of experts with a view to the 
obtaining and assessing of evidence. For the ICJ, Article 50 of the Statute may be 
used as a basis for it to establish such a commission.43 Scholars44 and even judges45 
                                                
39 South West Africa cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) (Order) [1965] ICJ Rep, 
9-10. See also the Diversion of Water from the Meuse where the proposal made by Belgium was not 
opposed by the Netherlands, so that the site visit did take place, see Diversion of Water from the Meuse 
(The Netherlands v. Belgium), 1937 PCIJ (Ser. A/B) No 70, 9. 
40 Rosenne (n 34) 473. In the Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, Pakistan and India agreed that ‘it 
would be desirable for the Court of Arbitration to conduct a site visit’, Indus Waters Kishenganga 
Arbitration, para. 22.  
41 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) 
(Judgement) [1992] ICJ Rep 351, 361-362. 
42 See chapter 4, section 2.2.2. 
43  The equivalent provision for the ITLOS is Art. 289 of UNCLOS. 
44 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘Equipping the Court to Deal with Developing Areas of International Law: 
Environmental Law’ in Connie Peck and Roy S. Lee (eds), Increasing the Effectiveness of the 
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concur that the role of court-appointed experts needs to be enhanced and there should 
be much more use of them for the sake of rendering a more informed judgment.46 
 The details of how a commission of experts should carry out its tasks must be 
determined by the Court itself, as provided in Article 67 of the Rules of the Court. 
Contrary to in situ inspections, in which the judges directly visit the place, the Court 
may appoint one or several experts to visit the place, as it did in the Corfu Channel 
case.47 In this case a Committee of Experts had been formed to, inter alia, visit on 
behalf of the Court. Apart from visiting the site, several tasks were entrusted to this 
Committee, such as making an examination of information and documents. Article 67 
is wide enough to enable the Court to lay down the procedure to be followed by a 
commission. This means that the subject of the inquiry or the questions that the Court 
would like to know can be framed. For international environmental disputes, the 
Court could entrust a commission to examine, for example, the adverse impact of 
particular activities on the environment or natural resources, and both monetary and 
non-monetary damages arising from a breach of international environmental 
obligations. Experience regarding the examination of claims for loss and damage was 
evinced also in the Corfu Channel case when the Court made use of Article 50 to 
examine the amount of compensation claimed by the UK for the loss of its ships 
named the Saumarez and the Volage. The Court explicitly accepted that this ‘raised 
questions of a technical nature’.48 There would be no difficulty for the Court in 
relying on this precedent in a case where one party requests the Court to adjudge and 
declare the amount of compensation arising from environmental loss. In addition, to 
prevent the accusation of being procedurally unfair, the Court should state in its order 
that the parties have a right to comment in writing on the report submitted by the 
experts. Another solution may be that the Court may give an opportunity to each party 
to suggest or nominate members of the commission of experts. This approach would 
enable all the parties to take part in the process of forming a commission and thus the 
opinions of the experts that appear in the report of a commission may be 
                                                                                                                                      
International Court of Justice: Proceedings of the ICJ/UNITAR Colloquium to Celebrate the 50th 
Anniversary of the Court (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1997); Boyle and Harrison (n 1) 271. 
45 See Pulp Mills case, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma, paras. 8-9. 
46 Caroline E. Foster, ‘New Clothes for the Emperor? Consultation of Experts by the International 
Court of Justice’ (2014) 5 JIDS 139, 161. 
47 Corfu Channel case (UK v. Albania) (Order) [1948] ICJ Rep 124. 
48 Ibid, 237 and 238. See Pierre d' Argent, ‘Reparation and Compliance’ in Karine Bannelier, Theodore  
Christakis and Sarah  Heathcote (eds), The ICJ and the Evolution of International Law: the Enduring 
Impact of the "Corfu Channel" Case (Routledge 2012) 340. 
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unchallengeable in the sense that the parties themselves have selected the members of 
the commission.    
 Apart from Article 50, which is concerned specifically with the appointment 
of non-State entities to carry out the task of carrying out an enquiry or giving an 
expert opinion, one should not forget Article 48 of the Statute which has much wider 
scope than Article 50. Article 48 is an all-embracing provision that allows the Court 
to ‘make orders for the conduct of the case… and to make all arrangements connected 
with the taking of evidence’. This means that the Court enjoys considerable discretion 
in relation to the ways of gathering evidence, including inventing any mechanisms to 
assist the judges in evaluating the evidence. Many such ways have been proposed, 
such as the establishment of an ex curia expert’s group,49 holding a conference where 
both the parties’ experts convene together and answer questions asked by the Court,50 
creating a pre-trial procedure to deal specifically with scientific issues with the 
experts chosen by the ICJ.51  
 Yet, the Court has made use of a phantom expert, experts consulted privately 
by the Court, to advise judges with regard to scientific and technical issues.52 
However, such practices lack transparency and openness in the sense that the parties 
cannot cross-examine the experts who advise the judges behind the bench.53 For this 
reason, the use of court-appointed experts should be promoted and, for the sake of 
transparency, such experts under Article 50 should be subjected to the scrutiny of the 
parties either by way of making comments or by challenging the correctness of the 
information on which the experts relied in providing the Court with an opinion.54 It is 
possible that the experts may be cross-examined by the parties in the oral 
proceedings.  
 
                                                
49 Francesca Romanin  Jacur, ‘Remarks on the Role of Ex Curia Scientific Experts in International 
Environmental Disputes’ in Nerina Boschiero and others (eds), International Courts and the 
Development  of International Law: Essays in Honour of Tullio Treves (T.M.C. Asser Press 2013) 452. 
50 Philippe Sands, ‘Science and International Litigation’ in Denis Alland and others (eds), Unité et 
Diversité du Droit International: Écrits en l'Honneur du Professeur Pierre-Marie Dupuy (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2014) 903. 
51 Daniel Peat, ‘The Use of Court-Appointed Experts by the International Court of Justice’ (2014) 84 
British Ybk Intl L 271. 
52 See the details in chapter 4, section 2.2.2. 
53 Panos  Merkouris, ‘Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay): Of 
Environmental Impact Assessments and “Phantom Experts” ’ 11, available at 
<http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Commentaries%20PDF/Merkouris_Pulp%20Mills_EN.pdf> 
accessed 19 June 2016. 
54 See Guillaume  Gros, ‘The ICJ’s Handling of Science in the Whaling in the Antarctic Case: A Whale 
of a Case?’ (2015) 6 JIDS 578, 590. 
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 Judge Simma stresses the importance of having an independent expert that  
‘in environmental cases in which impacts on human life and health, 
the survival of species, or intergenerational consequences are 
involved, the more such cases have to do with “real people”,  the 
more the Court ought to play a stronger role with regard to seeking 
assistance by independent expertise.’55 
2.3 Addressing the Problem of Litigating Multilateral Environmental Disputes 
The truism that the procedures of international courts are bilateral in their nature may 
create some difficulties in finding ways in which multilateral environmental disputes 
can fit neatly into the bilateral structure of dispute resolution. Due to the fact that one 
cannot change the nature of the ICJ and the ITLOS, the proposals made in this section 
are limited to the attitude of the judges towards multilateral environmental disputes 
and the Statutes and Rules of Procedure of the ICJ and the ITLOS rather than 
proposing to overhaul the whole structure of the process of international litigation.56  
 As was mentioned in earlier chapters, there may be situations where a breach 
of the environmental obligations set out in a particular treaty by one State may impact 
on more than one State, or sometimes those States may have suffered no injury from 
such a breach but they have a common interest in maintaining the integrity of a treaty 
aiming at protecting the environment or natural resources.57 In the latter situation the 
question arises as to which States may bring a case to international courts? In recent 
years, the ICJ, notably in the Belgium v. Senegal case, has accepted that any State 
party to a treaty containing obligations that could be qualified as erga omnes partes 
may invoke the responsibility of another State party.58 In addition, although in the 
Whaling case the ICJ did not express any view explicitly about the erga omnes partes 
obligations set out in the ICRW, it simply proceeded on the basis that Australia has 
locus standi to bring a case against Japan without the need for Australia to 
                                                
55 Bruno Simma, ‘The International Court of Justice and Scientific Expertise’ (2012) 106 ASIL 
Proceedings 229, 232-233. 
56 For ad hoc arbitration, the parties could choose suitable procedures for multilateral environmental 
disputes, such as the PCA Environmental Rules. See chapter 4, section 2.1.1. 
57 See chapter 2, section 3.1.2. 
58 Belgium v. Senegal case, para. 69. 
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demonstrate that it had suffered any injuries from the hunting of whales.59 This can be 
viewed as a good sign in that the Court may interpret the other MEAs by assuming 
that their objective is to protect the community interest in the same way as the Court 
did in the Whaling case. Nonetheless, the Court, in those two cases, did not touch 
upon the nature of international environmental law. In the first case, the Court dealt 
with the Convention against Torture and in the second case—although the ICRW is a 
convention aimed in part at the preservation of whales—it did not expressly 
pronounce on the nature of the Convention as to whether or not it contains erga 
omnes partes obligations. What can be proposed is the need to urge the Court to 
thoroughly consider the nature of the conventions relating to the environment, taking 
the jurisprudence in these two cases into account, as well as the obligations that are 
claimed to have been breached, and it should treat all MEAs as having erga omnes 
partes environmental obligation, thus providing that all the States parties have an 
interest in each State’s compliance.60 
 Another question is that: how to bring all possible parties to a dispute into 
dispute resolution processes? There are two possible ways of handling the 
participation of other States which have an interest in protecting the environment that 
may increase the Court’s credibility when it has to deal with multilateral 
environmental disputes. There is the possibility of broadening participation by means 
of intervention. The proposals below can be applied to both the ICJ and the ITLOS 
but the discussion will focus mainly on the jurisprudence and the ICJ Statute, since 
there have been no cases brought before the ITLOS and the provisions on intervention 
under the ITLOS Statute were drafted in the same manner as in the ICJ Statute. 
 For the ICJ, it should establish whether all those States can satisfy the Court 
that they have ‘an interest of a legal nature that may be affected by the decision in the 
                                                
59 See Yasuhiro Shigeta, ‘Obligation to Protect the Environment in the ICJ's Practice: To What Extent 
Erga Omnes?’ (2012) 55 Japanese Ybk Intl L 176, 206. 
60 See also Art. 48 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility and Advisory Opinion on 
Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in 
the Area (2011) ITLOS, Seabed Disputes Chamber, para. 180. See also Art. 4 of the Resolution 
concerning obligations erga omnes in international law which provides that ‘The International Court of 
Justice or other international judicial institution should give a State to which an obligation erga omnes 
is owed the possibility to participate in proceedings pending before the Court or that institution and 
relating to that obligation’: The Institute of International Law, Fifth Commission, (Krakow Session 
2005), Rapportuer: Giogio Gaja, reprinted at 
<http://www.justitiaetpace.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2005_kra_01_en.pdf> accessed 5 June 2016. 
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case’ under Article 62 of the ICJ Statute61 or whether they are States parties which 
would like to interpret a treaty under Article 63.62 Intervention under Article 62 
within the environmental context is sparse. The Court, both in the 1974 and the 1995 
Nuclear Test cases, did not consider the issue of intervention requested by Fiji as a 
consequences of its decision in the principal cases,63 and, also, in the second case it 
dismissed the requests of Australia, the Solomon Islands, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Samoa to intervene because it lacked 
jurisdiction to decide the 1974 Judgment.64 The Court needs to change the mindset it 
has adopted with regard to multiple party international environmental litigation and it 
should promote a wider use of such provisions by taking a more liberal or less 
stringent approach towards the issue of intervention, especially in relation to Article 
62.65 The most important thing is that the Court, as Chinkin claims, needs ‘to find a 
balance between not allowing third parties to intrude unnecessarily in litigation 
between other States, while not permitting States to ignore legitimate third party 
claims in their litigation’.66 What the Court should do in order to strike such a balance 
is to clearly pronounce ‘a rational and coherent statement as to when third party 
claims will be allowed’.67  To this end, the Court should elaborate the criteria 
clarifying what is meant by ‘an interest of a legal nature’ in environmental matters 
that States need to prove in order to intervene under Article 62 in the case as it did in 
more recent cases related to non-environmental matter.68 This is because it is not clear 
that if a State that wishes to intervene in a case, it can invoke Article 62 by claiming 
that since erga omnes obligations have been breached its request would fall within the 
scope of the meaning of ‘the interest of a legal nature’ which may be affected by a 
decision. It might be useful if such criteria were developed by using the notion of 
injured State provided in Article 42 (b) (ii) of the ILC’s Articles on States 
                                                
61 See also Art. 31 of the ITLOS Statute and Art. 99 of the ITLOS Rules. 
62 See also Art. 32 of the ITLOS Statute and Art. 100 of the ITLOS Rules. 
63 1974 Nuclear Tests case, (Application by Fiji for Permission to Intervene) [1973] ICJ Rep 535. 
64 1995 Nuclear Tests case, para. 65. 
65 Chinkin asserts that ‘the ICJ has not enunciated any very clear policy on third party intervention but 
the undeniable trend of its jurisdiction has been towards restriction and containment within tight 
although not precisely defined limits’ see Christine Chinkin, ‘Intervention Before the International 
Court of Justice’ in Friedl Weiss (ed), Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Issues and 
Lessons from the Practice of Other International Courts and Tribunals (Cameron May 2000) 117. 
66 Christine Chinkin, Third Parties in International Law (Clarendon Press 1993) 149. 
67 Ibid, 149. 
68 See the cases law on intervention such as Territorial and Maritime Dispute case (Nicaragua v. 
Colombia) (Application by Costa Rica for Permission to Intervene) (Judgement) [2011] ICJ Rep 348 
and Jurisdictional Immunities of State (Germany v. Italy) (Application by the Hellenic Republic for 
Permission to Intervene) [2011] ICJ Rep 494. 
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Responsibility as a possible guideline in order to protect a collective interest should 
the obligations that have been breached are owed to a group of States or the 
international community as a whole and that State’s position and that of its fellow 
parties must have been radically changed.69 Consequently, all States parties to ‘certain 
regimes for the protection of the environment’,70 for instance, the Kyoto Protocol, 
CBD, UNCLOS (with regard to the common heritage of mankind) and ICRW might 
be entitled to intervene in a case.71  
 In addition to Article 42 (b) (ii), the criteria for intervention might also be 
derived from Article 48 of the ILC’s Articles on States Responsibility for States other 
than the injured State. After the Whaling case was rendered, there might be some 
possibility to expand the scope of intervention under Article 62 so as to include 
community interest of a legal nature. The fact that Australia sued Japan in the ICJ 
without being injured from any injuries opens the way for the ICJ to reverse its 
restrictive application of Article 62 towards a more liberal approach to intervention. 
That is to say, since Australia could have standing to bring the dispute to the ICJ 
without the need to show its specific individual interest in the main case, there is no 
reason for the Court to refuse a request to intervene of other States—which involves a 
procedure incidental the main case—on the ground that they has not demonstrated the 
precise legal claims to protect the community interest or being too remote and 
general. The operative part and the reasoning of a Judgment concerning the protection 
of the environment may also affect the rights of the third State to the same extent as 
the original parties capable of justifying intervention under this Article.72  This 
interpretation could facilitate the State that wishes to act on behalf of the international 
community which, as Crawford says: ‘should not be hindered by procedural 
technicalities. Better to give states standing in court to protect what they perceived as 
                                                
69 Art. 42 (b) of the ILC’s Draft Articles. 
70 James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (CUP 2013), 547. 
71 In the context of the law of the sea see Philippe Gautier, ‘Standing of NGOs and Third-Party 
Intervention before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’ (2014) 1 RBDI 205, 222; 
Philippe  Gautier, ‘Locus Standi and Breaches of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea: Some Reflection in Light of the Decision of the ICJ in the Case Concerning Questions Relating to 
the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium vs Senegal)’ in Roman Anatolʹevič Kolodkin and 
Anatolij L  Kolodkin (eds), Международное морское право: статьи памяти АЛ Колодкина : 
International Law of the Sea: Essays in Memory of Anatoly L Kolodkin (Ctatyt Moskva 2014) 138. 
72 See, however, the view that Art. 62 cannot be used to uphold the community interests in Rüdiger 
Wolfrum, ‘Interventions in Proceedings Before International Courts and Tribunals: To What Extent 
May Interventions Serve the Pursuance of Community Interests?’ in Nerina  Boschiero and others 
(eds), International Courts and the Development of International Law: Essays in Honour of Tullio 
Treves (T.M.C.  Asser Press 2013) 229; Paolo Palchetti, ‘Opening the International Court of Justice ot 
Third States: Intervention and Beyond’ (2002) 6 Max Planck UNYbk 139, 180-181.    
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global values than to leave them only with non-judicial means of dispute 
settlement’.73   
 The aforesaid intervention is distinguishable from an intervention under 
Article 63 where a State only needs to show that it is a party to a multilateral 
convention and it wishes to present to the Court its observations in relation to the 
interpretation of the convention where the original parties had different legal opinions 
on how to interpret relevant provisions. This provision can be used, and should be 
promoted to use, as a remedy for the shortcoming of bilateral nature of the ICJ. In the 
Whaling case, New Zealand, as one of the parties to the ICRW, filed a declaration of 
intervention under Article 63 to intervene in the Whaling case with a view to 
presenting its interpretation of Article VIII of the ICRW. The Court decided that the 
intervention was admissible.74 It should be noted, however, that the intervention of 
New Zealand did not allow it to become a party to the proceedings and this is clear in 
the declaration where it is stated that it did not seek to become a party.75  
 Intervention under Article 63 does not allow a third State to become one of the 
parties to the proceedings and it may not participate in the case as a party ‘on an equal 
footing with the original litigant State, nor as an applicant or respondent or even as an 
independent claimant’76 but this Article offers, at least, a channel for the other parties 
to a particular multilateral convention to present their views in relation to how a 
provision in the convention should be interpreted. This is of importance for 
multilateral treaties, not only multilateral environmental treaties in particular but 
multilateral treaties in general, since the texts contained therein may be concluded as 
a result of compromises that have been made during the negotiations. Different 
interpretations by the parties may emerge later after the conclusion of the negotiations 
so, when a dispute is put before the Court, as Chinkin states, ‘the parties to a 
convention the construction of which is in issue should be given an opportunity to 
express their preferred interpretation to the Court’.77  
 Judge Trindade has vigorously commented in his separate opinion in the 
Whaling case on the resurrection of the Article concerning intervention in which he 
                                                
73 Crawford (n 70) 368. 
74 Whaling case, (Order of 6 February 2013) [2013] ICJ Rep 3.  
75 Whaling case, Declaration of Intervention of the Government of New Zealand, para. 9. 
76 Shigeru Oda, ‘The International Court of Justice viewed from the Bench (1976-1993)’ (1993) 244 
Recueil des Cours 9, 78. 
77 Christine Chinkin, ‘Article 63’ in Andreas Zimmermann and others (eds), The Statute of the 
International Court of Justice: A Commentary (2 edn, OUP 2012) 1597. 
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was in favour of using Article 63 as a tool to overcome the ‘old bilateralist bias’78 
which is deeply-rooted in the dispute settlement procedures of the ICJ. This is of 
particular importance for those treaties which are concerned with collective interests 
in which other parties than those involved in the proceedings can voice their views to 
the Court. He makes an observation that the ICRW is concerned with ‘a matter of 
general or common interest, and is to be implemented collectively by States parties’. 
For this reason, in his view, ‘the resurgence of intervention is thus most welcome’79 
and it  ‘has at last seen the light of the day’.80  
 There is another benefit of intervention under both Article 62 and 63, even 
unsuccessful. Chinkin is of the view that intervention has been a ‘successful and 
worthwhile strategy’: even where requests are not granted, it can, at least, raise 
awareness about the importance about the dispute at hand to the Court and gain media 
attention. For instance, four South Pacific States could show their stance and 
dissatisfaction regarding France’s nuclear tests.81 In addition, as the Court held in the 
Libya v. Malta Continental Shelf case 82 and the Territorial and Maritime Dispute 
case,83 it still may, if it rejects the request to intervene, take into account, as a fact, the 
relevant information submitted by the unsuccessful States seeking permission to 
intervene.84 
2.4 Addressing the Problem of Ambiguous Environmental Judgments/Awards 
This is a case where the parties bring the case to an arbitral tribunal, the ICJ or the 
ITLOS and they do not clearly pronounce on what is expected of the future conduct of 
the parties or where the judgment is open-ended, as shown in the Gabčíkovo-
                                                
78 Whaling case, Separate Opinion of Judge Trindade, para. 71. 
79 Ibid, para. 68. 
80 Ibid, para. 66. 
81 Chinkin, Third Parties in International Law (n 66) 113. 
82 Case concerning the Continental Shelf case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta) (Application by Italy 
for Permission to Intervene) (Judgement)[1984] ICJ Rep 3, para. 43. 
83 Territorial and Maritime Dispute case (Nicaragua v. Colombia) (Application by Costa Rica for 
Permission to Intervene) (Judgement) [2011] ICJ Rep 348, para. 51. 
84 Some Judges suggest that the Court should establish a new mechanism to deal with this kind of 
information. For instance, Judge Gaja suggested that ‘the Court should establish a new procedural 
mechanism short of intervention that would allow third States to submit information which they 
consider useful in order to protect their interests of a legal nature’: see Declaration of Judge ad hoc 
Gaja in Territorial and Maritime Dispute case (Nicaragua v. Colombia) (Application by Costa Rica for 
Permission to Intervene) (Judgement) [2011] ICJ Rep, para. 5. See also Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Donoghue in Territorial and Maritime Dispute case (Nicaragua v. Colombia) (Application by 
Honduras for Permission to Intervene) (Judgement) [2011] ICJ Rep, para. 59.  
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Nagymaros case, which is the only environmental example that the author knows of.85 
The proposal will focus on the question of how the other modes of dispute resolution 
can be useful in handling the situation apart from asking the ICJ or ITLOS to interpret 
a judgment.86   
 The proposal is that a third-party non-judicial mechanism could be resorted to 
by the parties using the findings of a judicial body as the basis of a settlement.87 
Given that an ambiguous pronouncement of them is hard to implement, the parties 
should refocus their attention from ‘the result of execution stricto sensu to the process 
of negotiation related thereon’.88 That is to say, the judgment or award may be used as 
a framework for a third-party (mediator or conciliator). They can also provide the 
parties with proposals which are based, to some extent, on the judgment. Thus, 
diplomatic means may provide a way in which the overall dispute can be further 
settled. As Boisson de Chazournes and Angelini rightly say, ‘the ‘diplomatic 
component’ compensates for the partial scope of the pronouncement by embedding 
part of its content, or at least its spirit, in the settlement of aspects not adjudicated by 
the Court’.89  
 As elaborated in chapter 5, the ICJ in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case did not 
address the future operation of the Project, therefore third party diplomatic means 
could be used to find the way forward if the parties think that the time to make 
compromise has arrived. For example, when the Court mentioned to the right to an 
equitable and reasonable share of the waters,90 implementation of this principle would 
need to take various factors, including non-legal factors, such as social and economic 
needs.91 Conciliators, for example, could also provide concrete proposals to overcome 
the stalemate so as to allow the project to continue while taking the environmental 
                                                
85 See the details in chapter 5, section 2.1.4.1 (2). 
86 See Art. 60 of the ICJ Statute and Art. 33 (3) of the ITLOS Statute. 
87 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Antonella Angelini, ‘After "The Court Rose": The Rise of 
Diplomatic Means to Implement the Pronouncements of the International Court of Justice’ (2012) 11 
LPICT 1, 21. Paulson states about the implementation of the Judgment in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros 
case that ‘Answering the legal question may have been an important step toward settlement, but the 
parties have been unable to use the Judgment to resolve their differences’ see Colter Paulson, 
‘Compliance with Final Judgments of the International Court of Justice Since 1987’ (2004) 98 AJIL 
434, 449. Also, Llamzon is of the view that ‘there is basis to question whether the Court provided the 
parties with enough guidance for effective resolution to occur’ see Aloysius P.  Llamzon, ‘Jurisdiction 
and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court of Justice’ (2007) 18 EJIL 815, 845.  
88 Boisson de Chazournes and Angelini, ‘After "The Court Rose": The Rise of Diplomatic Means to 
Implement the Pronouncements of the International Court of Justice’ (n 87) 20. 
89 Ibid, 20.  
90 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, para. 85. 
91 Art. 6 (1) (b) of the Watercourses Convention. 
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concerns and principle of equitable and reasonable use seriously. This would make 
the proposals of the conciliator much more solid, since this would be supported by the 
authoritative pronouncements of the ICJ. In addition, as McCaffrey states, equitable 
utilisation is a dynamic process depending heavily on active cooperation between 
riparian States,92 this is perfectly matching the function of non-judicial mechanisms in 
that the latter could employ various techniques for cooperation between disputants in 
adjusting and balancing competing interests. Also, the conciliators could take certain 
aspects into account, such as economic or social considerations, that have not been 
addressed judicially in the adjudication. In the light of this approach, diplomatic 
means could play a supportive role in that they could add value to an unclear 
pronouncement of a court or an arbitral tribunal.  
3. PROPOSALS FOR ADDRESSING THE WEAKNESS OF NON-COMPLIANCE 
PROCEDURES 
There is a problem of the unclear relationship between NCPs and traditional dispute 
settlement mechanisms. The difficulties that may arise is that: if a State decide to 
bring an international environmental dispute before both NCPs and judicial means 
which require them to consider the same set of facts, what is the relationship between 
these mechanisms? what do they have to do if this situation arise?  
 Commonly for MEAs in which NCPs are established to supervise the 
compliance of States parties, there is a ‘without prejudice’ clause containing a phrase 
indicating that the procedures relating to compliance shall operate without prejudice 
to the traditional modalities of dispute settlement, for example international courts or 
arbitration, as well as non-judicial means.93 Given that the relationship between NCPs 
and traditional means is far from clear, since practice in this matter is rare, the 
proposal in this section is merely based on a speculative theoretical idea of how this 
clause could be interpreted properly with a view to mingling all the means of dispute 
settlement harmoniously.   
 The proposal here is that the ‘without prejudice’ clauses should be interpreted 
in a collaborative manner. It has been suggested that recourse to an NCP should be 
viewed as a precondition to seizing the jurisdiction of international courts over a 
dispute, similar to the requirement that negotiations should normally have been 
                                                
92 Stephen McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses (2 edn, OUP 2007) 405. 
93 See for example Part XVI of the Kyoto NCP. 
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exhausted before litigating a case before judicial means. This suggestion has been put 
forward by Boyle and Harrison who argue that ‘a court might then be invited to 
dismiss proceedings at the admissibility stage where there has been no attempt to 
settle the matter through the NCP’.94 This proposal seems to deny the idea that non-
compliance procedures and traditional dispute-settlement procedures can be instituted 
in parallel, which is, in theory, contrary to how the ‘without prejudice’ clause is meant 
to function. In addition, this idea suggests that an NCP would always have priority 
over judicial means. It is not incorrect to give such an interpretation in that way but 
the dismissal of a case should be confined to certain conditions. For example, judicial 
bodies might be invited to dismiss proceedings where there is a provision in the MEA 
concerned allowing judicial bodies to do so, otherwise parallel procedures should 
always be possible.95 The absence of such a provision either in an MEA or the 
procedures relating to non-compliance could not prevent international courts from 
judging a case. Nonetheless, one might be concerned that the parallel procedures 
could cause conflicts of decisions arising from the varying application of international 
environmental law. To prevent this from happening dispute settlement bodies should 
suspend proceedings with a view to waiting for the result of a pending non-
compliance procedure before continuing the proceedings rather than dismissing the 
case on the basis that the NCPs have not yet been exhausted. 
 When dispute settlement bodies decide cases in which non-compliance bodies 
have already given their findings, assuming that the latter found that a State had not 
complied with its environmental obligations, dispute settlement bodies could take into 
account the findings of NCPs which can be used to help them to interpret and apply 
the MEA at issue. There are three possible ways in which they could do so. 
 A first possibility is that a court could treat the findings of a non-compliance 
body as ‘subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the Parties regarding its interpretation’ which international courts or 
tribunals may take into account in accordance with Article 31 (3)(b) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).96 Subsequent practice in this case is 
obvious and it is related directly to the interpretation of conventional provisions made 
                                                
94 Boyle and Harrison (n 1) 261. 
95 In should be noted that, in practice, no such provisions exist in MEAs.  
96 Tullio Treves, ‘The Settlement of Disputes and Non-Compliance Procedures’ in Tullio Treves and 
others (eds), Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Agreements (T.M.C. Asser Press 2009) 508-509. 
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by the political plenary organ which carry considerable weight.97 Since COPs/MOPs 
are composed of all those States that are parties to a particular convention, the 
decisions adopted by them are good evidence of how the States parties interpret their 
convention. Usually, one of the important functions of COPs/MOPs is to supervise 
the implementation of the MEA by the States parties and they can use their decision- 
making power to consider the issue of non-compliance which, mostly, has been 
investigated and determined by subsidiary bodies, namely compliance committees, 
before making recommendations and reporting to COPs/MOPs. The adoption of a 
compliance committee’s decisions by the COPs/MOP provides more solid ground for 
such decisions to become the subsequent practice of the Parties. As Tanzi and Pitea 
also stated in the context of the Aarhus Convention,  ‘any decision by the Aarhus 
Convention Compliance Committee, when it is backed by the MOP through adoption 
by consensus, may be considered as falling within the concept of “subsequent 
practice”’. 98  Such an interpretation can be considered as an authoritative 
determination of the issue of non-compliance, although the findings are not binding 
and only have a recommendatory character.99 The interpretative value of non-binding 
recommendations has been confirmed by the ICJ in the Whaling case when it held 
that the recommendations adopted by the International Whaling Commission (IWC) 
‘when they are adopted by consensus or by a unanimous vote, they may be relevant 
for the interpretation of the Convention or its Schedule’.100 Although the case was not 
concerned with the NCPs, the adoption of recommendations by the IWC is 
comparable to the way in which COPs/MOPs adopt their own decisions. That is to 
say, the IWC is also the supreme decision making body that is composed of one 
member from each of the Contracting Governments. With this confirmation, 
international courts would not have any difficulties in taking into account decision of 
                                                
97 Ulrich Beyerlin, Peter-Tobias Stoll and Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘Conclusions Drawn from the Conference 
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COPs/MOPs which have been adopted by consensus or by a unanimous vote with 
regard to non-compliance issues.101 
 A second possibility is that the findings of an NCP committee may be taken 
into account by judicial bodies as ‘relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relation between the parties’ as set out in Article 31 (3)(c) of the VCLT. According to 
Tullio Treves, such findings can be classified as ‘normative material’ which has a soft 
law character.102 It should be noted that the non-binding character of the findings 
would not impede judicial bodies from using the findings as a tool to assist them in 
deciding the case.103 The practice of using non-binding documents can be seen in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) when interpreting the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which confirms that the Court does 
not confine itself to legally binding instruments but takes a less restrictive 
approach.104 The ECtHR has used, for example, ‘non-binding instruments of Council 
of Europe organs, in particular recommendations and resolutions of the Committee of 
Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly’ for the purpose of interpreting the 
ECHR.105  
 A third possibility is that the findings may be used by judicial bodies as a 
source of reliable factual evidence.106 The reason why the findings of NCPs are 
reliable may be explained by the fact that the process of determining the question of 
non-compliance is conducted in a systematic way guaranteed by due process, fairness 
and transparency by the independent organ which is established by the will of all the 
parties as a part of functioning of MEAs. The findings are also set out in an official 
document which has been thoroughly considered in a way similar to the proceedings 
of international courts. Thus, there is no reason not to believe in the accuracy of the 
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by Judge Tullio Treves, para. 10.  
104 Oliver Dörr, ‘General Rule of Interpretation’ in Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds), 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Springer 2012) 564. 
105 See, for example, Case of Demir and Baykaya v. Turkey (Judgment) 12 November 2008, paras.74-
75. 
106 See Ruth MacKenzie, ‘The Role of Dispute Settlement in the Climate Change’ in Jutta Brunnée, 
Meinhard Doelle and Lavanya Rajamani (eds), Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime 
(CUP 2012) 404. 
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information that the judicial bodies might get from the findings. The converse is, of 
course, also possible, namely that non-compliance bodies can also take into account 
the decisions of dispute settlement bodies as highly persuasive information and use 
them as a basis for making their findings. 
4. PROPOSALS FOR ADDRESSING THE WEAKNESS OF RFMO PANELS 
Past experience of this kind of dispute settlement is very limited, since there has so far 
been only one case. The lack of cases makes it difficult to develop proposals for 
dealing with the shortcomings of RFMO panels. Therefore, the provisions concerning 
review panels or ad hoc panels that stipulate, for example, their functions and the 
ways to conduct the process of dispute settlement, are the main sources which can be 
used for proposing any recommendations. 
 It is common for the constituent treaties of RFMO conventions to establish 
such a panel as an alternative means for the parties to choose to settle certain types of 
dispute and the details of how the panel procedures are to be conducted are usually set 
out in an Annex to an RFMO convention. What can be seen in terms of the rules 
concerning procedure are that some RFMOs conventions, namely the revised NAFO 
Convention and the WCPF Convention, provide that the panels shall determine their 
own rules of procedure for the purpose of achieving expeditious proceedings.107 It can 
be understood and implied that the only reason for laying down these procedures is 
the necessity of the rapidity of the proceedings, which seems to exclude any other 
reasons which the panel might deem necessary to enhance its capacity to provide 
good quality decisions. Indeed, effective dispute settlement depends partly on the 
speediness of the proceedings but the other procedural aspects should not be 
overlooked. One suggestion in this respect may be that any rules of procedure 
governing the proceedings which may be drafted in the future (or, if possible, 
amending the existing rules) should not specify the objective of drafting the 
procedure, as in the case of the SPRFMO Convention which broadly stipulates that 
‘the Review Panel shall determine its own rules of procedure’ without requiring a 
                                                
107 See Rule 9 of Annex II to the revised NAFO Convention, which stipulates that ‘the ad hoc panel 
may adopt any rules of procedures, which it deems necessary to accelerate the proceedings’ (emphasis 
added) and Rule 4 of Annex II to the WCPF Convention, which states that ‘the review panel shall 
determine its own procedures, providing for the expeditious conduct of the hearing and assuring to the 
applicant or applicants full opportunity to be heard and to present its or their case’ (emphasis added). 
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specific purpose.108 This would allow the Review Panel to have broad discretion in 
determining its rules of procedure in every detail, such as the appropriate measures to 
obtain information from various sources and to establish facts (such as the 
admissibility of information submitted by NGOs or international organisations and 
the issue of hearing evidence), the appointment of independent experts to assist the 
panel and the approach (whether inquisitorial or adversarial) which the panel may 
adopt to determine the resolution of the dispute. It should be noted, however, that 
although there is such a provision in the SPRFMO, the Procedural Directive No.1 
which the Review Panel adopted in the Trachurus murphyi case deals with no more 
than administrative issues, including the substance of written submissions, the form of 
written submissions, the language of written submissions and the notification of 
submissions.109 One can also learn from a panel established under the NEAFC. Annex 
1 allows the panel to use its discretion, since it explicitly provides that, in addition to 
the purpose of expeditious proceedings, the panel may adopt rules ‘that it considers 
necessary for effective proceeding’.110 What one would expect from procedural rules 
is that they should strike a balance between speed of the proceedings and their sound 
conduct.  
 Another problem that can be learnt from the Trachurus murphyi case is the 
about the powers of panels to decide conflicting facts. The panel did not determine 
whether or not Russia has actually caught the jack mackerel although all parties 
attempted to provide evidence about this issue.111 This might be linked to the time 
limit laid down to decide the case where a huge amount of relevant information was 
presented. The fact that the panel has to give its finding and recommendations within 
45 days after its establishment, might have forced the panel to leave some issues. The 
proposal that can be made here is that, for the sake of completeness in deciding a 
case, sufficient time must be devoted to examination of conflicting facts rather than 
proceeding very expeditiously. 
                                                
108 Rule 4 of Annex II to the SPRFMO Convention. 
109 Trachurus Murphyi case, Procedural Directive No.1, available at < http://archive.pca-
cpa.org/20130607_Procedural_Directive_No.1_ENGdfee.pdf?fil_id=2268> accessed 6 June 2016. 
110 See Section 8 of Annex 1 to the NEAFC Convention (emphasis added). 
111 See chapter 3, section 4.2. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of the chapter is to propose the ways in which the shortcomings of each of 
the dispute settlement mechanisms identified in the chapters 4 and 5 as well as other 
lingering shortcomings that weren’t mentioned in those chapters could be addressed. 
The proposals submitted in this chapter are ones that could be practically achieved, 
since they have a real possibility of their being implemented.  
 As far as non-judicial mechanisms are concerned, the proposals are based on 
the sound practice of international organisations such as the World Bank and the 
UNEP regarding the establishment of a roster of experts. This problem could be 
overcome by learning from the experiences of such organisations and using them as 
guidelines for addressing the problem of difficulty in selecting persons who will act as 
mediators, conciliators and fact-finders. Specialised mediators in the field of the 
environment are now provided by the UNEP. 
 For the ICJ and ITLOS, particular considerations were given to the existing 
provisions set out in their statutes and rules in order to determine the ways in which 
those provisions could be fully used by judges. International courts are faced with two 
obvious problems due to the nature of international environmental disputes. The first 
is complexity of the scientific and technical issues related to the protection of the 
environment to overcome this weakness the following measures are proposed: (1) 
drawing on the work of an existing inquiry commission with a view to combining it in 
the processes of dispute settlement in an integrated and complimentary manner, (2) 
enhancing the use of site visits and (3) enhancing the use of court-appointed experts. 
For the second problem, some international environmental disputes are concerned 
with the environmental interests of two or more States or the international community 
which in turn does not correspond to the nature of adjudication. These problems can 
be alleviated by enhancing the use of the provision relating to the intervention of 
other States that also have an interest in protecting the environment that is at issue in 
the case. A more liberal approach to intervention should be applied by the 
international courts. They need to elaborate the criteria that are applicable to a dispute 
that involves erga omnes partes obligations to protect the environment or natural 
resources.  
 For arbitration, the problem is concerned with the lack of mechanisms to 
induce compliance. The proposal brought forward here is to use the plenary organ, if 
it exists, of the MEAs as a possible mechanism to perform this function. NCPs or any 
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other institution established under particular MEAs could also undertake this function. 
For the ITLOS, the Meeting of States parties could probably put pressure non-
complying States. 
 With regard to NCPs, the problem of unclear relationship between NCPs and 
traditional judicial means of dispute settlement was identified. The proposals are 
made on the basis of an interpretative approach for overcoming the problem of the 
unclear relationship between NCPs and the traditional means of dispute settlement 
mechanisms. That is to say that the ‘without prejudice’ clauses should be interpreted 
in a collaborative manner so as to make these two mechanisms work well together. In 
the case where a NCP is considering the same issue as judicial body, the latter should 
suspend its proceedings. NCPs’ findings could be treated as subsequent practice or as 
relevant rules of international law when the international courts interpret and apply 
MEAs. With regard to the weight of factual evidence, judicial bodies might give 
much more weight to the information that has already been investigated by NCPs and 
treat it as reliable evidence.    
 For RFMO panels, the extremely rapid proceedings may seem to create 
problem in term of the establishment of the panel procedures and there being a 
sufficiency of time for the panels to evaluate the complex set of factual evidence. The 
proposals are brought forward to overcome the problem of what needs to be carried 
out for the purpose of achieving expeditious proceedings which is the suggestion of 
the need to take other factors into account when determining rules of procedures. 
Existing time limits may also need to be extended if panels are to examine a case 
thoroughly. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
This thesis aimed to provide the analysis of dispute settlement mechanisms in 
international law in settling international environmental disputes. The emphasis is on 
the portrayal of dispute settlement with the assistance of a third party as a decision-
maker rather than attempting to resolve a dispute by means of negotiation. 
Environmental disputes, like any other dispute, have to be settled peacefully by the 
parties to a dispute. Settlement of a dispute is a complex process involving, for 
example, time and costs that the parties need to invest and pay for. International 
environmental disputes are no exception. A government needs to contemplate which 
forum would best suit its interests. After making a calculation, a government would 
ultimately choose the means that it prefers, either out-of-court or a rigid judicial 
dispute settlement. Whether or not to litigate can purely be a political decision.1 
Choosing the right forum for settling a dispute is always important as a commentator 
notes that ‘the use of an inappropriate means of settlement decisively diminishes the 
chances for the resolution of a dispute.’2 
1. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 In order to find out which mechanism can provide for suitable and effective 
processes of dispute settlement or rules of procedures that could facilitate the 
settlement of international environmental disputes, this thesis set out four research 
questions. The answers can be summarised as follows: 
                                                
1 D.W. Bowett, ‘The Conduct of International Litigation’ in D.W. Bowett (ed), The International Court 
of Justice: Process, Practice and Procedure (BIICL 1997) 1. 
2 Nina Vajić, ‘Diplomatic Settlement or Adjudication? Advantages and Drawbacks’ in Lucius  Caflisch 
(ed), Règlement Pacifique des Différends entre Ètats: Perspectives Universelle et Européenne = The 
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States: Universal and European Perspectives (Kluwer Law 
International 1998) 23. 
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1) What is meant by an international environmental dispute and what are its 
characteristics? 
 Chapter 2 answered these research questions. As far as the definition of an 
international environmental dispute is concerned, we have seen that there are some 
difficulties in defining this term. This is because international disputes rarely revolve 
around a single issue and, according to past experience, environmental issues have 
always been part of the whole dispute that was submitted to the decision-making 
bodies.3 As was shown in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, the environmental concern 
was one part of the dispute which Hungary invoked in order to terminate the Treaty 
obligating it to construct the dam. In addition, in the Certain Activities/Construction 
of a Road cases, environmental concerns were raised in parallel with the question of 
territorial sovereignty over the disputed area. The difficulty involved in defining the 
term international environmental disputes probably led to the demise of the ICJ’s 
Chamber of the Court for Environmental Matters, since it could have created the 
problem of jurisdiction of the Chamber in that the parties might not agree that they 
were in dispute over an environmental matter.4 For the same reason, the prospect of 
the establishment of an international environmental court is also unlikely.  
 If one attempts to argue that environmental disputes are conflicts between 
States with regard to the breach of an international environmental treaty, this creates a 
never-ending dispute as to what constitutes an international environmental treaty. This 
is because sometimes ecological concerns are included within a particular treaty 
because they might be one of various issues which that treaty would like to address. 
UNCLOS is a good example in which environmental protection is one of the 
objectives that the drafters included in UNCLOS.  Therefore, this thesis suggests that 
we should focus on the subject matter that international law would like to protect, 
such as oceans, international rivers, air, biodiversity, etc. If the essential point or one 
of the points of disagreement with regard to the interpretation and application of 
international obligations between the parties is concerned primarily with an 
environmental issue, it can be considered that an international environmental case has 
arisen.  
 Chapter 2 went on to identify the characteristics of international 
environmental disputes that are: (1) international environmental disputes may be 
                                                
3 See chapter 2, section 2.1. 
4 See chapter 2, section 2.1. 
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bilateral or multilateral in character, (2) international environmental disputes entails a 
multi-dimensional character, (3) international environmental disputes may entail 
difficulties in identifying the source of the breach of an international environmental 
obligation, (4) international environmental disputes may involve complex questions 
of quantifying damages and (5) international environmental disputes may involve the 
interpretation and application of procedural obligations. 
 Once an international environmental dispute has arisen, national decision-
makers will have to choose the means for settling the dispute that they consider to be 
most appropriate. The decision on how a State would like to settle a dispute is rather 
subjective. That is to say, a government’s choice depends on several factors, such as 
its relationships with the opposing States, internal factors, foreign policy, costs, 
government popularity and domestic interests. It is not the objective of this thesis to 
study what political factors governments may consider when they need the assistance 
of a neutral party to end an environmental dispute. Rather, this thesis pointed out that 
potential applicants or disputing parties need to consider the nature of disputes 
involving such characteristics of international environmental when selecting an 
appropriate mechanism.5 
2) Are the dispute settlement mechanisms suitable for settling an international 
environmental dispute? 
 An endeavour has been made in chapter 4 to provide an objective analysis by 
considering the nature of environmental disputes and by contemplating the nature of 
each dispute settlement mechanism6 to find out how each mechanism may be suitable 
for settling environmental disputes and how they could be settled in an effective 
manner. So the thesis provides guidance for governments to enhance their 
understanding of the limits of each mechanism as well as the benefits that could be 
gained.  
                                                
5 Lapidoth states in the context of water disputes that ‘In choosing the appropriate mechanism, one 
should also bear in mind certain characteristics of water issues’ Ruth Lapidoth, ‘Some Reflections on 
Peaceful Means for the Settlement of Inter-State Disputes with Special Reference to the 1997 
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses’ in Robin 
Sanchez, Jeff  Woled and Darle Tilly (eds), Proceedings of the First Biennial Rosenberg International 
Forum on Water Policy: Resolving Conflict in the Management of Water Resources (University of 
California 1998) 71. 
6 The nature of each mechanism has been discussed in chapter 3.  
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 If a dispute arises in a bilateral context involving only two parties, all of the 
mechanisms are suitable for resolving this bilateral dispute. Basically, they offer 
adequate forums for this kind of dispute and practice shows that, in the majority of the 
cases submitted to them, nearly all of which involved bilateral disputes, all of the 
mechanisms worked well in a bilateral context. 
 For multilateral disputes involving several actors, one needs to consider those 
mechanisms that can facilitate the interests of a large number of parties. Non-judicial 
mechanisms may be the best option. The great advantage of mediation, conciliation 
and inquiry seems to be that the process is flexible, allowing for multiple participants. 
This depends on which techniques the mediators or conciliators may adopt. These 
means can accommodate disputes over the protection of the environment of common 
areas, disputes over the common heritage or the common concerns of mankind. For 
example, disputes about climate change, which have a collective character involving 
erga omnes partes can be best settled by non-judicial means. However, non-judicial 
means are a voluntary process that the State alleged to be in breach of an erga omnes 
partes obligation have to agree to mediate or conciliate except the case where a treaty 
has a provision allowing any State party to initiate the process of settlement 
unilaterally. If there is a breach of erga omnes partes obligations contained in 
particular MEAs in which the NCPs are established, States may consider bringing a 
dispute to the NCPs. This is because more than two parties to MEAs are entitled to 
trigger a dispute settlement process and they may be unilaterally referred without the 
consent of non-complying States. Therefore, States might need to consider whether 
they are a party to the relevant MEA in which an NCP is established. By this means 
multiple participants can be accommodated without showing that they are especially 
affected by non-compliance. For RFMO panels, they have procedures that are 
perfectly suited for multilateral environmental disputes. For example, there are 
provisions which allow any member of a commission to participate in the 
proceedings. 
 Judicial mechanisms, notably the ICJ, have experienced multiple applicants 
and multiple respondents, as is shown in several cases such as the River Oder case 
involving six States. This is suitable for environmental disputes in that all the parties 
share a common interest in a particular subject matter. However, in those cases where 
there is a breach of erga omnes partes environmental obligations, it is still unclear 
whether any treaty party can bring the case to the ICJ, since the Court has never 
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directly addressed this issue in an environmental context before. Although the Court 
touched upon the erga omnes partes obligation in the Belgium v. Senegal case, the 
central issue was not concerned with the environment. In the Whaling case the Court 
did not question Australia’s standing, so that we can take this to imply that the ICJ 
may accept a claim alleging a breach of erga omnes partes environmental obligations. 
Moreover, given the fact that when deciding the two cases the Court was dealt with 
two treaties, it is uncertain about the scope of the right of States to bring a case in the 
absence of a multilateral treaty claiming that they are representing all other States 
parties.7 However, one obvious example that has been pronounced by the Sea Bed 
Disputes Chamber is that of the obligations relating to the preservation of the 
environment in the Area in which each party to UNCLOS is entitled to claim 
compensation. As for arbitration, an arbitral tribunal can hear a case with more than 
one applicant and/or defendant, e.g. the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases. The issue about 
international courts and erga omnes partes obligations applies equally to arbitration. 
In order to initiate arbitration, the parties have to find a treaty that provided for the 
unilateral initiation of arbitration or they have to conclude an agreement with the State 
alleged to be in breach and there is no guarantee that the State concerned will agree. 
 If States need to present a vast amount of scientific evidence concerning the 
environment in order to substantiate their claims, then recourse to non-judicial 
mechanisms may seem to provide a good structural arrangement to deal with such 
evidence. Mediation and conciliation may be conducted by a team of mediators and 
conciliators with different kinds of expertise. The parties may appoint experts that 
have relevant knowledge, such as hydrographers, ecologists and biologists, to be 
members of a team. In a case where all the members are lawyers, the parties may 
request, or non-judicial bodies may request, the assistance of external experts. Since 
the scientific information which judges encounter has become increasingly complex, 
it is, without doubt, beyond the capacity of judicial institutions to ascertain. However, 
there are rules of procedure that enable them to resort to experts. The problem here is 
that courts, notably the ICJ, has been reluctant to make use of such provisions and has 
relied heavily on the expert witnesses appointed by the parties by reading their 
opinions from the observations submitted to it or hearing their arguments in the cross-
examination process in the courtroom, as shown in the Whaling case and the Certain 
                                                
7 Christine Gray, ‘Current Development: The 2014 Judicial Activity of the ICJ’ (2015) 109 AJIL 583, 
592. 
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Activities/Construction of a Road cases. The ICJ has never resorted to using experts 
suo motu in environmental cases. Outside the courtroom, the ICJ practice has revealed 
that experts fantômes are often resorted to. States bringing their case to the ICJ will 
certainly be faced with this practice in that their vast amounts of scientific evidence 
would be treated inappropriately. Thus, this kind of dispute is little suited for 
resolution by judicial decisions. If judicial mechanisms are the preferred means, then 
ad hoc arbitration is a better option, since the arbitrators could include, for example, 
relevant environmental scientists. Likewise, arbitral rules of procedure can be tailored 
to fit a case involving scientific questions, so that arbitration will have, to a greater 
extent, the potential to address the scientific issues more properly than the ICJ can. 
NPCs may employ various techniques to acquire and deal with scientific information 
with regard to non-compliance from different sources. Also, RFMOs panels can serve 
the purpose of disentangling the complexity of technical and scientific questions 
because of its composition not only lawyers are members but also scientists and 
technical experts 
 Environmental disputes which involve societal choice are suitable to be settled 
by non-judicial means. Mediation and conciliation are the processes whereby parties 
can ask decision-makers to consider non-legal factors. They may decide to have their 
dispute settled equitably on the basis of social and economic considerations that are 
suitable, especially for international water disputes pertaining to equitable and 
reasonable utilisation.8 Bringing non-legal factors into play is a way of matching 
those diplomatic dispute-settlement processes where a solution based on international 
law would not dispose satisfactorily of the dispute. On the contrary, judicial 
mechanisms, notably international courts, are not well suited to take into account 
those factors, since a case will be settled on the basis of international law. However, 
ad hoc arbitration might be an alternative for States seeking for binding outcomes, 
since they retain control over the rules of procedure so as to bring equity into play. It 
is also possible that the ICJ and the ITLOS may be asked to decide a case ex aequo et 
bono if the parties to a dispute agree explicitly. But in practice they have never 
decided a case based upon ex aequo et bono. NCPs and RFMOs panels have a broad 
                                                
8 Natalia Ochoa-Ruiz, ‘Dispute Settlement over Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: 
Theory and Practice’ in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Salman M.A. Salman (eds), Water 
Resources and International Law / Les ressources en eau et le droit international (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2005) 386. 
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discretion to take into account non-legal dimensions of a dispute rather than the law 
when providing its recommendations.  
 If a dispute is difficult to identify in terms of its sources, either because it 
involves multiple States, which makes it hard to identify the potential wrongdoer, or 
because it is extremely difficult to calculate the actual environmental harm, then 
inquiry may strive for success by making an impartial investigation of the facts by 
technical experts to establish causation. States may agree to ask an inquiry 
commission to carry out this task to resolve the dispute or as a prelude to the use of 
other mechanisms. It should be noted that an inquiry commission would not normally 
provide any recommendations. However, they could, as was shown in the Espoo 
inquiry commission and Baglihar dam case, also propose recommendations for 
settling disputes. Conciliation is also an appropriate means which is worth choosing. 
Due to the fact that conciliation also makes an active investigation into the facts in 
dispute, the parties may get benefits from this task if the sources of the breach are 
unclear. In addition, conciliators may employ diplomatic techniques, such as using 
persuasion or leverage, which are flexible enough to bring potential wrongdoers to 
engage in negotiating processes. Litigating in international courts is quite difficult, 
since they have to address the actual dispute rather than potential disputes. There must 
be a certainty of the parties to a dispute. A claim that an injury resulting from a breach 
of environmental obligations may be manifest in the future is rather speculative. 
Judicial means may not be appropriate means which allow States to litigate uncertain 
disputes. NCPs can investigate the facts relating to the sources of disputes so as to 
improve compliance with specific environmental treaty regimes. RFMO panels play 
any active role in finding the facts which they would use as a basis for deciding the 
case but they take the traditional approach of acquiring information by relying on the 
submissions of the parties. Once the facts giving rise to a dispute, the legal question of 
whether those facts represent a breach of international obligation by another State can 
be best answered by judicial means and NCPs. 
 For those cases involving the quantification of environmental damages, non-
judicial mechanisms, by their very nature and their primary function, might not be a 
proper means to address the issue of damages. However, if the parties prefer to resort 
to non-judicial means, they can certainly perform this function, since the parties may 
agree to ask them to calculate compensation. The parties can select mediators or 
conciliators who have expertise in this field, coupled with the various diplomatic 
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techniques which could be employed to achieve this task. If the States litigate a case 
in the international courts, the latter have the power to perform this duty. However, 
the problem may be that judges may not have sufficient knowledge or information to 
calculate environmental damages and enough practical guideline to follow. One may 
suggest that the Court should adopt the UNCC’s practice for the calculation because it 
provide a number of useful methodologies for calculating environmental damages but 
it is still uncertain whether they are willing to do so. Ad hoc arbitration might be a 
better option for those parties that have a preference for tailoring arbitral procedures, 
including establishing particular processes for quantifying damages. Lastly, NCPs and 
review panels are not designed to serve this purpose, since their function is to 
strengthen cooperation between the parties rather than determining compensation. For 
RFMO panels, it is not a panel’s function to award compensation for environmental 
damages. 
 In cases where the interpretation and application of procedural obligations, 
such as the obligations to notify, inform, consult and cooperate, are required, judicial 
means are likely to be suitable for settling this kind of dispute, judging from the past 
experiences of the ICJ and the ITLOS, as well as arbitral tribunals. This is because, 
firstly, the interpretation and application of procedural obligations are totally about 
legal issues relating to what judges or arbitrators are required to do. Secondly, they 
are familiar with this kind of obligation, as experienced in the MOX plant case, the 
Pulp Mills case and the Certain Activities/Construction of a Road cases. Thus, judges 
would be able to apply and interpret these obligations consistently and predictably. 
Non-judicial mechanisms, notably mediation and conciliation, could be used to 
interpret and apply such obligations when making recommendations because they 
may be composed of lawyers and diplomats and they can also take the relevant law 
into account when making recommendations. Conciliation might be the most suitable 
non-judicial means, since it can deal with the legal issue and, in those cases where the 
parties cannot promptly comply with their procedural obligations, conciliators can 
provide an equitable compromise that is acceptable to all parties. For example, they 
may suggest that a State should conduct an EIA and notify them if there is risk of 
environmental harm. NCPs are suitable only in some MEAs, such as the Aarhus and 
Espoo Convention, which are concerned directly with procedural obligations. But, 
generally, NCPs deal more with substantive obligations. Also, a RFMO panel decides 
those cases which involve the compatibility of conservation measures with the RFMO 
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convention, UNCLOS, the Fish Stocks Agreement whose findings are unlikely to 
order the parties to comply with procedural obligations. 
3) Are the dispute settlement mechanisms effective in settling international 
environmental disputes according to the criteria used for evaluating 
effectiveness? 
To answer this question, chapter 5 established the criteria of effectiveness with a view 
to using them as a framework to assess each of the mechanisms which are 1) the 
resolution of a dispute and its effect on States’ behaviour and 2) the availability of 
mechanisms to induce compliance. In this chapter, the discussion of effectiveness 
focused purely on the terms of outcomes. Given that there have only been a small 
number of cases, it is difficult to make generalisations about the first criteria with 
regard to dispute solving and behaviour changing.  
 With regard to mediation and inquiry, all the disputes brought before them 
were settled and the parties complied with the recommendations of the mediators and 
the inquiry committees. In the Indus Waters dispute, the mediator, through skillful 
mediation, helped to establish a new régime that is applicable to the utilisation of the 
Indus, which can be considered as a success on the part of the Work Bank. In the case 
of the inquiries, in the Baglihar Hydroelectric Dam and the Danube-Black Sea 
Navigation Route Project cases the parties accepted the findings and 
recommendations and agreed to comply with them. The situation with regard to 
behaviour changes is rather different. In all the cases except for the Indus Waters 
dispute, the parties still need to further modify their behaviour. In the Baglihar 
Hydroelectric Dam case, another dispute arose regarding the application and 
interpretation of the Indus Waters Treaty. In the Danube-Black Sea Navigation Route 
Project case, full compliance with the obligations of the Espoo Convention needs to 
be further improved. Thus, the recommendations of the inquiry committees have had 
only a limited impact on the behaviour of the parties. 
 As far as judicial mechanisms are concerned, the experiences of the ICJ 
indicated that in the 1974 Nuclear Tests case, the Pulp Mills case and the Whaling 
case the ICJ were settled and the parties agreed to comply with the judgments. 
However, the Court has failed to influence the parties’ behaviour in terms of 
complying with the wider spirit of the judgments. In the Pulp Mills case, a new 
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dispute seems to have arisen after the judgment was rendered. As for the Whaling 
case, it has not abandoned scientific whaling in the Antarctic and has made a 
reservation on the dispute concerning scientific research in order to preclude the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ. Therefore, like non-judicial means, the ICJ could stop the 
disputes temporarily but it could not change State’s behaviour in the light of the wider 
spirit of its judgments. However, in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, the ICJ could not 
even settle the dispute. 
 As for the cases of arbitration, four cases, namely the Bering Sea Fur-Seals 
Arbitration, the Trail Smelter Arbitration, the Iron Rhine Arbitration and the Indus 
Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, were settled and the parties complied with the 
awards. In the first two cases, arbitrations were effective because the awards have had 
a significant impact on the behaviour of the parties, since they helped to establish the 
régimes for future conduct. In the last two cases, the awards have had only a limited 
impact on the behaviour of the parties. For the Iron Rhine Arbitration, the line has not 
been reopened and the project is on hold. For the Indus Waters Kishenganga 
Arbitration, Pakistan keeps on claiming that several new hydropower dams that are 
being built by India are violating the Indus Waters Treaty.   
 As for the ITLOS, the cases discussed in this chapter are provisional measures 
orders. In all the cases, the disputes were resolved and the parties complied with the 
provisional measures. In the Land Reclamation case, the provisional measures had an 
impact on the ways in which the parties carried out further negotiations. The 
provisional measures helped to improve the cooperation between the parties in the 
MOX Plant case. In the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, the parties were able to create a 
positive and constructive atmosphere as a result of the provisional measures. 
 As far as NCPs are concerned, from the experience reviewed, the parties are 
proving to be receptive to the findings, since they usually show their willingness to 
comply with the recommendations. However, the non-complying States in all the 
cases have not achieved full compliance. They are being monitored by the NCPs for 
their implementation on a regular basis until they have fulfilled their obligations. NCP 
process initiated by party-to-party trigger is unpopular, since it can be considered as 
an unfriendly act. States will choose to do this only if their major interests are at 
stake.  
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 In the case of the RFMOs panels, the only case under the SPRFMO 
convention that was brought before the Review Panel was settled and both the parties 
followed the recommendations. 
 With regard to the availability of mechanisms to induce compliance as an 
effectiveness indicator, non-judicial means have no mechanisms to induce compliance 
and they do not need to have them. As for the ICJ’s judgments, the SC can play this 
role but, in practice, it has never adopted any measures. In cases of arbitration and 
ITLOS’s judgments, the parties can bring the dispute as a new case against the losing 
party to the ICJ and it can adopt counter-measures, since failure to comply with an 
award or a judgment is a breach of an international obligation. There are several 
measures that are available under some NCPs to induce repeated non-complying 
parties to comply, such as the suspension of benefits under the MEA concerned and 
trade restrictions. For ad hoc panels, there are dispute settlement mechanisms under 
UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks Agreement if an objecting State does not accept the 
panel’s recommendations. In addition, RFMOs can deal with the issue of non-
compliance by adopting measures, such as suspending their right to vote. 
4) How can the shortcomings that have been exposed in dispute settlement 
mechanisms be overcome? 
Chapter 6 answered this research question. With regard to the difficulty in selecting 
mediators, conciliators or inquiry commissions with expertise in relation to 
environmental issues, this thesis proposed that a roster of experts who are readily 
available for the disputing States needs to be established using the practice of the 
Work Bank as guidelines for other international organisations, such as the IUCN. 
 With regard to the lack of mechanisms to enforce arbitral awards or the 
ITLOS judgments, the proposal is that the existing mechanisms make a contribution 
to the implementation process. For example, if a dispute is concerned with MEAs, 
then COPs or MOPs may perform the task of inducing compliance. If the dispute is 
not about a convention under which COPs/MOPs have been established, such as the 
OSPAR Convention, or UNCLOS and the watercourses conventions, the institutions 
that were established under these conventions could perform this task. 
 Regarding the ways of handling scientific and technical evidence, this thesis 
proposed three ways to address this problem. Firstly, if a fact-finding body had 
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investigated the facts of a dispute prior to the referral of that dispute to a court, the 
latter could draw on the report of the body concerned when deciding the case. 
Secondly, in situ inspections may help the Court to acquire a better understanding of 
scientific and technical evidence. Lastly, court-appointed experts need to be appointed 
for the sake of rendering a more informed judgment. 
 As far as the issue of how multilateral disputes can be litigated is concerned, 
this thesis proposed that the provisions relating to intervention could help to address 
this problem by broadening the participation of States. The ICJ needs to take a less 
restrictive application of Article 62 of the ICJ Statute and move towards a more 
liberal approach to intervention by interpreting ‘an interest of a legal nature’ to 
include community interests of a legal nature and should use Article 42 (b) (ii) and 
Article 48 of the ILC’s Articles on States Responsibility as possible guidelines. In 
addition, Article 63 can also be used as a tool to overcome this problem because it 
does allow the other parties to particular MEAs to present their views on a matter of 
general or common interest. 
 Regarding the issue of how the parties can implement an ambiguous 
judgment, this thesis proposed that a third-party non-judicial mechanism could be 
resorted to so that the overall dispute can be further settled.  
 With regard to the problem of the unclear relationship between NCPs and 
traditional judicial means of dispute settlement, the proposal is that ‘without 
prejudice’ clauses should be interpreted in a collaborative manner. There are three 
ways of engaging in such an interpretation. Firstly, a court could treat the findings of 
a non-compliance body as ‘subsequent practice’. Secondly, a court could treat the 
findings as ‘relevant rules of international law applicable in the relation between the 
parties’. Thirdly, a court could use the findings as a source of reliable factual evidence 
for deciding a case. 
 Regarding the extremely rapid proceedings of RFMOs panels, the proposal is 
that the existing time limits may need to be extended in order to evaluate the complex 
set of factual evidence thoroughly. 
 
 242 
2. FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ON THE SELECTION OF MECHANISMS  
There are other considerations that will guide national decision-makers to choose the 
means for settling the dispute that they consider to be most appropriate—1) the 
desired outcome 2) time and 3) cost. 
2.1 Desired Outcomes 
Clearly, a government may choose to engage in the dispute settlement process that 
could provide something tangible for it to gain. A government would have its own 
desired outcomes, with the primary objective being the termination of a dispute aimed 
at a peaceful coexistence among the parties to the dispute. In settling international 
environmental disputes, States may have various desired outcomes which they want 
to achieve with the assistance of a third party. In order to reach such outcomes, a 
government has to choose the right mechanism. It should be pointed out that the 
proposals in 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 would be possible if the parties desire the same outcome 
and the proposal in 2.1.3 is go beyond the dispute settlement between the parties.  
2.1.1 Seeking to Enhance Future Cooperation in Protecting the Environment 
It is obvious that litigating a dispute by a judicial process means that the outcomes 
will be a zero-sum solution or a winner-takes-all type of solution in which a gain from 
one party involves a loss for the other party. In judicial proceedings each party needs 
to present to the decision-makers the worst aspect of the other party, encouraging 
confrontation rather than the exploring of ‘a more imaginative settlement’.9 The 
situation may be that one party wins the case while the other one loses. The dispute 
may be settled but the resentment of the losing party is not good for long-term 
relationships.10 One might argue that international courts could adjudge that the losing 
party should cooperate with the wining party so as to enable them to strengthen their 
cooperation in protecting the environment. It is not wrong to put forward such 
argument, since international courts usually do order the parties to cooperate with 
regard to environmental matters. Compulsory cooperation based on a judicial order 
resulting from adversarial proceedings will probably not maintain a long-continuing 
                                                
9 Vaughan Lowe, ‘Some Comments on Procedural Weaknesses in International Law’ (2004) 98 ASIL 
Proceedings 37, 37. 
10 Birnie views that the use of hard techniques can exacerbate disputes and that softer techniques may 
be much more appropriate see Patricia Birnie, ‘Legal Techniques of Settling Disputes: The “Soft 
Settlement” Approach’ in William E. Butler (ed), Perestroika and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1990) 191. 
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relationship, especially in the matter of environmental protection, which requires 
States to continually comply with their obligations to conduct an EIA where there is 
any risk of significant harm, to exchange information and engage in consultation. 
Judicial means are unlikely to be suitable for enhancing cooperation. Bilder notes that 
‘the parties to long term relationships may be particularly reluctant to “take their 
partner to court” as a way of settling disputes.’11 
 It would be more advantageous for disputing parties to settle their disputes by 
resorting to non-judicial mechanisms if a government desires to enhance future 
cooperation in protecting the environment rather than asking judges questions about 
the legality or illegality of certain actions. While judicial mechanisms are aimed at 
finding the rights and obligations of the parties to a dispute, based on rule-oriented 
procedures, non-judicial mechanisms avoid a win-lose situation and search for win-
win solutions, i.e. consensual solutions to a dispute and confidence building.12 This 
may be understood as a joint problem-solving approach rather than leaving a dispute 
to judicial mechanisms in which the parties lose control over the procedures and the 
outcomes.13 It would be desirable for the parties to cooperate on the basis of voluntary 
compliance with their international environmental obligations for the improvement of 
environmental quality or the preservation of natural resources. Mediation, conciliation 
and inquiry may be promoted by international organisations that are relevant to the 
protection of the environment. The atmosphere of the process is non-adversarial and 
the disputants have a chance to discuss the potential solutions with a view to come to 
a mutual agreement aided by a third party. As was mentioned in chapter 4, UNEP can 
provide such mediation services as it is equipped with expertise in the environmental 
field. Pechota is of the opinion that ‘active involvement by an international body in a 
dispute tends to promote long-term goals and to foster settlement with a view to the 
future rather than to the present.’14 It is worthwhile to consider inviting UNEP to act 
as mediator to resolve a dispute with a view to enhancing future cooperation and to 
                                                
11 Richard B. Bilder, ‘An Overview of International Dispute Settlement’ (1986-1987) 3 Emory JInt'l 
DispRes 1, 14. 
12 Magdy Abdel Moneim  Hefny, ‘International Water Issues and Conflict Resolution: Some 
Reflections’ (1995) 7 RADIC 360, 367. 
13 Judge Al-Khasawneh is of the opinion in the context of water disputes that ‘imposition of a solution 
by a judicial or arbitral body may be short term, as it often departs from the result intended by the 
parties…’, see Awn S. Al-Khasawneh, ‘Do Judicial Decisions Settle Water-Related Disputes?’ in 
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Christina Leb and Mara Tignino (eds), International Law and 
Freshwater: The Multiple Challenges (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 359. 
14 Vratislav  Pechota, Complementary Structures of Third-Party Settlement of International Disputes 
(UNITAR 1971) 43. 
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seek for consensus building in managing disputes. In those cases where parties could 
not reach mutual agreement to cooperate, bringing a dispute to the international courts 
should be a last resort.  
2.1.2 Setting Up a Régime or Standard for Environmental Protection 
It is possible that the desired outcome for the parties would be the establishment of a 
régime or standard for the protection of the environment. Litigating in international 
courts would not be the right choice, since they normally deal with breaches of 
international environmental obligations rather than creating an innovative system or 
producing constructive proposals for the parties. Ad hoc arbitration, mediation and 
conciliation are the mechanisms that can perform these duties, since their tasks are 
determined by the disputants. For arbitration, the parties may agree that the arbitrators 
shall determine a régime for regulating the future operation of certain activities with a 
view to protecting the environment. For instance, in the Bering Sea Fur-Seals 
Arbitration, the parties asked the arbitrators to determine the necessary regulations for 
the proper protection and preservation of the fur seal.15 To respond as the parties 
requested, the Tribunal, in its Award, set out a standard for preserving the fur seals, 
such as catch limits and types of equipment for fur seal hunting. In the Trail Smelter 
Arbitration, Canada and the US requested the Tribunal to answer the question  ‘what 
measures or régime, if any, should be adopted or maintained by the Trail Smelter’.16 
Generally, the awards of an arbitral tribunal are binding so that the parties must 
implement any regime that is established. The Tribunal in the Trail Smelter 
Arbitration imposed a permanent régime, explained in very great detail, with a view 
to controlling the maximum emissions of sulphur dioxide that could be released from 
the stacks. These are examples which show that arbitration, quite apart from the 
interpretation and application of international law to a case, can play a constructive 
role in setting up a regime or standards. It has also an advantage in those cases where 
science and technology come into play, since arbitrators may not necessarily be 
lawyers. In addition, the parties could agree to appoint relevant experts to help the 
arbitrators in setting up a regime or standard which needs to be scientifically 
established.  
                                                
15 Art. VII of the 1892 Treaty between the United States of America and Great Britain, Bering Sea Fur 
Seals Arbitration, 801.  
16 Trail Smelter Arbitration, 1908. 
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 If parties would like to develop a régime or standard through non-judicial 
mechanisms in which they can have, unlike arbitration, a high degree of participation 
in the process of establishing the régime that they want, then the mediators or 
conciliators could help the parties to achieve their desired outcome by proposing 
recommendations. The process used to achieve the desired outcome may not be 
straightforward, like the rendering of arbitral awards, so that the arbitrators need to 
use diplomatic techniques in an attempt to find a mutually agreeable solution. There is 
a well-known example where the World Bank assisted India and Pakistan in reaching 
mutual agreement, culminating in the conclusion of the Indus Waters Treaty, which 
can be considered as being the outcome of the process of dispute settlement. The 
settlement of the Indus waters dispute took 8 years from the time that the World Bank 
began to mediate the dispute. Throughout these 8 years, a series of dialogues took 
place. There were the Bank’s proposals, as well as the parties’ own proposals and 
plans that had been negotiated and discussed. The mediation in this case was a 
continuous process in which the ultimate outcome was produced in the form of a 
treaty as a result of negotiations between all the parties, as well as the mediator, rather 
than being produced in the form of a judgment made by judges. Such a long process 
could happen if the dispute in question is complex, either because of the crux of the 
matter or because of the relationships between the disputants. Therefore, disputing 
parties need to consider whether an environmental dispute needs to be resolved 
promptly or whether they could endure environmental harm while coming to a 
settlement.   
2.1.3 Raising Awareness of International Environmental Problems 
This desired outcome is really exceptional, since a government may not sue other 
States in contentious proceedings with a view to raising awareness of international 
environmental problems.17 Usually, States sue other States for the sake of their own 
national interests or national security. Most, if not all, of the environmental cases, 
such as the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros or Pulp Mills cases, are obvious examples of 
where environmental problems are raised purely for the sake of their own self-
interest. Thus, raising awareness of environmental problems through judicial means 
                                                
17 Some writer proposed that advisory proceedings might well be used to achieve this objective see 
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Advisory Opinion and the Furtherance of the Common Interest of 
Humankind’ in Cesare Romano, Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Ruth MacKenzie (eds), 
International Organizations and International Dispute Settlement: Trends and Prospects 
(Transnational Publishers 2002).  
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runs counter to the normal practice of States when they decide to litigate in 
international courts.  
 However, it is not impossible, if States so desire, to pursue this objective in the 
international courts, such as in the ICJ, if they are given jurisdiction to hear a case. As 
is shown in the Whaling case, Australia was not ostensibly injured by the JARPAR II 
whaling programme but it still decided to bring the case to the ICJ. One may argue 
that the reason why Australia brought this dispute before the ICJ was the commitment 
that the Rudd Labour government had made before the general election to put an end 
to this programme in the Southern Ocean.18 Thus, the primary motive was, arguably, a 
matter of internal political affairs rather than any intention to raise awareness among 
the international community. Even though Australia may have brought the case to the 
ICJ without any intention to raise awareness,19 its impact as a by-product of the 
dispute settlement cannot be underestimated. Due to the fact that judicial proceedings 
are conducted in public, unlike mediation or conciliation, the issues can get media 
attention, thus paving the way to reaching the forefront of the international 
community’s attention, in addition to achieving the objective of resolving the dispute 
so as to create legal order of international society.20  
 Moreover, judicial decisions are authoritative interpretations of a treaty and 
they could have an influence on state conduct despite the fact that the judgment is 
binding only upon the parties to a case, since ‘the reasoning leading to the dispositive 
and the dicta add to the body of international precedent’.21 Litigating environmental 
cases with regard to common resources or common concerns of mankind in the ICJ, 
whatever the result of a case may be, could carry some implications for various 
stakeholders other than the parties to the case, although such stakeholders are not 
                                                
18 Tim Stephens, ‘International Environmental Disputes: To Sue or Not to Sue? ’ in Natalie Klein (ed), 
Litigating International Law Disputes: Weighing the Options (CUP 2014) 287. See also Philip  Doring, 
‘Whaling Plan Was to Divert Public’ The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, 5 January 2011). 
19 In the oral proceedings, Henry Burmester, an Australian Government Solicitor, said that ‘Australia is 
seeking to uphold its collective interest, an interest it shares with all other parties’ CR 2013/18, para. 
19. Geddis and Ridings consider that ‘there was strong political support for the cause in dispute and 
active public interest in the outcome’ in New Zealand’s intervention see Elana Geddis and Penelope 
Ridings, ‘Whaling in the Antarctic: Some Reflections by Counsel’ (2013) 11 New Zealand Ybk Intl L 
143, 143. 
20 Ian Brownlie, ‘Why Do States Take Disputes to the International Court?’ in Nisuke  Ando and others 
(eds), Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda vol 2 (Kluwer Law International 2002) 831; Francisco 
Orrego Vicuña, ‘A New System of International Dispute Settlement for the Twenty-First Century’ in 
Calixto A. Armas  Barea and others (eds), Liber Amicorum "In Memoriam" of Judge José Mariá Ruda 
(Kluwer Law International 2000) 239-240. 
21 Cesare Romano, ‘Litigating International Law Disputes: Where to?’ in Natalie Klein (ed), Litigating 
International Law Disputes: Weighing the Options (CUP 2014) 470. 
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allowed to participate in the proceedings since they are constrained by the ICJ’s 
procedure in a contentious case.22  For the Whaling case, the stakeholders involved in 
whaling, such as the whaling industry, anti-whaling NGOs, the IWC etc., might 
change their policies with regard to the conservation of whales as a result of the ICJ’s 
judgment. Shirley Scott is of the opinion that the initiation of proceedings by 
Australia in the Whaling case can be understood as ‘something of a stooge for the 
anti-whaling movement, because the case could have been anticipated to achieve 
publicity for the issue, no matter what the legal outcome’.23 
2.2 Time 
Time is a crucial factor which States need to take into account when choosing their 
dispute settlement mechanism. Some environmental disputes need to be settled as 
early as possible because of the irreversibility of the ecological harm being caused. In 
addition, some environmental disputes, for instance a dispute over the utilisation of 
international rivers, if prolonged, might affect the economic development of the 
disputing parties. If States are in a great hurry to settle their dispute, non-judicial 
means, such as mediation or conciliation, might be a good option because they are 
generally quicker than judicial means. It should be noted, however, that mediation or 
conciliation might take a long or a short time. Given the fact that mediators or 
conciliators may come up with several proposals until they prove acceptable to all 
parties, this may prolong the process of dispute settlement, as in the Indus Water case, 
which took around 8 years and in which the mediators did not get the spontaneous 
acceptance of the parties. Whether it requires a long or short timeframe, it depends on 
the preparedness of the parties to make concessions and to accept recommendations 
proposed by a third party with a view to reaching a common solution.  
 If States seek for a rapid decision from a judicial mechanism, arbitration is the 
better option, since it is faster than the international courts. With ad hoc arbitration, 
the parties can specify the times, in the compromis, when arbitral awards should be 
delivered. While disputants will engage in lengthy legal battles in the ICJ that may, 
due to its large caseloads, take four or more years, except the parties seek provisional 
                                                
22 Andrew Strauss, ‘Climate Change Litigation: Opening the Door to the International Court of Justice’ 
in William C.G. Burns and Hari M.  Osofsky (eds), Adjudicating Climate Change: State, National, and 
International Approaches (CUP 2009) 337-338. 
23 Shirley V. Scott, ‘Australia's Decision to Initiate Whaling in the Antarctic: Winning the Case Versus 
Resolving the Dispute’ (2014) 68 Australian JInt'l Aff 1, 13. 
 248 
measures (around one month in deciding the request) in order to prevent irreversible 
ecological harm from continuing during the proceedings, arbitration takes on average 
around two years to finish the task. NCPs probably take a much shorter period of time 
to consider a dispute than the aforesaid mechanisms. The quickest procedures can be 
seen from RFMO panels but the caveat must be made that speedy procedures would 
not guarantee the quality of decisions. 
2.3 Cost  
If the parties are concerned about the costs of dispute resolution, non-judicial means 
are the best option, since they are less costly than judicial means. Bringing a case to 
international courts and arbitration differs in terms of the amount of money the parties 
have to pay. Arbitration will tend to be more expensive because the parties have to 
pay for the arbitrators. Also, they have to hire premises for arbitrating which may lead 
to a victory gained at too great a cost. However, there is a Financial Assistance Fund 
(FAF) that was established in 1994 that provides financial assistance for a State that is 
a party to the Conventions of 1899 or 1907 for settlement under the auspices of the 
PCA, and where the State, at the time of requesting assistance, is listed on the DAC 
List of Aid Recipients.24  It should be noted that arbitration would cost a lot of money 
and it is still unclear how large are the grants which will be provided. The Fund might 
not significantly remove the cost of arbitration. This is because not many States have 
contributed to this fund.25 The cost of litigation in international courts is different 
from that of arbitration. With the former, parties do not have to pay for international 
judges or the hire of premises. For the ICJ and ITLOS, ICJ judges are paid for out of 
the UN budget and ITLOS by the States parties to UNCLOS collectively. The 
necessary expenses that are involved are the fees of international lawyers of repute to 
present a party’s case who are highly paid. Parties might need to pay for 
environmental studies carried out by experts, such as geomorphologists, fresh water 
and marine ecologists and biologists etc., in order to substantiate their claims or to 
settle international environmental disputes. As well as the FAF, a similar fund is also 
                                                
24 Two Asian States, a Central American State, a South American State, and three African States have 
received grants from the FAF. See PCA, Annual Report 2014 (PCA 2014) 37. 
25 Since 1994, Cyprus, Costa Rica, France, Lebanon, the Netherlands, Norway, Saudi Arabia,  
South Africa, Switzerland and the United Kingdom have contributed to the Fund. Ibid, 37. 
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available for poorer States to litigate in the ICJ and ITLOS but it is impossible for it to 
cover the full costs.26  
3. EPILOGUE  
All of the dispute settlement mechanisms can be used in a collaborative manner. The 
fact that the parties decide to litigate in international courts does not mean that the 
other mechanisms would be excluded. Before or during the course of the judicial 
proceedings, diplomatic means can always be resorted to. As it was put in the premise 
in this thesis, international courts have some drawbacks which are that they are 
limited in their capacity to resolve environmental problems. Non-adjudicative means 
could be used to supplement adjudicative dispute settlement mechanisms. For 
example, inquiry may be resorted to, as a prelude to judicial mechanisms, for the 
examining of environmental damages or risks of transboundary harm. Judges may 
take the findings of an inquiry commission into account when weighing legal claims 
in order to adjudge the legality or illegality of certain actions carried out by the 
defendants. Higgins notes that ‘fact-finding commissions are likely to be more 
effective than a judicial body.’27 Also, a NCP’s findings may be used by judicial 
bodies as a source of reliable factual evidence. Thus, model provisions that could be 
included in international agreements relating to non-judicial and judicial mechanisms, 
such as the work related to biodiversity beyond national jurisdictions, may be as 
follows:  
Article…  
Dispute Settlement 
 1. In the event of a dispute between States Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention, the parties concerned shall seek 
solution by negotiation with good faith. 
 2. If the parties concerned cannot reach agreement by negotiation, they may 
jointly request mediation or inquiry, by a third party. 
                                                
26 See Revised Terms of Reference in UNGA ‘Secretary-General’s Trust Fund to Assist States in the 
Settlement of Disputes through the ICJ: Report of the Secretary-General’ (21 September 2004) UN 
Doc A/59/372. See the Fund for the ITLOS in UNGA Res 55/7 ‘Ocean and the Law of the Sea’ (27 
February 2001) UN Doc A/RES/55/7. 
27 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The Desirability of Third-Party Adjudication: Conventional Wisdom or 
Continuing Truth?’ in J.E.S. Fawcett and Rosalyn  Higgins (eds), International Organization: Law in 
Movement: Essays in Honour of John McMahon (OUP 1974) 45. 
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 3. When ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention, or at 
any time thereafter, a State may declare in writing that for a dispute not resolved in 
accordance with paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 above, it accepts one or more of the 
following means of dispute settlement: 
 (a) Conciliation in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Optional 
Rules for Conciliation of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or the 
Environment; 
 (b) Submission of the dispute to Non-Compliance Procedure established under 
this Convention. 
 4. If the parties to the dispute have not, in accordance with paragraph 3 
above, accepted the same or any procedure, the dispute shall be submitted only to 
Non-Compliance Procedure established under this Convention, unless the parties to 
the dispute agree otherwise 
 5. If the parties concerned cannot settle their dispute by the means mentioned 
in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4, the dispute shall be submitted to arbitration in 
accordance with the Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitration of 
Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or the Environment. Such arbitral 
tribunal may take into account the findings of conciliation or Non-Compliance 
Procedures when it has to decide the dispute. 
 This thesis has demonstrated that there is a limited usefulness of having resort 
to the ICJ with regard to its jurisdiction to decide environmental disputes. Even when 
States accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 36 (2) of the 
Statute of the ICJ, they sometimes exclude certain types of disputes from the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ, by way of reservation. The aftermath of the Whaling case is 
the obvious example, where Japan made a reservation to exclude the jurisdiction of 
the ICJ in future cases involving research on, or conservation, management or 
exploitation of, living resources of the sea. Although there is an increased effort to 
resolve environmental disputes before the ICJ, one has to urge caution against 
exaggerating the ICJ’s role in settling disputes, especially with regard to the 
environmental protection and sustainable utilisation of natural resources. 28  The 
withdrawal of the Aerial Spraying case reflects the fact that the final decision of the 
ICJ would not be the preferred choice of the parties. They may not resort to 
                                                
28 Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (CUP 1982) 
4. 
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international courts if they are not satisfied that clarification of legal issues will help 
the settlement of the dispute.29 As Rosenne writes: ‘the cases withdrawn by the parties 
before decision partly reflect this feature, to be added to the credit side of the Court’s 
ledger’.30 Successful environmental dispute resolution depends partly on the readiness 
of the parties to end a dispute and partly on the structure of the dispute settlement 
mechanism. Among the whole gamut of dispute settlement mechanisms, international 
courts may not always provide an appropriate forum to settle an environmental 
dispute. Judge Schwebel noted that ‘The Court (the ICJ) is no longer seen solely as 
“the last resort” in the resolution of disputes. States rather may have recourse to the 
Court in parallel with other methods of dispute resolution’.31 Ultimately, governments 
would have to decide what mechanisms could accommodate the unique 
characteristics of international environmental disputes that are at issue, taking into 
account all of the considerations discussed in this thesis.
                                                
29 Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920-2005: Volume I The Court 
and the United Nations (4 edn, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006) 167. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, ‘Speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations’ (27 October 
1998) 2, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/7/3007.pdf> accessed 14 June 2016. 
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